
The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy: Grammar, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā



PETER M. SCHARF

Transactions of the American Philosophical Society
Held at Philadelphia
For Promoting Useful Knowledge
Vol. 86, Pt. 3

The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy: Grammar, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā

PETER M. SCHARF
Brown University

American Philosophical Society
Independence Square • Philadelphia
1996

ISBN:0-87169-863-3 LC: 94-78520
US ISSN: 0065-9746

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Preface

This work deals with a topic to which philosophy, most notably analytic philosophy, has given considerable attention. Indian thinkers discuss the denotation of generic terms in a very sophisticated manner at a very early time. The present book seeks to make these discussions available to philosophers today.

As a philosophy major in college, I once asked my advisor about Indian philosophy. "You mean Indian religion," he replied. Most European and American philosophers, especially analytic philosophers, are under the impression that there is no philosophy in the history of Indian thought. Nor can one expect a disciplined thinker to form any other opinion if he judges from a vague idea of the Orient, the popular interest in India, and the general publications which respond to them. Moreover, the barriers of time, distance, and language, which prevent Indian philosophy from being known in the west, hinder the formation of any other impression. I hope the present work will come into the hands of philosophers and contribute to a better understanding of ancient Indian thought.

I would especially like to give acknowledgment and thanks to Dr. George Cardona for being so conscientious and thorough a teacher and advisor, and for conveying his love of knowledge along with clear and precise understanding. In my three years of studying Pāṇinian grammar at the University of Pennsylvania, and in the last year writing my dissertation of which this book is a revision, he has always inspired the highest standards of knowledge and expression.

I also owe especially deep gratitude to Dr. Śrīnārāyaṇa Miśra for generously availing me of his unusual combination of profound traditional learning, analytic ability, and skill as a teacher. During the year and two months in which I studied a few hours a day, six days a week with him in Varanasi, I made incomparable strides in facility with Sanskrit, knowledge of Indian semantics, and comprehension of the Mahābhāṣya and Nyāya texts.

I have benefited much from Dr. Ludo Rocher's excellence, generosity, and warmth as a teacher, and from Dr. Wilhelm Halbfass's insights and comprehensive knowledge of Indian philosophy. I would like to thank them both for their comments and suggestions in the preparation of this manuscript. I am also indebted to Dr. Narendranātha Pāṇḍeya with whom I studied the first three *āhnikas* of the Mahābhāṣya in Varanasi.

Finally, I am grateful to the American Institute of Indian studies for giving me a Junior Research Fellowship which enabled me to carry out dissertation research, and to the Mellon

Foundation which gave me the opportunity for a second research trip to India and the freedom to write the original dissertation uninterrupted.

Introduction

By the late fifth century B.C.E. Pāṇini had composed the Aṣṭādhyāyī, consisting of nearly 4,000 rules giving a precise and fairly complete description of late Vedic Sanskrit.[1] In the fourth or third century, Kātyāyana appended approximately 4,300 brief statements (*vārttikas*) to 1,245 of Pāṇini's rules. Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* examine the formulations of Pāṇini's rules, their relation to other rules, suggest modifications, and also address the fundamental principles presupposed. In the middle of the second century B.C.E., Patañjali composed his monumental commentary, the Mahābhāṣya, on Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* and independently on 468 *sūtras* of the Aṣṭādhyāyī.[2] In the course of this monumental commentary, nestled in the midst of detailed grammatical argumentation, Patañjali examines various philosophical presuppositions of the grammar and of ordinary language.

Pāṇini formulates many rules and uses certain procedures which make sense only if certain philosophical positions are accepted. The ultimate criterion for the correctness of the language description are the facts of ordinary usage. As is true in any science, given the same accuracy in accounting for the facts, the simpler the description of them, the better. The facts of language usage are most simply explained by accepting certain philosophical positions. At numerous points in the midst of a technical grammatical discussion, the Mahābhāṣya turns to consider certain philosophical presuppositions involved, and the implications of adopting one or other of them for the grammar and for other philosophical views. One such philosophical discussion concerns what the object denoted by a word is.

A word has the capacity to generate knowledge of its object for any competent speaker of the language to which the word belongs. By virtue of this capacity the word is said to denote the object, and the object is said to be the meaning of the word.[3] In everyday activity, a person recognizes individual

---

[1]See Cardona (1976: 238).

[2]Kielhorn 1886: 203. Cardona (1976: 260-68) summarizes the evidence for dating Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali. The date of Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya is reasonably accurate; those of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana are determined relative to Patañjali. One should note that the evidence to establish the chronology of ancient Indian authors is exceedingly scarce in comparison with what is available for authors in other parts of the world. Hence most of the dates mentioned are approximate and tentative.

[3]No distinction between denotation and connotation is made in this work. The verb 'to denote' is used here in precisely the sense mentioned, namely, to directly cause cognition of an object. Siderits (1991: 65-110) discusses the sense-reference distinction in Prabhākara and in Buddhist philosophy of

objects to be of the same kind. For example, one recognizes the object with roots, a trunk, branches, and leaves in one's own yard to be of the same kind as the object with roots, a trunk, branches, and leaves in the neighbor's yard. The recognition that they are the same is a certain knowledge or cognition which has, or for which one may posit, an object. The object, real or posited, of the cognition of individual objects as being of the same kind is called a generic property.

In the ordinary use of language, one uses the same words on different occasions to refer to different individual objects of the same kind. One also uses plural forms to refer to many individual objects of the same kind. For example, one uses the word 'tree' for the object with roots, a trunk, branches, and leaves in one's own yard, and one uses the word 'tree' for the object with roots, a trunk, branches, and leaves in the neighbor's yard. One also uses the word 'trees' for many such objects. This fact of speech usage presents a question fundamental to the nature of language and to the nature of human understanding: Does a word denote an individual object or a generic property?

The oldest extant systematic consideration of the question whether a word denotes an individual object or a generic property in India is in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini 1.2.64, *Sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*. The Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.58, *Jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām*, selections from the Paspaśāhnika and elsewhere supplement this discussion. Patañjali is not, however, the first to address the topic. He himself discusses the question commenting on Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* on the two *sūtras* mentioned. Kātyāyana in turn records the views of Vājapyāyana (1.2.64, *vārttika* 35) and Vyāḍi (1.2.64, *vārttika* 45) and their reasons for them. However, their work has not survived.[4] Both Pāṇini's *sūtras* and Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* are exceedingly brief and can hardly be understood independent of Patañjali's explanations. Hence the Mahābhāṣya stands as the most ancient source for the discussion concerning whether a word denotes an individual or a generic property.[5]

---

language.

[4]Patañjali mentions the Saṃgraha in the Paspaśāhnika. Kaiyaṭa says this is the name of a specific work. Nāgeśa attributes it to Vyāḍi and describes it as being the length of 100,000 *ślokas* (*anuṣṭubh* verses). MB, vol. 1, pp. 54b-55a. Vyāḍi, called *dākṣāyaṇa*, seems to have been a relative of Pāṇini, who is called *dākṣīputra*. See Goldstücker (1860: 86-90, 228-32). Nothing more is known of Vājapyāyana.

[5]Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* are known only as incorporated in the text of the Mahābhāṣya. It is not always clear whether a statement belongs to Kātyāyana or is Patañjali's own. Concerning criteria for distinguishing the *vārttikas* from their commentary, see Cardona (1976: 247). Yāska mentions the classification of words into nominals (including both nouns and adjectives), verbs, preverbs and particles, and briefly discusses the semantic distinction between nominals

Pāṇinians throughout history base their philosophical works on Patañjali. The philosophy of Bhartṛhari (5th c. C.E.), whose Vākyapadīya exerted a wide and lasting influence, derives its substance from the semantic discussions in the Mahābhāṣya. Unfortunately Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyadīpikā commentary on the Mahābhāṣya exists only in a single fragmentary and corrupt manuscript (*āhnikas* 1-7 with lacunae).[6] However, Kaiyaṭa wrote the commentary Pradīpa on the whole of the Mahābhāṣya in the eleventh century C.E. incorporating much of Bhartṛhari's work. The more recent works on semantics of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa are heavily indebted to Patañjali. In the eighteenth century Nāgeśa wrote the most comprehensive commentary on the Pradīpa. Numerous other commentaries have been written on the Pradīpa, and on the Mahābhāṣya. Commentaries directly on the Aṣṭādhyāyī, such as Bhaṭṭojīdīkṣita's Śabdakaustubha and the Kāśikā of Vāmana and Jayāditya, are heavily indebted to the Mahābhāṣya.[7]

Patañjali's arguments and conclusions in the area of semantics in general, and concerning whether a word denotes an individual object or a generic property in particular, are not only of central importance to the grammatical tradition. At least two other major systems of philosophy recognize and react to them: Nyāya and Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

Gautama's Nyāyasūtras, codified perhaps in the second century C.E., and Vātsyāyana's commentary on them, written in the early fifth century C.E., are the foundation of the Nyāya system. The most important ancient commentary to follow is Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika written at the end of the sixth or beginning of the seventh century C.E. Vācaspatimiśra wrote his Tātparyaṭīkā commentary on the Nyāyavārttika early in the eighth century.[8]

---

and verbs. Nirukta 1.1 - 1.2. Nir., part 2, pp. 5-6, part 3, pp.27-29. He also presents two views concerning the related question of the derivation of nominal forms. Nirukta 1.12 - 1.14. Nir., part 2, pp. 13-15, part 3, pp. 36-37. Sarup summarizes the two views in his introduction. Nir., part 1, pp. 68-70.

[6]Abhyankar and Limaye (1963-69) produced a provisional edition. Palsule (1985, 1988), Limaye, Palsule and Bhagavat (1985), Bhagavat and Bhate (1986, 1990), Bronkhorst (1987), Devasthali and Palsule (1989), and Palsule and Bhagavat (1991) have reedited and translated it. Bergdahl (1987) translated part of the Sādhanasamuddeśa of the Vākyapadīya, Houben (1992b) studied the Sambandhasamuddeśa giving a translation of Helārāja's commentary on it, and Herzberger (1986) studied Bhartṛhari in relation to the Buddhist philosophers.

[7]Filliozat (1973) gives a survey of the commentaries on the Mahābhāṣya and on the Pradīpa with the known facts concerning their authors and dates. Filliozat (1993) shows well the relation of the views of the commentators. Regarding other commentaries on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī see Cardona (1976: 278-86).

[8]Concerning the dates of early Nyāya see Jacobi (1911: 29), and for later dates refer to Potter's (1970-) introduction to volume 2 on Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika.

Initially concerned for the most part with means of correct knowledge and proof, Nyāya grows into a complete system of philosophy. But right from the beginning, it is concerned with questions of language and meaning. Gautama treats the subject of what a word denotes in Nyāyasūtra 2.2.58-69. At the start of the section, Gautama 2.2.58, *Te vibhaktyantāḥ padam*, makes implicit reference to Pāṇini 1.4.14, *Suptiṅantaṃ padam*, and Gautama's conclusion in 2.2.66, *Vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ*, as explained by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, bears some important similarities to the view Patañjali expresses under 1.2.64 *vārttika* 53 and 1.2.58 *vārttika* 7. Both solutions to the question of what a word denotes include all the entities considered in the denoted meaning, and both involve the element of a speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*).

Growing out of a long tradition of Vedic exegesis and performance, the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras were codified in about the second century B.C.E., although they may have reached their final form somewhat later. They are attributed to Jaimini but the names of both him and Bādarāyaṇa, to whom the Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtras are attributed, are mentioned in particular sūtras.[9] In the fourth or fifth century C.E. Śabara composed his Bhāṣya commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras. This is the most ancient commentary extant on them but Śabara mentions predecessors and cites a long passage from one Vṛttikāra in his commentary on 1.1.5. As would be expected for those concerned with the analysis and interpretation of statements and injunctions, the question of what a word denotes is a major concern, and the ancient literature on the subject in Mīmāṃsā is extensive. Śabara is followed by Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Prabhākara, and Maṇḍanamiśra in the seventh century. Kumārila has been the most influential of the three but each of them had his distinct ideas and gave rise to long and active independent traditions.

Jaimini and Śabara themselves deal most explicitly with the question of what a word denotes in *sūtras* 1.3.30-35 and the Bhāṣya on them. They take a view corresponding to the view which Kātyāyana attributes to Vājapyāyana in Pāṇini 1.2.64 *vārttika* 35 and argues for in *vārttikas* 35-44 and 53-59. Śabara closely paraphrases passages from the Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.64 and argues against the conclusion Patañjali states under *vārttika* 53.

It is impossible to examine all of the ancient Indian literature on the question of the denotation of a word, even in the three fields of grammar, Nyāya, and Pūrvamīmāṃsā. However, considering the close affinity of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara's explanations of Gautama 2.2.66 with Patañjali's statement on 1.2.64 *vārttika* 53, considering the correspondence between

---

[9]See Nilakantha Sastri (1921).

Jaimini's conclusion as explained by Śabara with Kātyāyana's presentation of Vājapyāyana's view, considering the likelihood that Śabara cites a passage in the Mahābhāṣya and directly responds to it, and finally, considering the possibility of other direct influence and exchange among these authors, it is judicious to examine Gautama 2.2.58-69 with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya and Jaimini 1.3.30-35 with Śabara's Bhāṣya together with the passages concerning the denotation of a word in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya.

Research Review

A considerable amount of scholarship has been done on Indian semantics. Brough (1951, 1953), Ruegg (1959), Gaurinath Sastri (1959), Kunjunni Raja (1963), Subha Rao (1969), and Staal (1976) give general overviews of the Indian philosophy of language. Ruegg (pp. 121-25), Kunjunni Raja (pp. 321-54), and Staal (pp. 132-36) include extensive bibliographies of the research in this area. Bhattacharya (1962) contains some valuable insights on the relationship of grammatical views with those in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā.

More recently, books by Matilal (1990) and Siderits (1991), and a number of essays in the volume edited by Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994), introduce Indian philosophy of language to scholars of analytic philosophy. Although some of his general remarks characterizing Pāṇinian grammar are misleading, for instance his (pp. 8-9) reference to *kṛt* affixes as inflections, his speculative etymology of the term *pratyaya* 'affixes' as from a meaning "condition", and (p. 11) his unfounded assertion that Patañjali gave no cogent reason for the study of the grammar of one's first language, Matilal (1990) furnishes an engaging exposition and critical analysis of classical Indian contributions to the philosophy of language.

Siderits (1991) thoroughly examines two issues in Indian semantics comparing them to, and framing them within, questions current in contemporary philosophy of language. Considering the problem of sentential unity, he (pp. 32-50) presents the "related designation theory" (*anvitābhidhāna*) of Prabhākara and (pp. 51-64) compares it favorably with Frege's asymmetry thesis. Then, taking up the problem of the sense-reference distinction in Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist philosophy of language, he (p. 76) rightly recognizes that Indian philosophers of language distinguish between type of entity denoted rather than between mode of denotation, and keenly observes that "nominalist scruples about allowing properties into one's ontology" motivated the distinction between denotation and connotation. He (pp. 65-86) argues that the Prābhākaras and (pp. 87-102) the Buddhist

logicians approach making the sense-reference distinction. Although his discussion is clear and engaging, he compromises precise, detailed description of the objects words denote and how they are related for the sake of his intended philosophical audience. As a result, he provides only vague description of the exact concepts of semantic condition (*svārtha, pravṛttinimitta*) and *kāraka* relations, and avoids discussing the denotation of nominal terminations so essential for arriving at sentential meaning.

A number of articles in the volume of essays edited by Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994) deal with speech as a means of knowledge. Mohanty (pp. 29-49) raises doubts about the status of speech as a means of knowledge. He examines the arguments of the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists that it is reducible to inference and of the Buddhists that it does not generate true cognition. Sibajiban Bhattāchāryya (pp. 69-97) surveys a number of topics in Nyāya concerning speech as a means of knowledge from the point of view of current discussions in contemporary philosophy of language. Chakrabarti (pp. 99-124), in an excellent introduction to the issue, defends the independence of speech as a means of knowledge by expressing his insights emerging from primarily Navyanyāya texts. Fricker (pp. 125-61) contributes to the view that knowledge from speech is inferential knowledge by arguing against the thesis posited in Nyāya that a speaker may be assumed to be trustworthy unless special circumstances defeat this assumption. She argues against the premise of this thesis, that it is impossible for a hearer to obtain independent confirmation of a speaker's trustworthiness, by showing how empirical confirmation of the trustworthiness of a particular speaker is possible. Matilal (pp. 347-66), on the contrary, defends the Naiyāyikas view that understanding does not constitute an intermediate stage to knowledge of an utterance. He affirms the view that speech, as a reliable independent means of knowledge, generates knowledge immediately unless blocked by contrary evidence over the view that the content of a proposition, understood by speech, must be separately justified in order to qualify as knowledge.

The volume includes two articles translated from Sanskrit. Shukla (pp. 315-24) presents an argument based on Nyāya against Russell's view that propositions are intentional entities. Viśvabandhu Bhaṭṭācārya (pp. 325-46) discusses various views concerning whether and how an individual is qualified in the cognition generated by a proper name. Sukharanjan Saha (pp. 367-84) discusses Gaṅgeśa's views concerning the denotation of cited speech forms.

Rocher (1975), Cardona (1976), and Scharfe (1977) survey the research done on Sanskrit grammar. More recently, Coward and Raja (1990), in the fifth volume of Potter's (1970-) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, summarize major works of

Indian grammatical philosophy and (pp. 433-548) provide an extensive bibliography.

In Volume 2 of this encyclopedia (1977), Potter introduces the philosophy of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, giving summaries of numerous works. Bibliography can be found in volume 1. Matilal (1977) and Verpoorten (1987) give historical surveys of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā literature respectively with extensive bibliographies. Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1942) and Pashupatinath Sastri (1923) give general introductions to the Mīmāṃsā and its philosophy. For background on generic properties in Indian philosophy consult Dravid (1972).

Translations

Danielsson (1883), Trapp (1933), Chatterji (1957), Charudeva Shastri (1968), and Abhyankar and Śukla (1975) translate initial portions of the Mahābhāṣya. Danielsson (1883) translated the Paspaśāhnika into German. Trapp (1933) produced a poorly received German translation of the first five *āhnikas* of the Mahābhāṣya. Chatterji (1957) translated the Paspaśāhnika with extensive notes. Charudeva Shastri (1968) translated the first nine *āhnikas* into Hindi. Finally, Abhyankar and Śukla (1975) produced a good translation of the first 3 *āhnikas*.

Paranjpe (1922) translated 273 of Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* into French. His translation and discussion of 1.2.58, *vārttikas* 1-7, and 1.2.64, *vārttikas* 1-59 serve as a good introduction to Patañjali's commentary on them. S. D. Joshi (1968) and Joshi and Roodbergen (1969-81) translate sections concerned with *kārakas* (1.4.23-55), most of the second *adhyāya* (*pādas* 1-3), and (1986) the Paspaśāhnika. The last contains sections directly concerned with topics of this book (pp. iv [§2.1.3], viii-xii [§2.4-2.6], 12-25 [§4-15], 78-126 [§56-86]), while the others contain some related philosophical material. Joshi and Roodbergen reformat Kielhorn's edition of the text to facilitate comprehension of the arguments, and supply extensive explanatory notes to accompany their precise and finished translation.

Strauss (1927a), Subrahmanya Sastri (1944-57), Biardeau (1964), and Filliozat (1975-86) translate sections of the Mahābhāṣya centrally concerned with the question of what a word denotes. Strauss translated the Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.64, *vārttikas* 35-59 into German (1927a: 256-71). He also translated the portion of the Mahābhāṣya on 4.1.3 preceding the discussion of the grammarians conception of gender and discusses epistemological questions in comparison with Carakasaṃhitā, Sāṅkhyakārikā, and Śābarabhāṣya on Jaimini 1.1.5 (1927b). Subrahmanya Sastri (1944-57) translated the Mahābhāṣya up to

Pāṇini 2.4.85. However, many terms are left untranslated. He supplies extensive commentary in the Paspaśāhnika but this tapers off quickly and one is left with just a rough translation by the second *pāda*. Biardeau (1964) includes translation (French) of selections from the Paspaśāhnika and passages from the Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini 1.2.58, 1.2.64, 4.1.63, and 5.1.119 (pp. 43-61). Filliozat (1975-86) translates the Mahābhāṣya with Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa and Nāgeśa's Uddyota on *adhyāya* 1, *pādas* 1-3 into French. His translations are clear and accurate, and the notes both supply useful details and explain the drift of the discussion. A satisfactory English translation of the Mahābhāṣya discussions concerning the denotation of a word does not exist.

The Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā sections concerning the denotation of a word have been translated. Spitzer (1927) studies Gautama 2.2.58-69 and includes translation (German) of Gautama's Nyāyasūtra and Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya. Ruben (1928) translated Gautama's Nyāyasūtra into German with brief explanatory notes. Biardeau (1964: 230-34) includes translation (French) of Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on Gautama 2.2.60-69. Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1912-19) translated Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya and Uddyotakara's Vārttika. This has recently been reprinted. But Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya's (1967-73) translation of the Sūtra and Bhāṣya is far superior. Tiwari (1994: 145-68) retranslates Gautama 2.2.58-69 with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya in his discussion of generic properties.

Yuddhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1977-86) translated Śabara's Bhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini into Hindi with thorough notes and an extensive introduction. Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1916) translated and explained the first three *adhyāyas* of Jaimini's Mīmāṃsāsūtras. He later (1933) translated the whole of Śabara's Bhāṣya. This is better than his translations of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika (1900-8) and Tantravārttika (1903-24). More recently, Biardeau (1964) includes a good French translation of relevant passages from Śabara's commentary on Jaimini 1.1.5 (pp. 162-63), Jaimini 1.1.19 (pp. 164-65) and the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa (pp. 169-73). Devasthali (1959: 27-36) practically paraphrases Śabara's Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa giving the corresponding text in notes.

Studies

Jacobi (1929), Hiriyanna (1938), Frauwallner (1960b), Narayana Murti (1971), and Matilal (1983) contribute to the study of the denotation of generic terms in the Mahābhāṣya. Jacobi (1929) includes a brief discussion of the Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.64 in comparison with Jaimini 1.3.30-35 (p. 149) and considers Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* 40, 48 and 56 (pp 150-51).

Hiriyanna considers the implications of Vyāḍi's and Vājapyāyana's views of what a word denotes for sentence meaning. Frauwallner (1960b) begins with a useful logical outline of arguments (pp. 93-94) and a summary of the Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.64, *vārttika* 53 (p. 95). It may also be mentioned here that Frauwallner (Nachgelassene Werke 3) summarizes the Nyāya view of the denotation of generic terms (p. 97) and then proceeds to discuss the Mīmāṃsā's theory of language and its background. Narayana Murti (1971) evaluates the grammatical status of Pāṇini 1.2.64-73. In concisely stating the various factors which impinge on the rule providing the remainder of one (*ekaśeṣa*), he brings attention to the related issues with which Kātyāyana's and Patañjali's discussion of the denotation of generic terms is connected. Matilal (1983) brings attention to the neglected discussion preceding *vārttika* 35 under 1.2.64. He translates the *bhāṣya* on *vārttikas* 28-29 and raises some probing questions. But after a digression into the theory of naming he can do little more, in this short article. Mukherji (1992) argues inadequately, without considering the Mahābhāṣya on the *sūtra*, that secondary reference (*lakṣaṇā*) motivated the formulation of 1.2.64. Deshpande (1972) studies Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa on the meaning of nominals. In addition to these studies, Van Nooten (1983) collects some scattered passages concerning a speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*), including the *bhāṣya* on 1.2.58 *vārttika* 7 and 1.2.64 *vārttika* 53, to which Scharf (1995) responds.

A few articles concerning semantics in Nyāya have appeared recently. Vattanky (1993) gives a technical exposition of the arguments of later Naiyāyikas concerning the denotation of generic terms in the *Muktāvalī*, *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī* commentaries on the *Kārikāvalī*. Tarkatīrtha (1992) provides a clear independent exposition of a number of concepts and examples found in Nyāya semantic discussions. Dash (1991) briefly peruses some Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika texts concerning the relation between a word and its meaning. The relation is one of convention (*samaya*, he translates 'agreement'). Houben (1992a) and Matilal (1990: 26-30) clearly distinguish this from the sense of *samaya* in Mīmāṃsā and grammar, namely, uncreated convention based on natural suitability.

Two major contributions to the study of Mīmāṃsā are the books by D'Sa and Clooney. D'Sa (1980: 83-97) properly assesses the aim of Śabara's views on the denotation of generic terms in his exposition of the assertion in Mīmāṃsā that the Veda serves as an independent means of knowledge. Clooney (1990: 77-79) touches on Mīmāṃsāsūtras 1.1.6-23 dealing with the eternal nature of speech in his important recent contribution to the study of Mīmāṃsā. While he (p. 78 n. 53) defers to D'Sa's more thorough treatment on this topic, yet he (p. 78 n. 54) plays down

both the claims of Mīmāṃsā regarding the nature of speech and their importance.

The most penetrating presentation of the content of arguments in the Mahābhāṣya concerning the denotation of a word given so far is by Gaurinath Sastri (1959: 143-56). However, he gives little historical or textual orientation to it. Spitzer (1927) has more thoroughly examined Vātsyāyana on the denotation of words. A full exposition of the arguments clarifying the logical presuppositions bound up with each view Patañjali discusses has not been done. A similar exposition of Śabara's Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa also remains a desideratum.

The most thorough study on the denotation of words in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (pp. 31-64), Śabara's Mīmāṃsābhāṣya and Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya (pp. 153-247) is by Biardeau (1964). She brings together an enormous amount of material and gives an engaging philosophical analysis of these ancient Indian theories of meaning as part of the background to her study of Bhartṛhari. In contrast to Gaurinath Sastri, she is more concerned in this study with the history of ideas than with the content of the arguments. Unfortunately, her concern with evaluating the ontological status of the entities discussed, the world-view of the authors, and the implications their conclusions have for their world-view and sociological circumstances, is sometimes at the expense of understanding, clarifying, and evaluating the arguments the authors make to establish their conclusions. It is not fruitful to superimpose on ancient authors an interpretation of the nature of entities, the evidence for which is altogether absent in their works, in order to summarize their conception of the world as the undeveloped beginnings of more advanced and discriminating analyses of things. An example of this will be discussed shortly.

In studying the history of ideas, it should not be overlooked that the ancient authors grapple with issues of current philosophical interest in a rigorous manner. The arguments of Patañjali, Vātsyāyana, and Śabara seek to account for known facts of the usage and comprehension of words in a systematic manner consistent with other aspects of knowledge of the world. Empirical facts of usage are brought in as evidence in the course of an argument. As such these authors engage in scientific activity not categorically different from science as it has developed in recent centuries.[10] Sufficient attention has not been given to clarifying the content and analyzing the soundness of their arguments, or to evaluating the relevance of the evidence adduced. The current book focuses attention on these issues.

[10]For more on scientific methodology in ancient India see Staal (1988).

The Meaning of the Term *'ākṛti'*

Although the current work is not intended primarily as a study of the meaning of the word *'ākṛti'*, the subject will be dealt with because it is central to Patañjali's discussions of the denotation of generic terms. Moreover, there has been some disagreement concerning what Patañjali means by this word. Most of this disagreement concerns whether it means a concrete shape or an abstract generic property. Associated with this is whether it means a class property as opposed to a class.

Matilal (1983), although he does not decide the issue himself, notes that the tradition held that the term *'ākṛti'* in the *bhāṣya* on 1.2.64 means *jāti*, that it means either a universal or a form in contrast to a particular. Goldstücker (1860: 168-171, with notes 180 and 182) maintained that the term *'ākṛti'* means 'species' in distinction to *'jāti'* which means 'genus'. From Ojihara's (1967) perspicacious analysis of Patañjali's definitions of a generic property (see my §1.2.5) it is sufficiently apparent that Goldstücker's interpretation was due to a misunderstanding.

Strauss (1927), while recognizing that it may mean either form or generic property in the Paspaśāhnika (p. 126), takes the term *'ākṛti'* in the Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.64 to be synonymous with the term *'jāti'* (pp. 135-150) as does Jacobi (1929). Renou (1942) also recognized the use of the terms *'ākṛti'* and *'dravya'* in different senses. These senses include 'forme' and 'genre' for the former (p. 78) and 'substance' and 'objet' for the latter (p. 162). Specifically he noted that the term *'dravya'* designates an 'objet individuel' or simply 'individu' in contrast to the term *'akṛti'* which designates an 'objet générique' or 'genre', notably in the exposition in the Mahābhāṣya under 1.2.64 concerning the question of which of the two a word denotes (p. 163).[11] If the term *'ākṛti'* has the sense 'genre', it is synonymous with the term *'jāti* (éspece, genre)' (p. 148).

Sreekrishna Sarma (1954, 1957) surveys the meanings of the terms *'ākṛti'* and *'jāti'* in different contexts. He concludes that an *ākṛti* is a universal serving as a class property, and that it should be distinguished from a *jāti* which is the class and an abstract entity. D'Sa (1980: 86) repeats Sreekrishna Sarma's view. Although Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: xi) make concessions to Sreekrishna Sarma's view, stating, "*ākṛti* is interpreted to mean '(common) shape', 'a generic feature'," and (p. 78), "ākṛti originally stands for a perceptible shape or form common to members of a given class or genus," they (p. 79) recognize the

[11] *d[ravya]* en tant qu' « objet individuel » s'oppose aussi à *ākṛti* (q. v.) « objet générique », not. dans l'exposé M[ahābhāṣya] 1 2 64 vt. 35 sqq. concernant la question si le mot désigne l'individu (opinion de Vyāḍi) ou s'il désigne le genre (Vājapyāyana).

double sense of the term in agreement with Strauss and Renou. They write, "Rather early, however, the terms *ākṛti* and *jāti* came to be regarded as synonyms in the sense of *jāti* 'class'. This use is already found in the Mbh.... On the other hand, the same word *ākṛti* is also used in the sense of 'shape'...."

Frauwallner (1960: 95-96) understands an *ākṛti* to be an eternal form ('ewige Form'). In Sprachtheorie (Nachgelassene Werke: 116-18) he observes that there is a development of the concepts of an *ākṛti*, a *jāti*, and a *dravya*. Originally *ākṛti* is seen as the form of an object. As a distinguishable property of many individual objects, one identifies it as that by virtue of which an individual object is a member of a class (*jāti*). He says that under the influence of category-theory (Vaiśeṣika) there is a tendency to identify form and class, or *ākṛti* and *jāti*.

Scharfe (1961: 129-42) considers the question of the meaning of the term *'ākṛti'* in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya in detail. He recognizes that it has a range of meanings. But after translating and considering numerous passages, he concludes that the translation 'form' is possible everywhere. He says that the form is often that which is the common factor in various material things, and concludes that we should stick with that as a translation of *'ākṛti'* in distinction to *'dravya'* (p. 133). Halbfass's (1992: 91) translation 'form' (in quotes) for Patañjali's term *'ākṛti'*, even where he recognizes that it refers to a "permanent generic" inhering in each individual object of a class, seems to persist in this opinion.

Biardeau (1964), in agreement with Sarma, asserts that for Patañjali and Śabara the term *'jāti'* means 'class' and the term *'ākṛti'* means a concrete structure which serves as a class property. Deshpande (1972: 26-40), after considering the opinions of the Indian commentators and modern scholars, concurs with Biardeau and Sarma.

Filliozat (1975-86) appropriately translates *'dravya'* as 'individu' in the discussions devoted to the denotation of generic terms under 1.2.58 and 1.2.64. He translates the term *'ākṛti'* as 'forme' and 'forme générique', and notes that it is the class property in distinction to the class itself and has this same sense throughout the Mahābhāṣya.[12] However, he makes one exception to translating *'ākṛti'* as 'forme générique' translating it as 'universel' instead (vol. 4, p. 354). He also uses the word 'universel' when he supplies the rest of a sentence (p. 365), and

[12]"*Ākṛti*, couramment traduit par 'forme', semble être employé plutôt pour désigner le manifestant de l'espèce que l'espèce même. C'est dans ce sens qu'il est pris dans le *sūtra* de Gautama cité dessous (voir 2.2.68). On le trouve dans ce même sens dans d'autres passages du *bhāṣya*." Filliozat (1975-86: vol 1, p. 21 n. 1). See also p. 78 n. 1, "Nous avons vu ci-dessus que *ākṛti* désigne la forme à quoi on reconnaît l'espèce...."

frequently discusses what *'ākṛti'* and *'dravya'* refer to using the terms 'universel' and 'individu' (vol. 4, p. 343, notes 4-6; p. 346, notes 1-4; 347, notes 1, 2; p. 354, notes 1, 2; p. 358, note 1).

Although it is true that the term *'ākṛti'* means both a class property and a shape, the first meaning is found without the second. It is not proper to tie Patañjali's concept of a class property to a concrete shape. While Scharfe concludes that we should stick with 'form' consistently as a translation of *'ākṛti'* everywhere, he explicitly recognizes the double meaning of the term *'dravya'*, used in opposition to it, as both substance and individual object (p. 138). Opposed to Goldstücker, he rightly recognizes (p. 141) that *ākṛti* is different from *jāti* in the first of the two verses Patañjali cites under Pāṇini 4.1.3. However, he does not observe that immediately following the verses Patañjali uses the term *'ākṛti'* to refer to the entity to which the term *'jāti'* refers in the *sūtra* and from which the verse distinguishes an *ākṛti* (see §1.2.5 below). This oversight prevents him from seeing that in fact there are two distinct meanings of the term *'ākṛti'*, one synonymous with the term *'jāti* (generic property)' and a second distinguished from it, 'configuration' or 'shape', as in Gautama 2.2.68.

Accepting the interpretation that *'ākṛti'* means a shape, Biardeau (1964) concludes that Patañjali and Śabara are still bound to considering concrete objects of everyday use and are unable to conceive of an abstract generic property as she says Vātsyāyana and even Gautama do. She sums up her discussion of the passages in the Mahābhāṣya saying that it is clear that an *ākṛti* constitutes the permanent perceptual element which permits fixed speech to apply to transient things. Then she adds that the Vedic injunction will therefore denote concrete things by the intermediary of their specific form (p. 61).[13]

In addition, she draws a distinction between a class and a class property. She asserts, without adducing any evidence, that for Patañjali and Śabara the term *'jāti'* means 'class' and the term *'ākṛti'* means a concrete structure which, as a common trait of many objects, serves as a class property to identify an object as one of a class. Because this latter distinction conforms neatly to the modern concepts of class and class property, it merits close consideration.

Biardeau refers to Nāgeśa's comment that for Patañjali *ākṛti* is "le genre et le structure" (p. 33).[14] She also refers (p. 32, note 2) to Renou's explanation, based on the commentatorial

---

[13]Mais il est clair qu'elle constitue l'élément perceptif permanent qui permet à un langage fixe de s'appliquer aux choses passagères.... L'injonction védique dénotera donc les choses concrètes par l'intermédiare de leur forme spécifique.

[14]With regard to the *bhāṣya* passage, *"Nety āha ākṛtir nāma sā,"* Nāgeśa: **ākṛtir** *jātiḥ saṃsthānaṃ ca*. MB, vol. 1, p. 15b.

tradition, (1942) giving diverse senses of the term. But she chooses to ignore the tradition and Renou. She states that Patañjali uses the term *'jāti'* to mean solely a species or a class of distinct entities, and the term *'ākṛti'* to mean solely the composition of parts, structure, or (specific) form which serves to make known that an individual belongs to a certain class (p. 48).[15] She says that an *ākṛti* is the common trait that determines an individual's class (*jāti*) (p. 49), and that it is an immediately visible trait.

However, she retreats from this position in particular circumstances. Discussing 1.2.64 *vārttika* 40, she accepts that an *ākṛti* is not necessarily visible. She says that an *ākṛti* is the *sāmānya* that is a property which determines an individual entity as belonging to a certain class (*jāti*) (p. 52). She notes that not all *samānyas* are such properties and not all determine a *jāti*. A *sāmānya* is a dynamic property... expressible by a proposition or a sensible quality (p. 52, note 3). Discussing 1.2.64 *vārttika* 43, *Tatrāsarvadravyagatiḥ*, she is forced to admit that the proponent of the view that an individual substance is denoted considers the *ākṛti* to be identical to the *jāti*. He considers it to be the entire group of individuals of a kind because the injunction to bind a cow would apply to all cows if it applied to the *ākṛti*. But rather than depart from her view that a *jāti* is a class and the *ākṛti* is the property which identifies an individual as belonging to it, she concludes from this that just the proponent of the view that an individual substance is denoted uses the word *'ākṛti'* to speak of the class, while the proponent of the view that an *ākṛti* is denoted uses it to speak only of the class property.

It is true that the two discussants disagree over the nature of an *ākṛti*, but this disagreement hardly furnishes evidence for the conclusion that Patañjali considers an *ākrti* to be a class property while he considers a *jāti* to be a class. This would make a neat and useful distinction if it were the case that Patañjali adhered to it. But the fact that the proponent of the view that an individual substance is denoted uses the term *'ākṛti'* for the class here is just one example in which that distinction is not adhered to. I do not believe Patañjali makes such a distinction. On the other hand, I will show that under 4.1.63, where no proponent of the view that an individual substance is denoted is involved, Patañjali again uses the term *'ākṛti'* in the sense of a class (*jāti*) in distinction to a second meaning of the term *'ākṛti'* meaning shape (see my §1.2.5).

---

[15]Introducing the first verse characterizing a *jāti* under 4.1.63: Cependant, cette composition de parties représente ce qui fait reconnaître l'appartenance d'un individu à une espèce ou à une classe d'êtres distincts (*jāti*). Car c'est là rigoureusement le seul sens possible du terme *jāti* dans le *Mahābhāṣya*, tout comme *ākṛti* n'est jamais que la structure ou la forme (spécifique).

The conclusion that an *ākṛti* is always a concrete shape is due in part to a small but critical error in translating Patañjali on 5.1.119, *Tasya bhāvas tvatalau.* Biardeau translates *'vartin'* as 'subsisting element' taking it to refer to the *dravya.* She erroneously connects the passage in which this term occurs with the previous passage in which Patañjali states that a substance is a stable element in relation to transient qualities (see my §1.2.1). She concludes that words ending in the abstract suffixes *'tva'* and *'tal'* would denote the substance! She says, "un suffix abstrait, même s'il est attaché à un adjectif, ne signifie pas le genre d'une qualité.... Il se rapporte en réalité à la substance qui forme le support de la qualité.... (p. 59)" She then generalizes this to deny that Patañjali considers an *ākṛti* to be a condition for the occurrence of such a suffix (*bhāva*), "C'est la recherche même de l'élément stable qui trahit d'ailleurs qu'il s'agit encore d'un aspect de l'universel, mais Patañjali ne met le *bhāva* en rapport ni avec l'*ākṛti*, 'forme spécifique', ni avec la *jāti*, 'classe', ni avec le *sāmānya*, 'trait commun' (p. 59)."

The general conclusion that an *ākṛti* is a concrete structure is drawn from the impression that Patañjali says that a substance, rather than an *ākṛti* inhering in that substance, is the condition for the occurrence of an abstract suffix. This impression, in turn, is based on a small but critical mistake in translation. Hence the general conclusion is undermined by correcting the mistake.

The term *'vartin'* does not refer to the substratum of a property here; it refers to the condition for the usage of the suffixes *tva* and *tal*.[16] The present discussion concerns Patañjali's commentary on Kātyāyana's *vārttika* 5, *Yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau.* According to this *vārttika*, *'tva'* and *'tal'* occur to denote a *guṇa* (property). The word derived by providing one of these suffixes after a quality word denotes the quality (*tadabhidhāne tvatalau*) due to the presence of which (*yasya guṇasya bhāvāt*) in a substance, the quality word denotes the substance (*dravye śabdaniveśaḥ*). Similarly, the word derived by providing one of these suffixes after a generic term denotes the property (*guṇa*) due to the presence of which in a substance, the generic term denotes the substance. Hence *'śuklatva'* denotes the quality white, and *'vṛkṣatva'* denotes the generic property by virtue of having which a tree is a tree.

Patañjali uses such a term *'vrīhitva'* under 1.2.58, *Jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām*, as an example of the single *sāmānya* denoted by a generic term on the view under which 1.2.58 is stated. The *sūtra* itself, by assuming

---

[16]See Kaiyaṭa, "***Vartyabhāvād*** *iti. Vartanaṃ vartaḥ. Vṛttir ity arthaḥ. Varto 'sminnastīti vartī pratyayārthaḥ...*" and, most explicitly, Nāgeśa, "*...guṇipareṣu śuklādiṣu guṇa eva vartī.*" MB, vol. 4, p. 300b.

that if a word refers to a *jāti* it refers to a single entity (*ekasmin*), under the most straightforward interpretation, identifies the *jāti* with that single entity. Similarly, Kātyāyana's first *vārttika*, *Jātyākhyāyāṃ sāmānyābhidhānād aikārthyam*, refers to that same single entity using the term *'sāmānya'*. Under *vārttika* 7, Patañjali refers to the single entity denoted by a generic term using the term *'jāti'*. Now in the Paspaśāhnika Patañjali states that 1.2.58 is stated considering that a word denotes an *ākṛti*.

Hence, Patañjali himself identifies an *ākṛti* as a *jāti* and as a *sāmānya* which is in turn what Pāṇini 1.2.58 refers to with the term *'jāti'*. Patañjali uses terms ending in the suffix *'tva'* to denote examples of such entities. On the view adopted under 5.1.119 *vārttika* 5, such entities are properties (*guṇa*) of substances (*dravya*), and these properties are considered to be the essence (*bhāva*) of an object, namely, that by virtue of having which it is what it is. Given the synonymous use of the terms *ākṛti* and *jāti* in the sense of class under 1.2.64 and 4.1.63 (just mentioned), and the synonymous use of the two terms I point out in chapter one (§1.2.7), what evidence is there for the distinction that *'ākṛti'* means class and *'jāti'* means class property? Given the fact that these two terms are used for a property which is considered to be the essence of an individual substance, how can anyone insist that it is always a concrete shape?

Moreover, the phrase, "That which is known by means of a shape (*ākṛti*) is a generic property (*jāti*) (*Ākṛtigrahaṇā jātiḥ*)," is so close to Gautama 2.2.68, "A shape is that which makes known the generic property and its indicatory marks (*Ākṛtir jātiliṅgākhyā*)," that it is more likely that the first verse Patañjali cites under 4.1.63 and Gautama 2.2.68 refer to the same idea than that Patañjali cut a distinction between a *jāti* and an *ākṛti* in a manner as different from Gautama's as Biardeau suggests.

Biardeau's statement that an *ākṛti* is the general property which identifies an individual as belonging to a certain class, is all right. But her insistence on characterizing it as a visible form, a structure, rather than as a general property pure and simple, whether concrete or abstract, is unjustified, and so is her rigid distinction of an *ākṛti* from a class (which she reserves as the sense of the term *'jāti'*). The discussion on whether an *ākṛti* is eternal (*nitya*) or transient (*kārya*) in the Paspaśāhnika may be interpreted as involving only a concrete form; however, it may also be interpreted as involving distinct alternatives: an individual transient concrete form versus an abstract general property.

Therefore, having considered the views of various scholars concerning the meaning of the term *'ākṛti'* in the Mahābhāṣya, I agree with Strauss, Jacobi and Renou. In the discussions concerning the denotation of generic terms under 1.2.64, 1.2.58 and in other places, the term *'ākṛti'* means a class

property which is clearly distinguished from a shape and as such is synonymous with the term *'jāti* (generic property)'.

As the evidence in chapter one (§1.2) will show, Patañjali uses the term *'ākṛti'* in at least two distinct senses: 1) the shape which a material has, and 2) the class property which identifies what sort of thing an individual object is. In the second sense, it is synonymous with the term *'jāti'*, both of which terms are used by Patañjali to refer to both the class and the class property. It is quite clear that a shape may serve as a class property too in the case of certain classes of material objects, and that a visible shape makes a good example of a class property. However, this does not imply that an author who uses the term *'ākṛti'* in both senses is limited to conceive of a class property as an entity with concrete structure perceptible by the senses.[17]

Much attention has been paid to the question what Patañjali, Śabara, and Vātsyāyana considered the terms *'akṛti'* and *'dravya'* to denote without explicitly taking up the question of the nature of the entities. The two questions are intimately connected. In contrast, the recent work of Halbfass (1980, 1992), Matilal (1973), and Wezler (1985) concerning the nature of substances, qualities, and universals is exemplary. Bhaduri's (1947) sweeping yet penetrating presentation of the nature of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika entities remains one of the clearest expositions, particularly (pp. 22-51) concerning substance.

There seem to be two traditions of thought concerning generic properties and qualities which are perceptible by the senses. According to one, a shape is clearly distinguished from a generic property. It is the characteristic outward mark of an object which serves as grounds for the inference that the generic property is present in a certain object. In this tradition of thought, Vaiśeṣika clarifies the distinction between a quality (such as a color) and a generic property (such as treeness) by adopting the idea that there are individual quality instances. An individual quality instance is an entity distinct from both the substance in which it inheres, and from the generic property inhering in quality instances of the same kind. On the other view, such a distinction is absent. A single quality recurs in many individual substances in a manner quite similar to a generic property. Perceptible qualities such as color and shape are considered to be general properties much as abstract kinds or types are.[18]

The former tradition of thought prevails in Nyāya; the latter in Mīmāṃsā. Both traditions find their place in the Mahābhāṣya. It is well known that the discourse in the

---

[17]Scharf (1993) collects in a single presentation all the evidence for the conclusion that Patañjali uses the term *'ākṛti'* to denote a class property.

[18]Concerning the conception of qualities as individual instances versus their conception as universals, see Halbfass (1980, 1992: 113-37), Siderits (1982).

Mahābhāṣya makes sudden shifts in point of view. In each new point of view Patañjali takes up in philosophical discussions, he may represent a different tradition of though prevalent at his time. For example, in the Paspaśāhnika when he discusses whether a form is permanent or transient, he states three points of view: 1) It is absolute and immutable (*kūṭasthanitya*). 2) It is permanent in the sense that it is recognized as the same even with changed particulars (*pravāhanitya*). 3) It is transient. It is clear in this discussion that it is not a single conception of an *ākṛti* that he means as having these mutually contradictory characteristics. The same word is used in each case for a distinctly conceived entity. Therefore, Patañjali uses the term *'ākṛti'* in different meanings. It is more useful to identify the sense in which a term is used in particular cases (as Sreekrishna Sarma does in the body of his work) than to stretch a single term to cover different meanings and blur the sense of the term in the discussion at hand. Unfortunately, it is the latter which most of those who have studied the meaning of the term *'ākṛti'* in the Mahābhāṣya, including Sreekrishna Sarma in his conclusion, attempt to do.

Unlike the case in the Mahābhāṣya, there is a genuine difficulty in Śabara's argument concerning the denotation of generic terms which leads one to question whether he held a concept of a generic property distinct from a shape. This difficulty concerns his example of the injunction to build a falcon-altar (*śyenacitaṃ cinvīta*). Biardeau (1964: 177) recognizes that this weighs in favor of concluding that an *ākṛti* is bound exclusively to sense perception. Chapter three of the present work discusses the example of the falcon-altar and Śabara's arguments based on it at length.[19]

Overview of the Work

The current work consists of three chapters dealing with the arguments concerning the denotation of a word in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini 1.2.64 and 1.2.58, Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya on Gautama 2.2.58-69, and Śabara's Bhāṣya on the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa respectively. Each chapter consists of two major parts, the first being an analysis and the second a translation. In addition, an outline precedes the major selections translated. The notes to these selections include translations of passages from the commentaries on these texts.

The first chapter analyzes the arguments for two extreme views of what a word denotes: the view that a word denotes just an individual object, and the view that it denotes just a generic

[19]Scharf (1993b) briefly analyzes the shortcomings of the example.

property. This chapter probes the implications of adopting these views for accepting other presuppositions such as those concerning the analysis of the meaning of speech forms by concomitant presence and absence (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), and the denotation of one and only one object by a word. The first chapter concludes with an examination of Patañjali's solution to include both an individual object and a generic property in the denoted meaning, with one or the other having greater importance depending on the speaker's intention.

The second chapter examines the arguments of Gautama, as explained by Vātsyāyana, to include three elements in the meaning denoted by a word, rather than just two as Patañjali does. This view includes a generic property, the configuration which serves as its inferential mark, and an individual object. The second chapter explores the relationship between the generic property and its inferential mark with regard to the use of words for imitations of the objects they ordinarily denote.

The third chapter examines Śabara's arguments in favor of one of the extreme views considered in the Mahābhāṣya. It undertakes to clarify Śabara's argument and the role certain fundamental principles of epistemology play in it. It explores the relation that including the means of knowledge known as presumption (*arthāpatti*) in the procedure to determine a word's meaning has to the argument against including more than one element in the denoted meaning. Because these arguments are sophisticated and subtle, they will be clearly stated in terms of symbolic logic as well as in English. At the end of chapter three, the role that examples of the use of generic terms to refer to imitations play in Śabara's arguments are compared with the role of similar examples in Nyāya. Finally, the general conclusion summarizes the relation the different views of what a word denotes have to the presuppositions concerning the procedure to determine a word's meaning.

The following analysis frequently refers to the translation and often to other sections of the book. These references are included in parentheses in the text. If they are preceded by a helix, they refer to a section number as listed in the table of contents. Otherwise they refer to the translation accompanying the chapter in which they appear.

In the translation of the Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.64 and 1.2.58, the *vārttikas* themselves provide an outline of the subject matter. Because of the length of its commentary, a brief overview of the topics in 1.2.64 is given there in outline form. The *vārttika* numbers as in Kielhorn's edition constitute an easy means of reference, with the following supplements in square brackets. 40a labels the *vārttika* segment separated from its later part 40b, numbered 40 in Kielhorn's edition. 53a, b, and c label segments of the long commentary under *vārttika* 53.

A full logical outline precedes the translations of Gautama 2.2.58-69 with Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya and selections from Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika. References to the translation are by *sūtra* number followed by 'V' for Vātsyāyana or 'U' for Uddyotakara and occasionally a number corresponding to the lower levels of the outline. References are made in a similar manner to the minor Mīmāṃsā sections translated. Because of the length and detail of Śabara's *bhāṣya* on the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, the outline numbering itself serves as a more precise means to refer to the text. Hence references are made simultaneously to the outline and the translation which has been marked with the outline numbering.

A few conventions used in this book should be mentioned. When discussing grammatical elements such as verbal roots and affixes, the markers (*it*) are set in bold. All Sanskrit terms and text are set in italics, except the names of schools for which there is no English equivalent, and the titles of works and chapters. These appear capitalized in roman script. With the exception of Pāṇinian grammatical elements always referred to as speech forms, a Sanskrit term referred to as a term is enclosed in single quotes in addition to italics.

Grammar

1.1. Background

Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) is the branch of knowledge associated with the Veda (*vedāṅga*) which instructs the use of correct speech forms (*śabda*). Various entities are parts of the single whole which constitutes an experience. Patañjali singles out a speech form from among those entities as the sound by means of which a knower knows an object of experience. It is that which when uttered is the means to cognition of an object.[1] It is distinguished from the objects of which it communicates knowledge, namely, substances, actions, qualities, and class properties.

Taking the experience of a cow as an example, Patañjali describes four types of objects from which he distinguishes speech sounds. He calls the object consisting of a dewlap, tail, hump, hooves, and horns a substance (*dravya*). He identifies gesture, movement, and blinking as actions (*kriyā*). He identifies various colors (white, blue, black, brown, and grey) as qualities (*guṇa*). He calls the general property which is the same in different things and which is not destroyed when the things in which it resides are destroyed a class property (*ākṛti*).[2]

There is an established relationship between words and their objects, which is known from ordinary usage, such that certain words are used to denote certain objects. One uses speech forms in order to convey knowledge of objects.[3] When one may convey meaning equally by the use of correct or incorrect speech forms, grammar teaches a restriction for the sake of *dharma* similar to ordinary and Vedic restrictions for *dharma*. By teaching certain speech forms grammar makes known that these speech forms are correct, they should be used, and by using them

---

[1]*Yenoccāritena sāsnālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇinām sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 1, lines 10-11. Filliozat (1991: 33-85) has recently treated this passage with its commentaries in depth in a lecture entitled, "Patañjali's Definition of Śabda." Bronkhorst (1987: 46-56) examines Patañjali's ideas concerning the wholeness of a speech form and (pp. 56-71) explores its relation to ideas in the early history of Indian philosophy, specifically in Abhidharma Buddhism. Concerning Patañjali's alternative explanation of *śabda*, i.e. *pratītapadārthakaḥ*, etc., Wezler (1994) establishes finally that this means (p. 185), "The word 'śabda' is one the meaning of which is well-known," namely, (p. 188) sound, including noise as well as language.

[2]MB-K, vol. 1, p. 1, lines 6-10.

[3]See 1.2.64 translation, *vārttika* 29 note 15.

one will accrue merit. Other speech forms are incorrect, should not be used and may lead to ill results. Kātyāyana says this in his very first *vārttika*:

> *Siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ, yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.*[4]
> Since speech, its object, and the relationship between the two are established (and are known) from ordinary usage, and since one uses speech prompted by meanings in accordance with ordinary usage, the science (of grammar) restricts (usage to correct speech forms) for the sake of *dharma* just as in ordinary and Vedic (instances).

Words are divided into four categories: nominals, verbs, preverbs, and particles.[5] Nominals are again divided into four categories according to the type of object which is the semantic condition for their usage (*pravṛttinimitta*): generic terms (*jātiśabda*), quality words (*guṇaśabda*), action words (*kriyāśabda*), and arbitrary names (*yadṛcchāśabda*).[6]

---

[4]MB-K, vol. 1, pp. 6, 8. Cardona (1988: 633-34) paraphrases the *vārttika*. For other English translations see Abhyankar and Shukla, pp. 24, 30, 31, Chatterji, pp. 57, 58, and Joshi and Roodbergen 1986: 90,115,117, 120). In disagreement with the last, Wezler (1994: 173-74 n. 2) reaffirms that this is the first *vārttika*.

[5]Yāska says, *"Tad yāni catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyāte copasarganipātāś ca tānimāni bhavanti.* Nirukta, part 3, p. 27. Patañjali says, *"catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyātopasarganipātāś ca."* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 3, lines 17, 26.

[6]Patañjali on Śivasūtra 2, *vārttika* 1, *Ḷkāropadeśo yadṛcchāśaktijānukaraṇaplutyādyarthaḥ*, says: *Catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiḥ: jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā yadṛddhāśabdāś caturthāḥ.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 19, lines 20-21. There are only three categories of nominals on the view that no names are arbitrary. On this view, the semantic condition for their usage is ultimately a generic property, quality, or action, so they are classed as words of the first three types. *Trayī ca śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ. Jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā iti. Na santi yadṛcchāśabdāḥ.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 20, lines 3-9. There are no underived nominals on this view. Under 7.1.2, *Āyaneyīnīyiyaḥ phaḍhakhacchaghāṃ pratyayādīnām*, Kātyāyana and Patañjali conclude that 1.2.45, *Arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam*, shows that Pāṇini considered there to be underived nominal bases. The nominal bases whose derivation is attempted using Uṇādi affixes comprise these underived bases. ***5. Prātipadika-vijñānāc ca Pāṇineḥ siddham.*** *Prātipadikavijñānāc ca bhagavataḥ Pāṇiner ācāryasya siddham. Uṇādayo 'vyutpannāni prātipadikāni.* MB-K, vol. 3, p. 241, lines 19-21. Both views are represented under 7.3.50, *Ṭhasyekaḥ*, *"Uṇādayo 'vyutpannāni prātipadikāni"* and *"Athāpy uṇadayo vyutpādyanta evam api na doṣaḥ."* MB-K, vol. 3, p328, lines 20, p. 328 line 24 - p. 329, line 29, p. 329, lines 4-5. See also 8.3.59, *Ādeśapratyayayoḥ*, and *bhāṣya*. MB-K, vol. 3, p. 439, lines 10-16.
According to this scheme of naming types of words, the semantic condition for using a generic term for an object is that a certain generic property is present in the object. The condition for using a quality word for an object is that a certain quality is present in the object. The condition for using an action word for an object is that the object have a certain relation to a specific action. Although the name 'generic term' indicates that a generic property is the condition for usage of the word, it need not denote a generic property. It may have received its name because it denotes a substance on the condition that it has a certain

The first type of word, a generic term, is a common noun such as 'tree' or 'cow'. Such a term is used to refer either to a particular individual object of a kind or to all individuals of the kind. Hence the question arises whether a generic term denotes the class property or an individual substance of the class. In preparation to investigate Patañjali's view concerning whether a generic term denotes a substance or a class property, we will first clarify what he considers the nature of a substance (*dravya*) and the nature of a class property (*ākṛti*) to be in this discussion.[7]

1.2. Substance (*dravya*) and Class Property (*ākṛti*)

Patañjali uses each of the terms *'dravya'* and *'ākṛti'* in at least two senses. He uses the term *'dravya'* to mean 1) the material out of which an object is made, and 2) an individual object. He uses the term *'ākṛti'* to mean 1) the shape which a material has, and 2) the class property which identifies what sort of thing an individual object is. Although he uses each of these terms in two senses, he shows that he is aware of a distinction between the two meanings. In his discussions concerning the denotation of generic terms he intends each of the terms in their second meanings: *'ākṛti'* means a class property and *'dravya'* means an individual object.

1.2.1. Pāṇini 5.1.119

Under 5.1.119 Patañjali juxtaposes these two conceptions of a *dravya* in the course of explaining how a *dravya* is something other than a particular quality present in it.[8] First he gives the following three examples which characterize a *dravya* as the material out of which an object is made: 1) Given the same volume of cotton and iron, that due to which their weight is different is *dravya*. 2) Given the same sharp edge of two things, that due to which one cuts by just touching and the other does

---

generic property. In any case, Patañjali's discussion does not concern the name, nor does it assume that a generic property even exists. I mention the categories just to identify the words whose denotation is being discussed.

[7]Concerning the nature of a *guṇa*, see MB-K vol. 2, p. 216, line 19 - p. 217, line 5. Halbfass (1980, 1992: 113-37), Matilal (1973), and Subramania Iyer (1942) discuss the nature of a *guṇa*, the latter two in grammar itself. Rocher (1966) deals with *kriyā* in the Mahābhāṣya, and Subramania Iyer (1950-51) discusses the concept more generally among grammarians.

[8]See the discussion beginning, *"Kiṃ punar anyac chabdādibhyo dravyam āhosvid ananyat?"* under 5.1.119, *vārttika* 5. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 366, lines 14-26.

not, even when applied for a long time, is *dravya*. 3) That due to which one thing causes a break with one blow and another does not, even with two blows, is *dravya*.[9] The mention of cotton and iron make it clear that the material is what is considered to be *dravya*.

Alternatively Patañjali characterizes a *dravya* as an individual whole consisting of a certain set of properties. Although a whole is made up of its parts, it is not identical to any one of them. Hence characterizing a *dravya* as a whole whose parts are its properties is in accord with the purpose of the section, namely, to explain how a *dravya* is something other than one of its properties. Although a *dravya* consists of its properties, it is not identical to any one of them. It is that which remains what it is even when certain of its qualities disappear and others appear. For example, the qualities, red, yellow, etc. appear in the fruits, *āmalaka*, *badara*, etc. while they ripen, but the *āmalaka* remains what it is and so does the *badara*. A particular *āmalaka* remains that particular *āmalaka* while it gets ripe.[10]

Patañjali adduces an etymology of the word *'dravya'* to support this second alternative by saying that a *dravya* is a *guṇasaṃdrāva* (a confluence of qualities).[11] The term *'guṇasaṃdrāva'* should be understood as synonomous with the term *guṇasamudāya* (aggregate of qualities) which Patañjali uses to describe the nature of a *dravya* under 4.1.3, *Striyām*.[12]

---

[9]*Iha samāne varṣmaṇi pariṇāhe cānyat tulāgraṃ bhavati lohasyānyat kārpāsānāṃ yatkṛto viśeṣas tad dravyam. Tathā kaścit spṛśannevacchinatti kaścil lambamāno 'pi nacchinatti yatkṛto viśeṣas tad dravyam. Tathā kaścid ekenaiva prahāreṇa vyapavargaṃ karoti kaścid dvābhyām api na karoti yatkṛto viśeṣas tad dravyam.* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 366, lines 19-23.

[10]*Athavā yasya guṇāntareṣv api prādurbhavatsu tattvaṃ na vihanyate tad dravyam. Kiṃ punas tattvam? Tadbhāvas tattvam. Tad yathā. Āmalakādīnāṃ phalānāṃ raktādayaḥ pītādayaś ca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanty āmalakaṃ badaram ity eva bhavati.* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 366, lines 23-25. Note that I have paraphrased the passage, "whose...essence is not destroyed (*yasya...tattvaṃ na vihanyate*) loosely as "which remains what it is." If 5.1.119 is interpreted according to Kātyayana's *vārttika* 5, *Siddhaṃ tu yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau*, then the essence (*tattva*) of a substance would be the property by virtue of whose presence in the substance it is called what it is. In the case of many individual substances of a kind, this essential property by virtue of which a generic term is used for each of them is a class property.

[11]*"Anvarthaṃ khalvapi nirvacanam: guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam iti."* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 366, lines 25-26. The word *'saṃdrāva'*, meaning that to which something flows, is derived by providing the suffix ***ghañ*** after the verbal root √*dru*, to flow, when it occurs with the preverb *sam*. 3.2.23. *Sami yudruduvaḥ (ghañ 16, akartari ca kārake sañjñāyām 19)*. The word *'dravya'* in the same meaning is derived by providing the *kṛtya*-suffix *yat* after the verbal root √*dru* which terminates in a vowel. 3.1.97. *Aco yat (dhātoḥ 91, kṛtyāḥ 95)*. The suffix occurs if the direct object (*karman*) is to be denoted in accordance with 3.4.70, *Tayor eva kṛtyaktakhalarthāḥ*. See Kaiyaṭa on 5.1.119. MB, vol. 4, p. 299a.

[12]*"Guṇasamudāyo dravyaṃ"*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 200, lines 13-14. See his

In the latter context, the conception of a *dravya* as an aggregate of properties is extended to include *bhāva* (being) denoted by nouns. It is stated that feminine gender is a property of a *dravya* while defending the view that a feminine suffix denotes feminine gender.[13] On this view, if it were the case that only that which is an aggregate of qualities (*guṇasamudāya*) is a *dravya*, then words with *kṛt* and *taddhita* affixes denoting *bhāva* would not occur in the feminine because *bhāva* is not an aggregate of properties. However, they do occur in the feminine. For example, the word *'cikīrṣā'* with the *kṛt* suffix *a*, and *'gotā'* with the *taddhita* suffix *tal* both terminate in the feminine suffix *ṭāp*.[14] In order to account for words with *kṛt* and *taddhita* affixes denoting *bhāva*, an extension is made to treat *bhāva* as if it were a *dravya*.[15] Kaiyaṭa comments that the meaning of this extension is that anything one may refer to with a pronoun is a *dravya*.[16] In other words, the word *'dravya'* means an individual object.

---

example of the use of the term *'brāhmaṇa'* for a *guṇasamudāya* under 2.2.6. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 411, line 15 - p. 412, line 1 (p. 411, lines 15-21 are cited under 5.1.115, vol. 2, p. 363, lines 12-19). Although Kaiyaṭa explains the etymology by saying that a *dravya* is the *āśraya* of qualities (*Gūṇānām āśrayo dravyam ity arthaḥ.*), and likewise explains the examples of fruit by saying that a *dravya* is the *āśraya* of color, etc. (*Tasmād asti rūpāśrayo dravyam.*) in accordance with Vaiśeṣika notions, Wezler (1985) convincingly argues that Patañjali refers to Sāṅkhya notions here. Biardeau (1964: 228) mentions that, according to the Sāṅkhya theory of a substance, a substance endures even with variations in its formulation. See also Nāgeśa MB, vol. 4, 299a, and Laghumañjuṣā, p. 347. He refers to Vyāsa on Yogasūtra 3.44, *"Sāmānyaviśeṣasumudāyo 'tra dravyam.... Ayutasiddhāvayavabhedānugata-samūho dravyam iti Patañjaliḥ."* Pātañjalayogasūtra, pp. 162-63.

[13]The alternative is that feminine gender is included in the meaning of the nominal base as the qualifier of the denoted object. In this case the feminine suffix co-signifies feminine gender.

[14]3.3.102. *A pratyayāt (striyām 94, bhāve 18).* The *kṛt* suffix *a* occurs after a derivative verbal root if *bhāva* with feminine gender is to be denoted.
5.1.119. *Tasya bhāvas tvatalau.* The *taddhita* suffixes *tva* and *tal* occur after a word if the *bhāva* of the object denoted by the word is to be denoted by the derivate.
4.1.4 provides the feminine suffix *ṭāp*. See §1.2.5, note 36.

[15]*Kasya tāvad bhavān ekaṃ guṇam nyāyyaṃ manyate strītvaṃ nāma? Dravyasya. Dravye ca bhavataḥ kaḥ saṃpratyayaḥ? Yadi tāvad guṇasamudāyo dravyam? Kā gatir ya ete bhāvāḥ kṛdabhihitās taddhitābhihitāś ca: cikīrṣā, goteti? Atha matam etat kṛdabhihito bhāvo dravyavad bhavatīti....* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 200, lines 12-15.

[16]***Atha matam*** *iti. Idaṃ tad iti sarvanāmapratyavamarśayogyaṃ vastu dravyam ity arthaḥ.* MB, vol. 4, p. 30a. Similarly, under 5.3.55, *Atiśāyane tamabiṣṭhanau*, Kaiyaṭa says, "It is intended that anything fit to be referred to by the pronouns 'this' and 'that' is a *dravya*. In this way generic properties, qualities and actions are included too." MB, vol. 4, p. 374b. In the *Bhūyodravya-samuddeśaḥ* Bhartṛhari says, *Vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate; dravyam ity ucyate so 'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ.* That object, to refer to which a pronoun is used and which is intended as an object to be qualified, is called a *dravya*. Vākyapadīya 3.4.3. Abhyankar and Limaye, p. 75.

1.2.2. *'Dravya'* Used to Mean an Individual Object

Patañjali uses the term *'dravya'* unambiguously to mean an individual object in other contexts. He gives an example of the use of many names for a single object citing the many names of the single deity Indra. Summarizing the purport of the example he says, "There are many names for a single individual object (*dravya*),"[17] using the term *'dravya'* for the single deity Indra. Similarly, Patañjali uses the word *'dravya'* unambiguously to mean an individual object when he states that two properties, being a participant in an action (*kārakatva*) and being the locus of an action (*adhikaraṇatva*), mutually specify each other "because they both inhere in the same individual object (*dravya*)." He gives the example, *"Gārgyo Devadattaḥ,"* in which both words refer to the same individual person. The word *'gārgya'* qualifies the person as a descendant of Garga; the word *'devadatta'* qualifies the person as having the name *'devadatta'*. The two properties, being a descendant of Garga (*gārgyatva*) and being called Devadatta (*devadattatva*), mutually specify each other "because they both inhere in the same individual object (*dravya*)".[18]

In the first of these last two examples, a *dravya* is understood to be the single object referred to by several words. In the second, it is the single object which is the locus of two properties designated by two words. Whenever two or more words refer to the same individual object, or two or more properties reside in the same individual object, the words, or properties, are said to have the same locus. They are *samānādhikaraṇa*. The compound *'samānādhikaraṇa'* is widely used in grammar and in other disciplines in this meaning. The word *'adhikaraṇa'* in this compound denotes the individual object which is the locus of properties or the object referred to by the two words. Patañjali explicitly states that the word *'adhikaraṇa* (locus)' is used as a synonym for the word *'dravya'*, both in

---

The Vṛtti on 1.64 says: *Yāvad idam tad iti prādhānyenopādīyate tad dravyam.* Whatever (the pronouns) 'this' and 'that' denote as principal is a *dravya.* Subramania Iyer, Kāṇḍa I, p. 122, line 5.

[17]1.4.1, *vārttika* 1. ***Anyatra saṃjñāsamāveśān niyamārthaṃ vacanam.*** *Anyatra saṃjñā samāveśo bhavati. Kvānyatra? Loke vyākaraṇe ca. Loke tāvat: indraḥ śakraḥ puruhūtaḥ puraṃdaraḥ, kadruḥ koṣṭhaḥ kuśūla iti. Ekasya dravyasya bahvyaḥ saṃjñā bhavanti.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 296, lines 3-6.

[18]Under 1.4.23, *vārttika* 15: *Na hi kārakam ity anenādhikaraṇatvam uktam adhikaraṇam iti vā kārakatvam. Ubhau cānyo'nyaviśeṣakau bhavataḥ. Katham? Ekadravyasamavāyitvāt. Tad yathā. Gārgyo Devadatta iti. Na hi gārya ity anena devadattatvam uktaṃ Devadatta ity anena vā gārgyatvam. Ubhau cānyo'nyaviśeṣakau bhavata ekadravyasamavāyitvāt.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 326, lines 11-15.

ordinary parlance and in grammar.[19] Therefore, Patañjali does use the word *'dravya'* to mean an individual object as a locus of a certain class property and other properties.

1.2.3. *Ākṛti:* Permanent versus Transient

The phrase, *"siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe,"* in Kātyāyana's first *vārttika* states that the relationship between a word and the object it denotes is established (§1.1). Patañjali gives the gloss, *"siddhe śabde 'rthe saṃbandhe ca,"* for the phrase, and interprets the word *'siddha'* as *'nitya'*. In this way he shows that he considers Kātyāyana to mean that the word, the denoted object, and the relation between them are all permanent.[20] Whatever object a generic term denotes, it must be of a permanent nature in order to maintain a permanent relation with the word which denotes it. Hence if a generic term denotes an *ākṛti*, an *ākṛti* must be a permanent entity. On the other hand, if it denotes a *dravya*, a *dravya* must be a permanent entity. In order to determine which is of a permanent nature and which is of a transient nature, Patañjali enters into a discussion on the nature of an *ākṛti* and a *dravya* at this point in the Paspaśāhnika.

He gives the following two ordinary examples in which a substance (*dravya*) is permanent and its shapes (*ākṛti*) are transient:

> Clay connected with a certain shape is a ball. Crushing the ball-shape small pots are made. Crushing the small-pot-shape cups are made. Similarly, gold connected with a certain shape is a ball. Crushing the ball-shape necklaces are made. Crushing the necklace-shape bracelets are made. Crushing the bracelet-shape auspicious symbols (*svastika*) are made. Again it returns to a gold ball. Again connected with another shape it becomes two golden earrings the color of *khadira*

---

[19]Under 2.1.1, *vārttika* 21, ***dravyaṃ padārtha iti cet:*** *Athavā yāvad brūyāt samānadravyeṇeti tāvat samānādhikaraṇeneti. Dravyaṃ hi loke 'dhikaraṇam ity upacaryate. Tad yathā. Ekasmin dravye vyuditam. Ekasminnadhikaraṇe vyuditam iti. Tathā vyākaraṇe vipratiṣiddhaṃ cānadhikaraṇavāci* (2.4.13) *ity adravyavācīti gamyate.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 371, lines 2-5.

[20]See the discussion beginning, *"Kiṃ punar nityaḥ śabda āhosvit kāryaḥ?"* MB-K, vol. 1, pp. 6-7. Kātyāyana also clearly favors the view that speech units are eternal, as he states in 1.1.1, *vārttika* 9, *Siddhaṃ tu nityaśabdatvāt.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 40, line 26 - p. 41, line 4. See also MB-K, vol. 1, p. 40, line 26 - p. 41, line 4. See also p. 60, lines 17-26, p. 104, lines 8-25, p. 112, lines 6-17, p. 112, line 23 - p. 113, line 15, p. 136, line 11 - p. 138, line 26, p. 158, lines 6-8; vol. 2, p. 113, lines 16-22; p. 234, lines 21-23; vol. 3, p. 251, lines 12-13; p. 420, line 21 - p. 421, line 1. For the posited view that speech units are producible (*kārya*) and transient, see: vol. 1, p. 257, lines 23-25, p. 404, lines 3-5.

> embers. Each shape is different but the substance is the same. By crushing the shape, only the substance remains.[21]

Immediately following these examples, Patañjali considers the alternative that the *ākṛti* is permanent and individual substances are not. He says, "It is not the case that if the *ākṛti* ceases to be in one substratum it ceases to be in all of them. On the contrary, it is found present in another individual substance."[22] In this case the *ākṛti* is considered to be absolutely fixed, eternal and unchangeable.[23] The *dravya* is considered to be a transient individual object.

If one considers that a *dravya* is permanent and an *ākṛti* is not, then *dravya* is the material substance out of which an object is made and an *ākṛti* is the shape or the limits of extension which define an individual body made of that material. On the other hand, if one considers that an *ākṛti* is permanent and a *dravya* is not, then an *ākṛti* is a class property and a *dravya* is an individual object of the class. A word must denote that which is permanent. Hence in the former case it denotes material substance, and in the latter case it denotes a class property.

Given Patañjali's use of the term *'ākṛti'* in the two meanings of a transient shape and a permanent class property, one may suppose that he uses the term in just one meaning somewhere in between the two intending that an *ākṛti* has characteristics of both a shape and a class property.[24] One may suppose that a certain shape, viewed as a single property recurring in many individual substances, serves to characterize each individual substance as the object it is. Hence, the shape in a substance is its class property. One may consider that the shape itself serves as a class property in the examples of clay and gold formed into different objects. In these examples, the shape of the object serves to characterize the object as what it is and to distinguish one type of object from another. Although the shape is not precisely the same from one individual substance to another, and although it is not immutable, it is recognized as essentially the same shape. Hence it may be said to be permanent.[25]

---

[21]MB-K, vol. 1, p. 7, lines 11-18. Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.1.4-6 has a comparable passage. *Ten Principal Upanishads*, p. 505. See Biardeau 1964: 45 note 1 for references.

[22]*Nityākṛtiḥ. Katham? Na kvacid uparateti kṛtvā sarvatroparatā bhavati dravyāntarasthā tūpalabhyate*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 7, lines 19-20.

[23]See note 25.

[24]A survey of the literature on this topic is given in the Introduction.

[25]*Athavā nedam eva nityalakṣaṇaṃ dhruvaṃ kūṭastham avicāly anapāyopajanavikāry anutpatty avṛddhy avyayayogi yat tan nityam iti. Tad api nityaṃ yasmiṃs tattvaṃ na vihanyate. Kiṃ punas tattvam? Tadbhāvas tattvam. Ākṛtāv api tattvaṃ na vihanyate*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 7, lines 21-23. My statement that the shape is essentially the same paraphrases Patañjali's remark that the

1.2.4. Shape versus Substance as the Alternatives

On the supposition that the term *'ākṛti'* means shape as a class property, it seems possible that Patañjali considered the permanent shape as one alternative in the debate concerning what the object denoted by a word is, the other alternative being *dravya*. We have seen that Patañjali uses the term *'dravya'* in two meanings: 1) a permanent material, and 2) an individual object. The examples of the clay and gold objects illustrate a *dravya* in the first sense. *Dravya*, as the material which remains the same in different objects, is considered to be permanent. Patañjali remarks in the Paspaśāhnika that it is as a permanent entity that *dravya* may be considered to be the object denoted by a word (§1.2.3). Hence it is possible to suppose that the debate over what the object denoted by a word is, concerns the alternatives of shape and material.

In Patañjali's examples depicting a substance remaining permanent while its shapes vary, the words 'clay' and 'gold' are mass nouns. Each of them denotes a single substance which is the same in many different shapes. By the words 'ball, small pot, cup, necklace, bracelet,' etc., which are generic terms, Patañjali intends the shape in contrast to the substance. One could consider the question concerning the meaning of generic terms to be whether they are mass nouns denoting substance or a separate type of word denoting shape. For example, the word 'wood', like the words 'clay' and 'gold', is a mass noun. It denotes the substance out of which trees and other objects are made. Does the word 'tree' denote only wood? Or does it denote a certain shape?

The supposition is that the debate over the meaning of generic terms concerns whether they are mass nouns or a separate type of word denoting shape. It may seem too obvious, on this supposition, that generic terms denote shape and not substance. The word 'wood' denotes a single substance whether it is the wood of one or many trees, or whether one makes it into a table, chair or house. But the word 'tree' is not used for wood made into a table, etc. Its use is limited to an object with a certain shape. It does not refer to a material but to a body. In the plural it refers to many separate bodies, not to a single material.

---

essence (*tattva*) in the shape is not destroyed. Here I concur with Joshi and Roodbergen 1986: 108-109, n. 444. If 5.1.119 is interpreted according to *vārttika* 5, then Patañjali's statement that there is a *tattva* in the shape which is not destroyed means that there is a single generic property in each individual shape-instance by which each is recognized as being a certain shape. This accords with the conception that there are generic properties in quality instances in Vaiśeṣika.

Although it may seem too obvious that generic terms denote shape and not substance, on the supposition that the debate concerns whether they are mass nouns or a separate type of word; the debate under this supposition is not trivial. Consider the English word 'water'. It is a mass noun denoting a single material. But it is also used for water taking the shape of the glass that holds it, and in the plural for many separate bodies of water. For instance, when we ask a waiter for "three waters," he brings three separate bodies of water in three glasses.

The question whether words such as 'tree' or 'cow' denote a material or a shape is certainly an interesting question. Patañjali seems to brush against the question in the examples he gives in the Paspaśāhnika, and it may have been a question which his predecessors considered in works we do not have. However, it is not the question which Patañjali and Kātyāyana deliberate at length under *sūtra* 1.2.64 and elsewhere. The question which Patañjali and Kātyāyana discuss is whether a generic term denotes a class property or an individual substance of the class. The debate concerns a class property which is clearly distinguished from a shape, and an individual substance which is clearly distinguished from a material.

The attempt to find a single meaning for each of the terms *'ākṛti'* and *'dravya'* is based on the fallacy that authors use a term in a single meaning consistently. It is quite plain that Patañjali uses each of the terms in clearly distinguished meanings. First let us consider how this is true for the term *'ākṛti'*.

1.2.5. Definitions of a *jāti* under 4.1.63

Under 4.1.63, *Jāter astrīviṣayād ayopadhāt*, Patañjali quotes two verses which define a generic property (*jāti*). On the condition that a feminine object is to be denoted, 4.1.63 introduces the suffix *ṅīṣ* after a nominal base denoting a generic property which is not restricted to the feminine and which does not have a penultimate *y*. Patañjali cites two verses to explain the nature of a generic property to which the *sūtra* refers:

> *Jāter ity ucyate kā jātir nāma?*
> (The *sūtra*) says, "after a word denoting a generic property." What is a generic property?"
>
> *Ākṛtigrahaṇā jātir liṅgānāṃ ca na sarvabhāk; sakṛdākhyātanirgrāhyā gotraṃ ca caraṇaiḥ saha.*
> That which is known by means of a shape is a generic property. So is that which does not partake of all genders and which taught once with respect to one object is recognizable in others. Lineage is also a generic property, as are branches of Vedic learning.

> *Apara āha:*
> Someone else says:
>
> *Prādurbhāvavināśābhyāṃ sattvasya yugapad guṇaiḥ;*
> *asarvaliṅgāṃ bahvarthāṃ tāṃ jātiṃ kavayo viduḥ;*
> That which manifests, simultaneously with qualities, at the appearance of an individual substance and disappears, simultaneously with them, at the disappearance of the substance, which does not have all genders and which resides in many objects, that the sages know to be a generic property.
>
> *Gotraṃ ca caraṇāni ca.*
> They consider lineage and branches of Vedic learning generic properties too.[26]

The first quarter of the first verse clearly distinguishes a shape from a generic property. The shape or configuration (*avayavasaṃniveśaviśeṣa*) of an object is a means of knowing its generic property.[27] Here the word *'ākṛti'* denotes the shape, and *'jāti'* denotes the generic property. As a further sign of distinguishing shape from generic property, the verses classify lineage and branches of Vedic learning, where shape is not an identifying factor, as generic properties.

Yet, in commenting on this very *sūtra*, Patañjali uses the word *'ākṛti'* to refer to a generic property. Just after using the term *'ākṛti'* for shape as distinguished from generic property, he uses it to refer to a generic property—the very meaning from which he has just distinguished its previous meaning.

According to the second verse, youthfulness (*kaumārya*) is not considered a generic property because it does not appear at a persons birth and last until the person's death.[28] The first two *pāda*s of the second verse are not satisfied. The nominal base *'kumāra'* denotes youth. 4.1.20, *Vayasi prathame*, provides that the suffix ***ṅīp*** occurs after a nominal base denoting the first stage of life, if a feminine object is to be denoted. This gives the feminine form *'kumārī* (girl)'.[29] A *bahuvrīhi* compound is

---

[26]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 225, lines 13-19. Referred to in MB-K, vol. 1, p. 303, lines 19, 22. For the use of the term *'jāti'*, see MB-K, vol. 2, p. 208, line 22 - p. 209, line 5; p. 219, lines 3-6; p. 222, lines 5-6; p. 226, lines 20-22; p. 227, lines 17-19; p. 250, line 6 - 251, line 1; p. 259, lines 16-19.

[27]See Kaiyaṭa: ***Ākṛtigrahaṇā.*** *Avayavasaṃniveśaviśeṣavyaṅgyety arthaḥ.* MB, vol. 4, p. 80a. Ojihara (1967) discusses the meaning of these verses in detail.

[28]Under 5.3.55, *Atiśāyane tamabiṣṭhanau*, Patañjali says, "That which is obtained by birth is a generic property and there are no superior and inferior degrees of this object. (*Jananena yā prāpyate sā jātir na caitasyārthasya prakarṣāpakarṣau staḥ.*)" MB-K, vol. 2, p. 414, line 4.

[29]6.4.148 deletes the final *a* of *'kumāra'* before the *ī* of the suffix. See 1.2.64, *vārttika* 44 note 56.

formed meaning he whose wife is (just) a girl (*kumārī bhāryā yasya sa*). 6.3.34, *Striyāḥ puṃvad bhāṣitapuṃskād anūṅ samānādhikaraṇe striyām apūraṇīpriyādiṣu*, applies so that in the compound the word *'kumārī'* appears like its masculine counterpart from the same base, *'kumāra'*.[30] The result is *'kumārabhāryaḥ'*.

According to the first verse, youthfulness (*kaumārya*) is considered a generic property. The nominal base *'kumāra'* denotes a generic property, occurs in genders other than the feminine and does not have a penultimate *y*. Hence 4.1.63 applies to form *'kumārī'* ending in the suffix *ṅīṣ* in the feminine.[31] When the *bahuvrīhi* compound is formed meaning he whose wife is a girl, 6.3.41, *jāteś ca*, applies providing an exception to 6.3.34: In the compounds formed on the conditions under which 6.3.34 applies, a term denoting a generic property in the feminine does not appear like its masculine counterpart from the same base. The result is *'kumārībhāryaḥ'* in which *'kumārī'* retains its feminine suffix.[32]

In order to determine the scope of the qualification, "which is not restricted to the feminine (*astrīviṣayād*)," in 4.1.63, Patañjali asks whether the word must occur in the feminine "in the same *ākṛti*" or "in any *ākṛti*":

> *Athāstrīviṣayād iti katham idaṃ vijñāyate: samānāyām ākṛtau yad astrīviṣayam iti, āhosvit kvacid yad astrīviṣayam iti?*
> How is (the phrase) "which is not restricted to the feminine" understood: "which is not restricted to the feminine in the same *ākṛti*," or "which is not restricted to the feminine in any *ākṛti*"?[33]

Similarly, in order to determine the scope of the qualification, "which has a masculine counterpart from the same base (*bhāṣitapuṃskād*)," in 6.3.34, Patañjali asks whether the first constituent of the compound must have a masculine counterpart "in the same *ākṛti*" or "in any *ākṛti*":

> *Bhāṣitapuṃskād iti katham idaṃ vijñāyate: samānayām ākṛtau yad bhāṣitapuṃskam āhosvit kvacid yad bhāṣitapuṃskam iti?*
> How is (the phrase) "which has a masculine counterpart from the same base" understood: "which has a masculine counterpart from the

---

[30]See Cardona 1988: 268-69, 211-12.

[31]This is identical to the word *'kumārī'* ending in *ṅīp*. Hence in order to show a different speech form resulting from conceiving youthfulness as a generic property, Patañjali must derive the compound where the different conception shows its effect in the retention of the feminine suffix.

[32]*Kaḥ punar etayor jātilakṣaṇayor viśeṣaḥ? Yathā pūrvaṃ jātilakṣaṇaṃ tathā kumārībhārya iti bhavitavyam. Yathottaraṃ tathā kumārabhārya iti bhavitavyam.* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 225, lines 20-21.

[33]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 225, lines 22-23.

> same base in the same *ākṛti*," or "which has a masculine counterpart from the same base in any *ākṛti*"?[34]

In both cases, Patañjali uses the word *'ākṛti'* in the phrase, "in the same *ākṛti* (*samānayam ākṛtau*)." The *ākṛti* here is the semantic condition for usage of the word (*pravṛttinimitta*).[35] One of the conditions for usage for all nominal bases to which 4.1.63 applies (and all of the bases which 6.3.41 excepts from the application of the general rule 6.3.34), and with which Patañjali's question is therefore concerned, is a generic property. The semantic condition for usage, here called *ākṛti*, of nominal bases denoting a generic property is a generic property (*jāti*).[36]

---

[34]MB-K, vol. 3, p. 150, lines 3-4. See MB-K, vol. 2, p. 408, lines 13-19; vol. 3, p. 268, lines 4-14.

[35]See, *"Samānāyām ākṛtāv ekasmin pravṛttinimitte,"* in the Kāśikā, part 2, p. 707. (=KNP, part 5, p. 221.) The term *'ākṛti'* in the phrase, *"samānāyām ākṛtau,"* is not restricted to just *jātis*. It extends to the condition for use (*pravṛttinimitta*) of other nominal speech forms as well. However, Patañjali always uses it when the condition for use of a generic term is involved. See under *sūtras* 1.2.66-68 (MB-K, vol. 1, p. 247, lines 17-20; p. 248, lines 4-24) and 7.1.74, *vārttika* 5, *Na vā samānāyām ākṛtau bhāṣitapuṃskavijñānāt* and *bhāṣya* (MB-K, vol. 3, p. 268, lines 4-14). Under 2.2.28, *Tena saheti tulyayoge* (MB-K, vol. 1, p. 429, lines 2-4) and 5.3.28, *Dakṣiṇottarābhyām atasuc* (MB-K, vol. 2, p. 408, lines 13-14) it is used specifically for directions but the discussion there refers to the more general discussion under 6.3.34. Hence we should understand that the meaning *pravṛttinimitta* is an extension of the meaning *jāti* rather than that the meaning *jāti* is a limitation of the meaning *pravṛttinimitta*.

[36]Patañjali's discussion under 4.1.63 seems to conclude that the qualification, "which is not restricted to the feminine (*astrīviṣayād*)," applies to a term in any meaning. Hence it applies to the words *'droṇī'* meaning trough, *'kuṭī'* meaning hut, and *'pātrī'* meaning a particular kind of pot. Each of these words occurs only in the feminine in these meanings, but occurs in the masculine and neuter in other meanings. According to Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa, *'droṇa'* meaning a certain measure occurs in the masculine, *'kuṭa'* meaning a particular pot is used in the masculine, and *'pātra'* meaning a pot in general occurs in the masculine and neuter (MB, vol. 4, p. 81b-82a). If the qualification *astrīviṣaya* limited the application of 4.1.63 to a term which is not restricted to the feminine in the same meaning, it would not apply to these. By accepting that the qualification limits the application of 4.1.63 to a term which is not restricted to the feminine in any meaning, these words are included within the scope of 4.1.63. However, with the qualification *astrīviṣaya* interpreted in this way the condition for the application of the *sūtra* is too broad. It includes the word *'mālā'* meaning a garland and the word *'balākā'* meaning a crane. These words also occur in genders other than the feminine in other meanings. The word *'māla'* meaning rubbing occurs in the masculine, and meaning a certain field occurs in the neuter; the word *'balāka'*, as derived from *'bala + āka'*, meaning braggard, agrees in gender with the word it qualifies. But it is not desired that 4.1.63 apply to them. To prevent *ṅīṣ* from occurring after the nominal bases to which the *sūtra* should not apply, he suggests including the derivates *'mālā'* and *'balākā'* of these bases in the set beginning with *'ajā'*. 4.1.4 provides the suffix *ṭāp* for the members of the set beginning with *'ajā'* as an exception to 4.1.63. Pāṇini 4.1.4. *Ajādyataṣ ṭāp*. The affix *ṭāp* occurs after a base ending in *a* and specifically in

Hence Patañjali uses the word *'ākṛti'* to refer to a generic property under 4.1.63. He does so just after citing a verse the first quarter of which clearly distinguishes between a shape (*ākṛti*) and a generic property (*jāti*). Therefore, he uses the word *'ākṛti'* to refer to two types of objects, a generic property and a shape, which he clearly distinguishes from each other.

1.2.6. Śivasūtra 1, *A i u ṇ*

Finally, Kātyāyana distinguishes class property from configuration under Śivasūtra 1, *A i u ṇ*. In *vārttika* 13, *Ākṛtigrahaṇāt siddham*, he concludes that mentioning the sound *a* refers to all instances of all sounds of the a-class (*avarṇa*) "because it includes the class property (*ākṛti*)." In *vārttika* 16, *Rūpasāmānyād vā*, he gives the alternative solution, "or because they have the same form (*rūpa*)." The second *vārttika* offers a solution which is different from the first. It is different only if the word *'ākṛti'* in the first denotes something different from what the word *'rūpa'* denotes in the second. In the first, *'ākṛti'* refers to a generic property common to all the individual *a*-sounds of various qualities. In the second, *'rūpa'* refers to an aspect of each individual sound which is similar from one to the other.[37] Hence, *'ākṛti'* in *vārttika* 13 denotes a class property as opposed to a configuration denoted by *'rūpa'* in *vārttika* 16.

---

the derivates *'ajā'*, etc. *"Astu kvacid yad astrīviṣayam iti. Katham mālā balāketi? Ajādiṣu pāṭhaḥ kariṣyate."* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 225, lines 25-26.

On the other hand, Patañjali concludes that the qualification, "which has a masculine counterpart from the same base (*bhāṣitapuṃskād*)," in 6.3.34, applies to a term only in the same meaning. *"Astu samānāyām ākṛtau yad bhāṣitapuṃskam iti."* MB-K, vol. 3, p. 150, lines 6-7.

Haradattamiśra concludes in his Padamañjarī commentary on 4.1.63 that there too the qualification applies to a term in the same meaning, not in any meaning. With this qualification the application of 4.1.63 is too narrow. It does not apply to form the derivates *'droṇī'*, *'kuṭī'*, and *'pātrī'*. he suggests including them in the set of bases beginning with *'gaura'*. 4.1.41, *Ṣidgaurādibhyaś ca*, provides for the feminine suffix *ṅīṣ* after the bases of the set beginning with *'gaura* (white)' as well as after bases ending in an affix marked with *ṣ*. *"Gaurādipāṭhāt siddham."* KNP, part 3, p. 369. Note that *'droṇa'* does appear eleventh in the set beginning with *'gaura'* in the Kāśikā, part 1, p.328.

[37] I have stated the difference as Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa understand it. Kaiyaṭa: ***Ākṛtigrahaṇād*** *iti. Akārajātiḥ sarvapradeśeṣu nirdiśyate.* MB, vol. 1, p. 88a. Nāgeśa under ***Rūpasāmānyāt: Abhedavyavahāra*** *iti. Rūpasādṛśya-nibandhanapratyabhijñākṛtābhedavyavahāra ity arthaḥ.* MB, vol. 1, p. 89a. However, it may be that the configuration (*rūpa*) itself is considered a general property in *vārttika* 16. In that case, the difference is that the class property (*ākṛti*) in *vārttika* 13 is considered to be merely an abstract entity presumed as the basis for identifying each sound as being of the same kind, while the configuration is considered to be a perceptible characteristic.

1.2.7. *'Ākṛti'* and *'Jāti'* are Synonymous under 1.2.58 and 1.2.64

We have seen that Patañjali uses the term *'ākṛti'* in two distinct meanings: 1) a class property, and 2) a shape. In the first sense it is equivalent to a generic property (*jāti*), and in the second to a configuration (*avayavasaṃsthāna*). The following paragraphs show that Patañjali uses the term *'ākṛti'* to mean a class property in his commentary on 1.2.64 concerning the denotation of generic terms. As such it is synonymous with the term *'jāti'* meaning a generic property.

Many of the characteristics attributed to a generic property (*jāti*) in the verses Patañjali cites under 4.1.63 are explicitly attributed to an *ākṛti* under 1.2.64.

The phrase, "Which taught once with respect to one object is recognizable in others (*sakṛdākhyātanirgrāhyā*)," is used to describe a generic property in the first verse under 4.1.63 (§1.2.5). Kātyāyana says, "And taught once, it is known," of an *ākṛti* in 1.2.64, *vārttika* 38, *Jñāyate caikopadiṣṭam*. The phrase, "Which resides in many objects (*bahvarthām*)," is used to describe a generic property in the second verse under 4.1.63 (§1.2.5). 1.2.64, *vārttikas* 40 and 56 (*Asti caikam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapat*, etc.) assert being present in many substrata simultaneously as an essential property of an *ākṛti*, and *vārttika* 48 denies the possibility of this in attempting to refute the existence of an *ākṛti* (§1.3.2-4, §1.4.1).

The phrase, "Which does not partake of all genders (*liṅgānāṃ ca na sarvabhāk*)," in the first verse, and the phrase, "Which does not have all genders (*asarvaliṅgām*)," in the second verse, speak of a generic property as being associated with fewer than the three genders. Under 1.2.64, *vārttika* 53 [53a], Patañjali speaks of a generic property as gender specific. He says, "A generic property is gender specific; from origin to destruction it does not abandon the gender it starts out with (*Āviṣṭaliṅgā jātir....*)." He uses the word 'generic property (*jāti*)' to refer to the very object which he has been calling an *ākṛti* throughout his commentary on 1.2.64. The reason he uses a different word for the same object at that point is that the statement is taken from his commentary on 1.2.52, *Viśeṣaṇānāṃ cājāteḥ* (§1.5.4 note 79). In that context the word 'generic property (*jāti*)' is used because it appears in the *sūtra* itself.

Similarly, both Kātyāyana and Patañjali discuss the question of the denotation of generic terms under 1.2.58 in terms of whether a generic property (*jāti*) or an individual substance (*dravya*) is denoted. The major question at issue is whether the object denoted is a single object or many objects. The same issue permeates the debate whether a generic term denotes an *ākṛti* or a

dravya under 1.2.64. This is most evident in the discussions related to the application of the rule that one remains (*vārttikas* 1-3, 28-35, 52, 59) and the occurrence of different number-terminations (*vārttikas* 27, 46, 53-54). With the same point at issue on the same topic with the same alternative (that the generic term denotes a *dravya*), the discussion under 1.2.58 uses the term '*jāti*' and the discussion under 1.2.64 uses the term '*ākṛti*'. One is forced to conclude that the terms are synonymous. The term '*ākṛti*' under 1.2.64 means a class property. The reason the term '*jāti*' is used instead under 1.2.58 is that Pāṇini himself uses it in the *sūtra*.

1.2.8. *Dravya:* an Individual Object under 1.2.58 and 1.2.64

Patañjali uses the term '*dravya*' in different meanings just as he uses the term '*ākṛti*' in different meanings. He uses the term '*dravya*' in at least three distinct senses: 1) an individual object, 2) a material, and 3) wealth. For example, in the phrase, "He whose wealth (*dravya*) something is does what he has to with it," he uses the word '*dravya*' to mean wealth.[38] We have already discussed the use of the term in the first two meanings in the Paspaśāhnika (§1.2.3). In the discussions concerning the denotation of generic terms under 1.2.58, 1.2.64, and elsewhere, Kātyāyana and Patañjali use the term '*dravya*' to mean an individual object.

The advantage of the view that a generic term denotes a *dravya* over the view that it denotes a class property is that the former view naturally accounts for differences. The use of dual and plural terminations is achieved naturally on the view that a generic term denotes a *dravya*. 1.2.58, *vārttika* 6, *Aśiṣyaṃ vā bahuvat pṛthaktvābhidhānāt*, says that there is no need to make a special provision for the plural terminations on a generic term because it denotes many objects as separate. *Vārttika* 7, *Jātiśabdena hi dravyābhidhānam*, explicitly uses the word '*dravya*' to refer to these separate objects (§1.8).

1.2.64, *vārttika* 46, *Tathā ca liṅgavacanasiddhiḥ*, also claims that dual and plural terminations are achieved naturally on the view that a generic term denotes a *dravya*. Similarly, *vārttika* 46 says that the use of a generic term in different genders is achieved naturally on the view that a generic term denotes a *dravya* (§1.3.3). The use of more than one of the same word in analytic strings and usages attributing different qualities to the

[38] *Ataś cāvayavā evārthavanto na samudāyā yasya hi tad dravyaṃ bhavati sa tena kāryaṃ karoti yasya ca tā gāvaḥ santi sa tāsāṃ kṣīraṃ ghṛtaṃ copabhuṅkte 'nyair etad draṣṭum apy aśakyam.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 217, lines 19-21. For another use of '*dravya*' meaning wealth, see MB-K, vol. 2, p. 340, lines 11-16.

objects they denote are natural if the words denote different individual objects. *Vārttikas* 50-51 (*Asti ca vairūpyam. Tathā ca vigrahaḥ*) assert that these usages are accounted for naturally on the view that a generic term denotes a *dravya* (§1.3.3).

The use of more than one of the same word in analytic strings and usages attributing differences to the objects they denote are difficulties, on the view that a generic term denotes a class property, because a class property is a single object. As a single object, it cannot have any number other than the singular number, nor can it have different properties at once. In defense of the view that a generic term denotes a class property, under *vārttika* 54 Patañjali explains the use of dual and plural terminations and different gender terminations based on the dual and plural number and different genders of the *dravyas* in which the class property resides (§1.5.4). After stating in *vārttika* 55, *Adhikaraṇagatiḥ sāhacaryāt*, that cognition of a substratum arises because it accompanies the class property, in *vārttika* 58, *Vairūpyavigrahau dravyabhedāt*, Kātyāyana explains that the differences one speaks of as belonging to a class property are due to the differences of the *dravyas* (§1.3.4).

The passages noted attribute the fact that it naturally accounts for differences, and for dual and plural number, to the view that a generic term denotes a *dravya*. Differences, and dual and plural number, naturally belong to two or more distinct individual objects. They do not naturally belong to a single object. The material out of which objects are made is a single object; hence dual and plural number, and differences of gender and other qualities are as foreign to it as they are to a class property. If Kātyāyana and Patañjali used the word *'dravya'* to mean the material out of which various individual bodies are made, the view that a generic term denotes a *dravya* would have precisely the same difficulties as the view that a generic term denotes a class property. The fact that these difficulties are attributed solely to the view that a generic term denotes a class property and that different gender and number terminations and other usages based on the differences of the objects they denote are naturally achieved on the view that a generic term denotes a *dravya*, shows that such a *dravya* is conceived of as an individual object, not as the material out of which objects are made. Therefore, Kātyāyana and Patañjali use the term *'dravya'* in 1.2.58, 1.2.64, and in other discussions concerning the denotation of generic terms, to mean an individual object.

1.2.9. Conclusions Regarding the Term *'ākṛti'* and Other Terms

We have concluded that in their extended discussions concerning the denotation of class terms, Kātyāyana and Patañjali use the term *'ākṛti'* to mean a class property and the term *'dravya'* to mean an individual object. Therefore, the question concerning the denotation of generic terms has to do with whether a generic term denotes a class property or an individual object, not whether it denotes a shape or a material. Other authors in different cultural contexts have raised the same question in terms of universal versus particular, type versus token, etc. In the discussions that follow and in the translations of the selections from the Mahābhāṣya, the English words 'class property' and 'individual substance' translate the Sanskrit *'ākṛti'* and *'dravya'* respectively. The term 'generic property' translates the Sanskrit *'jāti'*. Even though *'ākṛti'* and *'jāti'* in these discussions are synonymous, the distinct use of the Sanskrit terms has been preserved by translating them consistently with the synonyms 'class property' for *'ākṛti'* and 'generic property' for *'jāti'*.

Although I regularly translate *'ākṛti'* as 'class property' and *'jāti'* as 'generic property', there is one drawback in doing so. We consider a class to be the collection or set of all objects in which the class property is present, and clearly distinguish between the class property and the class. Neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali distinguishes between a class property and the class it serves to define, or between a generic property and the genus it serves to define. They do consider an *ākṛti* a property because they speak of it as residing in substrata just as qualities do. These substrata are the individual substances of the class. Kātyāyana in *vārttikas* 40, 41, 48, 55, and 56, and Patañjali in his commentary thereon, speak of it in relation to its substrata. But this does not imply that it is an entity distinct from the class itself. Indeed, number and action are also considered to be properties of objects in which they inhere.

Vārttika 49, *Vināśe prādurbhāve ca sarvaṃ tathā syāt*, implies that the class property is identical to the class. This *vārttika* raises the following objection against the view that a generic term denotes a class property: If a generic term denotes a class property, to say that the denoted object comes into being or dies is to say that all of the individuals of the kind do so. This objection makes sense for a class but not for a class property. It is true that if a class property is destroyed, then there are no longer any objects of the class either. But if a class property comes into being or manifests itself, it does not imply that every object that ever is, was, or will be of that kind comes into being with it. It implies only that at least one does. As *vārttika* 40a, *Asti caikam*

anekādhikaraṇastham yugapat, states, and Patañjali's discussion under *vārttika* 43 makes clear, the class property has the relation of being wholly present in each of its substrata. Hence one individual of the class is sufficient to manifest the class property.

A class does not have the relation of being wholly present in each of its substrata. A class has the relation with individual objects of the class of being one object in relation to all of the individual objects collectively, just as the number 3 is a single object in relation to three individual objects collectively (it has *vyāsajyavṛtti*). Hence a class requires all of the individual objects of the class to come into being in order for it to come into being. So speaking of the class as coming into being implies that all individuals of the class come into being. Understanding the object as a class better suits the intent of the objection raised in *vārttika* 47 than understanding it as a class property does.[39]

Similarly, in the phrase, "if the word refers to a class (*jātyākhyāyām*)," in *sūtra* 1.2.58, I translate *'jāti'* as 'class' rather than 'generic property'. The first objection raised against the *sūtra* in Patañjali's commentary asserts that the plural terminations are naturally appropriate because there are many objects. Nothing in the word 'class property' implies that there are many objects while the word 'class' does. Translating *'jāti'* as 'class' here brings out the implication which the first objection shows is present in the term *'jāti'*.

Patañjali uses the word *'sāmānya'*, which I translate 'general property', to mean anything common to more than one object. Hence he often uses it to refer to a generic property or class property. However, he also uses it to refer to an action or a number (which are not considered generic or class properties). Commenting on 1.2.64, *vārttika* 59, *Vyartheṣu ca sāmānyāt siddham*, Patañjali mentions action and number as general properties common to the various meanings of polysemous terms (§1.3.4).

1.3. The Denotation of Generic Terms

In the Paspaśāhnika, Patañjali briefly states that a word denotes both a class property and an individual substance. He says that this conclusion is based on the fact that Pāṇini composed his rules in both ways. He composed 1.2.58, *Jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām*, considering that a generic term denotes a class property, and he composed 1.2.64,

---

[39]See §1.3.3 note 58 and 1.2.64 translation, *vārttika* 49. Note that Kaiyaṭa states the objection as applying to a class property and reinterprets the *vārttika* to mean as much. See *vārttika* 49 note 63.

Sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau, considering that it denotes an individual substance.[40]

While this passage does express Patañjali's conclusion concerning the denotation of generic terms, it is not necessarily the case that the statement of 1.2.64 implies that a generic term denotes an individual substance. Under 1.2.64 Patañjali discusses the denotation of generic terms at length and clarifies his conclusions on the subject under 1.2.58. We will investigate his views by reconstructing the nature of the problem as it arises for a grammarian.[41]

1.3.1. Denotation is Natural

1.3.1.1. Concomitant Presence and Absence

I have mentioned that Patañjali singles out a speech form from among the various entities which together form the single whole of an experience as the means by which a knower knows an object of experience. Speech is continuous. A continuous uninterrupted utterance goes alongside a continuous stream of knowledge of objects. By observing these two parallel streams, the grammarian sees certain elements of speech which co-occur with certain cognitions of objects. When a certain speech form is present, a certain object is known. When that speech form is absent that object is not known. By observing the corresponding presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*) of certain speech forms with the knowledge of certain objects, the grammarian determines that certain speech forms denote certain objects. Ordinary usage is the ultimate criterion of the meaning of words, and observation of the corresponding presence and absence of words and knowledge of objects in ordinary usage is the means to determine their meaning.[42]

---

[40]*Kiṃ punar ākṛtiḥ padārtha āhosvid dravyam? Ubhayam ity āha. Kathaṃ jñāyate? Ubhayathā hy ācāryeṇa sūtrāṇi paṭhitāni. Ākṛtiṃ padārthaṃ matvā Jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām* (1.2.58) *ity ucyate. Dravyaṃ padārthaṃ matvā Sarūpāṇām* (1.2.64) *ity ekaśeṣa ārabhyate.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 6, lines 8-11.

[41]Under 5.1.119, *Tasya bhāvas tvatalau*, and 5.3.55, *Atiśāyane tamabiṣṭhanau*, Patañjali discusses the question whether a word denotes a property or an individual substance. I cannot deal with these sections in detail here although I will mention the essentials of the former discussion. Although inconclusive, the latter discussion is interesting for its portrayal of the two extreme views, which it commences as follows: *Kaḥ punar ṅyāpprātipadikārthaḥ? Dravyam. Na vai dravyasya prakarṣa iṣyate. Evaṃ tarhi guṇaḥ.* See MB-K, vol 2, pp. 413-15.

[42]See Cardona (1988: 499-503, 1967-68: 313-352, 1981: 79-104, 1983: 37-116) concerning *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Scharfe (1961) deals with varied aspect

Take for example the generic term *'vṛkṣa* (tree)'. Observing ordinary usage one sees that, when the speech form *'vṛkṣaḥ* (*vṛkṣa + s*)' is used, one understands a certain meaning: that which has roots, a trunk, fruit, and leaves, and singular number. When *'vṛkṣau* (*vṛkṣa + au*)' is used, the speech form *'vṛkṣa'* remains, *s* is missing and *au* is added. Some meaning also is missing, some is added, and some remains. Singular number is missing, dual number is added, and that which has roots, a trunk, fruit, and leaves remains. The meaning which is missing belongs to the speech form which is missing, the meaning which is added belongs to the speech form which is added, and the meaning which remains belongs to the speech form which remains.[43]

In this manner, by concomitant presence and absence of certain speech forms with certain meanings, one determines which meaning belongs to the base and which to the suffix. The use of the base *'vṛkṣa'* corresponds to the meaning, that which has roots, a trunk, fruit, and leaves. The use of the suffix *s* corresponds to the meaning, singular number; the use of the suffix *au* to dual number, and *as* to plural number.[44] Hence *'vṛkṣa'* denotes that which has roots, a trunk, fruit, and leaves, and the suffixes *s*, *au*, and *as* denote singular, dual, and plural number, respectively.

1.3.1.2. One Word Used for Each Object Denoted

Now consider the fact that speech forms are used in order to convey knowledge of the objects they denote. Each time knowledge of a certain object is to be conveyed, one speech form denoting that object will be used. There is a one to one relationship between the knowledge of the object and the use of the speech form denoting the object.

We have been very careful to say that it is the knowledge of the object to which the speech form corresponds rather than to the object itself. The question is open whether a single cognition can have 1) many objects or 2) only a single object. Suppose that

---

of Patañjali's logical procedures, and Staal (1988) deals with several logical concepts in Indian thought. Halbfass (1983: 54-67) examines Śaṅkara's references to *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.

[43]See Patañjali under 1.2.45, *vārttika* 9, *Siddhaṃ tv anvayavyatirekābhyām*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 219, lines 19-27.

[44]*Yatas tu khalu niyogato vṛkṣa ity ukte svabhāvataḥ kasmiṃścid arthe pratītir upajāyate 'to manyāmahe neme sāmānyaśabdā iti. Na cet sāmānyaśabdāḥ prakṛtiḥ prakṛtyarthe vartate pratyayaḥ pratyayārthe.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 220, lines 6-8. For a more complete discussion on this section of the Mahābhāṣya see Cardona 1967-68: 332-36.

it has only a single object. For each cognition there is a single object known.

We have just said that there is a one to one relationship between the knowledge of the object and the use of the speech form denoting the object. We have also made the supposition that a single cognition has a single object. The principle may be formulated on the basis of these two statements that for each object denoted a single speech form is used. In 1.2.64, *vārttika* 1, Kātyāyana states this principle using the phrase, "words apply per object (*pratyartham śabdaniveśaḥ*)."

1.3.1.3. The Grounds for the Rule that One Remains

Now suppose that a generic term denotes an individual substance and not a generic property. We have just determined by concomitant presence and absence that the nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* denotes that which has roots, a trunk, fruit, and leaves. Hence the nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* denotes each individual tree. To denote each individual tree, one nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* is used. In this case a problem arises: To denote many trees, many bases *'vṛkṣa vṛkṣa vṛkṣa'* would arise. Although it is accepted usage to refer to many trees singly by using one word *'vṛkṣaḥ'* for each (each base *'vṛkṣa'* with the singular termination *s*), it is also accepted that one word *'vṛkṣāḥ'* (one base *'vṛkṣa'* with the plural termination *as*) refers to many trees. This latter usage would not arise. In order to obtain this usage, one would have to provide for it explicitly. 1.2.64, *Sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*, accomplishes this. According to 1.2.64, just one of speech units of the same form remains if they occur with one inflectional termination.[45]

---

[45]Cardona (1988: 11-12, 306-8), gives an overview of rules providing for a single remainder. Patañjali debates whether the rule applies to nominal bases (*prātipadika*) or to words (*pada*) at length. On each alternative, Patañjali addresses problems in the derivation on alternative interpretations of the *sūtra*. I cannot discuss all of these problems and alternatives here. However, whether the remainder of one applies to nominal bases or to words, it is still true that one nominal base would arise for each object denoted. The following sketches of derivations merely illustrate the two alternatives. If 1.2.64 applies to nominal bases, the derivation may be sketched like this:

vṛkṣa vṛkṣa vṛkṣa	One base arises before the termination to denote each individual tree.
vṛkṣa vṛkṣa vṛkṣa + as	The plural termination arises by 1.4.21.
vṛkṣa + as	Just one base remains before the termination by 1.2.64.
vṛkṣās	6.4.102.

If 1.2.64 applies to words, the derivation may be sketched as follows:

vṛkṣa, vṛkṣa, vṛkṣa	One base arises to denote each individual tree.

Given the two assumptions 1) that for each object denoted a single speech form is used, and 2) that a generic term denotes an individual substance, one cannot account for the use of one speech form in the plural referring to many individual substances naturally. One must make an explicit statement in order to bring this about.[46] Although *sūtra* 1.2.64 achieves the use of one speech form in the plural on these assumptions, this solution is not satisfactory. It is preferable to account for the usage of certain speech forms as naturally arising on the basis of certain principles to convey their meanings rather than to have to state a rule explicitly.

The grammatical procedure of allowing many speech forms to occur to denote many objects and then providing that just one of those speech forms remains to denote those objects is an artifice to make known that the one word which remains denotes many meanings. Such procedures are used in Pāṇini's grammar for the purpose of making known correct speech forms. The provision and deletion of grammatical elements is such a procedure. It makes known that the meaning attributed to a grammatical element by concomitant presence and absence is sometimes present even in the absence of that grammatical element. For example, the word *'somasut'* is formed by providing the suffix ***kvip*** after the verbal root *√suñ* when the subordinate word *'soma'* denotes the direct object, and the word *'agnicit'* is formed by providing the same suffix after the verbal root *√ciñ* when the subordinate word *'agni'* denotes the direct object. The suffix ***kvip***, called *kṛt*, occurs to denote the agent of the action denoted by the verbal root. The suffix is later deleted. However,

---

vṛkṣa-s, vṛkṣa-s, vṛkṣa-s	A singular termination arises after each nominal base by 1.4.22.
vṛkṣa-s + vṛkṣa-s + vṛkṣa-s	A *dvandva* compound is formed by 2.2.29, *Cārthe dvandvaḥ*.
(*vṛkṣa-s vṛkṣa-s vṛkṣa-s*) + *as*	The plural termination arises after the *dvandva* base by 1.4.21.
vṛkṣa-s + as	Just one word remains before the termination by 1.2.64.
vṛkṣa + as	The termination *s* of the base is deleted by 2.4.71.
vṛkṣās	6.1.102.

See 1.2.64 translation, note 81 for 1.4.21-22; note 27 concerning 2.2.29.

2.4.71. *Supo dhātuprātipadikayoḥ (luk 58).* Zero (*luk*) replaces a nominal termination (*sup*) which is part of a denominative verbal root (*dhātu* 3.1.32) or a nominal base (*prātipadika*).

6.1.102. *Prathamayoḥ pūrvasavarṇaḥ* (*aci 77, ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ 84, akaḥ dīrghaḥ 101*). A long vowel homogenous with the preceding sound is the single replacement of an *a, i, u, ṛ* or *ḷ* and the initial vowel of a following first or second triplet nominal termination.

[46]Note that given the first assumption, Patañjali's statement in the Paspaśāhnika that Pāṇini composed 1.2.64 considering that a generic term denotes an individual substance is true.

the meaning remains. The derivates *'agnicit'* and *'somasut'* denote the agents of building a fire and pressing soma even though any affix denoting an agent is absent.[47]

Pāṇini has to posit deletion in his grammar because the relation of a grammatical element and the meaning in which it is provided are not entirely coextensive. In the example of the suffix ***kvip***, the absence of the suffix in the words *'somasut'* and *'agnicit'* is evidence that the suffix is absent when its meaning is present.[48] The relationship of the suffix and its meaning falls short of strict concomitant presence and absence. The concomitant presence and absence is posited to enable the formulation of a general rule that the grammatical element occurs to denote a certain meaning. Deletion is then posited to account for the exceptions.

Just as concomitant presence and absence is merely posited in the case of deletion, similarly, it is merely posited in the case of the use of one speech form used to denote many objects. It has been accepted as the second assumption above that a generic term denotes an individual substance. If one closely observes ordinary usage one sees that when the nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* is present, sometimes the meaning "one tree" is present, sometimes the meaning "two trees", and sometimes the meaning "many trees". The usage of the base *'vṛkṣa'* is not coextensive with the meaning "one tree" (nor with the meanings "two trees" or "many trees"). The concomitant presence and absence of the nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* with the meaning, one tree, is posited in

---

[47]The sūtra-rejecter argues that there is a difference between the provision and deletion of *lopa* and the provision that one remains. He claims that the former is necessary to derive the correct speech forms whereas the provision that one remains is not. 1.1.62, *Pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇam*, provides that an operation conditioned by an affix applies even if the affix has been deleted. In the example Patañjali gives under 1.2.64, the suffix ***kvip*** is a *kṛt* affix marked with *p*. 6.1.71, *Hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk*, provides that the final augment ***tuk*** is added to a short vowel before such an affix. Although the suffix ***kvip*** has been deleted, by virtue of 1.1.62 it provides the condition for the application of 6.1.71 which provides the final *t* in the words *'somasut'* and *'agnicit'*. In this way the provision of the suffix ***kvip*** and its replacement by *lopa* serve a purpose in deriving the correct speech forms. It is not merely an artifice to make known that a certain speech form has a different meaning without effecting any change in the speech form itself. Although this distinction may be valid for *lopa* because of 1.1.62, it is not valid for *luk*. The provision of a grammatical element and its deletion by *luk* effects no change in the stem (1.1.63, *Na lumatāṅgasya*); it is merely an artifice to make known that a certain speech form has the meaning of the deleted element (and to allow the term *'pada'* to apply). See 1.2.64 translation, *vārttika* 29 notes 18 and 23. Concerning positing zero replacements, see Cardona 1988: 503-10.

[48]Actually, according to the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, ***kvip*** is always deleted by 6.1.67 (see translation, *vārttika* 29 note 18). It is termed *apṛkta* by 1.2.41, *Apṛkta ekāl pratyayaḥ*, because it consists of the isolated sound *v*. See Cardona 1988: 48 and 1975.

order to abide by the general principle that for each object denoted a single speech form is used (§1.3.1.2, §1.3.1.3 assumption 1). The remainder of one is then posited to account for the cases where the use of the nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* does not correspond to one tree but rather to two trees or many trees.

1.3.1.4. One Word Naturally Denotes Many Meanings

According to the first assumption, a single speech form is used for each object denoted. Suppose that we do not accept this assumption. Although the assumption is based on the fact that speech forms are used in order to convey their meaning, the fact does not imply that a speech form necessarily conveys only one object. The meaning a speech form conveys may include more than one object. That speech forms are used in order to convey meaning implies only that the appropriate speech form is used when the meaning it denotes is to be conveyed. Let us replace the first assumption with this one, and hold onto the second, that a generic term denotes an individual substance.

Now let us reexamine the ordinary usage of the generic term *'vṛkṣa'*. We find that if the meaning to be conveyed is one tree, the speech form used is *'vṛkṣaḥ'*, if the meaning to be conveyed is two trees, the speech form used is *'vṛkṣau'*, if the meaning to be conveyed is many trees, it is *'vṛkṣāḥ'*. The nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* is never used alone so, properly speaking, it does not convey meaning by itself. It conveys meaning only when used together with a suffix.[49] Therefore, accepting that the base and suffix together constitute the meaningful speech unit, and not attempting to extract a nominal base with a consistent meaning, even if it is accepted that generic terms denote individual objects one can account for correct usage naturally.

Grammar is an empirical science. It formulates rules to account for existing usage. The fact that speech forms are used in order to convey meaning implies that the speech form used for a certain meaning arises naturally to convey an understanding which speakers have. Hence the ordinary use of language has inherent in it certain commonly held conceptions concerning the nature of things, and certain usages presuppose certain conceptions. In the course of formulating and examining rules to account for ordinary usage, many of these conceptions and presuppositions come to the fore. Patañjali comes upon the

[49]See 1.2.45, *vārttika* 7, *Arthavattā nopapadyate kevalenāvacanāt*, and *vārttika* 8, *Na vā pratyayena nityasaṃbandhāt kevalasyāprayogaḥ*, and *bhāṣya*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 219, lines 10-18.

question whether a generic term denotes a generic property or an individual substance because certain usages seem to presuppose that it denotes one or the other. In determining which it denotes, he weighs the assumption that it denotes one or the other against other assumptions such as that for each object denoted a single speech form is used.

In deciding whether to accept an assumption or not, Patañjali tests whether grammatical rules can be formulated in a simpler way to account for all the usages by accepting the assumption rather than in a more complicated way by rejecting it, or vice versa.[50] That a certain assumption leads to a simpler formulation of rules is evidence that that assumption is in fact a presupposition of ordinary usage of the language. If it leads to an additional formulation of rules, it is evidence that it is not a presupposition. Hence, if adopting an assumption entails the explicit formulation of a rule but rejecting it does not require such an explicit statement, it is a reason for rejecting the assumption. Given the assumption that 2) a generic term denotes an individual substance, to accept 1) for each object denoted a single speech form is used requires the explicit formulation of the rule that just one of homophonous speech forms remains.

The explicit formulation of the rule can be avoided even by accepting that a generic term denotes an individual substance, if one does not carry out the analysis of word-meaning relation by concomitant presence and absence fully. If one does not attempt to attribute a consistent meaning to the nominal base separately, then one may accept that the word *'vṛkṣāḥ'* and other plural forms denote many individual substances. In this case one word denotes many objects. The principle that one word denotes one object cannot be adhered to as such. It can be accepted only in the looser sense that each word is used to denote whatever its meaning is whether that meaning be one object, two objects, or many objects.

On the other hand, if one does carry out the analysis of word-meaning relation by concomitant presence and absence fully and does attribute a consistent meaning to the nominal base, given the assumption that one word is used for each object denoted, to accept that a generic term denotes an individual substance requires one to formulate the rule that just one of homophonous speech forms remains.

---

[50]Similarly Filliozat 1991: 63.

1.3.1.5. Reasons for Positing Generic Properties

Rejecting the assumption that one word is used for each object denoted, it is accepted outright that a generic term in the plural has a one-many relation with the individual substances it denotes. According to the assumption that one word is used for each object denoted, there is a one-one relationship between a word used and the object denoted. Given the assumption that a generic term denotes an individual substance, when there are many individual substances to be denoted, many words arise because of the one-one relationship between the word used and object denoted. By the application of 1.2.64 the single word which remains has a one-many relation with many individual substances.

The fact that words are used to convey meaning implies that a certain word conveys a certain cognition. A generic term applies to each of many objects based on the fact that the cognition which the term conveys is the same for each of many objects. Whether in actual fact there is a single object that is the basis of the same cognition is not a matter of concern for a grammarian. The fact that there is an identical cognition is. Speakers use words based directly on their knowledge of objects, not based directly on the objects themselves.

A generic term used in the plural conveys a single cognition of many objects as identical to each other. Ordinary speakers have a single cognition of many objects as identical to each other. There is a one-many relationship between the one cognition and the many objects. Similarly there is a one-many relation between the generic term used to convey that cognition and the many objects.

The innocent assumption regarding every cognition is that it is correct unless some other evidence contradicts it. When one has knowledge of an object, one innocently assumes that the object is as one knows it. Hence it is natural to assume that a single entity is the basis of a single cognition of many objects as identical to each other. One assumes that a single forest is the basis of the cognition of many individual trees as a group. One assumes that a single number 2 is the basis of the cognition of two objects as a pair. Similarly, one may assume that a single generic property or class property is the basis of the cognition of many objects as being of a kind.

For example, the word 'cow' is used for each of many individual cows. The word 'cow' is used for each of them based on the fact that one recognizes each object as a cow. The knowledge, "x is a cow," is identical regarding the many individual cows. Not only does one have the identical cognition

with respect to each cow, but in addition one recognizes that each cow is identical in so far as it is a cow. The existence of a single generic property, cowness, present in each cow is posited as the basis for the same cognition regarding each cow and the cognition that each is the same. In any case in which an identical cognition arises regarding each of many objects and one knows each of those objects as being the same in a certain respect, one posits the existence of a generic property present in each of them.

A generic term used in the plural has a one-many relation with individual substances. The single generic term is used to convey a single cognition of many individual substances as identical to each other. There is a one-many relation between the cognition and the individual substances. If one accepts that a single class property is the basis of the cognition of many individual substances as identical to each other, the class property has a one-many relation to the many individual substances. But the single class property accepted as the basis of the single cognition may be accepted as the object denoted by the generic term. In this case, there is a one-one relation between the word used and the object denoted.

Therefore, one may uphold assumption one, that for each object denoted a single speech form is used, and still account for the use of a single generic term arising in a natural way. The generic property is a single object so it is natural that one word is used to denote it. By accepting that a generic term denotes a class property one accounts for the use of a single generic term to refer to many individual substances naturally without having to formulate the explicit rule that just one of homophonous speech forms remains.

1.3.2. A Generic Term Denotes a Class Property

Patañjali presents two views of what a generic term denotes under 1.2.64. In *vārttika* 35, *Ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikaṃ vibhaktau Vājapyāyanaḥ*, Kātyāyana mentions Vājapyāyana as a proponent of the view that a generic term denotes a class property, and in *vārttika* 45, *Dravyābhidhānaṃ Vyāḍiḥ*, he mentions Vyāḍi as a proponent of the view that it denotes an individual substance. In *vārttikas* 36-44 Kātyāyana presents reasons for the view that a generic term denotes a class property.

Vārttika 35 makes known the implication of the view that a generic term denotes a class property for the need to state 1.2.64. The *sūtra* is unnecessary on this view because it is natural that just one nominal base arises before an inflectional termination. 1.2.58, *vārttika* 1, *Jātyākhyāyāṃ sāmānyābhidhānād*

aikārthyam, voices what is understood here, that denoting the class property means the word has just one object (§1.8).

Vārttika 36, *Prakhyāviśeṣāt*, asserts that there is an identical cognition with respect to each of the individual substances of a kind. In itself this is evidence for the existence of a class property. If this identical cognition arises from the use of a generic term, it also serves as evidence that a generic term denotes a class property. Patañjali gives an example of identical cognition arising from the use of a generic term. He says that the use of the generic term 'cow' does not lead to the cognition of the specific features of any individual cow.

Vārttika 37, *Avyapavargagateś ca*, asserts that in addition to identical cognition with respect to each of the individual substances of a kind, one knows that they are not set apart from each other. One knows that each is the same as the other in some respect. Here Patañjali gives the same example of the use of the generic term 'cow'. Hence this reason serves as evidence both for the existence and denotation of a class property. The knowledge of individual substances as not set apart from each other is evidence that they have a common class property. If this knowledge arises from the use of a generic term, it is evidence for the fact that a generic term denotes that class property.

Vārttika 38, *Jñāyate caikopadiṣṭam*, supports the evidence given in *vārttika* 36 for the existence of a class property. Together with Patañjali's explanation, it states that once one is taught what one individual substance of a certain class is, one knows what other individual substances of that class are too. Once one is taught that one object is a cow, one recognizes other animals of different colors and ages at different times and places as being cows. If a common property were not present in the different individuals of the class, this would not be possible. Therefore, there must be a class property which they have in common. Having learned the class property in a specific individual of the class, one recognizes it in any individual substance in which it resides. The fact that one recognizes a previously unknown individual substance is evidence that it has a property which one has known previously in another individual. The fact that one recognizes a number of objects as being x is evidence that there is a single generic property, x-ness, belonging to each of those objects.

Vārttika 40, *Asti caikam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapat, etc.*, supports the argument that there is such a thing as a class property. A class property is a single entity which resides in many substrata simultaneously. *Vārttika* 40a asserts that it is in fact possible for one entity to be present in many substrata simultaneously. Patañjali examines the sun as an example of such an entity but dismisses the example because it is not analogous to the present case. In *vārttika* 40b, *itīndravad viṣayaḥ*, Kātyāyana

proposes Indra (or his name) as such an object.[51] Invoked in many Vedic performances at once, Indra is present simultaneously in them all. A class property is present in many objects simultaneously as Indra is present in many Vedic performances simultaneously.

Vārttika 41, *Naikam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapad iti cet tathaikaśeṣe*, strengthens this argument for the existence of a class property by pointing out that the existence of an object which has a one-many relation cannot be avoided by denying the existence of a class property. On the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance it is accepted that a generic term in the plural denotes many individual objects. The one word which remains according to 1.2.64 is a single object which has the relation of signifier-signified to many objects simultaneously. If a signifier-signified relation can exist between one word and many objects then the relation of property-substratum can hold between one class property and its many substrata.

Vārttika 39, *Dharmaśāstraṃ ca tathā*, supports the evidence given in *vārttika* 37 for the denotation of a class property. Instructions concerning how one ought to behave are formulated as general injunctions and prohibitions. They are meant to apply universally within their sphere of application, that is, to every object that meets their conditions. Hence a generic term used in such an instruction does not refer to a specific individual. Rather, it refers to any individual which has a certain class property. Therefore, the word denotes the class property, not a particular individual.

Vārttikas 42, *Dravyābhidhāne hy ākṛtyasaṃpratyayaḥ*, and 43, *Tatrāsarvadravyagatiḥ*, explain why it cannot be the case that a generic term denotes a particular individual. If it denoted an individual and not the class property, cognition of the class property would fail to arise. Without cognition of the class property, that of all the individuals of the kind would not arise; cognition of just the one particular individual object denoted would arise.

Under *vārttika* 39, Patañjali gives two prohibitions as examples of general instructions concerning behavior. In the prohibition, "One should not kill a *brāhmaṇa*," if the generic term *'brāhmaṇa'* denoted an individual, the rule would mean that one should not kill that particular individual. It would not prohibit killing any other individual because the word *'brāhmaṇa'* would not denote any other individual. However, it is understood that the rule prohibits killing any individual of the *brāhmaṇa* class. Therefore, it must be the case that the generic term *'brāhmaṇa'*

---

[51]See 1.2.64 translation, *vārttika* 40b and notes 45-46, concerning the interpretation of the example. The interpretation here agrees with Paranjpe 1922: 45-46.

denotes the class property common to all and only *brāhmaṇas*. Similarly, in the prohibition, "One should not drink liquor," if the generic term 'liquor' denoted a particular individual drink of liquor, it would not denote any other drink of liquor. The rule would mean that one should not drink that particular drink but would not prohibit drinking any other drink. However, it is understood that the rule prohibits drinking any liquor at all. Therefore, it must be the case that the generic term 'liquor' denotes the class property common to all alcoholic drinks.

Under *vārttika* 43, Patañjali gives the injunction, "One should bind a cow, a goat for Agni and Soma," as an example of general instructions concerning behavior. If the word 'cow' or 'goat' denoted an individual cow or goat, it would fail to denote any other. Only binding that particular animal would fulfill the injunction and once that animal had been used in a Vedic performance, no one else could succeed in fulfilling the command to bind it. It would be useless for any one else to do the performance or for the original performer to do it again because they would be unable to bind that particular cow or goat again, they would be unable to fulfill the command so the fruit of the performance would be unattainable. However, it is understood that one may carry out the instruction repeatedly on any cow or goat. Therefore, each of the generic terms 'cow' and 'goat' denotes a class property, not an individual substance.

Finally, *vārttika* 44, *Codanāyāṃ caikasyopādhivṛtteḥ*, considers that a general injunction associates an attribute with a class property, not with an individual substance. In the injunction, "One should set out an *aṣṭākapāla* (eight-cup) rice cake oblation for Agni," the attribute *'aṣṭākapālatva* (prepared in eight cups)' qualifies the oblation to be offered to Agni. The injunction associates the attribute, prepared in eight cups, with a single thing. If that single thing were an individual substance, only one person could carry out the injunction once because the injunction would attribute only that particular individual substance with being prepared in eight cups, and no other. However, it is understood that the injunction is meant to be carried out repeatedly. If the single thing with which the attribute of being prepared in eight cups is associated is a class property, the command may be fulfilled by carrying out the action on any individual substance in which the class property and its associated attribute reside together. Hence the command may be carried out repeatedly. Because the correct meaning of the injunction is arrived at if the attribute is associated with a class property, and it cannot be arrived at if the attribute is associated with an individual substance, it must be the case that a generic term denotes a class property and not an individual substance.

Patañjali says (under *vārttika* 38) that *vārttika* 38 supports *vārttika* 36 and (under *vārttika* 38) that *vārttika* 39 supports

vārttika 37. In addition, from the questions introducing *vārttikas* 36 and 37 one can infer that the questioner understands that *vārttika* 36 establishes that a class property exists, and that *vārttika* 37 establishes that it is denoted.[52] The question, "But how does one know that there is one class property and it is denoted?" introduces *vārttika* 36, and the question, "Well, even if one knows that there is one class property because there is undifferentiated cognition, what is the basis for asserting that the word denotes it?" introduces *vārttika* 37. Hence *vārttika* 36 satisfies the questioner concerning the existence of a class property but does not satisfy him concerning its being denoted. He asks this of *vārttika* 37.

Although these questions indicate that *vārttika* 36 should serve only as evidence for the existence of a class property and not as evidence for the fact that it is denoted, nevertheless what I have stated above is true. Patañjali's phrase, "When the word 'cow' is uttered," under *vārttika* 36, allows one to understand that the identical cognition referred to in the *vārttika* arises from the use of a generic term. If identical cognition with respect to many individuals of a kind arises from a generic term, one can conclude both that a class property exists and that it is denoted. Since it is true that both *vārttikas* 36 and 37 offer evidence both for the existence and denotation of a class property, one must understand that the questioner simply has not understood the full implication of *vārttika* 36 and its commentary and requires a fuller exposition.

The argument that a generic term denotes a class property comprises evidence for the existence of a class property and evidence for the fact that it is denoted. *Vārttikas* 36 and 37 give evidence of both. The latter is not redundant because the evidence it offers is different. The first asserts that there is an identical cognition with respect to many individual objects; the second that there is the cognition that the individual objects are of the same kind. *Vārttikas* 38, 40 and 41 argue for the existence of a class property. *Vārttikas* 39 and 42-44 argue that it is denoted.

1.3.3. A Generic Term Denotes an Individual Substance

In *vārttikas* 46-52, Kātyāyana presents reasons for the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance. *Vārttika* 48 denies the existence of class properties, and *vārttika* 50 offers evidence to this effect too. *Vārttikas* 46-47, 49, 51, and 52 argue for the view that an individual substance is denoted.

[52]Note that Kaiyaṭa makes much of this distinction. See translation, note 37.

Vārttika 48, *Na caikam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapat*, denies that a single entity can be present in many substrata simultaneously. Patañjali gives the example of an individual person, Devadatta. It is impossible for him to be present in the city of Srughna at the same time he is present in the city of Mathurā. Just as it is impossible for an individual person to be in two places at once, it is impossible for a single entity to reside in many substrata at once. Therefore, there is no such thing as a class property.

Vārttika 50, *Asti ca vairūpyam*, says that individual substances differ from each other. The fact that one individual substance is similar to another is not grounds for establishing the existence of a class property common to both. Although they are similar, they are nevertheless recognized as distinct objects with individual differences. Kaiyaṭa explains that it is impossible for two objects to be both different and the same. He says that the cognition of objects as the same is based on the fact that they serve the same function, it is not based on an identical property of the objects themselves (*vārttika* 50 note 64). In fact, the objects are recognized as different. Since the objects are recognized as different and the cognition of their sameness is accounted for by the fact that they serve the same function, there is no reason to posit the existence of a class property common to the individual substances. Therefore, there is no such thing as a class property.

As a corollary, the use of a generic term to refer to objects attributed with different properties implies that it refers to more than one object. It is impossible for a single entity to have property a and not property b, and yet have property b and not property a. For example, "an unwhole bull, a hornless bull (*khaṇḍo gaur, muṇḍo gaur*)," refers to one bull which is crippled or injured and another which has had its horns clipped. Hence each use of the generic term 'cow (*gauḥ*)' in this example denotes a different entity. A class property is a single entity; the individual substances of a kind are multiple. Therefore a generic term denotes an individual substance.[53]

Vārttika 51, *Tathā ca vigrahaḥ*, argues that the use of analytic strings presupposes that a word denotes an individual substance. for example, the analytic string, "*gauś ca gauś ca* (a cow and a cow)," is used to show the meaning of the word '*gāvau* (two cows)'. In the analytic string, each use of the generic term '*gauḥ* (cow)' denotes an individual substance. If both denoted a class property, both would denote the same entity. Because using one word is enough to convey cognition of the entity, usage of the second would not occur. It would be redundant to use both

---

[53]See Nāgeśa, translation, note 64.

words.[54] The fact that there are two usages of the generic term *'gauḥ* (cow)' shows that each denotes a distinct object. In addition, the word *'ca* (and)' in the analytic string makes known that there is an aggregate of more than one object. There is just one class property but there are many individual substances of a kind. Therefore, a generic term denotes an individual substance and not a class property.

Vārttika 46, *Tathā ca liṅgavacanasiddhiḥ*, argues that the occurrence of a generic term in different genders and numbers presupposes that it denotes an individual substance. If a generic term denoted a class property, it would occur only in the singular because a generic property is a single entity and a singular termination naturally arises when a single object is to be denoted. A generic term would never occur in the dual or plural. However, a generic term is used in the dual and plural. Therefore, a generic term does not denote a class property.

There are many individual substances of a kind. One taken by itself has singular number, two taken together have dual number, and many taken together have plural number. A singular inflectional termination naturally arises to denote singular number, a dual termination naturally arises to denote dual number and a plural termination naturally arises to denote plural number.[55] Hence it is natural for a generic term to occur with different number terminations if it denotes individual substances. Therefore, a generic term denotes an individual substance.

Similarly, if a generic term denoted a class property, it would occur in only one gender, the gender which belongs to that class property. However, the generic term *'brāhmaṇa'* occurs both in the masculine (*brahmaṇaḥ*) and in the feminine (*brahmaṇī*). The masculine form occurs to denote an object which has the masculine gender, and the feminine form occurs to denote an object which has the feminine gender. A single person cannot be both a male and a female so the male is one person and the female another. Because their genders are different, there are two distinct objects denoted. The class property is a single entity; but there are many individual substances of a kind. Therefore, a generic term denotes an individual substance and not a class property.

Vārttika 47, *Codanāsu ca tasyārambhāt*, argues that a generic term denotes an individual substance because one performs the action enjoined in a command on an individual substance. Given the injunction, "One should bind a cow, a goat for Agni and Soma," one binds an individual cow or goat. One does not bind a class property cowness or goatness. Therefore,

---

[54]See translation, *vārttika* 29, note 15 concerning the principle, "One does not use speech forms whose objects have already been denoted (*uktārthānām aprayogaḥ*)."

[55]In accordance with 1.4.21-22. See translation note 81.

each of the generic terms 'cow' and 'goat' must denote an individual substance. If they denoted class properties, binding an individual would not fulfill the command. A class property and an individual are two different entities. The command is fulfilled only if one does the action on what it says to do it on. However, it is understood that the command is fulfilled if one binds an individual cow or goat. Therefore, 'cow' denotes an individual cow and 'goat' denotes an individual goat.

Vārttika 49, *Vināśe prādurbhāve ca sarvaṃ tathā syāt*, points out a difficulty with the view that a generic term denotes a class property. If it were the case that a generic term denotes a class property, when one spoke of destruction or coming into being, one would convey that everything of that kind is destroyed or comes into being. In the statement, "A dog has died," if it were the case that the word 'dog' denotes the class property doghood, then the statement would mean that doghood has ceased to exist. If there were no class property of being a dog, then not a single dog would exist. Hence, the statement, "A dog has died," would mean that every dog has ceased to exist. Conversely, in the statement, "A cow has been born," if the word 'cow' denoted the class property cowness, then the statement would mean that cowness has come into being. Patañjali states that there would not be enough room for everything that ever is, was or will be a cow.[56] To manifest the class property cowness, every single cow would have to be born. However, when one says, "A dog has died," one means that an individual dog has died, and when one says, "A cow has been born," one means that an individual cow has been born. therefore, the generic terms 'dog' and 'cow' denote individuals, not class properties.

Finally, *vārttika* 52, *Vyartheṣu ca muktasaṃśayam*, defends the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance against the accusation that it requires the explicit formulation of a rule which the view that a generic term denotes a class property does not require. This *vārttika* argues that adopting the view that a generic term denotes a class property does not spare one from stating 1.2.64. The rule is necessary even on the view that a generic term denotes a class property. Even on the view that a generic term denotes a class property there are generic terms which denote many objects (polysemous terms). For example, the word *'akṣa* (die, axle, seed)' would denote the three

[56]This objection against the view that a generic term denotes a class property assumes that it is not the case that one class property resides wholly in each of its substrata simultaneously. It assumes that the class property, like the class itself, is fully present only when all the individuals of the class are present. This mode of relation to substrata is called *vyāsajyavṛtti*. The prime example of it is the relation of a whole to its parts. A whole exists only when all of its parts do. See §1.2.9.

class properties, being a die, being an axle and being a seed. According to the principle that for each object denoted a single speech form is used, one nominal base *'akṣa'* would be used for each class property denoted. Hence to refer to all three at once, three bases *'akṣa akṣa akṣa'* would arise. Although it is accepted usage to refer to each of these class properties singly by using one word *'akṣaḥ* (singular)' for each, it is also accepted that one word *'akṣāḥ* (plural)' can be used to refer to objects of all three types at once. This latter usage would not arise. In order to obtain that a single usage of the generic term *'akṣāḥ* (plural)' denotes all three class properties at once, one would require a rule to provide that just one of homophonous speech forms remains if they occur with one inflectional termination. Hence one would have to state 1.2.64 anyway, even on the view that a generic term denotes a class property. According to *vārttika* 35, the reason for adopting the view that a generic term denotes a class property rather than the view that it denotes an individual substance is that one would not have to state 1.2.64. This reason is invalid because 1.2.64 has to be stated anyway.

1.3.4. Denotation of a Class Property Vindicated

In *vārttikas* 53-59 Kātyāyana responds to each of the arguments against the view that a generic term denotes a class property presented in *vārttikas* 46-52. In *vārttika* 56, *Na caikam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapad ity ādityavad viṣayaḥ*, he responds to the objection in *vārttika* 48 that a single entity cannot be present in many substrata simultaneously by reiterating the statement in *vārttika* 40a that there is in fact such an entity. In *vārttika* 56 Kātyāyana gives the sun as an example of such an entity. Patañjali repeats his previous comment that the example of the sun is not analogous to a class property and reiterates the example of Indra. A class property is present in many substrata simultaneously just as Indra is present simultaneously in each of the Vedic performances in which he is invoked.

A generic term denotes a class property on this view; however, as *vārttika* 55, *Adhikaraṇagatiḥ sāhacaryāt*, explains, cognition of an individual substance arises because an individual always accompanies a class property. Because it is impossible to perform action on a class property, one understands that action takes place on an individual object which accompanies the class property. Thus when one speaks of birth and destruction connected with a class property, it is an individual substance associated with the class property which is born or destroyed, not the class property itself. *Vārttika* 57, *Avināśo 'nāśritatvāt*,

explains that although it accompanies each individual substance of the class, a class property itself is not dependent on the individuals. Hence it is not destroyed when an individual substance is destroyed.

Similarly, according to *vārttika* 58, *Vairūpyavigrahau dravyabhedāt*, one speaks of different properties associated with a class property because the differences belong to its accompanying individual substances. Hence it is justified that in analytic strings there is one occurrence of the generic term for each individual substance. Just as one speaks of other different properties associated with a class property because of the differences of its accompanying individual substances, *vārttikas* 53, *Liṅgavacana-siddhir guṇasyānityatvāt*, and 54, *Guṇavacanavad vā*, explain that different genders and numbers succeed because they are properties which belong to the individual substances associated with a class property, not to the class property itself. The properties of the individual substances are the conditions for the occurrence of the various suffixes.

Finally, *vārttika* 59, *Vyartheṣu ca sāmānyāt siddham*, denies that the rule that one remains would have to be stated even on the view that a generic term denotes a class property. The sūtra-rejecter adopted the view that a generic term denotes a class property in order to achieve the use of a single word without having to state explicitly that one remains. Accepting that one word denotes a single object, he asserts that the class property is the single object denoted by the generic term. Because the class property is a single object, naturally only one word is used to denote it and there is no need to state that only one remains (1.2.64). Arguing for the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance, in *vārttika* 52, *Vyartheṣu ca mukta-saṃśayam*, the sūtra-proponent claimed that 1.2.64 would have to be stated anyway, even on the view that a generic term denotes a class property, in order to account for the use of a single nominal base with a plural termination in the case of polysemous terms (§1.3.3).

In *vārttika* 59, the sūtra-rejecter responds that there is a single general property common to all the objects to which the word is used to refer. The solution is exactly parallel to the solution of accepting a single class property common to all the individual substances of a kind. That is, a "polysemous" generic term denotes the single general property common to all the objects for which the word is used. That property may be, for example, the action denoted by the verbal root from which the term is derived in its various meanings. Or the property may be a number which the term denoted in an original meaning no longer current. Because it is a single object, naturally just one word is

used to denote it and there is no need to state that one remains. 1.2.64 is rejected as unnecessary.[57]

1.4. Equivalence of the Two Views

1.4.1. Enjoined Universally, Fulfilled in a Particular

Under *vārttika* 43, Patañjali points out that there is equal fault on both views. In *vārttikas* 42 and 43 Kātyāyana attributes the following fault to the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance: Cognition of the class property would not arise; hence one would fail to understand all the individual substances to which the term applies (§1.3.2). A generic term would apply to a particular individual in the same arbitrary way that a proper name applies to an individual. A proper name does not apply to all the individuals of a class. Similarly, a generic term would fail to apply to other individuals of the class. Or if it did apply to other individuals of the class, one would have to learn separately, for each individual of the class, that it applies to that individual; just as one has to learn separately, for each individual to which a certain proper name applies, that it applies to that individual. However, it is a fact that cognition of any individual of the kind may arise from the use of a generic term. And once one has learned the meaning of a generic term it applies to any individual of the class. There may be innumerable objects of a kind so one would have to learn innumerable word-meaning relations.

In later discussions on the topic of the denotation of generic terms, it is standard to attribute two faults to the view that

---

[57]Note that Patañjali does not accept this as the final conclusion. Patañjali accepts that there are words which denote more than one meaning (polysemous terms). Under 1.2.45, *vārttika* 9, *Siddhaṃ tv anvayavyatirekābhyām*, which along with its commentary is identical to 1.3.1, *vārttika* 6, he gives the very words cited in 1.2.64 as examples of such words: *Ekaś ca śabdo bahvarthaḥ. Tad yathā. Akṣāḥ pādāḥ māṣā iti.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 220, line 2; p. 255, lines 21-22. The fact that a word denotes more than one meaning is inconsistent with the proposition that it denotes just a single over-arching general property common to all the objects for which a word is used.
Under 4.1.63 Patañjali concludes that the qualifier *'astrīviṣayam* (which is not restricted to the feminine)' limits the *sūtra*'s application to the nominal base of a generic term which is not restricted to the feminine <u>in any of its meanings</u>, that is, regardless of the condition for use of the term (*kvacid astrīviṣayam*). It does not limit it to the base of a generic term which is not restricted to the feminine on a certain condition for use of the term (*samānāyām ākṛtau*). See §1.2.5, note 38. The discussion accepts that generic terms may have more than one condition for use (*pravṛttinimitta*), that they denote more than one meaning. If a generic term denotes more than one meaning, then 1.2.64 has to be stated.

it denotes an individual substance. These two faults are referred to as deviation (*vyabhicāra*) and infinity (*ānantya*). 1) If a generic term denotes a particular individual it fails to denote any other. Because one does understand that it refers to others, it deviates from its denoted meaning. 2) If it does denote each individual of the class, then there is a separate word-meaning relation for each of the innumerable individuals of the class. Hence there would be innumerable word-meaning relations all of which would have to be learned in order to apply the word properly to an arbitrary individual of the class.

The view that a generic term denotes a class property does not have these faults. Cognition of the class property arises because the term denotes it. The class property is present in all individuals so one would understand all the individuals. The word-meaning relation is between one word and one denoted object so learned once it is known.

However, *vārttikas* 47 and 49 indicate complementary advantages to the view that a generic term denotes an individual. If a generic term conveyed knowledge of all individuals of a kind because it denotes the class property, then it would convey knowledge of every single individual when just a single arbitrary one is intended. For example, in the command, "One should bind a cow, a goat for Agni and Soma," if the words 'cow' and 'goat' conveyed knowledge of all cows and goats because they denote the class properties cowness and goatness, then one would have to bind all cows or all goats to fulfill the command. This is impossible. No one would be able to carry out the action to fulfill the command and no one would attain the fruit of the action. In the statements, "A dog has died" and "A cow has been born," if the words 'dog' and 'cow' conveyed knowledge of all cows and goats because they denote the class properties, doghood and cowness, then one would understand that all dogs have died and all cows have been born. However, that is not the way general injunctions and statements are understood. Action does not take place on all of the individuals of a kind at once; it takes place on a single individual in any given instance. The fact that the action takes place on particular individuals in particular instances rather than on every individual of the class in any particular instance is better accounted for if a generic term denotes an individual.

The solution to these difficulties for both views is achieved by accepting that a general injunction enjoins action universally but is fulfilled with respect to each individual. On the view that a generic term denotes a class property this is accounted for by accepting the class property as an entity which is entirely present in each of many individual substances. Kātyāyana asserts that there is such an entity and gives Indra as an example in *vārttika* 40 while presenting the reasons that a generic term denotes a class property (§1.3.2). He reiterates the same giving

the sun as an example in *vārttika* 56 while vindicating the view (§1.3.4). Patañjali, discussing both examples in both places, rejects the example of the sun because it is not analogous but accepts the example of Indra.

The analogy of a class property to the sun is as follows: We know that the class property present in different individuals at different times and places is a single entity just as we know that the sun which appears to be in different places to different individuals is a single entity (*vārttika* 40a, note 43, *vārttika* 56). Jaimini 1.1.15, *Ādityavad yaugapadyam*, gives the sun as an example of an object perceived in many locations simultaneously. Śabara's description portrays the following scenario: To each observer facing the sun in the early morning, the sun appears to be directly in front of himself (because of its size and distance). Hence to person A the sun appears to be directly in front of person A and to person B it appears to be directly in front of person B who stands 30 feet to A's right. Comparing their observations it would seem that the sun is in two places (§3.2.2, note 12).

The example of the sun is not parallel to the case of the class property. One person can see one class property in many substrata at once. However, the appearance of the sun in two places depends on two observers standing in different locations (*vārttika* 40a, note 44, *vārttika* 56). But Patañjali does accept Indra as an example of a single object present in many places at once. One knower is aware of one class property present in different individual objects at once just as it is possible for one observer to be aware of one Indra invoked (or his name enunciated) in many Vedic performances at once (*vārttika* 40b, notes 45-46, *vārttika* 56).

While presenting the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance, Kātyāyana says in *vārttika* 48 that it is not possible that a single entity be present in many substrata simultaneously. Patañjali gives the example of an individual Devadatta. He cannot be present in two different cities, Srughna and Mathurā, simultaneously (*vārttika* 48, note 62).

Although the proponent of the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance argues that it is impossible for one entity to be present in many places at once, he himself must accept that a single entity as a whole is related to each of many individual objects severally. The single generic term applies to each of many objects severally. Although the statement of 1.2.64 achieves the relation of one term in the plural to many objects, as Kātyāyana points out in *vārttika* 41, it does not achieve the use of a singular term in a general command or statement for one individual in one instance and for another individual in another instance (§1.3.2). In order that the same term apply to a different individual in each instance, he must accept that a single entity, the

generic term, is related to each of many individual objects as their signifier. If he can accept the relation of one to many in the case of a word denoting each of many individual substances, he can accept it in the case of a generic property present in each of many individual substances.

1.4.2. Number

Patañjali mentions that there is equal merit on both views in another respect as well. The view that a generic term denotes a generic property accounts for the use of a single nominal base to denote many individual substances of a kind in a natural way. One speech form is used to denote one object, i.e., the class property.

However, it has difficulty accounting for the dual and plural inflectional terminations. The dual termination naturally arises when dual number is to be denoted. The plural termination naturally arises when plural number is to be denoted.[58] The class property is a single object; it does not have dual or plural number. Hence the dual and plural terminations would not arise naturally. However, one does use generic terms in the dual and plural. Therefore, if a generic term denotes a class property, an explicit statement has to be made to account for the correct speech form (end of *bhāṣya* on *vārttika* 43).[59] To have to make such an explicit statement is a shortcoming of the view that a generic term denotes a class property.

The view that a generic term denotes an individual substance accounts for the use of singular, dual, and plural inflectional terminations in a natural way. The appropriate number naturally belongs to however many individual substances

[58]According to 1.4.21-22. See translation, note 81. I do not make an issue here of whether it is the many objects which are the condition for the use of the plural terminations or the plural number which belongs to them. Patañjali takes up a series of discussions parallel to the debate whether a generic term denotes a class property or an individual substance: whether number or the numbered objects (*saṃkhyā* or *saṃkhyeya*) are the semantic condition of inflectional terminations and number words, whether the participant in an action or the relation it has with the action (*śakti* or *śaktimat*) is the semantic condition of certain suffixes, whether feminine gender or the object qualified by it is the condition for the use of feminine suffixes, and whether a certain property, such as excellence (*prakarṣa* 5.3.55) or reproach (*kutsā* 5.3.74), or that which has that property is the semantic condition for *taddhita* affixes. Each of these discussions requires a lengthy treatment which I cannot give here.

[59]Note that 1.2.58 makes such an explicit statement for the use of the plural terminations. It states that a plural termination occurs when one object is to be denoted if that object is a generic property (§1.8). Pāṇini makes no explicit statement to provide dual terminations for a word referring to a single generic property.

are to be denoted. One individual substance has singular number, two individual substances have dual number, and many individual substances have plural number. The singular, dual, and plural terminations arise naturally to denote singular, dual, and plural number respectively. Hence there is no need for an explicit statement to account for the different number terminations on the view that a generic termination denotes an individual substance.

However, it has difficulty accounting for the use of a single nominal base when many individual substances are to be denoted. To denote many individual substances, many nominal bases would naturally arise and 1.2.64 would have to be explicitly stated to provide that only one remains and the others are dropped (*vārttika* 43).

There is equal fault on both views. Although the view that a generic term denotes a class property accounts for the use of just one nominal base naturally, it has to make an explicit statement to account for the use of dual and plural inflectional terminations. Conversely, the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance accounts for the use of dual and plural terminations naturally, but it has to make an explicit statement to account for the use of just one nominal base.

1.4.3. Gender

The view that a generic term denotes a class property has difficulty accounting for the use of a generic term in different genders just as it has difficulty accounting for dual and plural inflectional terminations. Unlike quality words, generic terms generally do not agree in gender and number with the words they modify. In the phrase, *"Badarī vṛkṣaḥ,"* the word *'badarī'* in the feminine denotes a species of tree. The generic term *'vṛkṣaḥ* (tree)' occurring in the masculine does not agree with it in gender.

On the basis of the fact that generic terms occur in a single gender consistently, the general rule is made that generic properties are permanently associated with a certain innate gender. Patañjali expresses this principle under 1.2.52, *vārttika* 2 (§1.5.4 note 78) and cites it under 1.2.64, *vārttika* 53 (53a, note 72). He says, "A generic property is gender specific; from origin to destruction it does not abandon the gender it starts out with." The verses describing the character of a generic property which Patañjali cites under 4.1.63 refer to this property of a generic property to be permanently associated with a specific gender. The second quarter of the first verse describes a generic property as "that which does not partake of all genders (*liṅgānāṃ ca na*

sarvabhāk)." The third quarter of the second verse describes it as that "which does not have all genders (*asarvaliṅgām*)" (§1.2.5).

Gender is considered to be a property of the object a word denotes. If a generic term denotes a class property, the fact that the class property is permanently associated with a certain gender accounts for the consistent use of a generic term in a single gender. The class property always has its innate gender and the gender suffixes and inflectional terminations appropriate to that gender arise naturally after the nominal base of the generic term. For example, the class property treeness is permanently associated with masculine gender. Hence the base *'vṛkṣa'* never takes feminine suffixes and is always followed by inflectional terminations appropriate for the masculine. This accounts for the use of the term *'vṛkṣa'* in the masculine in the example, *"Badarī vṛkṣaḥ,"* cited above.

This also accounts for the consistent use of generic terms in the masculine when referring to male and females of a kind. For example, in the phrase, *"brāhmaṇā ime* (these *brāhmaṇas*)," referring to males and females of the *brāhmaṇa* class, the word *'brāhmaṇāḥ'* is in the masculine. In this case the consistent use of the generic term in the masculine could be accounted for by the fact that the generic property of being a *brāhmaṇa* (*brāhmaṇatva*) is inherently masculine. The speech form used to denote a masculine object naturally occurs in the masculine. Hence the consistent use of generic terms in the masculine when referring to both males and females of a kind would be achieved naturally if a generic term denoted a generic property. Since it is achieved naturally there would be no need to state the rule that just a masculine speech form remains.

On the view that a generic term denotes an individual, *'brāhmaṇaḥ* (masculine singular)' would arise to denote each male *brāhmaṇa* and *'brāhmaṇī* (feminine singular)' would arise to denote each female *brāhmaṇa*. 1.2.64 would not provide that one speech form remains because the condition for its application, that the speech forms are homophonous, is not met. Hence an additional rule would have to be stated. 1.2.67 makes this provision.[60]

Although on the view that a generic term denotes an individual 1.2.67 has to be explicitly stated to account for the consistent use of a generic term in the masculine when male and female individuals are referred to, different genders are naturally accounted for on this view. For example, *'brāhmaṇī* (feminine singular)' denotes a female *brahmaṇa* and *'brāhmaṇaḥ* (masculine singular)' denotes a male *brāhmaṇa*. The feminine suffix ***ṅīṣ*** occurs after the nominal base *'brāhmaṇa'* naturally if the

---

[60]See 1.2.64 translation, *vārttika* 53a note 72.

individual to be denoted is a female of the *brāhmaṇa* class, and naturally no feminine suffix occurs if a male is to be denoted (§1.2.5).

Although the view that a generic term denotes a class property has the benefit of naturally accounting for the use of generic terms in a single gender consistently, it has difficulty accounting for the use of generic terms in different genders. If a generic term denoted a class property which is permanently associated with an innate gender, the term would always occur in one gender only. For example, if the nominal base *'brāhmaṇa'* denoted the class property of being a *brāhmaṇa* (*brāhmaṇatva*) and the class property of being a *brāhmaṇa* were innately masculine, then the feminine suffix *ṅīṣ* would not arise to form *'brāhmaṇī'*.[61] Yet the word *'brāhmaṇī'* does occur. In order to justify its occurrence one would have to accept that there were two *brāhmaṇa* class properties, one associated with masculine gender and one associated with feminine gender. But that contradicts the premise that a single class property is denoted. And if one accepted that there were more than one class property denoted, more than one speech form would occur to refer to males and females of the class together. One would have to state the rule that only one remains. Hence the very reason for adopting the view that a generic term denotes a class property would fail.

1.5. Solutions on the View that a Class Property is Denoted.

1.5.1. Properties are not Innate

The difficulty in achieving the use of a generic term in different genders and numbers arises on the view that a generic term denotes a generic property from accepting that a generic property is permanently associated with a certain innate gender and with singular number. In *vārttika* 53 Kātyāyana solves the difficulty by accepting the reverse: gender and number are not innate. A class property is not permanently associated with a certain gender and is not permanently associated with singular number.

The solution as stated is untenable. First of all, a class property is a single entity so it has singular number by nature. It is on the basis of its being a single entity that a single nominal base is used with the plural termination when many individual substances of a kind are to be referred to. If it were not a single

[61]See Nāgeśa on 1.2.64 *vārttika* 53 (translation, *vārttika* 53b note 73).

entity many bases would arise and 1.2.64 would have to be stated to provide that only one remains. The reason for adopting the view that a generic term denotes a class property was to spare one from having to state 1.2.64 (§1.3.2, *vārttika* 35). This reason would now fail (§1.4.2).

Secondly, it was accepted that a class property is permanently associated with a certain gender. This was accepted in order to account for the use of generic terms consistently in a single gender. Generic terms such as *'vṛkṣa'* are always used in the masculine, and generic terms such as *'brāhmaṇa'* are consistently used in the masculine when referring to both male and female individuals of the class (§1.4.3).

Patañjali revises Kātyāyana's statement by introducing the element of a speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*). The statement now asserts that a speaker's intention of gender and number is not innate. It is not necessarily the case that a speaker's intention associates a class property permanently with a certain gender and number. A speaker may intend the class property as having various genders and numbers in various instances even if a certain gender or singular number is innate. The use of the term in different genders and numbers in different instances arises based on the varied intentions of the speakers in different circumstances. A generic term is used in the masculine if the speaker intends the class property as having masculine gender. The same term is used in the feminine if the speaker intends the class property as having feminine gender, and it is used in the neuter if he intends neither. Similarly, if a speaker intends the class property as having dual or plural number, dual and plural terminations will arise naturally. Hence, the use of generic terms in all three numbers is accounted for, and the use of generic terms such as *'brāhmaṇa'* in different genders is accounted for (*vārttika* 53a).

1.5.2. Is the Gender Problem Solved by the Grammarians' Conception or by a Speaker's Intention Alone?

It is questionable whether or not Patañjali means that the solution including a speaker's intention as a factor accounts for the use of a generic term in different genders by itself. After the solution that a speaker's intention of gender and number are not innate is introduced, it is objected to on the same grounds it was objected to before. "A generic property is gender specific; from origin to destruction it does not abandon the gender it starts out with (*vārttika* 53a)." In answer to this objection, the proponent of the view that a generic term denotes a class property says, "Therefore, grammarians cannot accept the ordinary gender (of

an object as the criterion for the gender of the words denoting it). They have to adopt a conception of their own." Patañjali then gives a lengthy citation of the conclusion arrived at under 4.1.3, *Striyām*, concerning the grammarians' view of gender. The objector accepts this response as a solution to the problem saying, "In that case by saying, 'Gender and number succeed because a speaker's intention of a quality is not innate,' it may be possible to avoid the gender problem but it is not possible to avoid the number problem."

Hence, the line of argument seems to indicate that the problem of accounting for the use of a generic term in different genders is solved by introducing the grammarians' conception of gender and not by the introduction of a speaker's intention alone. However, a speaker's intention is the element in the grammarians' conception of gender which achieves the proper arrangement (*vyavasthā*) of speech forms in the appropriate genders. In order to resolve this question let us examine the problem of gender and the arguments for the grammarians' conception of it under 4.1.3.

The word 'gender (*liṅga*)' refers both to the sex characteristics of objects and to the characteristics which determine the use of certain speech forms rather than others (as well as to the characteristics of speech forms themselves). The discussion begins by accepting the ordinary conception of gender which identifies the first and second senses of the word then adopts the grammarians' view which distinguishes them. Under the ordinary conception, feminine gender is that by which one ordinarily identifies something as female, namely, breasts, long hair or, more definitely, the female sex organ. Masculine gender is that by which one ordinarily identifies something as male, namely, body hair or the male sex organ. Neuter gender is that by which one ordinarily identifies an object as neuter, namely, the absence of the male or female characteristic marks.[62]

Patañjali raises a number of faults that arise accepting the ordinary conception. Among them is that a bed (*khaṭvā*) is feminine and a tree (*vṛkṣa*) is masculine, while neither a tree nor a bed has either the male or the female characteristic marks and hence ought to be neuter.[63] The only evidence of the presence of female gender in a bed is the feminine affix ***ṭāp*** in the word '*khaṭvā*.'[64] However, it is circular for a grammarian to infer the feminine gender of the object from the use of the feminine affix when he justifies the use of the feminine affix by the presence of

[62]Concerning the ordinary conception of gender, see MB-K, vol. 2, p. 196, lines 1-5.

[63]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 196, lines 13-20.

[64]'*Khaṭvā*' has the feminine suffix ***ṭāp*** according to Pāṇini 4.1.4. *Ajādyataṣ ṭāp*. The affix ***ṭāp*** occurs after a base ending in *a* and specifically in the derivates '*ajā*', etc.

the feminine gender.[65] In addition, observing the occurrence of masculine, feminine, and neuter forms of the word '(river-) bank (*taṭaḥ, taṭī, taṭam*)', one would be unable to infer the gender of a bank.[66] If ordinary gender (the sex of the object) were the criterion for the gender of a word, two words of different gender could not refer to the same object nor could a word occur with suffixes of different genders. Therefore grammarians adopt their own criteria.

Note that this is the case for an individual object too. Any one of the three forms '*taṭaḥ, taṭī, taṭam*' may be used to refer to the same individual river bank. Hence the fault with the ordinary conception of gender arises regardless of whether a generic term denotes a class property or an individual substance. A speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*) must be included in accounting for the correct use of both gender suffixes and number terminations as arising from semantic conditions, because words of different genders and numbers are used for the same individual substance. For example, a man may use both of the words '*dārāḥ* (masculine plural)' and '*patnī* (feminine singular)' with reference to his own wife.

At this point the discussion under *sūtra* 4.1.3 includes the description of the grammarians' theory of gender which Patañjali cites under 1.2.64 (*vārttika* 53b). According to this theory, all manifest entities both become more manifest, in which case they are said to have the quality of increase (*prasava*) linked with masculine gender (*puṃliṅga*), and become less manifest, in which case they are said to have the quality of decrease (*saṃstyāna*) linked with feminine gender (*strīliṅga*). The balance of increase and decrease is linked with neuter gender. The link is not direct but depends on a speaker's intention.

If the link were direct, no object would be exclusively masculine or feminine because all manifest entities have both the qualities of increase and decrease. It is a speaker's intention of increase or decrease with regard to a certain object which constitutes masculine and feminine gender, and the absence of the intention of either which constitutes neuter gender. This intention of increase or decrease, or the lack of this intention, is expressed by masculine, feminine, and neuter speech forms.

Kaiyaṭa makes clear that the intention of a speaker is not individual whim commenting on the phrase, "from a speaker's intention (*vivakṣātaḥ*)," at the close of the passage cited from the *bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 4.1.3 (*vārttika* 53b). He says, "The intention of a

---

[65]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 197, lines 16-18.

[66]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 197, lines 22-24. See Amarakośa 1.9.7, p. 95b. The feminine suffix *ṅīṣ* occurs after the base '*taṭa*' according to 4.1.63 (§1.2.5).

speaker is resorted to as an echo of ordinary usage, not individually."[67] In that context Patañjali continues as follows:

> ***Tasyoktau lokato nāma***
> *Tasyoktau ca vacane lokato nāmaitad bhavati strī pumān napuṃsakam iti.... Na caitan mantavyaṃ svamanīṣikayocyata iti. Paṭhiṣyati hy ācāryo liṅgam aśiṣyaṃ lokāśrayatvāl liṅgasyeti. Punaḥ paṭhiṣyaty ekārthe śabdānyatvād dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgānyatvam avayavānya-tvāc ceti.*[68]
> **In expressing it one follows ordinary usage**[69]
> **In expressing** conveying **it** (an object's gender) this (arrangement): feminine, masculine, neuter, **follows ordinary usage**.... And one should not think that (this arrangement) is stated according to (the grammarians') own theory because the teacher will declare, "Gender should not be taught because gender is based on ordinary usage."[70] Then he will declare, "One sees that there are different genders in one object because different words are used for it. And because different parts (of words) are used for it."[71]

The ordinary usage of the learned shows the gender an object is intended to have.

Although Patañjali describes objective characteristics to constitute gender as a characteristic of objects, the universality of the characteristics makes them inadequate to account for a division of objects into categories of masculine, feminine, and neuter directly. In fact no objective characteristics of objects can account for such a division because the usage of some words attribute different genders to the same objects at once. The most unambiguous example Patañjali gives is *'taṭaḥ, taṭī, taṭam'*, masculine, feminine, and neuter for a bank. Commenting on the last two *vārttikas* referred to in the above passage (in quotes), under *sūtra* 4.1.92 Patañjali gives two examples in which words

---

[67]***Vivakṣāta** iti. Lokavyavahārānuvādinī vivakṣāśrīyate na tu prāyoktrī.* MB, vol. 4, p. 25a.

[68]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 198, lines 11-12, 15-17.

[69]This is the third *pāda* of the *ślokavārttika*: *Saṃstyāne styāyater ḍraṭ strī sūteḥ sap prasave pumān; tasyoktau lokato nāma guṇo vā lupi yuktavat.* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 198. Concerning the first line see 1.2.64 translation, *vārttika* 53b.

[70]Nāgeśa comments that 'teacher' here refers to the author of the *vārttika*: ***Ācārya** iti. Vārtikakṛd ity arthaḥ.* Bhārgavaśāstrin (1945: 3) argues that Kātyāyana is the author of the *vārttika*, *liṅgam aśiṣyaṃ lokāśrayatvāl liṅgasya*, while someone other than he and Patañjali authored the *ślokavārttika* because Patañjali cites the former in support of the latter. Patañjali cites the *vārttika* at several other points: MB-K, vol. 1, p. 390, lines 18-19; p. 435, lines 2-3; p. 477, line 4; vol. 2, p. 418, lines 24-25; p. 438, lines 2, 5-6, 12-13, 18; vol. 3, p. 371, line 7. Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.2.53, added after Pāṇini but before Patañjali, expresses the same principle: *Tad aśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt (vyaktivacane 51)*, "(Gender and number) should not be taught because the means of knowing them is the convention (of speakers)."

[71]Pāṇini 4.1.92, *vārttikas* 6 and 7. See MB-K, vol. 2, p. 246, lines 21-27.

of three different genders are used for the same object, and three examples in which masculine and feminine forms of the same word denote the same object. Hence gender is not exclusively an objective characteristic of objects but has a subjective component: the intention of a speaker. If a speaker intends an object as having a certain gender characteristic, he uses a speech form which conveys that characteristic, that is, one with a feminine suffix (if appropriate) and with the appropriate inflectional terminations.

This does not imply that an individual speaker can convey his intention of a certain object as having a certain gender characteristic by combining any base denoting the object with any suffix signifying the intended gender. On the contrary, just as ordinary usage follows certain patterns regarding the primary denotation of words (for example, the word 'cow' means a cow and not a horse) similarly it follows certain patterns regarding gender. The ordinary usage of the learned is such that certain nominal bases, such as those in *'khaṭvā'* and *'vṛkṣaḥ'*, are coextensive with a certain gender characteristic (feminine and masculine respectively) whenever they denote certain objects (a bed and a tree). Other nominal bases, such as *'taṭa* (bank)' are not. A speaker is free to convey a bank as having any of the three gender characteristics with the nominal base *'taṭa'* by adding the feminine suffix *ṅīṣ* (if he intends feminine gender) and the appropriate nominal inflectional termination.

It is evident that by including the subjective element of a speaker's intention (to which ordinary usage is the guide) the advantage of linking the arrangement of gender to the growth and waning of qualities rather than to ordinary male and female characteristics vanishes. One can account for the use of the word *'vṛkṣaḥ'*, which is masculine, for a tree, which has neither male nor female characteristics, by saying that ordinary usage shows that speakers intend trees as having male characteristics, just as well as by saying that it shows that they intend trees as having growth. The only difference is that under the conception of gender as the intention of male and female characteristics (or the lack of either) one superimposes a characteristic which is absent on an object, while under the grammarians' conception of gender one highlights one of two characteristics both of which are already present (or ignores them in the case of neuter gender).[72]

---

[72]This difference is negligible because, as Kaiyaṭa suggests and Nāgeśa explicitly points out, even under the grammarians' conception one must resort to superimposition. For example, in the cases of the self and the Lord which do not have the characteristics of increase and decrease, one uses the words *'ātman'* and *'Īśvara'*, which are masculine, by superimposing the increase present in the manifest elements. (See translation, *vārttika* 53b note 79). Furthermore, in other contexts Patañjali explicitly states that there can be the lack of intention of what is present as well as the intention of what is absent (*sato 'py avivakṣā*

If this is so, the ordinary conception of gender with the addition of a speaker's intention can account for usage just as well as the grammarians' conception of gender.

If Patañjali's presentation of the grammarians' conception of gender under 1.2.64 is intended as solving the gender problem, it must be because the inclusion of a speaker's intention as a factor did not solve it. This would indicate a limitation on the application of a speaker's intention. It highlights a property already present in the object but it cannot superimpose a property which is absent. One does not make a horse a cow just by a speaker's intention that it is so. Similarly, one cannot make an object have a gender that is not present in it by a speaker's intention. In other words, gender is still considered to be an objective characteristic of objects to some extent under the grammarians' conception. All objects have the properties of increase, decrease or balance. The masculine, feminine or neuter speech form a speaker uses conveys which he intends.

On the other hand, if Patañjali's presentation of the grammarians' conception of gender is not intended as a required factor in solving the gender problem, it is a grammatically irrelevant theory concerning the subtle composition of things about which we have no knowledge. In this case, a speaker's intention is the factor which solves the gender problem by itself.

The use of a generic term in different genders succeeds on the view that a generic term denotes a generic property because a speaker may intend a generic property as having one gender in one instance and another in another instance. In the case of terms such as *'brāhmaṇa'* which occur in different genders, the different intention is the condition for the use or lack of use of a feminine suffix. If the speaker intends the generic property *brāhmaṇatva* as having feminine gender, the suffix *ṅīṣ* arises according to 4.1.63 (§1.2.5). Otherwise no feminine suffix arises.

The use of a generic term in different genders contradicts the assertion, "A generic property is gender specific; from origin to destruction it does not abandon the gender it starts out with (*vārttika* 53a)." The introduction of a speaker's intention as a factor allows a class property to be permanently associated with a single gender in fact and yet have words denoting it occur in different genders. This accounts for the use of different generic terms for the same class property in different genders. For example, even if the generic property of being a hut is permanently associated with a single gender, the use of the generic terms *'geham'* in the neuter, *'kuṭī'* in the feminine, and *'maṭhaḥ'* in the masculine is accounted for because the gender of

---

bhavati... asataś ca vivakṣā bhavati....). MB-K, vol. 2, p. 118, lines 12-14; vol. 3, p. 157, lines 22-24. For a discussion on these and other passages concerning *vivakṣā* see Van Nooten 1983 and Scharf 1995.

the generic property is not a direct condition for the use of a speech form in a particular gender; a speaker's intention is.[73] The speaker's intention is not permanently associated with a certain gender even if the class property is.

However, the use of a generic term in different genders contradicts the assertion, "A generic property is gender specific, etc," even including a speaker's intention as mediating the connection of a generic property with a gender. Under 1.2.52 Patañjali states, "A generic property is gender specific, etc," to explain why generic terms such as *'vṛkṣa'* consistently occur in the masculine gender (§1.5.4 note 79). This explanation applies equally to explain why the generic term *'geham'* consistently occurs in the neuter, *'kuṭī'* consistently occurs in the feminine, and *'maṭhaḥ'* consistently occurs in the masculine. These three terms all denote the same generic property. That generic property cannot in actual fact be associated with any single gender. Yet the statement that a generic property is gender specific is meant to explain why each of these terms is consistently used in a single gender. In order that the statement apply to them it cannot speak of a generic property as an object independent of the word used to denote it. It must speak of a generic property as denoted by a particular word. The real meaning of the saying, "A generic property is gender specific (*āviṣṭaliṅgā jātiḥ*)," is that a generic property as denoted by a certain word is connected with a specific gender.[74] It does not change gender according to the gender of the individual substance in which it is present as qualities do.

If this is meant to be true of all generic properties, that a generic property as denoted by a certain word is gender specific, then it would also be true in the case of the generic property *brāhmaṇatva* as denoted by the generic term *'brāhmaṇa'*. The generic term *'brāhmaṇa'* would consistently occur in the masculine gender, and the form *'brāhmaṇī'*, in the feminine, would never occur. However, it does occur in the feminine. Therefore, it is not true of all generic properties that a generic property as denoted by a certain word is gender specific. The statement, "A generic property is gender specific; from origin to destruction it does not abandon the gender it starts out with (§1.5.4 note 78)," under 1.2.52 can only mean that a generic

---

[73]Patañjali gives the example under 4.1.92 *vārttika* 6 which Patañjali cites under 4.1.3 in the long passage quoted above in this section. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 246, line 23.

[74]Kaiyaṭa: *Āviṣṭaliṅgeti. Āviṣṭam liṅgaṃ yayā sāviṣṭaliṅgā. Niyataliṅgety arthaḥ. Sarvatra sarveṣāṃ liṅgānāṃ sadbhāve 'pi kenacic chabdena kiñcil liṅgaṃ pratyāyyata iti śabda-viśeṣāpekṣayāviṣṭaliṅgatvam ucyate.* MB, vol. 2, p. 64a. Nāgeśa reiterates Kaiyaṭa's remark under 1.2.64. See 1.2.64 translation, *vārttika* 53b note 73.

property as denoted by a certain word is gender specific as a fairly regular rule of thumb, not universally.

In summary, different genders succeed on the view that a generic term denotes a generic property because a speaker may intend a generic property as having one gender in one instance and as having another gender in another instance. These different intentions are the conditions for the use of a generic term in different genders. Although introducing a speaker's intention as a factor achieves the use of a generic term in different genders on the view that a generic term denotes a class property, it does not achieve the use of a generic term in different numbers.

1.5.3. Number

The solution stating that a speaker's intention of gender and number are not innate does not achieve the use of a generic term in different numbers because, if a generic property is intended as having a number other than one, more than one nominal base would arise just as the dual or plural termination arises. It is unable to account for the use of a generic term in the dual and plural. A contradiction arises between the intention which determines the number of nominal bases used and the intention which determines the choice of singular, dual or plural terminations. A single intention determines both in any instance. This single intention is the condition for the introduction of both the nominal base and the inflectional terminations.

There is no problem if a speaker intends a class property as having singular number. A single nominal base arises and the singular termination arises. However, if a speaker intends a class property as having dual or plural number, just as dual and plural terminations arise, two or many nominal bases would arise as well. The rule would have to be stated that just one of homophonous speech forms remains if there is one termination. And the reason for adopting the view that a generic term denotes a class property, namely, to spare one from having to state 1.2.64, would now fail (*vārttika* 53a).

Pāṇini 1.4.21-22 state which inflectional terminations occur for which numbers. It is natural to consider that the number of the object denoted by the nominal base is the number which is the condition for use of the inflectional terminations. On the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance, the number which is the condition for use of the inflectional terminations is a property of the individual substances denoted by the base. On this view it has to be explicitly stated that certain terminations occur if there is singular number, others if there is dual number, and a third set if there is plural number.

On the view that a generic term denotes a class property, suppose that the number belonging to the individual substances is accepted as the condition for use of the inflectional terminations, even though the individual substances are not the object denoted by the nominal base. One would state rules to achieve the occurrence of terminations according to the number of individual substances even though these are not denoted by the nominal base. Since 1.4.21-22 have to be explicitly stated on the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance, the same may be stated on the view that a generic term denotes a generic property. Hence stating the rules which bring about the use of the proper terminations in the proper numbers would not constitute an additional effort required of the view that a generic term denotes a generic property.

However, on this supposition the problem is that the number which is the condition for use of the terminations does not belong to the object denoted by the nominal base after which they occur.[75] Therefore, stating that "a speaker's intention of a quality is not innate" is not sufficient to account for the use of a generic term in different genders and numbers on the view that a generic term denotes a generic property. With this in mind, Kātyāyana states *vārttika* 54 to explain how gender and number suffixes occur for generic terms on this view.

1.5.4. Agreement in Gender and Number[76]

In *vārttika* 54, *Guṇavacanavad vā*, Kātyāyana says that gender and number terminations occur for generic terms as they do for quality words. In explanation, Patañjali cites the established principle of gender and number agreement for quality

---

[75]Mīmāṃsā proponents of the view that a generic term denotes just a class property argue that this is not a problem. It is not necessary that gender and number suffixes arise to denote gender and number belonging to the object denoted by the base. They may belong to another object. In the case of verbs (*tiṅanta*), grammarians accept that the verbal root (*dhātu*) denotes action. The verbal suffix (*tiṅ*) denotes the substratum of the action, that is, either the agent (*kartṛ*) or object (*karman*), and number. Action is a single entity; it naturally has singular number. The number of the substratum of the action determines which set of verbal terminations is used. Hence in this case, the property which determines which set of terminations is used does not belong to the object denoted by the base (the verbal root) after which they occur. Just as in the case of verbs the number of the substratum of the action denoted by the verbal root determines which set of verbal terminations occur, in the case of generic terms the gender and number of the substratum of the class property denoted by the nominal base determine whether feminine suffixes occur and which set of nominal terminations occurs.

[76]For an introduction to the question of gender and number agreement see Cardona (1988: 214-17, especially 215).

words. "Different genders and numbers occur for words denoting qualities according to the substrata in which the quality resides." For example, in "*śuklaṃ vastram* (a white cloth), *śuklā śāṭī* (a white *śāṭī* (a woman's garment)), *śuklaḥ kambalaḥ* (a white blanket)," the quality word *'śukla'* occurs in the neuter to refer to the quality white residing in a neuter substance, in the feminine to refer to the quality white residing in a feminine substance, and in the masculine singular to refer to the quality white residing in a masculine substance. It occurs in the singular in each of these three cases to refer to the quality in a single individual substance. In "*śuklau kambalau* (two white blankets), *śuklāḥ kambalāḥ* (white blankets)," it occurs in the dual to refer to the quality white in two individual substances and in the plural to refer to it in many individual substances (*vārttika* 54).

Patañjali's citation of the principle, "Different genders and numbers occur for words denoting qualities according to the substrata in which the quality resides," roughly quotes Kātyāyana, 4.1.3, *vārttika* 6, "Because gender and number occur for a word denoting a quality according to the substrata in which the quality resides."[77] According to Patañjali, Pāṇini's purpose in stating 1.2.52, *Viśeṣaṇānāṃ cājāteḥ*, is to make known this principle.[78]

---

[77]4.1.3, *vārttika* 6, *Guṇavacanasya cāśrayato liṅgavacanabhāvāt*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 200, lines 1-6. The following passages also cite the principle as Kātyāyana states it: MB-K, vol. 1, p. 410, lines 18-24; p. 422, lines 17-22; p. 430, lines 15-19; vol. 2, p. 414, line 25 - p. 415, line 1.

[78]Pāṇini 1.2.51, *Lupi yuktavad vyaktivacane*, provides that when a suffix is deleted (replaced by *lup*) the object denoted by the derivate is considered to have the gender and number of the object denoted by the pre-suffixal base. The result is that gender and number suffixes occur for the derivate as they do for the base. 1.2.52, *Viśeṣaṇānāṃ cājāteḥ*, provides that qualifiers of the object denoted by the derivate are also considered to have the gender and number of the object denoted by the pre-suffixal base (*viśeṣaṇānāṃ ca*). This extension does not apply to qualifiers which are generic properties or to qualifiers taken to qualify the generic property directly rather than the object denoted by the derivate (*ajāteḥ* or *ājāteḥ*). For example, the word *'pañcālāḥ'* originally refers to a certain people. According to 4.2.67, *Tadasminnastīti deśe tannāmni*, the suffix *aṇ* prescribed by 4.1.83, *Prāg dīvyato 'ṇ*, occurs after it if the derivate, meaning that in which the Pañcālāḥ people live, is the name of a place. If that place is a district (*janapada*), 4.2.81, *Janapade lup*, deletes the suffix *aṇ* leaving no trace of its occurrence. The derivate *'pañcālāḥ'* formed in this manner is the name of a district. By 1.2.51, it takes the masculine plural terminations as does *'pañcālāḥ'* referring to the people. In the phrase, "*Pañcālāḥ subhikṣāḥ* (The Pañcālāḥ plentiful in food)," the word *'subhikṣāḥ* (plentiful in food)' denoting a property qualifying the Pañcālāḥ place also takes the masculine plural in accordance with 1.2.52. In contrast, in the phrase, "*Pañcālā janapadaḥ subhikṣaḥ*," the generic term for a district, *'janapadaḥ'*, does not take the plural termination, nor does the word *'subhikṣaḥ'*, because the property of being plentiful in food is understood to qualify the place as a generic district.

According to Kātyāyana, 1.2.52 constitutes a restrictive rule (*niyama*) rather than a provision (*vidhi*). Its purpose is to prevent the gender and number of the object denoted by the original word from applying to a generic property

Although this is not Patañjali's final view on the subject, there is a view that a quality word denotes just a quality.[79] This view is parallel to the view that a generic term denotes just a generic property. Gender and number are properties of the individual substances in which a quality resides.[80] It is natural to assume that the semantic conditions for the occurrence of gender suffixes and number terminations after a nominal base are the gender and number which belong to the object denoted by the nominal base. However, on the view that a quality word denotes just a quality, this is not so. It is the gender and number of an object other than that denoted by the nominal base. The gender and number terminations arise after a nominal base denoting a quality according to the gender and number of the individual substances in which the quality resides.

This fact is accounted for by extending the properties of the substratum to the quality which resides in it. The gender and number which properly belong to the individual substances in

---

qualifying the object denoted by the derivate. (1.2.52. *vārttika* 1. *Viśeṣaṇānāṃ vacanaṃ jātinivṛttyartham*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 228.) Suffixes naturally occur for words denoting qualifiers in accordance with the gender and number of the object denoted by the original word because both words refer to the same object. (1.2.52. *vārttika* 2. *Samānādhikaraṇatvāt siddham*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 228.) In the example, the word *'subhikṣa'* takes the plural, as the word *'pañcālāḥ'* does, naturally because they both refer to the same object. The *sūtra* does not serve to bring this about. It serves to prevent *'janapada'* from taking the plural.

Patañjali notes that if gender and number suffixes for words denoting qualifiers naturally agree with those for words denoting the objects qualified, and if the *sūtra* were stated just to prevent such agreement for a word denoting a generic property qualifying an object denoted by a derivate formed by replacing an affix by *lup*, it would not have to be stated. Even when an affix is not replaced by *lup* a generic term does not agree in gender and number. For example, in the phrase, *"Badarī sūkṣmakaṇṭakā madhurā vṛkṣaḥ,"* the word *'badarī'* (feminine singular) denotes a species of tree. The words *'sūkṣmakaṇṭakā'* and *'madhurā'*, denoting the qualifiers having small thorns and sweet, occur in the feminine. But the word *'vṛkṣaḥ'* denoting the generic property occurs in the masculine. The word *'badarī'* is not derived according to 1.2.51 and involves no deletion. Since no *sūtra* states an exception for generic terms occurring with *'badarī'*, there is no need for 1.2.52 to state an exception for generic terms occurring with derivates such as *'pañcālāḥ'* formed by 1.2.51. Generic properties in general do not adopt the gender and number of the objects they qualify. They keep their own gender and number consistently.

Patañjali concludes that the reason 1.2.52 is stated is to inform us of the general principle of gender and number agreement for words denoting qualities: A word denoting a quality takes the gender and number of the substratum in which the quality resides. *"Na tarhīdānīm ayaṃ yogo vaktavyaḥ. Vaktavyaś ca. Kiṃ prayojanam? Idaṃ tatra tatrocyate, guṇavacanānāṃ śabdānām āśrayato liṅgavacanāni bhavantīti. Tad anena kriyate."* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 228, lines 19-21.

[79]Śabara expresses this view commenting on Jaimini 3.1.12. See §3.6, note 58.

[80]For example, under 4.1.3, *vārttika* 7, *Bhāvasya ca bhāvayuktatvāt*, Patañjali states that feminine gender is a property of an individual substance: *Kasya tāvad bhavān evaṃ guṇaṃ nyāyyaṃ manyate strītvaṃ nāma? Dravyasya*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 200, lines 12-13.

which a quality resides are considered to belong to the quality too. Considering them to belong to the quality, the gender and number terminations naturally arise after the word denoting the quality. Hence, even though the gender and number which are the semantic conditions for a quality word's gender suffixes and number terminations belong to something other than the quality, by extension they belong to the quality so that the occurrence of the terminations after the quality word is achieved naturally.

5.2.94, *vārttika* 5, *Tathā ca liṅgavacanasiddhiḥ*, concludes how different genders and numbers occur for words denoting qualities. Commenting on it Patañjali says, "The gender and number of the substance in which the quality resides occur for the quality too."[81] Different genders and numbers occur for words denoting qualities according to the substrata in which the quality resides because the gender and number of the substance in which the quality resides belong to the quality too.

Similarly, different genders and numbers will occur for generic terms according to the substrata in which the generic property resides because the gender and number of the substance in which the generic property resides belong to the generic property too.

1.2.58 *vārttika* 3, *Arthātideśāt siddham*, interprets *sūtra* 1.2.58 to be this sort of extension. According to *vārttika* 3, the number which belongs to many objects is considered to belong to a single generic property which resides in them (1.2.58, note 5). On this interpretation, 1.2.58 does not extend the use of the plural termination by explicit statement to occur where a singular termination naturally arises. Rather, it extends the meaning condition on which the plural termination naturally arises. The *sūtra* allows that a generic property, although a single object, will be considered to have the plural number which properly belongs to the many objects in which it resides. Thus the plural termination which naturally arises to denote the plural number, will naturally arise to denote the plural number attributed to a single generic property.

In *vārttika* 55, *Adhikaraṇagatiḥ sāhacaryāt*, Kātyāyana states the reason that the gender and number which properly belong to the substance in which a property resides belong to the property too. Cognition of the property's substratum arises because it accompanies the property. Because cognition of an individual substance in which the class property resides arises, the properties of the substance, which by extension belong to the class property too, are among the semantic conditions for use of the generic term. It is by virtue of being included among the

---

[81]*Yad asau dravyaṃ śrito bhavati guṇas tasya yal liṅgaṃ vacanaṃ ca tad guṇasyāpi bhavati.* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 394, lines 14-15.

semantic conditions for use of the generic term that they can determine its gender and number suffixes.

1.6. Patañjali's Solution

Kātyāyana's argument in *vārttikas* 53-59 presents solutions to the objections raised in *vārttikas* 45-52 and establishes the view that a generic term denotes a class property alone. In general, Patañjali's comments on these *vārttikas* elaborate the argument as Kātyāyana presents it. However, under *vārttika* 53 Patañjali presents a lengthy discussion on gender and number ending with an independent conclusion concerning the denotation of generic terms.

The manner in which he concluded his commentary on *vārttika* 43 foreshadows his conclusion. There he showed that there is equal fault on both the view that a generic term denotes a generic property alone and the view that it denotes an individual substance alone. I have discussed the equivalence of the two views above (§1.4). He concludes his commentary on *vārttika* 53 by stating that neither view can completely exclude the other. He says the following:

> It is not the case that an individual substance is not denoted for him for whom a class property is denoted, nor that a class property is not denoted for him for whom an individual substance is denoted. Both are denoted for both. But for each something is principal, something subordinate. For him for whom a class property is the object denoted the class property is principal and an individual substance is subordinate. For him for whom an individual substance is the object denoted an individual substance is principal and its class property is subordinate (*vārttika* 53c).

The view that a generic term denotes a class property must accept an individual substance as part of the meaning. Conversely, the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance must accept a generic property as part of the meaning. Even on the view that a generic term denotes a class property, the properties of the individual substances in which the generic property resides constitute meaning conditions determining the speech form used. It is an individual substance's gender, number, difference, and amenability to birth and destruction which condition the use of certain suffixes, analytic strings, and allow the use of the term in syntactic connection with verbs.

Kātyāyana's defense of the view that a generic term denotes just a class property solves the problem of different gender and number terminations by saying that the substratum of the class property is the determining factor. The substratum of a

class property is an individual substance. To admit that an individual substance is included in the semantic condition for the use of a speech form is as much as to admit that an individual substance is included in the meaning.

If one accepts that the gender and number suffixes arise naturally after a nominal base, conditioned by the gender and number belonging to the object denoted by the nominal base, then one must accept that the object to which the gender and number belong is included in that which is denoted by the nominal base. Gender and number belong to individual substances. Therefore, the nominal base of a generic term denotes individual substances.

Each of the reasons for accepting each of the extreme views that a generic term denotes a generic property alone and that it denotes an individual substance alone is a reason for including the generic property or individual substance in the denoted meaning. If individual substances are included in the denoted meaning, the appropriate number naturally belongs to however many individual substances are to be denoted. Singular, dual, and plural inflectional terminations naturally arise. Similarly, the different genders of different individual substances of a class are the conditions for the use of a generic term in different genders. The fact that distinct identities belong to a multiplicity of objects, not to a single object, and that multiple instances of a generic term in analytic strings are used to refer to such distinct objects is reason for including individual substances in the meaning denoted by a generic term. Likewise differences in quality are due to a multiplicity of objects. If a generic term is at once syntactically connected with terms for inconsistent qualities, the usage is accounted for by accepting that individual substances having the different qualities are denoted. The fact that particular individuals, not the class as a whole, participate in action in any given instance, and that generic terms are used to refer to such individuals in general statements and injunctions is reason for including an individual in the meaning denoted by a generic term.

Conversely, including a class property in the meaning of a generic term accounts for the use of a single nominal base even when referring to a plurality of individual substances. Naturally cognition of the class property arises if the term denotes it. And this accounts for the universal application of the term. The word bears a relation with the class property in an arbitrary individual substance. Since this relation is consistent, learned once, it is known.

In any particular usage, either the class property or an individual substance is principal in the meaning and the other subordinate. The intention of the speaker determines which. If the speaker intends the class property as principal, the term will be

used in the singular but will apply universally to any individual of the kind. The term will occur in the gender intended as associated with the class property. Because an individual substance is included in the meaning as subordinate, action which is impossible on the class property will take place on the individual substance.

If the speaker intends an individual substance as principal, the generic term will be used with gender and number suffixes according to the gender and number of the individual substances denoted, and will allow action to apply to particular individuals. Because the class property is included as subordinate, a single base will be used even to denote many individuals.

1.2.58, *vārttika* 7, as explained by Patañjali, explicitly states the conclusion that a generic term denotes both a generic property and an individual substance. Kātyāyana says, "Because a generic term denotes a substance." Patañjali comments, "Because a generic term denotes a substance too, as well as a generic property." Under 5.1.119, *Tasya bhāvas tvatalau*, Kātyāyana refers to the fact that a generic term denotes an individual substance. In *vārttika* 5, *Siddhaṃ tu yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau*, he says that the suffixes *tva* and *tal* are used in order to denote the property on account of which a word denotes an individual substance.[82] In stating the condition for the use of *tva* and *tal* Kātyāyana makes known that the word after which these suffixes are provided denotes a substance due to the fact that the substance has a certain property. Patañjali comments that generic terms denote both the substance and the property and that Kātyāyana's *vārttika* applies to generic terms by virtue of their denoting the substance. He says, "These (generic terms 'tree', etc.), denoting both, signify both an individual substance and a quality. By virtue of the fact that they denote a substance, (the suffixes *tva* and *tal*) occur (*Ubhayavacanā hy ete dravyaṃ cāhur guṇaṃ ca yato dravyavacanās tato vṛttir bhaviṣyati*)."[83]

1.7. Quality Words

1.2.64, *vārttika* 54 made a comparison between generic terms and quality words. It suggested that a generic term denotes only a generic property just as a quality word denotes only a quality. Similarly, Patañjali's conclusion regarding the denotation of generic terms is parallel to his conclusion regarding the denotation of quality words. He makes an explicit comparison

[82]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 366, line 10.
[83]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 367, line 16.

between the two types of words in the same passage from his commentary on 5.1.119 just cited. He says, "Then these (quality words 'white', etc.) denote both too (*Ime 'pi tarhy ubhayavacanāḥ*)."[84] A quality word denotes both a quality and an individual substance just as a generic term denotes both a generic property and an individual substance. He accepts that quality words such as *'śukla'* have two meanings: 1) the quality itself, and 2) a substance having that quality.

In his very next statement, Patañjali accepts the provision and deletion of ***matup*** as a way of making the quality word denote a substance.[85] Similarly, under 2.1.30, *Tṛtīyā tatkṛtārthena guṇavacanena*, Patañjali discusses how a word denoting a quality comes to denote a substance in which the quality resides. In that context too, he affirms the derivation of a quality word denoting an individual substance in which the quality resides by the provision and deletion of ***matup***.[86]

These two passages cite a derivation Kātyāyana presents under 5.2.94, *Tad asyāstyasminniti matup*, to show how a quality word denoting just a quality comes to denote a substance having that quality. The original quality word denotes just a quality. According to 5.2.94, the affix ***matup*** occurs after a word to form a derivate denoting that to which the object denoted by the base is related or that in which it resides. A quality resides in the substance it qualifies. Hence ***matup*** would arise after a quality word if the derivate denotes a substance in which the quality resides. For example, ***matup*** would arise after the word *'śuklam'* denoting the color white, if a white cloth is to be denoted.[87] However, the correct form used to refer to a white cloth, for example in *"śuklaṃ vastram,"* does not contain the suffix ***matup***. To account for this, Kātyāyana explicitly states that the suffix ***matup*** is deleted without leaving a trace (replaced by *luk*).[88] The result is a nominal base denoting a substance identical in form to the original nominal base denoting a quality.

5.2.94, *vārttika* 4, *Avyatirekāt siddham iti ced dṛṣṭo vyatirekaḥ*, recognizes and responds to an objection against the derivation of a quality word denoting a substance by the provision and deletion of ***matup***. The objection is that ***matup***

---

[84] *Ime 'pi tarhy ubhayavacanāḥ*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 367, line 17.

[85] *Katham? Ārabhyate matublopo guṇavacanebhyo matupo lug bhavatīti. yato dravyavacanās tato vṛttir bhaviṣyati*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 367, lines 17-18.

[86] *Kathaṃ punar ayaṃ guṇavacanaḥ san dravyavacanaḥ saṃpadyate? Ārabhyate tatra matublopo guṇavacanebhyo matupo lug iti*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 385, lines 9-10.

[87] The nominal termination *am* after the base *'śukla'* would be deleted by 2.4.71 (§1.3.1.3 note 45)

[88] 5.2.94, *vārttika* 3. *Guṇavacanebhyo matupo luk*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 394. See Cardona 1967-68: 327-31.

does not arise in the first place because one identifies the quality with the substance in which it inheres. Patañjali says, "It is achieved (that a quality word denotes a substance in which the quality resides even without the provision and deletion of ***matup***) because there is no distinction. A quality is never found without a substratum. (*Avyatirekāt siddham. Na guṇo guṇinaṃ vyabhicarati.*)"[89]

Kātyāyana dismisses this objection because we do find a quality word used to refer to a quality as something different from the substance in which it inheres (*dṛṣṭo vyatirekaḥ*).[90] For example, in the phrase, "*paṭasya śuklaḥ* (the white of the cloth)," the quality white is understood to be an object different from the cloth and entering into relation with the cloth based on that difference. Because the quality is understood as different from the cloth, it is not identified with it so the provision and deletion of ***matup*** is required to make the speech form which naturally denotes a quality denote a substratum in which the quality resides.

Under 5.1.119, Kaiyaṭa states that the provision and deletion of ***matup*** are a way of making known that a quality word denotes the substratum in which the quality resides due merely to the identity of the quality and its substratum. It does not mean that based on the difference of the quality from its substratum, and its relation to it, a suffix arises and is deleted.[91] He upholds the objection to the provision and deletion of ***matup***.

If we observe usage of a quality word, we see that it is not the case that there is concomitant presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*) of a quality word and a substance. One does observe a quality word used without the cognition of a substance. In Patañjali's example, "*paṭasya śuklaḥ,*" the word *'śukla'* gives cognition only of the quality white, not of that in which white resides. On the other hand, if we observe usage of a generic term, we see that there is concomitant presence and absence of a generic term and a substance. One does not observe any case in which a

---

[89]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 394, lines 8-9.

[90]MB-K, vol. 2, p. 394. See lines 7-15.

[91]***Abhinnarūpāḥ.*** *Śuklādayo matubluki vijñāyamāne yadyapi taddhitāntās tathāpi tebhyo bhāvapratyayo guṇa eva bhavati na tu saṃbandhe. Guṇaguṇinor jātitadvator iva so 'yam ity abhisaṃbandhena lokanirūḍhena bhedasaṃbandhasya nyagbhāvāt 'guṇavacanebhyo luk' iti lugvidhāna-dvāreṇābhedenaiva guṇino 'bhidhānaṃ na tu bhedaṃ kṛtvā matvarthotpattir ity ākhyāyate.* MB, vol. 4, p. 296a. Nāgeśa comments at the conclusion of 5.2.94 *vārttika* 5 that *vārttika* 3 and the derivation by the provision and deletion of ***matup*** is rejected as unnecessary: *Bhāṣye:* ***Yad asau dravyam*** *ityādinā: matublope 'pi liṅgādisiddhir dṛśyate, tena pratyākhyānasyaiva yuktatvaṃ darśyate, anyathāsya granthasyātrāsaṅgatir ity āhuḥ.* Although the success of gender, etc. is seen if ***matup*** is deleted, the statement, "The gender and number of the substance, etc.," in the *bhāṣya* shows that the only proper view is to reject *vārttika* 3 as unnecessary, otherwise this statement would not make sense here. MB, vol. 4, p. 350a. See note 93.

generic term is used without cognition of a substance in which the generic property resides. There is no example of the usage of a generic term parallel to the example, *"paṭasya śuklaḥ."* One must employ the suffix *tva* in the phrase, *"gor gotvam,"* in order to say, "the cowness of the cow."

The usage of a quality word and a generic term reveal the conception speakers have of the objects they are used to refer to. The sixth triplet termination signifying a relation in the word *'paṭa'* in the phrase, *"paṭasya śuklaḥ* (the white of the cloth)," shows that the object denoted by the quality word *'śuklaḥ* (white)' is related to a qualified object, denoted by the word *'paṭa'*, from which it is distinct. In this usage, a quality is conceived as something different from the substance in which it resides. On the other hand, in the phrase, *"śuklaḥ paṭaḥ* (a white cloth)," a speech form indicating a relation is absent, and there is agreement of gender and number terminations. The words are coreferential. Cognition of the quality white and the substance in which it resides arises from the word *'śuklaḥ'*. In this usage, a quality is conceived as identical to the substance in which it resides.

In the case of generic terms, examples such as *"paṭasya śuklaḥ"* are lacking. The fact that there is no such usage shows that a generic term is not used to refer to a generic property as something different from the substance in which it resides. This indicates that a generic property is never conceived as something different from the substance in which it resides. On the contrary, it is always conceived as identical to the substance in which it resides.[92]

When Patañjali proposes that a generic term denotes both a class property and an individual substance, he has in mind that it denotes them as identical. Similarly, when he says that a quality word denotes both a quality and an individual substance in which it resides, he intends them as identical. He does not intend that the word denotes two independent objects.[93] In the beginning of the

---

[92]Under 1.2.64, *vārttika* 54, Nāgeśa sums up the difference between quality words and generic terms as follows: *Iyāṃs tu viśeṣaḥ, śuklādiśabdavācya-guṇānāṃ guṇinā bhedābhedavivakṣe śabdavācyajātes tv abhedavivakṣaiveti*. MB, vol. 2, p. 99b. See also *vārttika* 54 note 84 for Kaiyaṭa's comment.

[93]In the passage quoted in note 91, Nāgeśa points out that Patañjali does not accept the provision and deletion of *matup* as the final conclusion regarding the reason quality words refer to a substance having that quality. The derivate *'śukla'* formed by the provision and deletion of *matup* would not denote a quality; it would denote a substance in which the quality resides. Gender and number suffixes would occur naturally according to its denoted object, the substance. If this solution were accepted as the final one, Patañjali's concluding statement would not make sense. He says, "The gender and number of the substance in which the quality resides occur for the quality too." There is no need to attribute the gender and number of the substance to the quality which resides in it, if the correct gender and number suffixes occur for the word *'śukla'* because it is a derivate denoting the substance directly. Conversely, the fact

Paspaśāhnika in his example of the experience of a cow, Patañjali illustrates how human conception distinguishes the various elements of an experience which constitutes a single undifferentiated whole (§1.1). He shows how human conception distinguishes a substance, a quality, a class property, etc. When he says that a generic term denotes both a generic property and a substance, or that a quality word denotes both a quality and a substance, he means that in this case human conception does not distinguish the two elements. This fact makes the objections which Śabara and Kumārila raise against the view that a generic term denotes both a class property and an individual substance vacuous.

Presenting the view that a generic term denotes just a class property, Kātyāyana says in *vārttika* 55, *Adhikaraṇagatiḥ sāhacaryāt*, "Cognition of a substratum arises because it

---

that Patañjali concludes that a quality adopts the gender and number of the substance in which it resides implies that gender and number suffixes in agreement with those occurring after the word denoting the substance occur naturally for the original word *'śukla'* denoting the quality. If that is so, there is no need for the grammatical mechanism of providing and deleting ***matup*** to make the word denote the substance. Therefore, *vārttika* 3 providing zero (*luk*) in place of ***matup*** is rejected as unnecessary.

Nāgeśa's point is valid. The derivation by the provision and deletion of ***matup*** derives a word *'śukla'* which denotes an individual substance as different from a quality. If Patañjali's concluding statement is understood to extend the gender and number of the substance to the quality as a different entity, only then does it not make sense. If Patañjali's concluding statement is understood to preserve a distinction between a quality and a substance while extending the properties of the substance to the quality—and one who accepts the derivation must understand it this way—then it serves no purpose because the quality word already achieves the correct gender and number suffixes by virtue of denoting the substance directly.

If one rejects the derivation by the provision and deletion of ***matup*** and instead understands that the quality adopts the gender and number of the substance by virtue of being conceived as identical to the substance, then Patañjali's concluding statement does make sense. However—and this is the point I wish to make—it makes sense only if it is understood as stating that a quality adopts the gender and number of a substance in which it resides by virtue of being identical to it. Otherwise the same fault holds. The reason the statement would not make sense is that the quality word, by denoting a substance, already automatically gets the proper gender and number suffixes even if the proper gender and number don't belong to the quality. This reason is valid irrespective of whether the original quality word denotes a substance conventionally or an identical speech form derived by the provision and deletion of ***matup*** denotes a substance.

Nāgeśa's point is valid, and valid only if Patañjali's statement is taken as implying that a quality is conceived as identical to a substance in which it resides. Therefore, his statement, "The gender and number of the substance in which the quality resides occur for the quality too," must be taken to imply conception of a quality and substance as identical. In a similar manner, we should understand that his assertion that a generic term denotes a generic property and an individual substance in which it resides implies conceiving the generic property and the substance in which it resides as identical.

accompanies (the class property)." The very same concomitant presence and absence of a generic term and an individual substance which lead Patañjali to conclude that a generic term denotes both a class property and an individual substance are used to explain how without denoting an individual substance cognition of it arises.[94]

1.8. Pāṇini 1.2.58

1.4.21, *Bahuṣu bahuvacanam*, and 1.4.22, *Dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane*, state the general rules for the occurrence of inflectional terminations in the proper numbers. A singular termination occurs when singular number is to be denoted. A dual termination occurs when dual number is to be denoted, and a plural termination occurs when plural number is to be denoted.[95] 1.2.58 states an extension (*atideśa*) regarding the use of the plural terminations. A plural termination optionally occurs for one object, if the word refers to a class.

As *vārttika* 1, *Jātyākhyāyāṃ sāmānyābhidhānād aikārthyam*, with Patañjali's commentary explain, a generic term denotes a generic property. A generic property is a single object. Hence, if a generic term denotes a generic property, it denotes a single object. In accordance with the general rules for the occurrence of inflectional terminations in the proper numbers, just a singular termination would occur. However, usage of the generic term is desired in the plural too. This usage would not be accounted for by the grammar without stating a specific rule for the purpose. 1.2.58 does this. 1.2.58 provides for the occurrence of a plural termination where only a singular termination would naturally arise. It is stated on the assumption that a generic term denotes a single generic property.

---

[94]See Cardona 1967-68: 324-27. He concludes, "The relation between the alternatives is clear. The first assumes that *ākṛti* (or *jāti*) and *dravya* are distinct, but that they always accompany each other.... That the two accompany each other then serves as the reason for the second alternative, which considers them identical." He refers to MB-K, vol. 2, p. 367, lines 3-8. On the first alternative action takes place on an individual substance which accompanies a denoted class property. The individual substance, which is considered to be distinct from the class property is not denoted. On the second alternative, action takes place on an individual substance which is identical to a class property. Both are denoted as identical. The very same alternatives are expressed under 1.2.64. *Vārttikas* 54-55 express the first alternative that a generic term denotes just a class property but that comprehension of an individual substance arises because it accompanies the class property. Patañjali's statement under *vārttika* 53 concluding that both a class property and an individual substance are denoted expresses the second alternative that both are denoted because they are considered as identical.

[95]According to 1.4.21-22. See 1.2.64 translation note 81.

In *vārttika* 6, *Aśiṣyaṃ vā bahuvat pṛthaktvābhidhānāt*, Kātyāyana states that the rule need not be taught because a generic term used in the plural denotes many individual objects separately. Although a single generic property is a single object present in each of the individual substances of a kind, the individual substances are many separate objects. If many separate objects are to be denoted, it is natural that a plural termination occurs. In *vārttika* 7, *Jātiśabdena hi dravyābhidhānam*, Kātyāyana states that a generic term denotes an individual substance as well as a generic property. He rejects the assumption that a generic term denotes just a generic property. Because a generic term denotes an individual substance, and a plural termination naturally occurs if there are many objects to be denoted, it is natural that a generic term be used in the plural to denote many individual substances of a kind.

A generic term may be used either in the singular or the plural to refer to a class of objects. If it is understood to denote the generic property which is a single object, then it is used in the singular. On the other hand, if it is understood to denote the individual substances which are many, then it is used in the plural. The use of a singular or plural termination is an indication of whether that which is denoted by the term is conceived as a single entity or multiple entities. The generic property, being a single entity, has singular number, and singular number is the natural semantic condition for a singular termination. Individual substances, being many, have plural number, and plural number is the natural semantic condition for a plural termination.

One can account for the use of a generic term in both the singular and plural without stating an additional rule by accepting that a generic term denotes both a generic property and the individual substances in which the generic property resides. Patañjali explains that a generic term does denote both. When a speaker intends the generic property as principal then the singular is used, and when a speaker intends the many individual substances as principal then the plural is used (1.2.58 *vārttika* 7).[96]

Under *vārttika* 7, Patañjali describes a scenario in which a listener has to understand that the speaker of a statement intends an individual substance as the principal object denoted by a generic term. A herdsman sits watching a large herd of cows. A man approaches him and asks him, "Do you see a cow here?" If the man meant a cow in general, that is, any cow whatsoever, he would not have asked the question, because it is obvious that he sees not only one cow but many. Given that it doesn't make sense

---

[96]This is neatly stated by Patañjali under 1.2.69, *vārttika* 2, *Ākṛtivācitvād ekavacanam*: *Ākṛtivācitvād ekavacanaṃ bhaviṣyati. Yadā dravyābhidhānaṃ tadā dvivacanabahuvacane bhaviṣyataḥ*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 250, lines 8-10.

to ask the question concerning a cow in general, he must be asking about a particular cow.

This scenario clarifies what Patañjali means by his statement under 1.2.64, *vārttika* 53 that a speaker intends either the generic property or an individual as principal and the other as subordinate (§1.6, *vārttika* 53c). Various factors in the use of a generic term and its context show which of the two the speaker intends as principal. The singular and plural terminations, and the context are examples of factors that help one to know what the speaker's intention is, whether he intends the generic property as principal and an individual substance as subordinate or an individual substance as principal and a generic property as subordinate.

We have discussed how the singular and plural terminations show this. Discussing 1.2.58 with the condition that a generic term refers to a class, Kātyāyana and Patañjali have taken the singular number termination to indicate that the object denoted has singular number, is a single object, hence is the generic property. They have also taken the plural number to indicate that the objects denoted have plural number, are many, hence are the individual substances.

In his example of the questioner and the herdsman, a generic term in the singular denotes an individual substance. Patañjali describes a context which shows that the speaker asks about an individual. From this example we conclude that, asking about a particular cow, a speaker intends the individual substance as principal and its generic property as subordinate. Asking about a cow in general, a speaker intends the generic property as principal and an individual substance as subordinate.

In *vārttika* 4, *Saṃkhyāprayoge pratiṣedhaḥ*, Kātyāyana notes an exception to 1.2.58. There is no option to use a generic term in the plural to refer to a class if the number one qualifies it. This exception need not be stated for the same reasons that the *sūtra* itself need not be stated. The general rules for the occurrence of inflectional terminations in the proper numbers account for the correct usage based on whether the speaker intends the object denoted by the generic property to be a single generic property or many individual substances.

We can learn a certain fact of usage from the statement of the *vārttika* with Patañjali's commentary: a generic term is always used in the singular to refer to a class if the number one qualifies it. This fact of usage indicates something about the conception of the speakers: a speaker always intends a generic property as the principal object denoted by the generic term if he uses the number word '*eka* (one)' with it, and if he refers to a class.

Patañjali gives the example, "One rice grown makes plenty of food (*eko vrīhiḥ sampannaḥ subhikṣaṃ karoti*)." In the example, the contextual information that the rice is plenty of food

makes it clear that the speaker does not intend a single individual rice grain as principal in the meaning of the word 'rice' here. He intends a whole crop as principal in the meaning.[97] The use of the singular inflectional termination and the use of the word *'ekaḥ* (one)' indicates that the speaker intends the object denoted by the word 'rice' as a single entity. He intends that the crop of rice as a single class is the principal meaning of the word 'rice' in this example. This is precisely in accord with the general pattern we have discussed for a generic term if it is used to refer to a class: if it is used in the singular, the speaker intends the generic property as principal in the meaning and the individual substances as subordinate. Therefore, Patañjali's explanation that a generic term denotes both a generic property and an individual substance with the intention of the speaker determining which is principal and which subordinate in the meaning accounts for the consistent use of a generic term in the singular to refer to a class if it occurs with the number one. Because Patañjali's explanation accounts for the usage based on general principles, there is no need to state *vārttika* 4 to provide for the usage.

1.9. Conclusion of the Grammar Section

Under 1.2.64 Patañjali discusses three views of the denotation of generic terms: 1) A generic term denotes an individual substance. 2) It denotes a generic property. 3) It denotes both. He also discusses the relationship of the principle that one word denotes one object to the question of the denotation of generic terms.

The first view discussed accepts that a generic term denotes individual substances and does not accept the principle that one word denotes one object at all. In order to account for the use of a single generic term in the plural for many individual substances of a kind, the procedure of determining the meaning of a speech form by concomitant presence and absence cannot be carried out to its full extent. One must rest content with the determination that a generic term denotes what it does naturally as we observe it in ordinary usage. Hence the singular *'vṛkṣaḥ'* denotes one tree, the dual *'vṛkṣau'* denotes two trees, and the plural *'vṛkṣāḥ'*, many trees. One cannot divide the nominal base and suffixes to determine that the base *'vṛkṣa'* means an individual tree. For this reason the view is unsatisfactory.

If one accepts the principle that one word denotes one object on the view that a generic term denotes an individual

---

[97]The fact that Patañjali considers that an exception would have to be stated for this example if 1.2.58 were stated shows that he considers that the word 'rice' in this example refers to the class. That is, he considers a crop of rice as a class.

substance, then one determines that the nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* denotes an individual tree. In order to denote many trees, many nominal bases would be used. But it is accepted that just one base with the plural termination denotes many trees. To achieve this one must state that one remains.

This view is unsatisfactory because the artifice of letting many homophonous speech forms occur and deleting all but one is not able to explain the cognition which arises from the single generic term used. One has the same knowledge regarding many individual trees that they are trees, and one knows that each is the same as the other. To convey this knowledge, the nominal base *'vṛkṣa'* is used (with an appropriate termination). Whether or not a generic property actually exists as an object is not the concern of a grammarian. However, Patañjali seeks to account for the ordinary usage of a word as arising naturally based on certain principles from the ordinary conception of an object.

People have identical knowledge regarding each of many individual substances of a kind and the knowledge that each is the same as the other. This knowledge is the condition for the use of a generic term. The object conceived to be the basis of such knowledge is a generic property. Hence, a generic term is said to denote a generic property. On this view a generic term denotes a generic property and the principle that one word denotes one object is upheld. Upholding the principle that one word denotes one meaning in order to avoid stating that one remains requires accepting that a word denotes an over-arching general property common to all the objects for which a word is used in the case of words used in different meanings.

The view that a generic term denotes a generic property has a difficulty complementary to the one belonging to the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance. The view that a generic term denotes an individual substance ignores that there is an identical cognition regarding each of many individual substances of a kind with the knowledge that each is the same as the other. As a result it has difficulty accounting for a single cognition in relation to many individual substances of a kind and the use of a single speech form to convey that single cognition. Similarly, the view that a generic term denotes a generic property has difficulty accounting for the cognitions of dual and plural number in connection with a single generic property and the use of dual and plural inflectional terminations which naturally arise to convey them. To overcome the difficulty it is accepted that the individual substances which are the substrata of a generic property are the semantic conditions for usage of inflectional terminations while still maintaining that the generic property itself is the only object denoted by the nominal base.

Patañjali accepts the view that a generic term denotes both a generic property and an individual substance. The generic

property included in the meaning accounts for the same cognition with respect to all individual substances of a kind and the knowledge that each of them is the same as the others. It is the semantic condition for the use of a single base and which allows general statements to apply repeatedly to different individuals. The inclusion of an individual substance in the meaning accounts for the use of a generic term in syntactic connection with action including the acts of coming into being and being destroyed. It accounts for the differences in quality of the object to which the word applies and for the distinction of one object from another which that implies. Individual substances are the semantic conditions for the use of different gender and number suffixes and for many instances of a generic term in analytic strings.

One of the two, a generic property or an individual substance, is principal in the meaning, the other subordinate depending on whether the speaker intends a particular individual or intends the statement to apply generally. The context and purpose of the statement help to determine what the speaker's intention is. In the case of generic terms which are polysemous, different generic properties are the reason they are said to have many meanings.

Pāṇini 1.2.58 Translation

1.2.58. Jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām.
A plural (number termination) **optionally occurs for one** (object) **if** (the word) **refers to a class.**

Idam ayuktaṃ vartate.
(Objector:) This is not proper.[1]

Kim atrāyuktam?
(Proponent:) What is not proper here?

Bahavas te 'rthās tatra yuktaṃ bahuvacanam. Tad yad ekavacane śāsitavye bahuvacanaṃ śiṣyata etad ayuktam. Bahuṣv ekavacanam iti nāma vaktavyam.
(Objector:) There are many objects so the plural is (naturally) appropriate. It is not proper that the plural is (explicitly) taught when it is the singular which has to be taught. "A singular (number termination) occurs for many (objects)," is what should be stated.

Ata uttaraṃ paṭhati:
(Narrator:) Hence he declares the answer:

I. Jātyākhyāyāṃ sāmānyābhidhānād aikārthyam.
(Proponent:) **If** (the word) **refers to a class, it has one object because it denotes a general property.**
Jātyākhyāyāṃ sāmānyābhidhānād aikārthyaṃ bhaviṣyati. Yat tad vrīhau vrīhitvaṃ yave yavatvaṃ Gārgye gārgyatvaṃ tad ekaṃ tac ca vivakṣitam. Tasyaikatvād ekavacanam eva prāpnoti. Iṣyate ca bahuvacanaṃ syād iti tac cāntareṇa yatnaṃ na sidhyatīti jātyākhyāyam ekasmin bahuvacanam. Evam artham idam ucyate.
If the word refers to a class, it will have one object because it denotes a general property. The riceness in rice, the barleyness in barley, the gārgyaness in Gārgya, is a single thing and it is what the speaker intends. Because it is a single thing, just a singular number termination obtains. But it is desired that the plural should occur too and that doesn't succeed without an effort. Hence Pāṇini states, "**A plural** (number termination) **occurs**

[1]The objector at first holds the view that a word denotes just an individual substance; the proponent that it denotes just a generic property. The text is from MB-K, vol. 1, pp. 229, line 9 - 230, line 21.

for one (object) **if** (the word) **refers to a class.**" It is for this purpose that the present *sūtra* is stated.

Asti prayojanam etat?
(Objector:) This is a reason?

Kiṃ tarhīti?
(Proponent:) What else do you think it is?

2. *Tatraikavacanādeśa uktam.*
(Objector:) **In this matter, with regard to the extension that** (a plural) **number** (termination occurs instead of a singular termination)**, it has been stated.**

Kim uktam?
(Proponent:) What has been stated?

Vrīhibhya āgata ity atra gher ṅitīti guṇaḥ prāpnotīti.
(Objector:) In "*vrīhibhya āgataḥ* (come for rice)," the guṇa vowel *e* would obtain (instead of the final *i* of the stem *'vrīhi'*) by 7.3.111.[2]

---

[2]7.3.111. *Gher ṅiti (guṇa 108).* A *guṇa* vowel replaces the final sound of a stem termed *ghi* before a termination marked with *ṅ*.
By 1.4.7, *Śeṣo ghy asakhi*, the class name *ghi* applies to speech forms ending in short *i* or *u* with the exception of *'sakhi'* and *'pati'* (outside of a compound). In addition it applies to feminine speech forms not termed *nadī*. In the example, *"vrīhibhya āgata,"* the base *'vrīhi'* is termed *ghi*. Hence, 7.3.111 provides that the *guṇa* vowel *e* substitutes for *i* before the fourth triplet singular termination *ṅe* (*e* marked with *ṅ*).
1.2.58 extends the use of a plural termination so that it occurs where a singular termination would otherwise occur. The objector understands that it applies after the singular termination has already arisen. He takes it as a substitution rule (*ādeśa*) replacing the singular which has already occurred naturally by explicitly stating that a plural occurs. If 1.2.58 were a substitution rule a fault would arise in the derivation of *'vrīhibhyaḥ'* because the extension rule (*atideśa*) 1.1.56 would come into play.
1.1.56. *Sthānivad ādeśo 'nalvidhau.* Except those which have certain sound conditions, operations which apply to an item subject to substitution equally apply to its substitute.
First the fourth triplet singular termination *ṅe* marked with *ṅ* would arise after the base *'vrīhi'*. Then, because *'vrīhi'* refers to rice as a class, 1.2.58 would optionally replace *ṅe* with the plural *bhyas* which is not marked with *ṅ* and does not condition *guṇa* substitution by 7.3.111. But 1.1.56 would allow 7.3.111 to replace the final *i* of *'vrīhi'* in *'vrīhi + bhyas'* with *e*, as it does in *'vrīhi + ṅe'*. The result is an erroneous form.
Saying, "**it has been stated,**" the objector refers to *vārttika* 19 under 1.1.56, and elaborating he cites a line of Patañjali's comment there: ***19. Jātyākhyāyāṃ vacanātideśe sthānivadbhāvapratiṣedhaḥ.*** *Jātyākhyāyāṃ vacanātideśe sthānivadbhāvasya pratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ. Vrīhibhya āgata ity atra gher ṅiti* (7.3.111) *iti guṇaḥ prāpnoti. Naiṣa doṣaḥ uktam etat.* ***Arthātideśāt siddham*** *iti.* (Objector:) **With regard to the extension of number, a prohibition against** (a substitute) **being**

Naiṣa doṣaḥ.
(Proponent:) This fault does not arise.
3. Arthātideśāt siddham.
It succeeds because the extension applies to the meaning.
Arthātideśo 'yam. Nedaṃ pāribhāṣikasya vacanasya grahaṇam.
This extension applies to the meaning. This is not a reference to the technical term.[3]

Kiṃ tarhi?
(Objector:) What then?

Anvarthagrahaṇam: Ucyate vacanam. Bahūnām arthānāṃ vacanaṃ bahuvacanam iti. Yāvad brūyād eko 'rtho bahuvadbhavatīti tāvad ekasmin bahuvacanam iti.
(Proponent:) It is a usage in accordance with its etymological meaning: *vacana* is that which is stated, *bahuvacana* is that which is stated of many objects.[4] To say, "A *bahuvacana* occurs for one object," is as much as to say, "One object is as if many."[5]

---

like its substituend (has to be stated). With regard to the extension that (a plural) number (termination occurs instead of a singular termination), a prohibition against (a substitute) being like its substituend has to be stated. In "*vrīhibhya āgataḥ* (come for rice)," the *guṇa* vowel *e* would obtain (instead of the final *i* of the stem '*vrihi*') by 7.3.111. (Proponent:) This fault does not arise. It has been stated, "**It succeeds because the extension applies to the meaning.**" MB-K, vol. 1, p. 138, lines 20-23.
Note that the proponent in the cited passage refers to *vārttika* 3 under *sūtra* 1.2.58.

[3]The word '*vacana*' in the compound '*bahuvacana*' in 1.2.58 is not a usage of the technical term '*vacana* (number termination)'.

[4]"This is not a usage, etc. (*Nedaṃ...iti*)" is cited under 8.2.81, *Eta id bahuvacane*. MB-K, vol. 3, p. 415, lines 9-10.

[5]*Vārttika* 3 avoids the fault attributed to 1.2.58 in *vārttika* 2. See §1.5.4.
Kaiyaṭa explains: ***Bahūnām** iti. Bahūnām arthānāṃ bahutvam evocyate ity ekasminnarthe bahutvam anenātidiśyata iti bahutvād bahuvacanaṃ bhavatīti nāsti sthānyādeśabhāvaḥ.*
Of many. It is the plural number which is stated of many objects; Hence (1.2.58) extends plural number to one object. The plural number termination arises because there is plural number. Hence there is no substitute-substituend relationship. MB, vol. 2, p. 66a-66b.
Pāṇini 1.4.102, *Tāny ekavacanadvivacanabahuvacanāny ekaśaḥ*, and 103, *Supaḥ*, introduce the terms *ekavacana*, etc. as technical terms of grammar. They are class names of certain members of the sets of verbal and nominal inflectional terminations (*tiṅ* and *sup*). Patañjali affirms this under 4.1.21: *Evaṃ tarhy ekavacanaṃ dvivacanaṃ bahuvacanam iti śabdasaṃjñā etāḥ.* (MB-K, vol. 1, p. 321, lines 3-4.) Later under the same *sūtra* he cites a *ślokavārttika* stating that number (*saṃkhyā*) is one of the meanings of the terminations which receive these class names: *Supāṃ karmādayo 'py arthāḥ saṃkhyā caiva tathā tiṅām.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 322, line 17.
The fault attributed to 1.2.58 in *vārttika* 3 arises from considering 1.2.58 to be a substitution rule (*ādeśa*). However, it does not supply grounds for denying that the term '*bahuvacana*' names inflectional terminations in 1.2.58. Nor does the

4. Saṃkhyāprayoge pratiṣedhaḥ.
(Objector:) **A prohibition has to be stated for when a number is used.**
Samkhyāprayoge pratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ. Eko vrīhiḥ saṃpannaḥ subhikṣaṃ karoti.
A prohibition against 1.2.58 has to be stated for when a number is used. "One rice grown makes plenty of food."
5. Asmado nāmayuvapratyayayoś ca.
And for when a name or yuvan-affix (is used with the first person pronoun) ***asmad.***
Asmado nāmaprayoge yuvapratyayayoge ca pratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ. Nāmaprayoge: Ahaṃ Devadatto bravīmi. Ahaṃ Yajñadatto bravīmi. Yuvapratyayaprayoge: Ahaṃ Gārgyāyaṇo bravīmi. Ahaṃ Vātsyāyano bravīmi.
A prohibition has to be stated (against 1.2.59) for when a name is used or a yuvan-affix is used with the first person pronoun *asmad.* When a name is used: I Devadatta say, I Yajñadatta say. When a yuvan-affix is used: I Gārgyāyaṇa say, I Vātsyāyana say.[6]

Yuvagrahaṇena nārthaḥ. Asmado nāmapratyayaprayoge nety eva. Idam api siddhaṃ bhavati: Ahaṃ Gārgyo bravīmi. Ahaṃ Vātsyo bravīmi.
(Suggested modification:) There is no purpose for including *'yuvan'* in the *vārttika.* One should state just, "1.2.59 does not apply when a name or affix is used with the first person pronoun

---

suggestion that it is an *anvarthagrahaṇa* have to be accepted as a final conclusion. The very fact that *vārttika* 6 offers an alternative solution indicates that it is not the final conclusion. Even if the proponent accepts that the term *'bahuvacana'* names a certain set of terminations he can establish his point, namely, that 1.2.58 is not a substitution rule replacing singular terminations with plural ones but rather an extension of the meaning in which the plural terminations initially arise. (See Śivarāmendrasarasvatī, *"Vastutas tv ekasminnarthe bahuvacanaṃ bhavatīti sūtrārthān na kāpy anupapattiḥ."* MPV, vol. 4, p. 84.) Since there is no sixth case indicating a substituend, 1.1.56 would not come into play. However, a problem would arise in *sūtra* 1.2.63, *Tiṣyapunarvasvor nakṣatradvandve bahuvacanasya dvivacanaṃ nityam,* where the presence of the sixth triplet termination makes the explanation of the rule as an extension (*atideśa*) rather than a substitute (*ādeśa*) less convincing. See Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa, MB, vol. 2, p. 66b.

[6]1.2.59. *Asmado dvayoś ca (ekasmin anyatarasyām 58).* After the first person pronoun base *asmad,* a plural (number termination) optionally occurs for one or two objects.

4.1.105, *Gargādibhyo yañ,* provides the suffix *yañ* after the bases *'garga'* and *'vatsa'* to form the derivatives *'gārgya'* and *'vātsya'* denoting a *gotra* descendant. After these derivatives, 4.1.101, *Yañiñoś ca,* provides the affix ***phak*** to form the derivatives *'gārgyāyaṇa'* and *'vātsyāyana'* denoting *yuvan* descendants. Pāṇini 4.1.162-167 define the terms *'gotra'* and *'yuvan'.* See Gautama 2.2.62 V10, note 22, and Pāṇini 1.2.64 translation, note 7. Concerning the status of *gārgyatva* as a generic property, see §1.2.5.

asmad. This achieves the following too: "I Gārgya say, I Vātsya say."[7]

Apara āha: Asmadaḥ saviśeṣaṇasya prayoge nety eva. Idam api siddhaṃ bhavati. Ahaṃ paṭur bravīmi. Ahaṃ paṇḍito bravīmi.
Another says: One should state just, "1.2.59 does not apply when the first person pronoun *asmad* is used with a qualifier." This achieves the following too: I, wise, say; I, learned, say.[8]

6. Aśiṣyaṃ vā bahuvat pṛthaktvābhidhānāt.
Aśiṣyo vā bahuvadbhāvaḥ.
(Objector:) **Or it should not be taught** (that one generic property) **is as if many because** (the substances) **are denoted as separate.**
It should not be taught that one generic property is as if many.[9]

---

[7]One need not specify a *yuvan* affix because the exception holds for affixes which occur to form derivatives denoting *gotra* descendants as well.

[8]If *'paṭu'* and *'paṇḍita'* are taken to be underived nominal bases, then the previous formulation, "(1.2.59) does not (apply) when a name or affix is used with *asmad*," cannot account for the two examples, "I, wise, say; I, learned, say." But if they are accepted as derived, then the phrase, "when an affix is used," includes them. *'Paṭu'* is derived by adding the *Uṇādi* affix *u* to the verbal root √*paṭ* (Kāśikā, vol. 3, p. 240), and *'paṇḍita'* by Pāṇini 5.2.36, *Tad asya saṃjātaṃ tārakādibhya itac*.

[9]From here on the discussant labeled 'objector' takes the view that 1.2.58 should be rejected as unnecessary because a generic term denotes both a generic property and an individual. This discussant need not be the same person as the one labeled 'objector' above now having shifted to adopt a new view; it may be a different discussant who presents the final view.
Kaiyaṭa: *Ubhayapadārthapakṣāśrayeṇa pratyākhyātum āha:* ***aśiṣyam*** *iti. Tatra kadācij jāteḥ prādhānyaṃ kadācid dravyasyeti yatheṣṭaṃ prayoga upapadyate.* He says, "**it should not be taught**," to reject (1.2.58) as unnecessary by resorting to the view that a word denotes both (a generic property and an individual substance). On that (view) sometimes the generic property is principal, sometimes an individual substance. Hence usage arises as desired. MB, vol. 2, p. 67a.
Nāgeśa summarizes the view on which 1.2.58 is unnecessary: A word gives cognition of both a generic property and an individual. In any particular usage, a speaker's intention determines which of the two is the qualified object (principal) and which the qualifier. Inflectional terminations, accompanying words, etc., make the speaker's intention understood. In the domain to which the present *sūtra* would apply, the singular number termination conveys that the speaker intends a generic property and the plural that he intends individuals. When a word such as *'gauḥ* (cow)' is used, the generic property is intended as being identical to an individual, even if it is intended as the qualified object. Hence it makes sense that the action carried out on an individual fulfills the intent of the command, "*Gāṃ vāhaya* (drive a cow)," even though an individual is not intended as principal. In contrast, a word ending in the suffix *tva* gives cognition of just a generic property as distinct from any individual. Hence it does not make sense to say, "*Gotvaṃ vāhaya* (drive cowness)." See MB, vol. 2, p. 67a.

Kiṃ kāraṇam?
(Proponent:) What is the reason?

Pṛthaktvābhidhānāt. Pṛthaktvena hi dravyāṇy abhidhīyante. Bahavas te 'rthās tatra yuktaṃ bahuvacanam.
(Objector:) Because the individual substances are denoted as separate. Because individual substances are denoted as separate. There are many objects so the plural is naturally appropriate.

Kim ucyate pṛthaktvābhidhānād iti Yāvatedānīm evoktaṃ jātyākhyāyāṃ sāmānyābhidhānād aikārthyam iti.
(Proponent:) How can you say, "Because (the substances) are denoted as being separate," since just now it has been said, "If (the word) refers to a class, it has one object because it denotes a general property (*vārttika* 1)."

7. Jātiśabdena hi dravyābhidhānam.
(Objector:) **Because a generic term denotes a substance.**
Jātiśabdena hi dravyam apy abhidhīyate jātir api.
Because a generic term denotes a substance too, as well as a generic property.

Kathaṃ punar jñāyate jātiśabdena dravyam apy abhidhīyata iti?
(Proponent:) But how does one know that a generic property denotes a substance too.

Evaṃ hi kaścin mahati gomaṇḍale gopālakam āsīnaṃ pṛcchati, "Asty atra kāṃcid gāṃ paśyasīti?" Sa paśyati: Paśyati cāyaṃ gāḥ, pṛcchati ca "Kāṃcid atra gāṃ paśyasīti." Nūnam asya dravyaṃ vivakṣitam iti. Tad yadā dravyābhidhānaṃ tadā bahuvacanaṃ bhaviṣyati; yadā sāṃānyābhidhānaṃ tadaikavacanaṃ bhaviṣyati.
(Objector:) In just this way: Someone asks a herdsman sitting by a large herd of cattle, "Do you see a cow?" The herdsman sees, "He sees cows and yet asks, 'Do you see a cow here?' Certainly he intends a specific individual substance." Therefore, when a generic term denotes an individual substance, the plural will occur; when it denotes a general property, the singular will occur.[10]

---

[10]The content of the last sentence is repeated in 1.2.69, *vārttika* 2 and commentary: ***Ākṛtivācitvād ekavacanam.*** *Ākṛtivācitvād ekavacanaṃ bhaviṣyati. Yadā dravyābhidhānaṃ tadā dvivacanabahuvacane bhaviṣyataḥ.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 250, lines 8-10.
In order to convey the intent of the question, *"Asty atra kāṃcid gāṃ paśyasi?"* it should be translated, "Do you see a certain cow?" rendering *'kāṃcit'* by 'a certain'. I have deliberately translated the question, "Do you see a cow?" rendering *'kāṃcit'* by the vague 'a' in order to allow Patañjali's own discussion to show the intent of the question. To translate *"kāṃcid gām"* by "a certain cow," gives it away that 'cow' refers to a particular individual.
Nāgeśa: ***Bhāṣye mahati gomaṇḍala*** *iti. Atinibiḍagomaṇḍale 'viviktatayā*

dṛṣṭe ittham uktiḥ. Tatra jāter eva śabdārthatve jāter dṛṣṭatvāt praśnānupapattir ity arthaḥ. In the *bhāṣya*, **by a large herd of cattle:** The statement is such that (the questioner) sees a very thick herd of cattle without distinguishing any of them. In such a situation, the question wouldn't make sense if just a generic property were the object denoted by a word because he sees the generic property. MB, vol. 2, p. 67b.

Pāṇini 1.2.64 Outline

I. Introduction to the purpose of the rule
   A. The function of each of the terms in defining the scope of the rule
   B. The grammatical purpose of the rule (*vārttikas* 1-3)

II. Examination of the rule's mode and scope of application (not included)

III. The rule is rejected as unnecessary on the view that a word denotes an individual substance by not accepting the principle that one word denotes one object. Words denote what they are seen denoting in ordinary usage naturally. (*vārttikas* 27-34)

IV. The rule is rejected as unnecessary on Vājapyāyana's view that a word denotes a single class property even accepting that one word denotes one object. (*vārttikas* 35-44)

V. Vyāḍi's view that a word denotes an individual. (*vārttikas* 45-52)

VI. Defense of Vājapyāyana's view that a word denotes a class property (*vārttikas* 53-59).

Pāṇini 1.2.64 Translation

1.2.64. Sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau.
Of those speech units whose form (*rūpa*) is the same, just one remains, if there is one termination.[1]

Rūpagrahaṇaṃ kimartham?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) For what purpose does the *sūtra* include the word 'form (*rūpa*)'?

Samānānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktāv itīyaty ucyamāne yatraiva sarvaṃ samānaṃ śabdo 'rthaś ca tatraiva syāt. Vṛkṣā plakṣā iti. Iha na syāt: akṣāḥ pādāḥ māṣā iti. Rūpagrahaṇe punaḥ kriyamāṇe na doṣo bhavati. Rūpaṃ nimittatvenāśrīyate śrutau ca rūpagrahaṇam.
(Sūtra-proponent:) If the *sūtra* said just, "Of the same just one remains if there is one inflectional termination (*samānānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*)," then the rule would apply only where everything is the same, the speech form and the meaning, for example, '*vṛkṣāḥ* (trees), *plakṣāḥ* (fig trees)'. It would not apply here: '*akṣāḥ* (die, axle, seed), *pādāḥ* (foot, verse segment, quarter), *māṣāḥ* (bean, monetary unit, fool)'. But if the *sūtra* includes the word 'form (*rūpa*)' the fault does not arise. The form is resorted to as the condition upon which just one remains, and form (*rūpa*) is taken in the domain of sound (*śruti*).[2]

---

[1]*"Samānaṃ rūpam eṣām iti sarūpāḥ. Sarūpāṇāṃ śabdhānāṃ ekavibhaktau parata ekaśeṣo bhavati. Ekaḥ śiṣyate itare nivartante."* Kāśikā, vol. 1, p. 48. The word *'sarūpa'* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound derived according to 2.2.24. *Anekam anyapadārthe*. *'Sa'* replaces *'samāna'* according to 6.3.85. *Jyotirjanapadarātrinābhināmagotra**rūpa**sthānavarṇavayovacanabandhuṣu (saḥ 78, samānasya 84).* The Kāśikā (vol. 1, p. 48) says, "before one termination (*ekavibhaktau parataḥ*)," rather than, "if there is one termination." Patañjali discusses the meaning and significance of the term *'ekavibhaktau'* in 1.2.64 at length. It has different meanings depending upon whether the rule applies to nominal bases (*prātipadika*) or words (*pada*). He determines justifiable meanings for the term which would yield the correct results on each interpretation and then proceeds to consider the more fundamental semantic issues bearing on whether it is necessary to state the rule at all. The present dissertation is concerned just with these latter issues and cannot dwell on the fine points of the formulation of the rule.

[2]Patañjali explains that by mentioning form (*rūpa*) in 1.1.68, *Svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā*, Pāṇini informs us that both sound and meaning belong to a speech form (*śabda*) and that reference to a speech form in grammar includes the meaning (*artha*) connected with the speech form as well as the speech form itself. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 175, lines 19-23. However, just the sound is a factor, not the meaning, in the condition for 1.2.64 to apply.
I have translated according to the first of two interpretations of the phrase, *"śrutau ca rūpagrahaṇam,"* which Kaiyaṭa offers. He comments: *Śabdānuśāsana-*

Athaikagrahaṇaṃ kimartham?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) For what purpose does the *sūtra* include the word 'one (*eka*)'?

Sarūpāṇāṃ śeṣa ekavibhaktāv itīyaty ucyamāne dvibahvor api śeṣaḥ prasajyeta. Ekagrahaṇe punaḥ kriyamāṇe na doṣo bhavati.
(Sūtra-proponent:) If the *sūtra* said just, "Of those speech units whose form is the same, there is a remainder, if there is one termination (*sarūpāṇāṃ śeṣa ekavibhaktau*)," it would be possible for two or many to remain. But if the *sūtra* includes the word 'one (*eka*)' the fault does not arise.

Atha śeṣagrahaṇaṃ kimartham?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Then for what purpose does the *sūtra* include the word 'remains (*śeṣa*)'?

Sarūpāṇām eka ekavibhaktāv itīyaty ucyamāna ādeśo 'yaṃ vijñāyeta.
(Sūtra-proponent:) If the *sūtra* said just, "Of those speech units whose form is the same, one occurs, if there is one inflectional termination (*sarūpāṇām eka ekavibhaktau*)," the rule would be understood as a substitution (*ādeśa*).[3]

Tatra ko doṣaḥ?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) If that were so, what fault would arise?

Áśvaś cā́svaś ca áśvau. Āntaryato dvyudāttavataḥ sthānino dvyudāttavān ādeśaḥ prasajyeta. Lopyalopitā ca na prakalpeta.
(Sūtra-proponent:) *Áśva* (horse) and *áśva* (horse) *áśvau* (two horses). Because of its similarity, in place of a substituend with two high pitched sounds a substitute with two high pitched sounds would obtain.[4] And that which ought to be deleted would not succeed in being deleted.

Tatra ko doṣaḥ?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) If that were so, what fault would arise?

---

prastāvāc ca śabdasambandhirūpaṃ gṛhyate. And because the presentation is instruction of (correct) speech (*śabda*), it is the form connected with speech sound (*śabda*) which is meant here (*gṛhyate*). Nāgeśa clarifies: *Ādye grahaṇaṃ viṣayatā.* On the first (of the two views) taking (*grahaṇa* means) being in the domain of. MB, vol. 2, p. 71a.
Śabara mentions the example of the word *'akṣa'* under Jaimini 6.8.10. MD, part 5, p. 370.

[3] 1.1.49. *Ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā.* A sixth triplet ending designates the relation "in place of".

[4] 1.1.50. *Sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ.* In place of (a substituend) the (element) most similar (to it occurs).

Gargāḥ Vatsāḥ. Bidāḥ Urvāḥ. Añ yo bahuṣu yañ yo bahuṣv ity ucyamāno lug na prāpnoti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) *Gargāḥ, Vatsāḥ. Bidāḥ, Urvāḥ.* The zero (*luk*) stated for the affix *añ* which refers to many descendants and for the affix *yañ* which refers to many descendants would not obtain.[5]

Mā bhūd evam. Añantaṃ yad bahuṣu yañantaṃ yad bahuṣv ity evaṃ bhaviṣyati.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) It would not be so. It will be like this: The base ending in *yañ* which refers to many, the base ending in *añ* which refers to many.[6]

Naivaṃ śakyam. Iha hi doṣaḥ syāt. Kāśyapapratikṛtayaḥ kāśyapā iti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) It can't be that way because there would be a fault here: *'kāśyapāḥ'* meaning many images of Kāśyapa.[7]

---

[5]With 4.1.92, *Tasyāpatyam*, 4.1.104, *Anṛṣyānantarye vidādibhyo 'ñ (gotre 98)*, provides the affix *añ* after the bases *'vida, urva,'* etc., and 4.1.105, *Gargādibhyo yañ (gotre 98)*, provides the affix *yañ* after the bases *'garga, vatsa,'* and most of the others in the list beginning with *'garga'*, to form derivates denoting *gotra* descendants. Concerning the term *gotra* see note 7.
2.4.64. *Yañañoś ca (bahuṣu tenaivāstriyām 62, gotre 63, luk 58).* Zero (*luk*) replaces the affixes *yañ* and *añ* referring to many *gotra* descendants in a gender other than the feminine (and nullifies any operations which those affixes condition).
Kaiyaṭa explains as follows: Since there are many descendants of one predecessor Garga, according to the principle that one speech form occurs for each object denoted, one base will be followed by many suffixes to yield *'garga + ya ya ya'*. Based on the assumption that 1.2.64 applies only to speech units whose form is the same, by applying the metarule 1.1.49 by which 1.2.64 would be a substitution rule, one suffix *ya* would be the substitute for all of the suffixes *ya ya ya*. On this view the fault which the proponent states would not obtain. However, in *vārttika* 23, *Ekārthānām api virūpāṇām* (MB-K, vol. 1, p. 239, line 6), Kātyāyana extends the rule that one remains to speech units whose forms are different. Based on this extension, applying 1.1.49 would result in *'garga + ya'* substituting for *'garga + ya ya ya'*. In this case, the stated objection would apply. It would not be the case that the suffix *ya* alone refers to many; rather, the base + affix together would refer to many. Hence the zero (*luk*) which 2.4.64 states as applying on the condition that the suffix refers to many would not apply. MB, vol. 2, p. 72a.

[6]1.1.72. *Yena vidhis tadantasya.* (A qualifier) x by means of which a provision is made refers to that which ends in x. Hence, *yañ* in 2.4.64 refers to that which ends in *yañ*. As long as the aggregate *'garga + ya'* which replaces *'garga + ya ya ya'* refers to many, *luk* will apply to the affix *yañ*.

[7]5.3.96. *Ive pratikṛtau (kan 95).* The affix *kan* occurs after a base if an image similar what the base denotes is to be denoted.
5.3.99. *Jīvikārthe cāpaṇye (lup 98).* Zero (*Lup*) occurs in place of *kan* if the object denoted is an image (used for worship), is not for sale, and serves the purpose of sustenance (for beggars). See Padamañjarī, KNP, vol. 4, p. 311.
7.2.117. *Taddhiteṣv acām ādeḥ (aṅgasya 6.4.1, vṛddhiḥ 114, ñṇiti 115).* *Vṛddhi* replaces the first of the vowels of the stem after which a *taddhita* affix marked

Ekavibhaktāv iti kimartham?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) For what purpose does the *sūtra* include the word 'if there is one termination (*ekavibhaktau*)'?
Payaḥ payo jarayati. Vāso vāsaś chādayati. Brāhmaṇābhyāṃ ca kṛtaṃ brāhmaṇābhyāṃ ca dehīti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) Milk curdles milk. Cloth covers cloth. Done by *brāhmaṇas* and give to *brāhmaṇas*.[8]

---

with *ñ* or *ṇ* is provided.
'Kaśyapa' is 3rd in the list beginning with *'vida'*. The derivation of *'kāśyapāḥ'* is as follows:

kaśyapa + añ,	4.1.104.
kāśyapa	7.2.117.
kāśyapa + kan	5.3.96.
kāśyapa + 0	5.3.99.

One *'kāśyapa'* substituting for *'kāśyapa kāśyapa kāśyapa'* ends in the affix *añ* and refers to many objects which are not feminine. Hence 2.4.64. would erroneously provide *luk* in this case. Later in his commentary on this *sūtra* Patañjali cites this passage (MB-K, vol. 1, p. 238, lines 22-26) and answers this last objection as follows: *Naiṣa doṣaḥ. Laukikasya tatra gotrasya grahaṇaṃ na caital laukikaṃ gotram* (p. 238, lines 26-27). *Tatra'* refers to 2.4.64 and *'etad'* refers to the use of *'kāśyapa'* for images. The term *'gotra'* has three meanings: 1) The technical term *'gotra'* (*śāstrīyaṃ gotram*) defined in 4.1.162-67 is confined to the provision of *gotra* affixes. See Gautama 2.2.62 V10, note 22, and Cardona (1988: 52-53). 2) Elsewhere such as in 2.4.63, *Yaskādibhyo gotre*, and the *sūtras* in which it recurs, the term *'gotra'* has its ordinary sense of descendant (*apatya*). 3) The term's sense is extended in practice to mean family line. In weddings and other ceremonies the participants' family line (*gotra*) is read out. 2.4.64 provides *luk* of the affixes *yañ* and *añ* wherever they occur in the second sense of the term *'gotra'*. Patañjali mentions *'laukika'* just to reiterate that sense; it is not relevant to the example of *'kāśyapa'* used for an image of a descendant. Such usage does not refer to *gotra* in any sense technical or ordinary, except metaphorically.
2.4.64 provides *luk* of *añ* only if the affix *añ* occurs in the plural. There must be many descendants. In the example, however, there are many images of only one descendant. Hence 2.4.64 will not apply (as it ought not) to *'kāśyapa'* as a single substitute for *'kāśyapa kāśyapa kāśyapa'*. Commenting on 2.4.62, Patañjali repeats much of the passage and clarifies that in order that *luk* occur the affix *añ* (or *yañ*) itself must refer to many: *Tenaiva cet kṛtaṃ bahutvam iti vā vaktavyam....Tasmāt pratyayārthabahutve lug ity eṣa eva pakṣo jyāyān.* See MB-K, vol. 1, p. 492, lines 12-19. For Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa's comments see MB, vol. 2, p. 72b and p. 84a-b, and vol. 2, p. 534b. For the Kāśikā, Nyāsa, and Padamañjarī on 2.4.63 see KNP, vol. 2, pp. 307-8.

[8]The examples show different terminations of the same form. In the first example, the first *'payaḥ'* is treated as if it ends in a first triplet termination; the second as if it ends in a second triplet termination. The second example is similar. In the third example the first *'brāhmaṇa'* ends in a third triplet termination; the second in a fourth triplet termination. Even though the speech forms are of the same form, the rule that one remains does not apply because the terminations are different. Later under the present *sūtra* Patañjali gives the last of these three examples again and then commenting on *vārttika* 14, *Na vārthavipratiṣedhād yugapadvacanābhāvaḥ*, accounts for the fact that the rule that one remains does not apply to it even without the word *'ekavibhaktau'*. The meanings of different terminations conflict and so cannot be expressed simultaneously. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 236 lines 12-19.

Kimartham punar idam ucyate?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) But for what purpose is this *sūtra* stated?

1. Pratyarthaṃ śabdaniveśān naikenānekasyābhidhānam.
(Sūtra-proponent:) **Because words apply per object, one word does not denote many objects.**
Pratyarthaṃ śabdā abhiniviśante.
Words apply per object.[9]

Kim idam pratyartham iti?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) What is this, 'per object'?

Artham arthaṃ prati pratyartham. Pratyarthaṃ śābdaniveśād etasmāt kāraṇān naikena śabdenānekasyārthasyābhidhānaṃ prāpnoti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) 'Per object' means "to each object".[10] Because words apply per object, due to this cause, it would not obtain that one word denotes many objects.

Tatra ko doṣaḥ?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) If that were so, what fault would arise?

2. Tatrānekārthābhidhāne 'nekaśabdatvam.
(Sūtra-proponent:) **In that case, to denote many objects many words would be used.**
Tatrānekārthābhidhāne 'nekaśabdatvaṃ prāpnoti. Iṣyate caikenāpy anekasyābhidhānaṃ syād iti tac cāntareṇa yatnaṃ na sidhyati.
In that case, to denote many objects the use of many words would obtain. But it is accepted that even one word may denote many objects, and that doesn't succeed without an effort.
3. Tasmād ekaśeṣaḥ.
Therefore, the rule that one remains.

---

[9]To be precise I should continue to translate *'śabda'* by 'speech form'. I use 'word' only because it is less cumbersome and because my paper is not concerned with distinguishing different types of speech forms.

[10]I have translated the doubling of the word *'artha'* as 'each' in accordance with 8.1.4, *Nityavīpsayoḥ (sarvasya dve 1)*, a whole (syntactic item) is doubled to convey repetition or pervasion. The compound *'pratyartham'* is formed by 2.1.6, *Avyayaṃ vibhakti-samīpa-samṛddhi-vyṛddhy-arthābhāvātyayāsampratiśabdaprādurbhāva-paścād-**yathā**nupūrvya-yaugapadya-sādṛśya-sampattisākalyānta-vacaneṣu (sup 2, supā 4, avyayībhāva 5)*, an indeclinable conveying the meaning of a termination (*vibhakti*), ..., the appearance of a sound or word (*śabdaprādurbhāva*), ..., certain meanings of *yathā* (fitness, repetition or **pervasion (*vīpsā*)**, and accordance), etc., combines with a syntactically related nominal word to form an *avyayībhāva* compound. The Kāśikā (vol. 1, p. 101) gives the present passage, *"artham arthaṃ prati pratyartham,"* as the example of an *avyayībhāva* formed from *'yathā'* conveying pervasion.

Evamartham idam ucyate.
For this purpose the present *sūtra* is stated.

Asti prayojanam etat?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) This is a reason?

Kim tarhīti?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What else do you think it is?

Kim idaṃ pratyarthaṃ śabdā abhiniveśanta ity etaṃ dṛṣṭāntam āsthāya sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ārabhyate na punar apratyarthaṃ śabdā abhiniviśanta ity etaṃ dṛṣṭāntam āsthāya virūpāṇām anekaśeṣa ārabhyate?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Why assume the principle that words apply per object and make the rule that of those speech units whose form is the same just one remains rather than assume the principle that words apply other than per object and make the rule that of those speech units whose form is different many remain?

Tatraitat syāl laghīyasī sarūpanivṛttir garīyasī virūpapratipattir iti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) This would be pertinent: Omitting those whose form is the same is easier; understanding those whose form is different is more difficult.[11]

Tac ca na. Laghīyasī virūpapratipattiḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) That's not right either. It is easier to understand those whose form is different.

Kiṃ kāraṇam?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What is the reason?

Yatra hi bahūnāṃ sarūpāṇām ekaḥ śiṣyate tatrāvarato dvayoḥ sarūpayor nivṛttir vaktavyā syāt.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Because where one of many speech units whose form is the same remains one must state the omission of at least two whose form is the same.[12]

---

[11]Once one knows the sequence of sounds of one of words of the same form one knows them all. On the other hand, one must learn the sequence of sounds of each of words whose form is different separately.

[12]If there are two similar speech forms just the last one is omitted, if there are three then the last two, ... if there are n then the last n-1. Understanding speech units with a different sound sequence is easier because the mind is consistently engaged in producing speech forms whereas if just one of similar speech forms remains the mind is sometimes engaged in producing and sometimes in omitting. The dual type of behavior is more complicated. See Kaiyaṭa MB, vol. 2, p. 74a.

Evam apy etasmin sati kiṃcid ācāryaḥ sukaratarakaṃ manyate sukaratarakaṃ caikaśeṣārambhaṃ manyate.
(Sūtra-proponent:) Even though that is true the teacher gives regard to something that is easier and he considers making the rule that one remains easier.[13]

... ...

27. Dvivacanabahuvacanāprasiddhiś caikārthatvāt.
Dvivacanabahuvacanayoś cāprasiddhiḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) **And the dual and plural terminations would not obtain because one object is denoted.**[14]
And the dual and plural terminations would not obtain.

Kiṃ kāraṇam?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What is the reason?

Ekārthatvāt. Eko 'yam avaśiṣyate tenānena tadarthena bhavitavyam.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Because one object is denoted. Just one (speech form) remains; that same (remaining speech form) should occur to denote its object.

Kimarthena?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What object?

Yadartha ekaḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) The object which one speech form denotes.

Kimarthaś caikaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What object does one speech form denote?

Eka ekārthaḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) One speech form denotes one object.

Naikārthyam. Nāyam ekārthaḥ.
(Sūtra-proponent:) It is not so that one object is denoted. This one speech form which remains does not denote one object.

Kiṃ tarhi?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) What then?

---

[13]In this way the section 1.2.64-73 remains consistent throughout. One must make the rule that one remains anyway for 1.2.65, *Vṛddho yunā tallakṣaṇaś ced eva viśeṣaḥ*, etc. which concern speech units of differing forms. In these *sūtras* just one of speech units of different forms remains.

[14]*Vārttika* 27 deals with the topic of number which is introduced in and recurs throughout the technical discussion concerning the term *'ekavibhaktau'* (if there is one termination). See MB-K, vol. 1, p. 235, line 21-24, p. 236, lines 19-20 and p. 237, line 27 - p. 238, line 1.

Dvyartho bahvarthaś ca.
(Sūtra-proponent:) It denotes two objects and many objects.

28. Naikārthyam iti ced ārambhānarthakyam.
Naikārthyam iti ced ekaśeṣārambho 'narthakaḥ syāt. Iha hi śabdasya svābhāvikī vānekārthatā syād vācanikī vā. Tad yadi tāvat svābhāvikī
29. Aśiṣya ekaśeṣa ekenoktatvāt.
Aśiṣya ekaśeṣaḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) **If it is not so that one object is denoted, there is no purpose in stating *sūtra* 1.2.64.**
If it were not so that it denotes one object, stating that one remains would have no purpose. The fact that the speech form denotes many objects is either natural or has to be explicitly stated. If it is natural,
It should not be taught that one remains because one speech form has already denoted the many objects.
It should not be taught that one remains.

Kiṃ kāraṇam?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What is the reason?

Ekenoktatvāt tasyārthasya dvitīyasya prayogeṇa na bhavitavyam uktārthānām aprayoga iti. Atha vācanikī tad vaktavyam eko 'yam aviśiṣyate sa ca dvyartho bhavati bahvarthaś ceti.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Because one speech form has already denoted all of the many objects, usage of a second speech form denoting any of them would not occur, "One does not use speech forms whose objects have already been denoted."[15] Alternatively, if it has to be explicitly stated, it must be stated that one speech form remains and it denotes two objects and many objects.[16]

---

[15]Kātyāyana lays the basis for this basic principle in his first *vārttika* with the phrase, "*arthaprayukte śabdaprayoge* (since it is the case that one uses words prompted by the objects they denote)." See my discussion §1.1. Patañjali explains the principle more fully as follows: *Arthagatyarthaḥ śabdaprayogaḥ. Arthaṃ sampratyāyayiṣyāmīti śabdaḥ prayujyate. Tatraikenoktatvāt tasyārthasya dvitīyasya prayogeṇa na bhavitavyam uktārthānām aprayoga iti.* The use of words is for the purpose of the comprehension of the objects they denote. With the intention, "I will give the understanding of an object" a word is used. This being the case, because one (word) has already stated it, usage of a second (word) denoting that object would not occur, "One does not use words whose objects have already been denoted." MB-K, vol. 1, p. 105, lines 2-3. Patañjali cites the principle earlier under the present *sūtra* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 238, lines 10-11, and in many places throughout the Mahābhāṣya, for example, MB-K, vol. 1, p. 252, lines 6-11; p. 370, lines 17-19; vol. 2, p. 199, lines 1-3. Many collections of these kinds of principles include it. See Abhyankar (1967: 470, index no. 12).

[16]The present *sūtra* must add that the one remaining speech form denotes more than one object. The *sūtra* would say, "Of those (speech units) whose form (*rūpa*) is the same just one remains and it denotes more than one object, if there

Na vaktavyam. Siddham ekaśeṣa ity eva.
(Sūtra-proponent:) It doesn't have to be stated. It succeeds just stating that one remains.[17]

Kathaṃ punar eko 'yam aviśiṣyata ity anena dvyarthatā bahvarthatā vā śakyā labdhum?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) But how is one able to get by stating, "This one speech form remains," that it denotes two objects or that it denotes many objects?

Tac caikaśeṣakṛtam. Na hy antareṇa tadvācinaḥ śabdasya prayogaṃ tasyārthasya gatir bhavati. Paśyāmaś ca punar antareṇāpi tadvācinaḥ śabdasya prayogaṃ tasyārthasya gatir bhavatīti agnicit somasud iti yathā. Te manyāmahe lopakṛtam etad yenātrāntareṇāpi tadvācinaḥ śabdasya prayogaṃ tasyārthasya gatir bhavatīti. Evam ihāpy ekaśeṣakṛtam etad yenātraiko 'yam avaśiṣyata ity anena dvyarthatā bahvarthatā vā bhavati.
(Sūtra-proponent:) The provision that one remains achieves that too. For without the use of the speech form denoting a certain object, comprehension of that object does not occur. And yet we see that even without the use of the speech form denoting a certain object comprehension of that object occurs, as in '*agnicit* (one who has built an altar), *somasut* (one who has pressed soma)'. We consider that deletion (*lopa*) achieves that in this case even without the use of the speech form denoting a certain object comprehension of that object occurs.[18] Similarly here too the provision that one remains achieves that in this case seeing, "This

---

is one termination. So says Kaiyaṭa: ***Sa ca dvyartha iti.*** *"Sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣo 'nekārthaś caikavibhaktāu" iti vaktavyam ity arthaḥ.* MB, vol. 2, p. 88a.

[17]Kaiyaṭa explains: ***Siddham iti.*** *Ekaśeṣārambhasāmarthyād ayam artho gamyate: śiṣyamāṇaḥ śabdo 'nekārthābhidhāyīti. Ekena hy anekārthābhidhānāyaikaśeṣaḥ kriyate.* **It succeeds.** By virtue of stating that one remains this meaning is understood: the remaining speech form denotes many objects. (The rule) that one remains is made for the very purpose that one (speech form) may denote many objects. MB, vol. 2, p. 88a.

[18]Pāṇini 3.2.90. *Some suñaḥ (bhūte 84, kvip 87).* When the subordinate word *'soma'* occurs as direct object, the affix ***kvip*** occurs after the verbal root √*suñ* (to press).
Pāṇini 3.2.91. *Agnau ceḥ (bhūte 84, kvip 87).* When the subordinate word *'agni* (altar)' occurs as direct object, the affix ***kvip*** occurs after the verbal root √*ci* (to pile up).
Pāṇini 3.1.93. Affixes provided for in the section beginning with 3.1.91, *Dhātoḥ*, which are not called *tiṅ* (3.4.78, *Tiptasjhi....*) are called *kṛt*.
Pāṇini 3.4.67. *Kartari kṛt.* (In general) affixes termed *kṛt* occur to convey the agent (*kartṛ*).
Pāṇini 6.1.67. *Ver apṛktasya (lopaḥ 66).* Zero (*lopa*) occurs in place of an isolated *vi*.
The affix ***kvip*** occurs after the given root to convey the agent (3.4.67) and then is replaced by zero.

one speech form remains," we comprehend two objects or many objects by it.[19]

Ucyeta tarhi na tu gamyeta. Yo hi gām aśva iti brūyād aśvaṃ vā gaur iti na jātucit saṃpratyayaḥ syāt. Tenānekārthābhidhāne yatnaṃ kurvatāvaśyaṃ lokaḥ pṛṣṭhato 'nugantavyaḥ: Keṣv artheṣu laukikāḥ kāñ śabdān prayuñjata iti. Loke caikasmin vṛkṣa iti prayuñjate dvayor vṛkṣāv iti bahuṣu vṛkṣā iti. Yadi tarhi loko 'vaśyaṃ śabdeṣu pramāṇaṃ kimartham ekaśeṣa ārabhyate?

(Sūtra-rejecter:) It could be stated (that the speech form which remains denotes two or many objects) but it would not be understood.[20] If one calls a cow a horse or a horse a cow there's

---

[19]The proponent does not use the verb 'achieves', literally, 'to make, do (√kṛ)', in its literal sense. A grammatical rule does not make a word or create its relation with the object it denotes; it makes us understand what is the correct speech form to denote a certain object. The word, the object it denotes, and the relation between them are eternal according to Kātyāyana's very first *vārttika* (§1.1). Hence the rule for deletion does not make the word *'somasut'* denote a certain object; it makes us understand what the object is that it already denotes. Similarly, the rule that one remains does not make one word denote more than one object; it makes us understand that certain words do denote more than one object.
For the foregoing reason Kaiyaṭa explains that *'kṛta* (made, done)' means made understood: ***Tac caikaśeṣakṛtam iti.*** *Ekaśeṣavidhānenaitat pratipāditam ity arthaḥ.* **That one remains achieves that too.** The meaning is: The provision that one remains makes it understood. ***Lopakṛtam iti.*** *Lopadvāreṇaitat saṃgṛhītam ity arthaḥ.* **Deletion achieves.** It is understood by means of deletion.
Nāgeśa makes it clear that the provision of the rule makes the usage understood: ***Etat pratipāditam iti.*** *Bhāṣye kṛtam iti karotir ekaśeṣavidhānasāmarthyalabdhapratipādane vartate, tena śabdārthasaṃbandhanityatve 'pi na kṣatir iti bhāvaḥ.* **Makes it understood.** 'Done (***kṛta***)' in the text: 'to do' occurs in the meaning "to make understood what is gotten by virtue of the provision that one remains." In this way there is no harm to a word, its meaning and their relation being eternal. That is what he has in mind.
Nāgeśa again expresses that Patañjali's discussion concerns how to account for the way we understand speech; grammar does not create that manner of understanding: *Bhāṣye* ***bahvarthatā vā bhavatīti.*** *....Vidyamānaiva bhodhyate ity arthaḥ.* In the text, **"or the fact of denoting many objects occurs."** ....The meaning is: being present is made known. MB, vol. 2, p. 88b.
I have translated the conclusion concerning ***ekaśeṣa*** exactly parallel to the example of *lopa* to which it is compared. My words, "by it," translate *'anena'* and refer to the one remaining speech form (*anena śiṣyamāṇena śabdena*) which the phrase, "This one remains," characterizes. Hence, I depart from Kaiyaṭa who takes the phrase, "This one remains," as stating the provision of the rule a second time: ***Aneneti.*** *Ekaśeṣavidhānena.* **By this.** By the provision that one remains. MB, vol. 2, p. 88b.

[20]The objection arises from taking the proponents use of the word 'achieves' (in the text, *'kṛta'*) in its literal sense of to make. He objects that stating a rule does not make the word have a meaning it did not have already even without the rule. Since that is so, why bother to undertake the effort of making the rule?
Kaiyaṭa comments: ***Ucyeteti.*** *Vacanād anekārthakāryāṇi pravartantāṃ yathā* ***jātyākhyāyām ekasminniti,*** *na tv ekārthaḥ śabda ekaśeṣavidhānenā*

no way that it would be understood.[21] Hence with respect to one word denoting many objects, one has to make an effort and follow ordinary usage closely—to denote which objects do ordinary speakers use which words? And in ordinary usage for one tree they use '*vṛkṣa* (tree sg.)', for two '*vṛkṣau* (trees du.)', and for many '*vṛkṣāḥ* (trees pl.)'. So if ordinary usage is necessarily the authority, for what purpose does Pāṇini commence the remainder of one?

Atha kimartham lopa ārabhyate?
(Sūtra-proponent:) Well, for what purpose does he commence deletion?[22]

Pratyayalakṣaṇam ācāryaḥ prārthayamāno lopam ārabhata ekaśeṣārambhe punar asya na kiṃcit prayojanam asti.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) The teacher commences deletion seeking to achieve operations caused by an affix where no affix is present, but there is no reason for him to commence the remainder of one.[23]

Nanu coktaṃ pratyarthaṃ śabdaniveśān naikenānekasyābhidhānam iti. Yadi caikena śabdenānekasyārthasyābhidhānaṃ syān na pratyarthaṃ śabdaniveśaḥ kṛtaḥ syāt.
(Sūtra-proponent:) But I have already said, "Because words apply per object, it is not the case that one word denotes many

---

'nekārthaḥ sampadyata ity arthaḥ. **It could be stated.** The meaning is: From the explicit statement (it is understood) let the operations which pertain to (a speech form) denoting many objects apply (to the one remaining), just as (from the statement of) 1.2.58, (the operations which pertain to a speech form denoting many objects apply to a speech form denoting one object if it denotes a generic property). But a speech form denoting one object does not come to denote many objects by the provision that one remains. MB, vol. 2, p. 88b.

[21]Nāgeśa explains: ***Saṃpratyayaḥ syād*** *iti bhāṣye. Aśvatvādipramā syād ity arthaḥ.* **(There's no way that (*na jātucit*))** cognition of (the cow) being a horse would arise. MB, vol. 2, p. 88b.

[22]Nāgeśa: *bhāṣye* ***atha kimarthaṃ lopa iti.*** *Agnicid ity ato lokata eva kartrarthapratītisiddher iti bhāvaḥ.* **Well, for what purpose is deletion.** Cognition of the meaning 'agent' succeeds from '*agnicit*' just by virtue of ordinary usage. That is what he has in mind. MB, vol. 2, p. 88b.

[23]***kvip***, which is provided (3.2.90-91) and then deleted (6.1.67) in the derivation of '*somasut*' and '*agnicit*' (See note 18), is a *kṛt* affix marked with *p*. By virtue of 1.1.62, 6.1.71 provides the augment ***tuk***, even though ***kvip*** has been deleted.
Pāṇini 1.1.62. *Pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇam.* An operation conditioned by an affix applies even if the affix has been deleted.
Pāṇini 6.1.71. *Hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk.* The final augment ***tuk*** is added to a short vowel before a *kṛt* suffix marked with *p*.
Nāgeśa: ***Pratyayalakṣaṇam iti.*** *Anena lopenānutpatter evānvākhyānam ity uktam.* **Operations caused by an affix.** By this he states that *lopa* is just an explanation that (the missing element) doesn't arise. MB, vol. 2, p. 89a.

objects."[24] And if it were the case that one word denotes many objects, it would not be true that words apply per object.

30. Pratyarthaṃ śabdaniveśād ekenānekasyābhidhānād apratyartham iti cet tad api pratyartham eva.
Pratyarthaṃ śabdaniveśād ekenānekasyābhidhānād apratyartham iti ced evam ucyate, yad apy ekenānekasyābhidhānaṃ bhavati tad api pratyartham eva. Yad api hy arthāv arthau prati tad api pratyartham eva. Yad api hy arthān arthān prati tad api pratyartham eva.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) **If you say this: "From the fact that words apply per object** (it follows that it is not the case that one word denotes many objects)**, hence from the fact that one word denotes many objects it would follow that it is not true that words apply per object,"** (I answer:) **That too is precisely per object.**
If you say this: "From the fact that words apply per object (it follows that it is not the case that one word denotes many objects), hence from the fact that one word denotes many objects it would follow that it is not true that words apply per object," even one word denoting many objects is still precisely per object. That which is per two objects is still per object, that which is per many objects is still per object.[25]

Yāvatām abhidhānaṃ tāvatāṃ prayogo nyāyyaḥ. Yāvatām arthānām abhidhānaṃ bhavati tāvatāṃ śabdānāṃ prayoga ity eṣa pakṣo nyayyaḥ.
(Sūtra-proponent:) It is reasonable that one uses as many as are denoted. This view is reasonable, that one uses as many words as there are objects denoted.

31. Yāvatām abhidhānaṃ tāvatāṃ prayogo nyāyya iti ced ekenāpy anekasyābhidhānam.
Yāvatām abhidhānaṃ tāvatāṃ prayogo nyāyya iti ced evam ucyate, eṣo 'pi nyayya eva yad apy ekenāpy anekasyābhidhānaṃ bhavati.

---

[24]See *vārttika* 1.

[25]Kaiyaṭa: ***Tad api pratyartham eveti.*** *Artho hy abhidheyam ucyate. Yaś ca dvyarthaḥ śabdo nāsau dvyarthatāṃ jahāti bahvarthaś ca bahvarthatāṃ....* **That too is precisely per object.** An object (*artha*) is said to be that which is denoted (*abhidheya*). And a word which denotes two objects does not depart from denoting two objects, nor does one which denotes many objects (depart from) denoting many objects.
Nāgeśa: ***Tad apīti.*** *Svīyasvīyārthātyāga eva pratyarthatvam iti bhāvaḥ.* **That too.** Being per object is just not abandoning whatever its own denoted object is (regardless of how many are its own). That is what he has in mind. MB, vol. 2, p. 89b.

(Sūtra-rejecter:) **If you say: "It is reasonable that one uses as many as are denoted,"** (I answer:) **one denotes many too.**
If you say this: "It is reasonable that one uses as many words as there are objects denoted," (I answer:) this is reasonable too, that it is also the case that one word denotes many objects.[26]

Yadi tarhy ekenānekasyābhidhānaṃ bhavati plakṣanyagrodhau ekenoktatvād aparasya prayogo 'nupapannaḥ. Ekenoktatvāt tasyārthasyāparasya prayogena na bhavitavyam.
(Sūtra-proponent:) If it were the case that one word denotes many objects, in the *dvandva* compound *'plakṣa-nyagrodhau* (the *Plakṣa* and the *Nyagrodha* species of Fig trees)', because one word has already denoted the object denoted by the other, usage of the other would not make sense. Because one word has already denoted the object, usage of another word for that object would not occur.[27]

---

[26]Kaiyaṭa: ***Ekenāpīti.*** *Sahavivakṣāyām eka eva śabda tadbhūtāvayavabhedaṃ samudāyam abhidhatta ity arthaḥ.* **One also.** The meaning is: When (the speaker) desires to express (the objects) together (*sahavivakṣāyām*), just one word denotes an aggregate (*samudāya*) the parts of which are distinct. MB, vol. 2, p. 89b.
Patañjali discusses *sahavivakṣā* under *vārttika* 19 of the present *sūtra*. He says: *Sahavivakṣāyām ekaśeṣaḥ.* One remains when (the speaker) desires to express (the objects) together. He then explains that the usage, "*vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca* (tree and tree)," is not equivalent to the usage, "*vṛkṣau* (trees (dual))." In the former there is no desire to express the objects together; in the latter there is. The facts of usage are that these different usages appear to express their respective meanings and each occurs only in its own meaning. We know which forms are used in which meanings from ordinary usage. Hence there is no need to state the rule 1.2.64, that one remains. See MB-K, vol. 1, p. 238, lines 2-5.

[27]A *dvandva* compound also gives simultaneous expression (*yugapadvacanatā*) to more than one object either as the mutual relation of individual objects (*itaretarayoga*) or as an aggregate (*samāhāra*). In the course of discussing the role of the word *'ekavibhaktau'* in the present *sūtra*, Patañjali considers 1.2.64 as an exception to the former type of *dvandva* compound. Under Pāṇini 2.2.29, *Cārthe dvandvaḥ* (MB-K, vol. 1, pp. 430-35), and 2.4.12, *Vibhāṣā vṛkṣamṛgatṛṇadhānyavyañjanapaśuśakunyaśvavaḍavapūrvāparādharottarāṇām* (MB-K, vol. 1, p. 475, line 15 - p. 476, line 5 and p. 476, line 23 - p. 477, line 5), Patañjali discusses the meaning condition for the formation of a *dvandva* compound and the example *'plakṣanyagrodhau'*. It conveys the two distinct and different objects in relation. (The *Plakṣa* is different from the *Nyagrodha*, and the dual compound is not a *samāhāra*. 2.4.12, *vārttika* 1, *Bahuprakṛtiḥ phalasenāvanaspatimṛgaśakuntakṣudrajantudhānyatṛṇānām*, limits *ekavad-bhāva* to *dvandvas* denoting many of certain objects (*bahuprakṛti*) including trees (*vanaspati*) and prevents it applying to duals) *'Plakṣau'*, however, expresses together two distinct objects which are yet the same.
See *vārttika* 12 under this *sūtra: Dvandvapratiṣedhaś ca* (And a negation (to prevent the formation) of a *dvandva* compound would have to be stated). MB-K, vol. 1, p. 234, lines 24-26, p. 235, lines 18-21, p. 236, lines 1-5 and p. 238, lines 5-12. Also , p. 236, line 20, and p. 237, line 27 - p. 238, line 1.

Kiṃ kāraṇam?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) What is the reason?

Uktārthānām aprayoga iti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) "One does not use words whose objects have already been denoted."[28]

32. Ekenoktatvād aparasya prayogo 'nupapanna iti ced anuktatvāt plakṣeṇa nyagrodhasya nyagrodha-prayogaḥ.
Ekenoktatvād aparasya prayogo 'nupapanna iti ced anuktaḥ plakṣeṇa nyagrodhārtha iti kṛtvā nyagrodhaśabdaḥ prayujyate.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) **If you say: "Because one word has already denoted the object denoted by the other, usage of the other would not make sense,"** (I answer:) **there is usage of the word *'nyagrodha'* because the word *'plakṣa'* has not denoted the object denoted by *'nyagrodha'*.**
If you say: "Because one word has already denoted the object denoted by the other, usage of the other would not make sense, (I answer:) the word *'nyagrodha'* is used based on the fact that the word *'plakṣa'* has not denoted the object denoted by *'nyagrodha'*.[29]

Katham anukto yāvatedānīm evoktam ekenāpy anekasyābhidhānaṃ bhavatīti?
(Sūtra-proponent:) How has it not denoted it since just now you said that it is the case that one denotes many too.[30]

Sarūpāṇām ekenāpy anekasyābhidhānaṃ bhavati na virūpāṇām.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) For words whose form is the same it is the case that one word denotes many too, not for words whose form is different.

Kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ sarūpāṇām ekenāpy anekasyābhidhānaṃ bhavati na punar virūpāṇām?
(Sūtra-proponent:) But what is the reason that for words whose form is the same it is the case that one denotes many too but not for words whose form is different?

33. Abhidhānaṃ punaḥ svābhāvikam.
Svābhāvikam abhidhānam.
34. Ubhayadarśanāc ca.

---

[28]Concerning this principle, see *vārttika* 29 note 15.
[29]Equals *vārttika* 14 and *bhāṣya* under Pāṇini 2.2.29. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 433, lines 17-21.
[30]See *vārttika* 31 and *bhāṣya*.

Ubhayaṃ khalvapi dṛśyate. Virūpāṇām apy ekenānekasyābhidhānaṃ bhavati. Tad yathā dyā́vā ha kṣā́mā. Dyā́vā cid asmai pṛthivī́ namete iti. Virūpāṇāṃ kila nāmaikenānekasyābhidhānaṃ syāt kiṃ punaḥ sarūpāṇām.

(Sūtra-rejecter:) **And denotation is natural.**

Denotation is natural.[31]

And because we see both.

Both are seen. Even for words whose form is different it is the case that one denotes many, for example, "*Dyā́vā ha kṣā́mā*... (May heaven and earth...),"[32] "*Dyā́vā cid asmai pṛthivī́ namete*... (Heaven and earth bow to him...).[33] When for words whose form is different it is possible that one denotes many, how much more so is it the case for words whose form is the same?[34]

---

[31]Equals *vārttika* 15 and *bhāṣya* under Pāṇini 2.2.29. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 433, lines 24-25. The fact that denotation is natural is often cited to explain why certain speech forms allowed by the grammar do not occur. See 3.2.1, *vārttika* 5, *Anabhidhānāt*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 94, line 14. See also Cardona (1988: 645).

[32]Ṛgveda 10.12.1. RVS, vol. 4, p. 303. Atharvaveda 18.1.29 (p. 342).

[33]Ṛgveda 2.12.13. RVS, vol. 2, p. 50. Atharvaveda 20.34.14 (p. 407). Patañjali cites both mantras again under 2.2.29, *vārttika* 6, and the first a third time under 2.2.29, *vārttika* 15. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 432, lines 4-5; p. 434, line 4. Reference: Rau (1985: 40, #346, #347). *'Dyā́vā'* and *'kṣā́mā'* in the first example, and *'dyā́vā'* and *'pṛthivī́'* in the second example, are vedic duals. (The Padapāṭha gives, "*pṛthivī́ iti*." The *'iti'* tells that the final long *ī* is *pragṛhya*, and according to 1.1.11 a dual form in final *ī* is termed *pragṛhya*. A nominative singular is not so termed.) In vedic, according to 7.1.39, *ā* occurs in place of the expected dual termination *au*, and by 6.1.106 a long vowel homogenous with the final vowel of the base optionally occurs to prevent the ordinary dual termination *au*. In the singular the former (*dyauḥ*) means heaven and the latter (*pṛthivī*) means earth. The dual makes either word refer to both heaven and earth. Hence one of two words whose forms are different refers to both objects.

Pāṇini 1.1.11. *Īdūded dvivacanaṃ pragṛhyam*. A dual speech form ending in long *ī, ū*, or *e* is termed *pragṛhya*.

Pāṇini 6.1.106. *Vā chandasi (dīrghaḥ 101, pūrvasavarṇaḥ 102, na ici 104, dīrghāt jasi ca 105)*. In vedic after a long vowel, before a nominative or accusative termination beginning in a vowel other than *a* and the nominative plural termination *jas*, a long vowel homogenous with the preceding vowel optionally does not occur.

Pāṇini 7.1.39. *Supāṃ sulukpūrvasavarṇāccheyāḍāḍyāyājālaḥ*. In vedic the following substitutes occur in place of the nominal terminations, *sup*: *su, luk*, a sound homogenous with the preceding, *ā, āt, śe, yā, ḍā, ḍyā, yāc, āl*.

[34]Kaiyaṭa sums up the point of the section: *Tad evaṃ dravyābhidhānapakṣe 'pi pratyākhyāta ekaśeṣaḥ. Anekārthaprakrame anekārtha eka eva vṛkṣaśabdaḥ prayujyate, na tu dvandvaḥ, anabhidhānāt*. In this way the rule that one remains is rejected as unnecessary even if words denote individual substances (*dravya*). To convey many objects (trees) just one word *'vṛkṣa* (tree)' denoting many objects is used, not a *dvandva* compound because it is not used to denote that meaning (*anabhidhāna*).

Nāgeśa comments: *Idaṃ ca pratyākhyānam* ***arthasyānyapramāṇatvād*** *ity anena sūtrakṛtāpi darśitaprāyam eva. Nanv evam api dvandvo durvāro 'ta āha:* ***na tv*** *iti. Sahavivakṣāyām ekajātīyārthānekaśabdaprayogādarśanena tad-asādhutvapratipādanārthaṃ sūtram iti bhāvaḥ*. And the *sūtra* author himself as

35. Ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikaṃ vibhaktau Vājapyāyanaḥ.

Ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikaṃ śabdaṃ vibhaktau Vājapyāyana ācāryo nyāyyaṃ manyate. Ekākṛtiḥ sā cābhidhīyata iti.

(Sūtra-rejecter:) **Alternatively, because it denotes a class property, Vājapyāyana holds that there is one speech form before an inflectional termination.**

Alternatively, because it denotes a class property, the teacher Vājapyāyana considers one speech form before an inflectional termination proper: There is one class property and it is denoted.[35]

Kathaṃ punar jñāyata ekākṛtiḥ sā cābhidhīyata iti?

(Sūtra-proponent:) But how does one know that there is one class property and it is denoted?

36. Prakhyāviśeṣāt.

Na hi gaur ity ukte viśeṣaḥ prakhyāyate śuklā nīlā kapilā kapotiketi.

(Sūtra-rejecter:) **Because there is no difference in the cognition.**

When the word 'cow' is uttered, one does not apprehend a difference: a white cow, a blue one, a brown one, a grey one.[36]

---

much as shows this rejection by (saying in *sūtra* 1.2.56) "something other than grammatical rules is the authority concerning meaning." But even so it would be difficult to avoid a *dvandva* compound occurring: hence, he says, "**But not.**" Because we do not see many words used for objects of one kind if the speaker desires to express them together (*sahavivakṣāyām*), the present *sūtra* (1.2.64) is for the purpose of expressing that such usage is incorrect. That is what he has in mind. MB, vol. 2, p. 90b.

[35]*Kaiyaṭa comments: Idānīm ākṛtipakṣāśrayeṇa pratyākhyānaṃ karoti:* ***ākṛtyabhidhānād*** *iti. Jātiḥ śabdārthaḥ, tasyā ekatvād anekaśabdaprayogaprasaṅga eva nāsti kim ekaśeṣeṇety arthaḥ.* Now he shows 1.2.64 to be useless by resorting to the view that a word denotes a class property: **because it denotes a class property.** The meaning is: A generic property is the object denoted by a word. Because it is one, the possibility of using more than one word doesn't even arise so of what use is the rule that one remains? MB, vol. 2, p. 90b.

[36]Kaiyaṭa comments: ***Prakhyāviśeṣād*** *iti.* ***Prakhyā*** *buddhiḥ, tasyā* ***aviśeṣād*** *ekarūpatvāt tadviṣayasyāpy aikyaṃ pratīyate. Guṇapramāṇādibhinneṣv api gopiṇḍeṣu gaur gaur ity ekākārapratyayodayād avaśyam ekenālambanena sāmānyena bhāvyam iti jātisadbhāva ekatvaṃ cāvasīyate.* ***Gaur ity ukta*** *iti. Gaur ity etena śabdenokte pratyāyite sāmānyalakṣaṇe 'rthe viśeṣānavadhāraṇād aikyaṃ sāmānyasyāvasīyata ity arthaḥ.* **Because there is no difference in the cognition. Cognition**, awareness, **because** there is **no difference** in it (because it is of one form) we apprehend that its object is one too. Because a single type of cognition 'cow' arises with respect to each of many cow-objects having different qualities, sizes, etc. there absolutely has to be a single general property as its basis. Hence it is determined that a generic property exists and is one. **When** (the word) **'cow' is uttered.** The meaning is: When the word 'cow' **states**, conveys, an object whose character is

Yadyapi tāvat prakhyāviśeṣāj jñāyata ekākṛtir iti kutas tv etat sābhidhīyata iti?
(Sūtra-proponent:) Well, even if one knows that there is one class property because there is undifferentiated cognition, what is the basis for asserting that the word denotes it?

37. Avyapavargagateś ca.
Avyapavargagateś ca manyāmaha ākṛtir abhidhīyata iti. Na hi gaur ity ukte vyapavargo gamyate śuklā nīlā kapilā kapotiketi.
38. Jñāyate caikopadiṣṭam.
Jñāyate khalvapy ekopadiṣṭam. Gaur asya kadācid upadiṣṭo bhavati. Sa tam anyasmin deśe 'nyasmin kāle 'nyasyāṃ ca vayo'vasthāyāṃ dṛṣṭvā jānāty ayaṃ gaur iti.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) **And because one understands that there is no setting apart.**
And because one understands that there is no setting apart, we consider that the class property is denoted. When the word 'cow' is uttered, one does not apprehend a difference: a white cow, a blue one, a brown one, a grey one.[37]
And taught once, it is known.
Moreover, taught once, it is known. At some time a bull is pointed out to him. Seeing one in another place, at another time, at another stage of life, he knows that it is a bull.[38]

---

a general property, because one does not determine any difference one concludes that the general property is a single thing. MB, vol. 2, pp. 90b-91a.
Filliozat (1975-86: vol. 4, p. 333) and Subrahmanya Sastri (1944-62: vol 4, p. 163) translate *'śuklā'*, etc. as substantives denoting the qualities white, etc, rather than as adjectives. As such they refer to the specific properties to which the word *'viśeṣa'* previously is taken to refer. But see Vātsyāyana on Gautama 2.2.60, example 8, *varṇa*, *"śuklā gauḥ kapilā gaur iti."*

[37]Kaiyaṭa: ***Avyapavargagateś*** *ceti. Avyapavargo 'bhedaḥ avicchedaḥ aviśeṣas tasya gatiḥ pratītir ity arthaḥ.* Kaiyaṭa then clarifies the difference between *vārttikas* 36 and 37: *Atha* ***prakhyāviśeṣād avyapavargagateś*** *ceti kimartham ubhayor upādānam, ekenāpi hetunaikatvābhidhānayoḥ siddhatvāt? Naiṣa doṣaḥ. Anabhidhīyamānāpi jātiḥ saṃnidhimātreṇa prakhyā-'viśeṣe nimittaṃ bhavatīti prakhyā'viśeṣe[ṇa] pratyabhijñāpratyayarūpeṇaika-tvam eva pratipāditaṃ nābhidhānam.* Now for what purpose are both "**Because the cognition is not different**" and "**And because** (one) **understands** (that there is) **no setting apart**" stated—one is cause enough to achieve both unity and denotation? This fault does not arise. Even without being denoted, just by being present, a generic property is a cause of cognition being not different; hence, cognition being not different, in the form of an awareness which is a recognition (*pratyabhijñā-pratyaya*), explains only unity, not denotation.
Nāgeśa clearly sums up the point of *vārttikas* 36 and 37: *Guṇādibhinneṣv anusyūtaikākārapratītyā jātisiddhau tatra śaktigrahaḥ. Śabdāt tasyā bodhaś ca.* Since the recurrent uniform cognition of objects having different qualities, etc. proves that there is a generic property, one locates the signifying capacity in it. And cognition of it arises from the word. MB, vol. 2, p. 91a.

[38]Śivarāmendrasarasvatī: ***Ekopadiṣṭam*** *iti. Ekavāraṃ upadiṣṭaṃ sakṛd-upadiṣṭam ity arthaḥ.* Against Kaiyaṭa's two alternatives Śivarāmendrasarasvatī

Kaḥ punar asya viśeṣaḥ prakhyāviśeṣād ity ataḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) But how is this (*vārttika* 38) different from "Because there is no difference in the cognition (*vārttika* 36)"?

Tasyaivopodbalakam etat. Prakhyāviśeṣāj jñāyate caikopadiṣṭam iti.
39. Dharmaśāstraṃ ca tathā.
Evaṃ ca kṛtvā dharmaśāstraṃ pravṛttam. Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ surā na peyeti brāhmaṇamātraṃ na hanyate surāmātraṃ ca na pīyate. Yadi dravyaṃ padārthaḥ syād ekaṃ brāhmaṇam ahatvaikāṃ ca surām apītvānyatra kāmacārah syāt.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) This (*vārttika* 38) supports that (*vārttika* 36): Because there is no difference in the cognition, and taught once, it is known.[39]

---

most closely follows Patañjali's own comment here. MPV, vol. 4, p. 111.
Although Patañjali uses masculine forms here (*ayam, tam*) and feminine adjectives under *vārttikas* 36 and 37 (*śuklā*, etc.), in both places he intends the word *'gauḥ'* to refer to any generic bovine animal without regard to gender or any other subclassification. Whenever I use the word 'cow', I intend it in the same generic sense. Patañjali uses the masculine form generically in accordance with Sanskrit usage as codified in 1.2.67, *Pumān striyā*. In English usage, 'cow' may be used either generically or for the female; 'bull' occurs only for the male.

[39]Kaiyaṭa: ***Prakhyāviśeṣād*** *ity anena pratyakṣaṃ jātyālambanaṃ pramāṇam upanyastam. Tato vipratipannapratipādanāyānumānam iha jātisadbhāve* ***jñāyate caikopadiṣṭam*** *ity anenoktam, deśakālāvasthāpiṇḍāntareṣv abādhitapratyabhijñāpratayodayānyathānupapattyā sāmānyasadbhāvo 'numīyate ity arthaḥ.* (*Vārttika* 36) "**Because there is no difference in the cognition**" presents the direct perception whose basis is a generic property as evidence. Then, in order to explain to one who suspects error, (*vārttika* 38) "**And taught once, it is known**" states an inference here for the existence of a generic property: One infers the existence of a general property because the occurrence of an uncontroverted recognition-awareness (*pratyabhijñā-pratyaya*) with respect to different bodies at different places, times and stages, does not make sense otherwise (i.e., if there is not a single generic property). That is the meaning.
Kaiyaṭa states this after giving the following interpretation of the term ***'upodbalaka'***: *udgataṃ balaṃ pratyakṣaṃ tatpūrvakatvād anumānasya udbalasya samīpam anumānam ity arthaḥ.* The meaning is: inference is that which is near to that whose strength is greater (*udbala*); that whose strength is greater is direct perception, because inference is preceded by it. Then he offers a second interpretation of the term: *Atha vā balam uddīpayaty upodbalakam upabṛṃhakam ucyate.* Or being that which lights up the strength (of x) an *upodbalaka* is called a support (*upabṛṃhaka*).
Nāgeśa: *Prayogas tu: Vimatapratyayo jātiviṣayo deśādibhede 'py abādhitaikākārapratyayatvāt saṃmatavad iti.* The statement of the inference is: The doubted cognition (which *vārttika* 36 presents as evidence) does have a generic property as its object because it is an uncontroverted cognition whose form is the same even when the place, etc. are different, just like the cognition which it is agreed (has a generic property as its object) (the topic of *vārttika* 38). ... ***Upabṛṃhakam*** *iti. Bhrāntatvāśaṅkānivartanena pramātvanirvāhakas tarka ity arthaḥ.* An argument to establish that it is correct knowledge by removing the doubt that (the direct perception) is erroneous. MB, vol. 2, p. 91b.
Śivarāmendrasarasvatī: ***Upodbalakam*** *iti. Sahakārīty arthaḥ.*

And the instruction of *dharma* (*dharmaśāstra*) is in this manner.
And the instruction of *dharma* proceeds on this basis (that a word denotes a class property): The instruction, "One should not kill a *brāhmaṇa*. One should not drink liquor," means: one doesn't kill any *brāhmaṇa* and one doesn't drink any liquor. If an individual substance were the object denoted by a word, refraining from killing one *brāhmaṇa* and abstaining from drinking one drink, one could do as one pleased with the rest.[40]

Kaḥ punar asya viśeṣo 'vyapavargagateś cety ataḥ.

Śivarāmendrasarasvatī rejects Kaiyaṭa's statement that *vārttika* 36 offers the evidence of direct perception. He holds that undifferentiated cognition with respect to many individual objects is grounds (*hetu*) for the inference (*anumāna*) that there is one generic property; it is not direct perception of the generic property. Hence both *vārttika* 36 and 38 offer inferential evidence, and the latter is a helper (*sahakārin*) of the former. MPV, vol. 4, p. 111 bottom - 112 top.
Kaiyaṭa expresses the view that perception is based in reality. If we have one undifferentiated perception, there is one object at its basis which is the object of that one perception. See the translation of Śābarabhāṣya on Jaimini 1.1.5.

[40]***Dharmaśāstraṃ ca tatheti.*** *anenaitad darśayati: na sādṛśyaikārthakriyākāritvādinimittā bhrāntā pratyabhijñā sarvatreti grāhyam, kiṃ tarhi, abhinnaviṣayanimittā smṛtikārāṇām apy avigītapramāṇabhāvasmṛtopanibaddhavacanānāṃ jātyāśrayeṇa sarvavyavahārapravartanād ity arthaḥ.* **And the instruction of *dharma* (*dharmaśāstra*) is in this manner.** By this he shows the following: One should not accept that recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is everywhere erroneous, caused by the fact that objects are similar in that they perform the same purposeful activity. Rather, it is caused by a single object because, in addition, all the usage of the authors of *smṛti* texts, whose statements based on received tradition have undisputed authority, proceeds by resorting to generic properties. That's the meaning.
Nāgeśa: *Dravyasya śabdārthatve hy ekabrāhmaṇavadhaniṣedhādy eva pratīyeta. Ekaḥ ka iti cet, yo yasya tadvākyaśravaṇakāle buddhisthaḥ sa iti gṛhāṇa. Jāteḥ padārthatve tu na doṣa iti tātparyam.* ***Anyatra kāmacāra*** *iti. Sarveṣām iti śeṣaḥ. Ekenaikasyāhanane jātaḥ śāstrārtha ity anyabrāhmaṇaviṣaye sarveṣāṃ kāmacāraḥ syād ity arthaḥ.* The point is: If an individual substance were the object denoted by a word, one would understand a prohibition against slaying just one *brāhmaṇa*, and so on. If you ask "Which one?" take that for each hearer it is he who comes to mind at the time of hearing the statement. But if a generic property is the object denoted by a word the fault doesn't arise. **As one pleased with the rest.** Add "Everyone." When one person doesn't kill one (*brāhmaṇa*) the purpose of the instruction is achieved. Hence, concerning other *brāhmaṇas* everyone could do as he pleased. That's the meaning. MB, vol. 2, p. 92a.
Patañjali discusses these examples again under 6.1.84, *vārttikas* 4-5. MB-K, vol. 3, p. 57, line 7 - p. 58, line 17; especially p. 57, lines 16-19, and p. 58, lines 3-5. Manusmṛti 11.93 says, *"na surāṃ pibet,"* and 11.94 has *"surā... na pātavyā."* See 9.235 and 11.55. Bühler, pp. 383 and 441, and his "Synopsis of parallel passages." Manusmṛti, p. 318. The Kāṭhakasaṃhitā 12.12 (p. 117) says, *"Brāhmaṇaḥ surāṃ na pibati."*

(Sūtra-proponent:) But how is this (*vārttika* 39) different from "And because one understands that there is no setting apart" (*vārttika* 37)?

Tasyaivopodbalakam etat. Avyapavargagateś ca dharmaśāstraṃ ca tatheti.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) This (*vārttika* 39) supports that (*vārttika* 37): And because one understands that there is no setting apart, and the instruction of *dharma* is in this manner.[41]
[40a.] *Asti caikam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapat.*
Asti khalvapy ekam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapad upalabhyate.
And it is the case that one thing is present in many substrata (*adhikaraṇa*) simultaneously.
Moreover it is the case that one thing is found present in many substrata simultaneously.[42]

Kim?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What is?

Ādityaḥ. Tad yathā. Eka Ādityo 'nekādhikaraṇastho yugapad upalabhyate.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) The sun. For example, the one sun is found located in many places (*adhikaraṇa*) simultaneously.[43]

Viṣama upanyāsaḥ. Naiko draṣṭādityam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapad upalabhate.
(Sūtra-proponent:) The example given is not the same. It is not the case that one observer sees the sun present in many places simultaneously.[44]

---

[41]Kaiyaṭa: ***Tasyeti.*** *Avyapavargagatir abhrāntā, smṛtikārāṇām api tathaiva vyavahāradarśanād ity arthaḥ.* "**This...**" The meaning is: understanding (that there is) no setting apart is not erroneous because we see that the usage of authors of *smṛti* texts is in this manner (their usage assumes that words denote generic properties). MB, vol. 2, p. 92a.

[42]Kaiyaṭa: *Nanv ekam anekasthaṃ kathaṃ bhavati, na hi Devadatto yugapan Mathurāyāṃ Srughne ca bhavatīty ata āha: **asti ceti**.* But how is one thing present in many? After all Devadatta is not simultaneously in Mathurā and Srughna. MB, vol. 2, p. 92a. Kaiyaṭa anticipates the objections to the notion of a class property raised in the argument to establish that a word denotes an individual substance. See Patañjali on *vārttika* 48.

[43]Patañjali gives this passage (including the example of the sun, and its rebuttal in the following line) in commenting on *Śivasūtra* 1, *vārttika* 12. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 18, lines 16-19. Śivarāmendrasarasvatī says: *Ekasminneva pradeśe vartamāna ādityo nānādeśasthair yugapad dṛśyata iti....* People present in various places simultaneously see the sun which is present in just one place. MPV, vol. 4, p. 115.

[44]Under Śivasūtra 1, *vārttika* 12, the objection appears as follows: *Naiko draṣṭādityam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapad deśapṛthaktveṣūpalabhate.* It includes the additional word, *'deśapṛthaktveṣu* (in different places)'. It is not a single observer in different places who sees the sun present in many places

Evaṃ tarhi
40b. Itīndravad viṣayaḥ.
Tad yathā. Eka indro 'nekasmin kratuśata āhūto yugapat sarvatra bhavati. Evam ākṛtir api yugapat sarvatra bhaviṣyati. Avaśyaṃ caitad evaṃ vijñeyam ekam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapad upalabhyata iti.
41. Naikam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapad iti cet tathaikaśeṣe.
Yo hi manyate naikam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapad upalabhyata ity ekaśeṣe tasya doṣaḥ syāt. Ekaśeṣe 'pi naiko vṛkṣaśabdo 'nekam arthaṃ yugapad abhidadhīta. Avaśyaṃ caitad evaṃ vijñeyam ākṛtir abhidhīyata iti.
42. Dravyābhidhāne hy ākṛtyasaṃpratyayaḥ.
Dravyābhidhāne saty ākṛter asaṃpratyayaḥ syāt.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) If that is so, then
The domain is like that of '*Indra*'.[45]
Just as one Indra, invoked in many hundreds of Vedic performances, is simultaneously everywhere, thus a class property will be simultaneously everywhere too.[46] And it absolutely has to

---

simultaneously. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 18, line 18. See §1.4.1.

[45]With Kayaṭa's suppletion of the sentence, this could be translated: (One is related to more than one) **object as '*Indra*' is.** With Nāgeśa's alternative reading of Kayaṭa's suppletion: **One object** (is present in many places) **as '*Indra*' is.**

Kaiyaṭa: ***Itīndravadviṣaya*** *iti. Ekasyāpy aneka iti vākyaśeṣaḥ.* (One is related to more than one) **object as 'Indra' is.** The remainder of the sentence is: even one is related to more than one.

Nāgeśa: ***Ekasyāpy aneka*** *iti pāṭhaḥ. Ekasyāpīndraśabdasya yathāneko yāgo 'ṅgitvena viṣaya ekabodhajñānaviṣayaś ca, ekadeśāvacchinnānekayāgeṣu tathā darśanasaṃbhavāt tathaikasyā api jāter aneko viṣaya āśrayatayety arthaḥ.* ***Anekastha*** *iti pāṭhe eko 'pi yathā indraśabdo 'nekayāgastha ekasyāpi boddhur viṣayas tathā jātir apīty arthaḥ.* The reading is: **even one is related to more than one.** The meaning is: Just as even one word *'Indra'* is related to more than one Vedic performance, which is a related object (*viṣaya*) as the principal (action to which *'Indra'* is subordinate) and is also related as the (common) object of one cognition (of both the word *'Indra'* and the Vedic performance), similarly—because it is possible to see many Vedic performances in one place—similarly, even one generic property is related to the many objects which are its substrata. If the reading is, "present in many places," just as even one word *'Indra'* present in many Vedic performances, is an object for one perceiver; similarly, a generic property is too. MB, vol. 2, p. 92b.

Pāṇini 2.1.6 provides for the indeclinable compound *'itīndra'*. See *vārttika* 1 note 10. According to 5.1.115, the suffix *vat* follows to form the indeclinable *'itīndravat'* meaning "like the word *'indra'*. The Kāśikā (vol. 1, p. 101) on 2.1.6 says: ***Śabdaprādurbhāvaḥ*** *prakāśatā śabdasya: itipāṇini tatpāṇini. Pāṇiniśabdo loke prakāśate ity arthaḥ.* **A speech unit's manifestation** the being known of a speech unit: *itipāṇini tatpāṇini.* The meaning is: The speech unit (name) *'pāṇini'* is well known in the world.

Pāṇini 5.1.115. *Tena tulyaṃ kriyā ced vatiḥ.* After a word syntactically connected with a word x ending in a third triplet nominal termination, the affix *vatiḥ* occurs to mean "like x", if that which is alike is an action.

[46]Kaiyaṭa: ***Sarvatreti.*** *Sarveṣu yāgeṣu dravyavad aṅgatām pratipadyata ity*

be understood this way, that one thing is found present in many substrata simultaneously.

If (you say:) **it is not the case that one thing is present in many substrata simultaneously,** (I answer:) **likewise if one remains.**

A fault arises for him who thinks that it is not the case that one thing is present in many substrata simultaneously. Even if it were the case that one remains, one word 'tree (*vṛkṣa*)' would not denote many objects simultaneously.[47] And it absolutely has to be understood this way, that a class property is denoted.

---

arthaḥ. **Everywhere.** The meaning is: In all the Vedic performances (the word *'indra'* or Indra) attains to being a subordinate part, like a substance.

Nāgeśa: *Prādurbhāvaviṣayendraśabdarūpā tadbodhyā vā devatā vrīhyādi-dravyavat sarvayāgeṣv aṅgatāṃ yugapat pratipadyata ity arthaḥ. Bhāṣye 'pi* ***Indraḥ*** *indraśabdaḥ.* ***Āhūtaḥ*** *prādurbhūtaḥ. Yugapat sarvatrāṅgaṃ bhavatīty arthaḥ.* The meaning is: The deity, which is either the manifesting word *'indra'* or that which it conveys, simultaneously attains to being a subordinate part of all the Vedic performances, like the substances rice, etc. In the *bhāṣya* too, **Indra** is the speech unit *'indra'*. **Invoked** manifested. The meaning is: participates in every performance simultaneously. MB, vol. 2, p. 92b.

Śivarāmendrasarasvatī takes the view that a class property is compared to the diety Indra, not the speech unit *'indra'* which names him: ***Itīndravad*** *iti. Itīndreti śabdaprādurbhāve 'vyayībhāvaḥ, tasmād arthaprakāśalakṣakāt 'tena tulyam' iti vatiḥ.... Purāṇādiprasiddham idam: Devatā sarvatra kratuṣu saṃnihiteti.* **As 'Indra' is.** The indeclinable (compound) *'itīndra'* occurs meaning the manifestation of a speech unit. It secondarily refers to the appearance of the object the speech unit denotes. After the (compound *'itīndra'*, secondarily referring to the appearance of the deity Indra), the suffix *vat* occurs according to 5.1.115.... This is well attested in the Purāṇas, etc., that the deity is present in all the Vedic performances. MPV, vol. 4, p. 112.

On the view that a deity is a speech form, the word 'invoked (*āhūta*)' must be interpreted to mean manifested. On the view that a deity is denoted or named by a speech form, the word 'invoked' makes sense in its usual meaning.

Patañjali presents the view that it is one and the same speech form which is enunciated at various places and times in commenting on *Śivasūtra* 1, *vārttika* 12. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 18, lines 19-20. Śabara presents the same view concluding his comment on Jaimini 1.1.15. *Ādityavad yaugapadyam*. See §3.2.2, note 12, and §1.4.1. In the Mahābhāṣya, however, the explanation of the awareness of one speech form in many individual enunciations is not content with this solution but offers two further solutions: *Vārttika* 13, *Ākṛtigrahaṇāt siddham*, and *vārttika* 16, *Rūpasāmānyād vā*. These solutions are the two debated in the present discussion. The former accepts a generic property in many individuals; the latter does not. See MB-K, vol. 1, p. 18, line 20 - p. 19, line 8.

Note that *vārttika* 40 is parallel to *vārttika* 56 in wording. This has raised the question of interpolated text. Jacobi (1929: 151) considers that *vārttika* 40 with its commentary is added later, as is possibly *vārttika* 41, so that *vārttika* 42 follows *vārttika* 39 with a discussion on the same topic.

[47]Kaiyaṭa: ***Ekaśeṣe 'piti.*** *Yady ekasyānekasambandho nābhyupagamyate tadaikaḥ śabdo 'nekam arthaṃ sambandhābhāvān na pratyāyayed ity arthaḥ.* **Even it it were the case that one remains.** The meaning is: If it is not accepted that one thing has many relations, then one word would not give the understanding of many objects because of the absence of any relation (to them). MB, vol. 2, p. 92b.

Because if it were the case that a word denotes an individual substance, there would be no cognition of the class property.

Tatra ko doṣaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What is the fault if that were so?

43. Tatrāsarvadravyagatiḥ.
Tatrāsarvadravyagatiḥ prāpnoti.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) **If that were so, one would fail to understand all the individual substances.**
If that were so, failure to understand all the individual substances would obtain.

Asarvadravyagatau ko doṣaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What is the fault if one fails to understand all the individual substances?

Gaur anubandhyo 'jo 'gnīṣomīya iti. Ekaḥ śāstroktaṃ kurvītāparo 'śāstroktam. Aśāstrokte ca kriyamāṇe viguṇaṃ karma bhavati viguṇe ca karmaṇi phalānavāptiḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) "One should bind a cow, a goat for Agni and Soma." One person would perform that which the instruction has stated, the rest would perform something other than what the instruction has stated. If something other than what the instruction has stated is performed, the action is deficient and if the action is deficient, one does not obtain the result.[48]

---

[48]Patañjali cites this Vedic injunction immediately below under *vārttika* 47, and in MB-K, vol. 1, p. 71, lines 18-19; p. 354, lines 12-13; p. 393, lines 15-18; vol. 2, p. 246, lines 5-11; p. 357, lines 4-7; vol. 3, p. 161, lines 2-3; p. 445, line 21. Aitareyabrāhmaṇa 2.24 (part 1, p. 235): *paśur anubandhyaḥ*, Tāṇḍyabrāhmaṇa 21.14.11: *ajo 'gnīṣomīyaḥ*, Śabara on Jaimini 10.4.32 (MD, part 6, p. 386): *Asti jyotiṣṭomaḥ. Tatra śrūyate, gaur anubandhyaḥ, ajo 'gnīṣomīya iti.* Kāṭhakasaṃhitā 13.11 (p. 124): *Āgneyam ajam ālabheta saumyam ṛṣabhaṃ....*, Maitrāyaṇīsaṃhitā 2.5.5 (p.137): *Āgneyam ajam ālabheta, saumyaṃ babhrum ṛṣabhaṃ piṅgalaṃ bhūtikāmaṃ yājayed.* See also Taittirīyāsaṃhitā 5.5.24.6 (p.233): *āgneyaḥ kṛṣṇo 'jaḥ.* Kāṭhakasaṃhita 24.7 (p. 261) speaks of an *aja* which is *agnīṣomīya*. Śabara on Jaimini 6.8.30 says that some recension states: *ajo 'gnīṣomīyaḥ*. MD, part 5, p. 368. See also Jaimini 6.3.31, *Chāgo vā mantravarṇāt*, and Śabara's commentary. MD, part 5, pp. 368-69.
Nāgeśa: ***Aparo 'śāstroktam*** *iti. Ekaḥ śabdaḥ pratyarthaniveśitvād ekaṃ dravyaṃ gorūpaṃ bodhayet, tasya kenacid ālambhe kṛte parais tena vā gavāntarālambhe 'śāstrārthaḥ syāt.* **The rest would perform something other than what the instruction has stated.** Because words apply per object, one word would make known one individual cow substance. Once someone has sacrificed it, if he or anyone else should sacrifice another cow, it would be other than the intent of the instruction. MB, vol. 2, p. 93a.

Nanu ca yasyāpy ākṛtiḥ padārthas tasyāpi yady anavayavena codyate na cānubadhyate viguṇaṃ karma bhavati viguṇe ca karmaṇi phalānavāptiḥ. Ekākṛtir iti ca pratijñā hīyeta. Yac cāsya pakṣasyopādāne prayojanam ekaśeṣo na vaktavya iti sa cedānīṃ vaktavyo bhavati.

(Sūtra-proponent:) But isn't it so that even for him who holds that a class property is the object denoted by a word, if the instruction enjoins the action universally (*anavayavena*)[49] and one does not bind all cows,[50] then the action is deficient, and if the action is deficient, one does not obtain the result? And, to avoid this, one would abandon the thesis that there is one class property, and, as a result, the very reason for adopting this view, namely, that one would not have to state that one remains, would fail—now one would have to state it.[51]

---

[49]*Sākalyena anubandhanādikaṃ karma vidhīyate ity arthaḥ.* Raghunātha Śarman, MB, vol. 2, p. 93b, note 2.

[50]*Sakalo gaus tarhi iti śeṣaḥ.* Raghunātha Śarman, MB, vol. 2, p. 93b, note 3.

[51]Kaiyaṭa: ***Nanu ceti.*** *Sarvaviṣayā ced ākṛtiś codyate tadā sarvavyaktiviṣayam anuṣṭhānaṃ vinā vaiguṇyam eva syād ity arthaḥ. Athānuṣṭhānasiddhyartham ekadravyaviṣayam eva karma kriyate tatrāpy ucyate:* ***ekākṛtir*** *iti ceti....* ***Sa cedānīm*** *iti. Ekatve jāter ekaśabdapravṛtteḥ siddhatvād ekaśeṣārambhaḥ pratyākhyāyate, anekatve tv ārabdhavya evaikaśeṣa ity arthaḥ.* **But isn't it so.** The meaning is: If the instruction enjoins (action on) the class property which belongs to all (individuals of the class), then without performing (it) on all individuals, certainly deficiency would occur. On the other hand, if, in order to accomplish the performance, one does the action with regard to one individual substance—concerning this he says: (one would abandon the thesis that) **the class property is one. Now one would.** The meaning is: Stating (the rule) that one remains is rendered useless (*pratyākhyāyate*) because the remainder of one is achieved due to the fact that one word is used if a generic property is one (entity). But if there are many (generic properties within the class) (the rule) that one remains certainly does have to be stated.

Nāgeśa: ***Athānuṣṭhāneti.*** *Ayaṃ bhāvaḥ: Jāteḥ sākṣād anubandhanādyasambhavād vyaktidvārā tad vācyaṃ, tatrānuṣṭhānasiddhyartham ekaprayoge ekavyaktidvārakam eva tad āśrīyate. Tatrākṛter ekatve vinigamanāvirahāt sarvavyaktidvārakam eva tad āśrīyeta. Ākṛter anekatve tu pratijñāhānir iti.* **On the other hand, if,** (in order to accomplish) **the performance.** This is what he has in mind: Because (an action such as) binding, etc., is impossible on the generic property directly, one must say that it involves individual objects. If that is so, in order that the performance succeed in one instance, one accepts that it involves just one individual object. Hence, if there were one class property, because one would not decide (on one individual to the exclusion of the others), one would resort to (the action) involving all individuals. But if there were many class properties, the thesis (that there is one class property) would be abandoned.

Bhāṣye: ***anavayaveneti.*** *Jātyāśrayā vyaktiviśeṣā avayavā ity ucya[n]te.* ***Anavayavena.*** *Vyaktiviśeṣānālambanenety arthaḥ.* In the *bhāṣya*: **universally.** Specific individuals which are the substrata of the generic property are called parts (*avayava*). **Universally.** The meaning is: without regard to specific individuals. MB, vol. 2, p. 93a-b.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa: *Ākṛter abhidheyatvam aṅgīkṛtyaikadravyaviṣaye codanāṅgīkāre*

Evaṃ tarhy anavayavena codyate pratyekaṃ ca parisamāpyate yathādityaḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) If that is so, then an instruction enjoins action universally and is fulfilled with respect to each individual, as is the sun.[52]

Nanu ca yasyāpi dravyaṃ padārthas tasyāpy anavayavena codyate pratyekaṃ ca parisamāpyate.
(Sūtra-proponent:) But an instruction enjoins action universally and is fulfilled with respect to each individual of the class for him

---

ākṛteḥ pratyekaparisamāptir vācyā, tatra yugapad ekasyānekaparisamāptivṛttikatvāyogād ākṛter aikyaṃ bhajyeteti ***ekākṛtir iti ca*** *iti bhāṣyam.* Accepting that a class property is denoted, if one accepts that an injunction concerns one (individual) substance, one has to admit that the class property is complete in each. If that were so, the unity of the class property would fail because it is impossible for one thing to occur complete in many things simultaneously. Hence, the Bhāṣya, "**But** (if one abandons the thesis) **that there is one class property.**" MPV, vol. 4, p. 112.

[52]Kaiyaṭa: ***Evaṃ tarhīti.*** *Sarvābhir vyaktibhiḥ saṃbandhasya tulyatvāt sarvatraivābhinnabuddhyutpādanāt pratyekaṃ parisamāptatvād ekasminnapi dravye tat karma kriyamāṇaṃ jātau kṛtam eva bhavatity arthaḥ.* ***Yathāditya iti.*** *Pratideśaṃ yathā sarvātmanāditya upalabhyate tathā jātir apīty arthaḥ.* **If that is so.** The meaning is: Because (the generic property's) relation to each individual is the same, because the same cognition arises with respect to each (individual), and because the generic property is complete in each, the action done even on one individual substance is in fact done on the generic property. **As is the sun.** The (whole) generic property (is present in each individual) as the whole sun is seen in each place. (In the scenario described by Śabara (see §3.2.2 note 12) and discussed in §1.4.1, each observer sees the whole sun directly in front of himself.)

Nāgeśa: *Nanv āśrayabhedāt tadbhedo 'ta āha:* ***sarvābhir*** *iti. Bhedakābhāvān na bheda iti bhāvaḥ. Pratyakṣavirodhād dharmigrāhakamānavirodhāc ca bhedānumānam asaṅgatam iti bhāvaḥ.* In answer to the objection that the generic property is different (in each individual of the class) because its substrata are different, he says: **to each.** What he has in mind is: There is no difference (between the class property in one individual of the class and in another) because difference (of the substratum of a property) is not a cause of difference (of the property). What he has in mind is: The inference ("The generic property is different because its substrata are different") is unsound because it contradicts direct perception (*vārttikas* 36-37) and because it contradicts the evidence by which one knows the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*, i.e., the generic property). MB, vol. 2, p. 93b.

Nāgeśa raises a technical point: Inference establishes a conclusion (*sādhya*) on the basis of an established (*siddha*) common ground (*pakṣa* or *dharmin* 'subject of the inference'). The inference is faulty if the conclusion contradicts the established common ground. In the present case, the conclusion that the generic property in one individual of the class differs from that in another contradicts the direct perception which establishes that there is a generic property in the first place. The same cognition which occurs with respect to each of many individuals is direct evidence (*pratyakṣa*) (or according to Śivarāmendrasarasvatī, grounds for inference) of the generic property. It is in conflict with the conclusion that it is a different generic property in each of the many individuals of the class.

who holds that an individual substance is the object denoted too.[53]

Ekaśeṣas tvayā vaktavyaḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) You have to state that one remains.[54]

Tvayāpi tarhi dvivacanabahuvacanāni sādhyāni.
(Sūtra-proponent:) Then you have to justify the occurrence of dual and plural inflectional terminations.[55]

44. Codanāyāṃ caikasyopādhivṛtteḥ.
Codanāyāṃ caikasyopādhivṛtter manyāmahe ākṛtir abhidhīyata iti. Āgneyam aṣṭākapālaṃ nirvapet. Ekaṃ nirupya dvitīyas tṛtīyaś ca nirupyate. Yadi ca dravyaṃ padārthaḥ syād ekaṃ nirupya dvitīyasya tṛtīyasya ca nirvapaṇaṃ na prakalpeta.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) **And because in an injunction an attribute (*upādhi*) applies to one thing.**
And because in an injunction an attribute (*upādhi*) applies to one thing, we consider that a class property is denoted. "One should set out an *aṣṭākapāla* (eight-cup rice cake oblation) for (the deity) Agni."[56] Having set out one, he sets out a second and a third.

---

[53]*Kaiyaṭa:* ***Nanu ceti.*** *Dravye 'pi padārthe jāter anabhidheyāyā upalakṣaṇatvenāśrayaṇāt parityaktabhedaṃ dravyamātraṃ viśiṣṭajātiyuktaṃ śabdenocyate.* ***Pratyekaṃ ca parisamāpyata*** *iti. Śāstram ity adhyāhāraḥ. Atha vā jātir upalakṣaṇabhūtā pratyekaṃ parisamāpyata iti vyākhyeyam.* **But.** If an individual substance is the object denoted by a word, because the generic property, although not denoted, is accepted as an identifying mark (*upalakṣaṇa*), a word denotes any individual substance connected with a specific generic property regardless of its differences (from others connected with that generic property). **And is fulfilled with respect to each** (individual of the class). Supply 'an instruction'. Or it should be explained like this: The generic property as an identifying mark is complete with repect to each. MB, vol. 2, p. 93b.

[54]Kaiyaṭa: ***Ekaśeṣas tvayeti.*** *Jātyupalakṣitasya dravyasya śabdenābhidhāne saty abhidheyānekatvenānekaśabdatvaprasaṅgād ity arthaḥ.* **You** (have to state) **that one remains.** Because, if it were the case that a word denotes an individual substance identified by a generic property, due to there being many objects to denote it would be possible that many words occur. MB, vol. 2, p. 93b.

[55]Kaiyaṭa: ***Tvayāpi.*** *Jāter ekatvād dvitvabahutvanibandhanāni dvivacanabahuvacanāni na sidhyantīti bhāvaḥ.* **Then you.** Because a generic property is one (object), the dual and plural (terminations) which depend on there being two or many (objects) would not succeed. That is what he has in mind. MB, vol. 2, p. 93b.

[56]"*Āgneyam aṣṭākapālaṃ nirvapet*": Kāṭhakasaṃhitā 10.9 [13] (p. 92), 11.1 [1] (p. 18), 11.2 [2] (pp.18-19), 13.3 [7] (p. 123), 22.3 [7] (p. 236). Maitrāyaṇīsaṃhitā 2.1.3, (p. 105), 2.2.7 [29] (p.115), 2.2.13 [35] (p. 118), 2.3.1 [1] (p. 119), 2.3.5 [19] (p. 123), 2.3.6 [22] (p. 124), 2.4.6 [22] (p. 131), 2.5.9 [11] (p. 140). Taittirīyasaṃhitā 2.2.5.5 [7] (p.70), 2.3.2.3 [10] (p. 77), 5.6.5.1 (p. 236). Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa 3.9.17.1 (vol. 4, p. 141). See also Taittirīyasaṃhitā 1.8.1.10, 1.8.2.1 (p. 51), 1.8.7.2, 1.8.17.1 (p. 56), 1.8.19.1, 1.8.20.1 (p. 57), "*āgneyam*

But if an individual substance were the object denoted, having set out one, setting out a second and a third would not succeed.[57]

---

aṣṭākapālaṃ nirvapati." Reference: Rau (1985: 18, #108).

The word *'āgneya'*, meaning that which is offered to the deity Agni (4.2.24), is formed from the word *'agni'* by adding the suffix ***ḍhak*** (4.2.24, 33), strengthening the first vowel (7.2.118) and dropping the final *i* of the base (6.4.148).

4.2.24. *Sāsya devatā*. Affixes occur as provided in the meaning of a sixth triplet termination after a word ending in a first triplet termination, if it names a deity.

4.2.33. *Agner ḍhak*. The suffix ***ḍhak*** occurs after the word *'agni'* to form a derivative meaning that whose deity is Agni.

6.4.148. *Yasyeti ca (lopaḥ 147, taddhite 144, bhasya 129, aṅgasya 1)*. Zero replaces the final sound of a stem termed *bha* (1.4.18) which ends in a sound of the class *i* or *a* and which is followed by a *taddhita* affix or the sound *ī*. For the term *bha* see Cardona (1988: 49).

7.2.118. *Kiti ca (taddhiteṣv acām ādeḥ 117, aco ñṇiti 115, vṛddhiḥ 114 aṅgasya 6.4.1)*. A *vṛddhi* vowel replaces the first vowel of the stem after which a *taddhita* affix marked with *k* is provided.

The word *'aṣṭākapāla'* means an oblation (*havis*) prepared (*saṃskṛta*) in eight (*aṣṭa*) cups (*kapāla*). It is derived by forming the ***dvigu*** compound (2.1.52, *Saṃkhyāpūrvo dviguḥ*) in the meaning "prepared food" (4.2.16), one of the meanings in which the *taddhita* (2.1.51, *Taddhitārthottarapadasamāhāre ca*) affix *aṇ* occurs (4.1.83, *Prāgdīvyato 'ṇ*). No trace of the affix remains in the resulting *dvigu* compound (4.1.88, *Dvigor lug anapatye*).

4.2.16. *Saṃskṛtaṃ bhakṣāḥ (tatra 14)*. After a word ending in a seventh triplet termination, affixes occur as provided to mean that which is prepared, if it is food.

Kāśikā (vol. 1, p. 113) on 4.2.16 explains the details of derivation of *'aṣṭākapāla'*.

[57]*Kaiyaṭa: Evaṃ bhāṣyakāreṇa pakṣayoḥ sāmyaṃ darśitam. Vākyakāras tu jātipakṣāśrayaṇasya prayojanāni samuccayenācaṣṭe:* ***codanāyāṃ caikasyeti****. Sāmānyasyāgneyādeḥ.* ***Upādhivṛtter*** *iti. Aṣṭākapālatvādir* ***upādhiḥ*** *tasya* ***vṛttiḥ*** *pravṛttiḥ. Etad uktaṃ bhavati: Yadi āgneyādiśabdena sāmānyam abhidhīyate tadā tenāśeṣadravyāṇām ākṣepāt pratidravyam aṣṭākapālatvam upādhir yujyate dravye tu padārthe ekenaiva yajamānena sakṛd evāṣṭākapālaḥ puroḍāso nirupyeta nānyena nāpy anyadety arthaḥ.* In this way Patañjali shows the equivalence of the two views. But Kātyāyana states all the reasons for accepting the view that a generic property is denoted together: **And** (because) **in an injunction** (an attribute) **applies to one** (thing). To one general property: being for Agni. **An attribute applies.** The attribute of being *aṣṭākapāla*, etc., **applies** occurs. What is stated is this: If a word such as 'being for Agni', etc., denotes a general property, then because (the general property) requires any individual substance, the attribute of being *aṣṭākapāla* would be joined to each individual substance. But if an individual substance were the object denoted by a word, only one performer would set out an *aṣṭākapāla* rice cake oblation only once; no one else (would) nor (would he) another time. That is the meaning.

Nāgeśa: *Ekasyāgneyāder ya upādhir aṣṭākapālatvādis tasya punaḥ punaḥ pravṛtter iti vārtikārthaḥ....* ***Aṣṭākapālatvādī****tyādipadena nirvāpaḥ. Ata eva bhāṣye sa eva darśita* ***ekaṃ nirupye****tyādinā.* The meaning of the *vārttika* is: Because an attribute such as being *aṣṭākapāla*, etc., occurs again and again for one (constant qualifier) such as being for Agni. By the word 'etc.' in *'aṣṭākapāla*, etc.', (he intends) setting out (*nirvāpa*). Hence, that is what Patañjali shows by (saying) "having set out one." MB, vol. 2, p. 94a.

If the word *'āgneya'* referred to a single individual oblation, it would refer to the

Kaḥ punar etayor jāticodanayor viśeṣaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) But what is the difference between these two generic property injunctions?[58]

Ekā nirvṛttenāparā nirvartyena.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) The first enjoins by means of something which already exists, the other by means of something which has to be made.[59]

---

particular oblation set out by one performer on one particular occasion. It would not refer to the oblation which he might set out on any other occasion or which another performer might set out. Hence the injunction which refers to an oblation having the attribute *aṣṭākapālatva* could only be carried out once. However, if the word *'āgneya'* denotes the general property being for Agni, it will refer to any individual substance joined to that general property. Hence the injunction to set out such a substance having the attribute *aṣṭākapālatva* could be satisfied by setting out any oblation for Agni having the attribute *aṣṭākapālatva*, that is, any oblation prepared in eight cups for Agni.
Annaṃbhaṭṭa: ***Sāmānyasyeti.*** *"Ekam anekānugataṃ sāmānyam" iti lakṣaṇānusārād* ***ekaṃ*** *sāmānyam ity arthaḥ.... Jātiśabdena sāmānyamātrābhidhānād upādhirūpasāmānyasyāpy abhidheyatvāvirodhaḥ.* **To one general property.** The meaning is: **One** is a general property following the definition, "One thing which occurs in many things is a general property."... Because the word 'generic property (*jāti*)' denotes any general property (*sāmānyamātra*), there is no conflict in (the word 'one') denoting a general property (*sāmānya*) in the form of an attribute (*upādhi*). MPV, vol. 4, p. 113.
Although *'āgneya'* is also an attribute applied to the oblation, it is taken as constant in the present example. *Aṣṭākapālatva* varies with other attributes such as *ekādaśakapālatva* (being prepared in eleven cups).
Śivarāmendrasarasvatī: ***Ekasyopādivṛtter*** *iti. Ekasyaiva vastuna upādhināṣṭākapālatvādinā* ***vṛtteḥ*** *saṃbandhāt tadvastuno dravyatve ekenaiva sakṛd eva niruptaṃ śāstrīyaṃ syāt, nānyena, na punaś ca. Ākṛtitve tu sarvair niruptaṃ punar niruptaṃ ca śāstrīyaṃ syād iti bhāvaḥ.* Because a property such as being *aṣṭākapāla*, etc., **applies** is related **to** just **one** thing, if that thing were an individual substance, that which is set out by just one (person) just once would fit the instruction, not (that which is set out) by anyone else, nor (by the same person) another time. But if that thing were a class property, that which is set out by anyone and set out (even by the same person) another time would fit the instruction. That is what he has in mind. MPV, vol. 4, p. 115.

[58]Kaiyaṭa: ***Kaḥ punar*** *iti.* ***"Gaur anubandhyaḥ"*** *iti* ***"Āgneyam aṣṭākapālam"*** *iti cānayor ity arthaḥ.* **But what.** He means of these two: "One should bind a cow, (a goat for Agni and Soma)," and "(One should set out) an *aṣṭākapāla* for Agni." MB, vol. 2, p. 94a.

[59]Kaiyaṭa: ***Ekā nirvṛtteneti.*** *Niṣpanno hi paśur yāgasādhanāyopādīyate.* ***Aparā nirvartyeneti.*** *Āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālaś codanayaivotpādyate na tu codanāyāḥ pūrvaṃ niṣpanna ity arthaḥ.* **The first** (enjoins) **by means of something which already exists.** One takes an already existing cow for a means to accomplish the Vedic performance. **The other by means of something which has to be made.** The injunction itself causes the oblation for Agni to come into being.; the oblation does not exist prior to the injunction. That is the meaning. MB, vol. 2, p. 94a-b.
Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa go on to give a reason for the distinction. This is unconvincing for the reasons which Śivarāmendrasarasvatī gives:
Śivarāmendrasarasvatī: *Aṣṭākapālādikaṃ hi sad yo niṣpādya tena yāgaḥ kriyate. Etena "Tatra nirvṛtte bhedāgrahaṇāt dravyāntare 'pi pravṛttiḥ syān na tu*

45. Dravyābhidhānaṃ Vyāḍiḥ.
Dravyābhidhānaṃ Vyāḍir ācāryo nyāyyaṃ manyate. Dravyam abhidhīyata iti.
46. Tathā ca liṅgavacanasiddhiḥ.
Evaṃ ca kṛtvā liṅgavacanāni siddhāni bhavanti. brāhmaṇī brāhmaṇaḥ brāhmaṇau brāhmaṇā iti.
47. Codanāsu ca tasyārambhāt.
Codanāsu ca tasyārambhān manyāmahe dravyam abhidhīyata iti. Gaur anubandhyo 'jo 'gnīṣomīya iti. Ākṛtau coditāyāṃ dravya ārambhaṇālambhanaprokṣaṇaviśasanādīni kriyante.
48. Na caikam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapat.
Na khalvapy ekam anekādhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapad upalabhyate. Na hy eko Devadatto yugapat Srughne bhavati Mathurāyāṃ ca.
49. Vināśe prādurbhāve ca sarvaṃ tathā syāt.

(Sūtra-proponent:) **Vyāḍi holds that a word denotes an individual substance.**
The teacher Vyāḍi considers it appropriate that a word denotes an individual substance: A substance is denoted.[60]

---

nirvartye sādṛśyāgrahaṇād ity avaśyāśrayaṇīyā jātiḥ," iti Kaiyaṭo nirastaḥ, nānāvidhapakvānnādīnāṃ nirvartyānāṃ sādṛśyagrahaṇapūrvakaṃ loke kriyamāṇatvenānubhavaviruddhatvāt. One does the Vedic performance with the *aṣṭākapāla*, etc., entity which is to be brought into existence. This refutes Kaiyaṭa (saying) "Since this is so, although it may be possible for one to act on another already existing individual substance because one is not aware of its differences (from the individual the word denotes), it would not be possible on an object which has to be made because one would not be aware of the similarity. Therefore, one must necessarily resort to a generic property," because it is opposed to the ordinary experience of various types of cooked food and so on which have to be brought into existence being made with a prior grasp of the (mutual) similarity (of the individuals of each type). MPV, vol. 4, p. 115.

[60]Kaiyaṭa: ***Dravyābhidhānam** iti. Jāter vṛttivikalpākṣamatvenābhāvaṃ manyamāno Vyāḍir dravyam eva śabdenābhidhīyata iti manyate.* (Vyāḍi **holds**) **that** (a word) **denotes an individual substance.** Considering that there is no generic property because it is incapable of any of the possible modes of occurrence, Vyāḍi considers that a word denotes just an individual substance.
Nāgeśa: *Nanu vyaktiśaktāv ānantyavyabhicārayoḥ sattvāt jātau śaktir ity āśaṅkya jātir eva nāstīty āha:* ***vṛttivikalpeti.*** *Jātir na tāvad dravyeṣu vyāsajyavṛttiḥ, ekāśrayanāśe 'pratītyāpatteḥ. Kiṃ ca gām ālabhetetyādi-nodanāsu sarvadravyālambhāpattiḥ. Pratyekasamāptau tu dravyāntare tad-anāpattis tatrāpi sattve ekākṛtir iti pratijñāhānir ity arthaḥ. Tattatsaṃsthānādy-upalakṣitam adhiṣṭhānacaitanyam eva dravyam iti nānantyavyabhicārāv iti tātparyam.* Answering the objection, "Because there would be infinity (of signifying relations) or deviation (of a word's usage from the object it signifies) if the signifying relation were to an individual, the signifying relation is to a generic property," he says that there is no such thing as a generic property: (Because it is incapable of) **any of the possible modes of occurrence.** (1) A generic property does not occur in individual substances collectively because then upon the destruction of one substratum, it would not be perceived. Moreover, in commands such as, "Sacrifice a cow," etc., the sacrifice of all individual substances would result. (2a) But if a generic property were complete in one (individual substance), it could not be in another individual

And in this manner gender and number succeed.

And on this basis, different genders and numbers are achieved: *brāhmaṇī* (feminine singular); *brāhmaṇaḥ* (masculine singular), *brāhmaṇau* (masculine dual), *brāhmaṇāḥ* (masculine plural).

And because in injunctions one commences the action on a substance.

And because in injunctions one commences the action on a substance, we consider that a substance is denoted. "One should bind a cow, a goat for Agni and Soma." Even if the instruction enjoins the action on the class property, one does the tying, killing, washing, cutting up, etc., on a substance.[61]

And it is not the case that one thing is present in many substrata simultaneously.

Moreover it is not the case that one thing is found present in many substrata simultaneously. For the single individual Devadatta is not present simultaneously in Srughna and in Mathurā.[62]

---

substance. (2b) If it were in another too, that would destroy the thesis that there is one generic property (for the class). The purport is: There would not be infinity or deviation because a substance is just underlying consciousness characterized by a certain configuration, etc. MB, vol. 2, p. 94b.

Nāgeśa suggests that a word denotes *brahman*, the single basis of the world full of diffferences. Since there is just one *brahman*, the faults of infinity and deviation would not apply. They are possible only if there are many individual substances. However, this is not the view of Vyāḍi as Patañjali presents it. A single substance would be devoid of gender and number so would not be capable of the solution to the gender and number problem stated in *vārttika* 46. In addition, it would be subject to the faults Vyāḍi attributes to the view that a word denotes a generic property in *vārttika* 49. From Patañjali's presentation it is clear that Vyāḍi takes the view that a word denotes each of many individual substances.

[61]Kaiyaṭa: ***Ākṛtau coditāyām*** *iti. Ākṛtivādipakṣe śabenākṛtiś codyate dravye tu kāryaṃ pravartate. Ayuktaṃ caitat. Na hy anyacodane 'nyasya kārye kriyamāṇe yathoktaṃ kṛtaṃ bhavati. Tasmād dravyam eva śabdenocyata iti nyāyyam.*

If (the instruction) **enjoins** (the action) **on the class property.** On the view that a word denotes a class property, a word enjoins (an action to be done on) a class property but the action to be brought about takes place on a substance. And that is not right. Because when an instruction enjoins (an action) on one thing and the action to be brought about is done on another, it is not done as stated. Therefore, it is appropriate that a word denotes just a substance.

Nāgeśa: *...**ārambhaṇaṃ** krayo bandhanaṃ vā.* ...**tying** is either purchase or binding. MB, vol. 2, p. 95a.

[62]The passage appears under *Śivasūtra* 1, *A i u ṇ*, *vārttika* 12, *Yugapac ca deśapṛthaktvadarśanāt: Na hy eko Devadatto yugapat Srughne ca bhavati Mathurāyāṃ ca.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 18, lines 11-12.

Kaiyaṭa: ***Na caikam*** *iti. Na ca heturahitenādityadṛṣṭāntena sādhyasiddhir bhavati, devadattadṛṣṭāntena viparyayasyāpi sādhanāt.*

And it is not the case that one thing. One does not establish the (inferential) conclusion (that one generic property is present in many substances) by the example of the sun without an inferential mark, because by

When something perished and when something came into being, all of it would likewise.

Kim?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) What?

Vinaśyec ca prāduḥṣyāc ca. Śvā mṛta iti śvā nāma loke na pracaret. Gaur jāta iti sarvaṃ gobhūtam anavakāśaṃ syāt.
50. Asti ca vairūpyam.
Asti khalvapi vairūpyam. Gauś ca gauś ca khaṇḍo muṇḍa iti.
51. Tathā ca vigrahaḥ.
Evaṃ ca kṛtvā vigraha upapanno bhavati. Gauś ca gauś ceti.
52. Vyartheṣu ca muktasaṃśayam.
Vyartheṣu ca muktasaṃśayaṃ bhavati. Ākṛtāv api padārtha ekaśeṣo vaktavyaḥ. Akṣāḥ pādāḥ māṣā iti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) Perish and come into being. "A dog has died." No dog whatsoever would remain in the world. "A bull has been born." There would not be enough room for everything that ever is (was or will be) a cow.[63]

---

the example of Devadatta one establishes the opposite. MB, vol. 2, p. 95a.

[63]Kaiyaṭa: ***Śvā mṛta** iti. Abhivyañjakavināśe jātes tirobhāvāt piṇḍāntare śveti pratyayo na syāt. Śatapratyaya ivaikāpāya ity arthaḥ. Yad vā āśrayāpāye āśritasyāpy apāyaḥ avayavāpāye avayavina iveti jāter vināśaprasaṅga ity arthaḥ. **Gaur jāta** iti. Jātena gopiṇḍena gotvam abhivyaktaṃ tac ca sarvāśrayavartīti ekagopiṇḍapratyakṣatve sarvagopiṇḍapratyakṣatvaprasaṇgaḥ.... Atha vā sarvavastuvyāpi gotvam eṣṭavyam.... Tataś ca...sarveṣu padārtheṣu gopratyayaprasaṅgaḥ.* **A dog has died.** The meaning is: Because the generic property would disappear when an object manifesting it perished, the cognition, "dog," would not occur with respect to any other object just as the cognition of a hundred (does not occur) when one is subtracted. Or when the substratum ceases to be, that which rests on it ceases to be too just as the whole (ceases to be) when a part ceases to be; hence, the destruction of the generic property would result. **A bull has been born.** An individual cow having been born manifests cowness and that is present in all its substrata; hence, when direct perception of one individual cow occurred, direct perception of all individual cows would result.... Or it should be accepted that cowness pervades all things... and then... the cognition of cow in all objects would result. MB, vol. 2, p. 95b. Kaiyaṭa cites Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika (p. 304-05), Pariccheda 3, verses 152, 155b-56a, to elaborate on the faults in the concept of a generic property.
Nāgeśa: ***Abhivyañjaketi.** Vyāsajyavṛttir jātiḥ sarvavyaktibhiḥ saṃbhūyābhivyajyata iti mate idaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ, jāter nāśaś ca tirobhāva evety arthaḥ.... Evaṃ vināśapadaṃ vyaktiṣu dhvaṃsaparaṃ tatheti parāmṛṣṭam ākṛtau tirodhānaparam ity ayuktam iti matvāha: **yad veti**. .... **Jāteneti**. Vyāsajyavṛttigotvaṃ sarvāśrayajñānair abhivyaṅktavyam anyathā gotvajñānam eva na syād ity arthaḥ. Astu tarhi tatpratyakṣatvāya tadāśrayasarvasya pratyakṣatvam ata āha bhāṣye: **anavakāśam** iti.* (An object) **manifesting.** This fault occurs on the view that all individuals combined manifest a generic property which is present in them collectively, and the perishing of the generic property is just its disappearance.... Considering it incorrect that the word 'perishing', meaning destruction with regard to individuals, which is referred to by 'likewise' (vt. 49), should mean disappearance with regard to a class property, he says: **Or.** .... (An individual cow) **having been born.** The meaning is:

And there is difference.
Moreover, there is difference: a bull and a bull; an unwhole bull, a hornless bull.[64]
And in this manner, analytic strings (make sense).
And on this basis, the analytic string, "a bull and a bull," (for the dual word 'two bulls (*gāvau*)') makes sense.[65]

---

cowness present in all its substrata collectively is manifested by knowledge of all the substrata (together); otherwise, knowledge of cowness simply would not arise. Since that is so, in order to bring about direct knowledge of it, let there be direct perception of all its substrata. Hence he says in the bhāṣya: **not enough room.** MB, vol. 2, p. 95b-96a.
Śivarāmendrasarasvatī explains the word *'anavakāśam'* saying, *"niravakāśam ādhāraśūnyam* (without space, devoid of ground)," and elaborates that even the entire earth would not be able to be ground for innumerable cows. *Na hy asaṃkhyeyānāṃ gavāṃ pṛthivī samastāpy ādhāro bhavitum alam.* He rejects Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa's interpretation of the word as a *bahuvrīhi* bearing the meaning of a fifth triplet termination saying: *Anavakāśaśabdo hi prāyeṇa ṣaṣṭhyarthagarbhitabahuvrīhir evātra śāstre āśritaḥ.* The word *anavakāśa* is usually used in this discipline only as a *bahuvrīhi* enveloping the meaning of a sixth triplet termination. See MPV, vol. 4, p. 115, lines 22-23 and 26-27.

[64]Kaiyaṭa: ***Asti ca vairupyam*** *iti. Tasmād dravyam evāstu na tu sāmānyam. Na hy ekasya bhedābhedau viruddhau upapadyete ity arthaḥ. Ekārthakriyākāritvādinimittas tu pratyabhijñāpratyayaḥ.* ***Gauś ceti.*** *bhedādhiṣṭhānaḥ samuccayaḥ sāmānyasyaikatvābhideyatvayor na syād ity arthaḥ.* **And there is difference.** Therefore, let just an individual substance be (the object denoted by a word) and not a general property. Because the opposites, difference and non-difference cannot belong to one thing. That is the meaning. And the identity-cognition (*pratyabhijñāpratyaya*) is caused by the fact that different objects perform the same purposeful activity. **A bull and** (a bull). The meaning is: There could not be an aggregate if there were one general property and it were denoted, because an aggregate depends on the aggregated objects being distinct.
Nāgeśa: ***Na hīti.*** *Evaṃ ca tattacchabdapratipādye ekasmin viruddhadharmopapatter abhāvād dravyam eva padārtha iti bhāvaḥ. Bhāṣye* ***gauś ca gauś cety*** *anenābhipretaṃ vairūpyam upapādayati:* ***bhedeti.*** *Evaṃ khaṇḍo gaur muṇḍo gaur iti ca na syād iti bhāvaḥ.* **Because** (one thing) **cannot.** And so just a substance is the object denoted by a word because it is impossible for opposite properties to be in one single object which each of many words expresses. Kaiyaṭa explains the difference intended by the *bhāṣya* passage, "**a bull and a bull**": **difference.** Similarly (because one thing cannot have property a and not property b, and yet have property b and not a) "an unwhole bull, a hornless bull" wouldn't occur either. That is the sense. That is what he has in mind. MB, vol. 2, p. 96a.
I have edited Patañjali's examples here in accordance with Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa's commentaries. However, Śivarāmendrasarasvatī takes the example as showing both similarity and difference. The repetition of the word 'cow' shows similarity; the different qualifiers 'unwhole' and 'hornless' show dissimilarity. He says: *Sārūpyaṃ tāvad darśayati: gauś ca gauś ceti. Vairūpyaṃ darśayati: khaṇḍo muṇḍa iti.* MPV, vol. 4, p. 114.

[65]Nāgeśa: ***Tathā ca vigraha*** *iti. Ekārthatve paryāyāṇām iva sahaprayogo na syād iti bhāvaḥ.* **And thus analysis.** They would not be used together because they would denote the same object, like synonyms. That is what he has in mind. MB, vol. 2, p. 96b.

And for words having different meanings, it is indubitable.
And for words having different meanings, stating that one remains is indubitable. Even if a class property is the object denoted by a word, one has to state that one remains: '*akṣāḥ* (die, axle, seed), *pādāḥ* (foot, verse segment, quarter), *māṣāḥ* (bean, monetary unit, fool).'[66]

53. Liṅgavacanasiddhir guṇasyānityatvāt.
Liṅgavacanāni siddhāni bhavanti.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) **Gender and number succeed because a quality is not innate.**
Different genders and numbers are achieved.

Kutaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) Why?

Guṇasyānityatvāt. Anityā guṇā apāyina upāyinaś ca.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Because a quality is not innate. Qualities are not innate; they come and go.[67]

---

[66]Kaiyaṭa: ***Ākṛtāv apīti.*** *Yadartha ākṛtipakṣaparigrahaḥ tad eva na sidhyati na hi śakaṭākṣadevanākṣādiṣv ekākṛtisadbhāvaḥ.* **Even if a class property.** The very reason for adopting the view that a class property is denoted (i.e., that the rule that one remains would not have to be stated) does not succeed because (the same) one class property does not exist in (both) a cart-axle (*śakaṭa-akṣa*) and a gaming die (*devana-akṣa*), etc.
Nāgeśa: *bhāṣye:* ***vyartheṣv*** *iti. Vijātīyānekārthasarūpaśabdeṣv ity arthaḥ.* ***Muktasaṃśayam*** *iti. Ekaśeṣāṅgīkaraṇam iti śeṣaḥ.*
In the *bhāṣya*: **For** (words) **having different meanings.** The meaning is: for words of the same form having many meanings of different types. **Indubitable.** The remainder is: accepting that one remains. MB, vol. 2, p. 96b.
[67]Kaiyaṭa: *Idānīm ākṛtivādī doṣān parihartum āha:* ***liṅgeti.*** *Ākṛtisadbhāvaḥ pūrvam eva pratyakṣānumānāgamapravṛttibhiḥ pratipāditaḥ. Sarvagatatve 'pi padārthānāṃ vicitraśaktiyogāt kaścit padārthaḥ kāṃcid evākṛtim abhivyanakti na tu sarvāṃ sarvaḥ. Guṇāś cātra dvitvastrītvādayo vivakṣitāḥ. Taiś cākṛter ekārthasamavāyalakṣaṇaḥ saṃbandha ity ākṛtāv api padārthe liṅgasaṃkhyāsiddhir ity arthaḥ.* ***Anityā*** *iti. Kadācit strītvayuktena piṇḍenākṛtir vyajyate kadācit puṃstvayuktena, kadācid ekādhārasthā pratipadyate kadācid anekādhārasthety arthaḥ.* Now the proponent of the view that a class property is denoted, to avoid the faults (which Vyāḍi had attributed to it), says: **gender.** It was shown previously by direct perception, inference, authoritative texts and behavior that class properties exist. Even if class properties are all pervading, because entities have varying capacities, a certain entity manifests a certain class property; not all (entities manifest) every (class property). He intends the qualities here to be duality, femininity, etc. A class property has the relation of inhering in the same object with them; hence, even if a class property is the object denoted by a word, gender and number succeed. That is the meaning. **Not innate.** Sometimes a class property is manifested by a body connected with feminine gender, sometimes by one connected with masculine gender; sometimes it occurs in one substratum, sometimes in many substrata.
Nāgeśa: ***Anityā*** *iti. Aniyatā ity arthaḥ Apāyitvopāyitvābhyām aniyatatvam*

Kiṃ ya ete śuklādayah?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What, white and so on?

Netyāha. Strīpuṃnapuṃsakāni sattvaguṇā ekatvadvitvabahutvāni ca. Kadācid ākṛtir ekatvena yujyate kadācid dvitvena kadācid bahutvena kadācit strītvena kadācit puṃstvena kadācin napuṃsakatvena.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) No. The qualities of a substance: feminine, masculine, and neuter gender, and singular, dual, and plural number. Sometimes a class property is connected with singular number, sometimes with dual number, sometimes with plural number; sometimes with feminine gender, sometimes with masculine gender, sometimes with neuter gender.[68]

Bhavel liṅgaparihāra upapanno vacanaparihāras tu nopapadyate. Yadi hi kadācid ākṛtir ekatvena yujyate kadācid dvitvena kadācid bahutvenaikākṛtir iti pratijñā hīyeta yac cāsya pakṣasyopādāne prayojanam uktam ekaśeṣo na vaktavya iti sa cedānīṃ vaktavyo bhavati.
(Sūtra-proponent:) It may be possible to avoid the gender problem but it is not possible to avoid the number problem. Because if a class property is connected sometimes with singular number, sometimes with dual number, sometimes with plural number, one would abandon the thesis that there is one class property, and, as a result, the very reason mentioned for adopting this view, namely that one would not have to state that one remains, would fail—now one would have to state it.[69]

[53a.] *Evaṃ tarhi liṅgavacanasiddhir guṇavivakṣānityatvāt. Liṅgavacanāni siddhāni bhavanti.*

---

eva bhāṣye darśitam. **Not innate.** The meaning is impermanent. The fact of going and coming (mentioned) in the *bhāṣya* shows just impermanence. MB, vol. 2, p. 96b.

68The word 'gender' like the term *'liṅga'* it translates, refers 1) to the sex characteristics of objects, 2) to the characteristics which determine the use of certain speech forms rather than others and 3) to the characteristics of speech forms themselves. It has the third sense in the *vārttika*, meaning the correct affixes would occur. In the present paragraph the sūtra-rejector intends the second sense but the sūtra-proponent understands the first sense.

69Kaiyaṭa: ***Vacanaparihāras tv iti.*** *Liṅgaparihāre na kiṃcid duṣyati, vacanaparihāre tv abhidhīyamāne ekākṛtir iti pratijñāhāniḥ, dvitvabahutvasaṃbandhasyāpy abhyupagamāt. Dvivacanabahuvacanavad anekaśabdatvam api prāpnotīty ekaśeṣo 'pi vaktavya ity arthaḥ.* **But it is not pertinent to number.** Nothing is wrong with the rebuttal sparing gender but if one puts forward the rebuttal regarding number, it destroys the thesis that there is one class property because it accepts that a class property has a relation with dual and plural number too. The occurrence of many words would obtain just as the dual and plural inflectional terminations do and so (the rule) that one remains would have to be stated. MB, vol. 2, p. 97a.

(Sūtra-rejecter:) In that case, gender and number succeed because a speaker's intention of a quality is not innate. Different genders and numbers are achieved.

Kutaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) Why?

Guṇavivakṣāyā anityatvāt. Anityā guṇavivakṣā. Kadācid ākṛtir ekatvena vivakṣitā bhavati kadācid dvitvena kadācid bahutvena kadācit strītvena kadācit puṃstvena kadācin napuṃsakatvena.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Because a speaker's intention of a quality is not innate. A speaker's intention of a quality is not innate. Sometimes a speaker intends a class property with singular number, sometimes with dual number, sometimes with plural number; sometimes with feminine gender, sometimes with masculine gender, sometimes with neuter gender.[70]

Bavel liṅgaparihāra upapanno vacanaparihāras tu nopapadyate. Yadi kadācid ākṛtir ekatvena vivakṣitā bhavati kadācid dvitvena kadācid bahutvenaikākṛtir iti pratijñā hīyeta yac cāsya pakṣasyopādāne prayojanam uktam ekaśeṣo na vaktavya iti sa cedānīṃ vaktavyo bhavati. Liṅgaparihāraś cāpi nopapadyate.
(Sūtra-proponent:) It may be possible to avoid the gender problem but it is not possible to avoid the number problem. If it were the case that sometimes a speaker intends a class property with singular number, sometimes with dual number, sometimes with plural number, one would abandon the thesis that there is one class property, and, as a result, the very reason mentioned for adopting this view, namely that one would not have to state that one remains, would fail—now one would have to state it. Moreover, it is not possible to avoid the gender problem either.[71]

---

[70]Kaiyaṭa: ***Guṇavivakṣā'nityatvād** iti. Svata ākṛter ekatvaṃ dravyagata-dvitvabahutvavivakṣāyāṃ tu dvivacanabahuvacane bhavataḥ. Āśrayadharmair āśritānāṃ vyapadeśaḥ.*
Because a speaker's intention of a quality is not innate. In and of itself a class property has singular number but the dual and plural (inflectional terminations) occur if a speaker intends the dual and plural number which belong to the substance. One speaks of the properties which reside in a substrate (the class property) as having the properties of the substrate (gender and number). MB, vol. 2, p. 97a.

[71]Śivarāmendrasarasvatī: ***Pratijñā hīyeteti**. Vivakṣāmātreṇārtha-viśeṣāsiddheḥ. Anyathā vivakṣayā gavy aśvaśabdaḥ, aśve 'pi gośabdaḥ prayoktavyaḥ syāt. Ata ākṛtibhedam antareṇa vacanopapādanāsambhavāt pratijñāhānyādikaṃ tadavastham iti bhāvaḥ.* (One) **would abandon the thesis.** Because a certain meaning does not occur just by a speaker's intention. Otherwise, if it did, the word 'horse' would be used for a cow and the word 'cow' for a horse just by a speaker's intention (see Patañjali on *vārttika* 29). Hence the problem of abandoning the thesis and so on would still remain, because it is impossible to explain (dual and plural) number without splitting up a class property. MPV, vol. 4, p. 118.

Kiṃ kāraṇam?
(Sūtra-rejecter:) What is the reason?

Āviṣṭaliṅgā jātir yal liṅgam upādāya pravartata utpattiprabhṛtyā vināśāt tal liṅgaṃ na jahāti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) A generic property is gender specific; from origin to destruction it does not abandon the gender it starts out with.[72]

[53b.] *Tasmān na vaiyākaraṇaiḥ śakyaṃ laukikaṃ liṅgam āsthātum. Avaśyaṃ kaścit svakṛtānta āstheyaḥ.*
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Therefore, grammarians cannot accept the ordinary gender of an object (as the criterion for the gender of the words denoting it). They have to adopt a conception of their own.[73]

---

[72]The passage, "A generic property... (*āviṣṭaliṅgā jātir*...)," cites the commentary on *sūtra* 1.2.52, *Viśeṣaṇānāṃ cājāteḥ*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 228, lines 18-19. See my discussion §1.4.3.

Kaiyaṭa: *Tataś caikam evāśrayagataṃ liṅgam upādatte sarvadā jātiḥ yathā grāmyapaśujātayaḥ saṃghe strītvam evopādadate gāva imā iti, anyās tu puṃstvam eva brāhmaṇā ime iti yathety arthaḥ.* And so a generic property always takes just one of the genders present in its substrata. In this way the generic properties of domestic animals in herds take only feminine gender, (for example) "these cows (feminine by 1.2.73)," while in contrast other (generic properties take) only masculine gender, (for example) "these *brāhmaṇas* (masculine by 1.2.67)." MB, vol. 2, p. 97b.

1.2.73 is an exception to 1.2.67.

Pāṇini 1.2.67. *Pumān striyā (tallakṣaṇaś ced eva viśeṣaḥ 65).* In stating (a male) together with a female just the masculine speech form remains if that is the only difference between them.

Pāṇini 1.2.73. *Grāmyapaśusaṃgheṣv ataruṇeṣu strī.* For herds of domestic animals other than just young, if a speaker intends the animals together, just a feminine speech from remains.

The word *'āviṣṭaliṅgā'* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound literally meaning that in which gender (*liṅga*) has entered (*āviṣṭa*). Formed in accordance with Pāṇini 2.2.24, *Anekam anyapadārthe*, the past passive participle (word ending in the suffix *kta*) falls first according to Pāṇini 2.2.36, *Niṣṭhā (pūrvam 30, bahuvrīhau 35).*

Śivarāmendrasarasvatī: ***Yal liṅgam** iti. Āviṣṭaliṅgā jātir iti dravyapadārthavādināpy āśrayaṇīyam eva, vṛkṣaśabdaprabhṛtteḥ sarvathā puṃlliṅgādyanupapatteḥ. Tathā cobhābhyām eva kiṃcil lokasiddhaliṅgavilakṣaṇaṃ liṅgam āstheyam ity āha: **Tasmād** iti.* **The gender.** The proponent of the view that an individual substance is the object denoted by a word has to accept that a generic property is gender-specific too because (otherwise) it would not make sense that the word 'tree', and other words, always occur in the masculine gender. And so both (the proponents of both views) have to accept a conception of gender which is different from the one ordinarily accepted. Hence he says: **Therefore.** MPV, vol. 4, p. 118-19.

[73]Kaiyaṭa: ***Laukikam** iti. Stanakeśādisaṃbandha ity arthaḥ. Tasminnāśrīyamāṇe liṅgāntareṇa saṃbandho na syāt. Tasmāt svasiddhāntavyavasthāśrīyate.*

Ordinary. The meaning is: Having a relation to breasts, (long) hair, etc. If grammarians did accept ordinary gender, a generic property's relation to another gender would not occur. Therefore, they resort to a classification (based on) a

Ko 'sau svakṛtāntaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What is this conception of their own?

Saṃstyānaprasavau liṅgam.
Saṃstyānaprasavau liṅgam āstheyau.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) ***Saṃstyāna* and *prasava*** have to be accepted as **gender.**
Saṃstyāna and *prasava* have to be accepted as gender.

Kim idaṃ saṃstyānaprasavāv iti?
(Sūtra-proponent:) What is this *'Saṃstyāna* and *prasava'?*

Saṃstyāne styāyater ḍraṭ strī sūteḥ sap prasave pumān.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) The word *'strī* (feminine)' is formed from the verbal root √*styai* (to combine) with the suffix *ḍraṭ* in the meaning *saṃstyāna*; the word *'puṃs* (masculine)' is formed from √*sū* (to procreate) with *p* for *s* of the root in the meaning *prasava.*[74]

---

conception of their own.
Nāgeśa clarifies that if the gender of words for the generic property *brāhmaṇatva* were determined by the sex of its substrata, the word *'brāhmaṇa'* would take just the masculine (1.2.67) and *'brāhmaṇī'* with the feminine affix *ṅīṣ* (4.1.63, §1.2.5) meaning a *brāhmaṇa* woman would never occur: ***Liṅgāntareṇeti.*** *Brāhmaṇī dārā ity ādau dravyadvārā jāter liṅgāntareṇa yogo na syāt taṭas taṭītyādau ca kasyāpi liṅgasya yogo na syād iti bhāvaḥ.* **To another gender.** In "a *brāhmaṇa* (feminine) wife," etc., the generic property would not have a connection with another gender by way of the substance and in "a bank (masculine), a bank (feminine)," etc., it would not have a connection with any gender at all. That is what he has in mind.
Nāgeśa concludes: *Śabdaviśeṣāpekṣayā tu jāter āviṣṭaliṅgatvoktir iti tātparyam.* The point is: A generic property is said to be gender specific only in so far as its gender depends on the specific word used for it. MB, vol. 2, p. 97b.

[74]The word *'strī'* is derived as follows:

√*Styai + ḍraṭ*	Pañcapādyuṇādisūtra 4.166.
√*Styai + ḍra + ṅīp*	4.1.15.
Styā + ḍra + ṅīp	6.1.45.
Sty + ra + ṅīp	6.4.143.
Stra + ṅīp	6.1.66.
Strī	The final *a* of *'stra'* is deleted before *ī* by 6.4.148. See note 56.

Dhātupāṭha 1.959. √*Styai śabdasaṃghātayoḥ.* Böhtlingk, vol. 2, p. 69.
Pañcapādyuṇādisūtra 4.166. *Styāyater ḍraṭ.* SK #615 p. 559. See Amarakośa 2.6.2, p. 203.
4.1.15. *Ṭiḍḍhāṇañdvayasajdaghnañmātractayapṭhakṭhañkañkvarapaḥ (ṅīp 5).* The feminine suffix *ṅīp* occurs after a base ending in an affix marked with *ṭ*, etc.
6.1.45. *Ād eca upadeśe 'śiti.* *ā* substitutes for the final sound of a verbal root ending in *e, o, ai,* or *au*, unless an affix marked with *ś* follows.
6.4.143. *Ṭeḥ (ḍiti 142, lopaḥ 134).* Zero (*lopa*) replaces the *ṭi* (the last vowel and following sounds 1.1.64) of a base followed by an affix marked with *ḍ*.
6.1.66. *Lopo vyor vali.* Zero (*lopa*) replaces *v* or *y* followed by a consonant other than *y*.
Patañjali derives the nominal base *'puṃs'* from the verbal root √*ṣūṅ*. √*ṣūṅ*

Nanu ca loke 'pi styāyater eva strī sūteś ca pumān.
(Sūtra-proponent:) But *'strī* (a female)' is from √*styai* and *'puṃs* (a male)' from √*sū* in ordinary usage too, isn't it so?

Adhikaraṇasādhanā loke strī. Styāyaty asyāṃ garbha iti. Kartṛsādhanaś ca pumān. Sūte pumān iti. Iha punar ubhayaṃ bhāvasādhanam. Styānaṃ pravṛttiś ca.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) In ordinary usage *'strī* (a female)' means that which brings about the action of combining as its locus, "that in which an embryo combines."[75] And *'puṃs* (a male)' means that which brings about the action as its agent, "a male procreates."[76] But here (in the grammatical conception of gender) both words mean the occurrence of the action itself, decrease (*saṃstyāna*) is feminine and increase (*pravṛtti*) is masculine.[77]

Kasya punaḥ styānaṃ strī pravṛttir vā pumān?
(Sūtra-proponent:) But of what is feminine gender the decrease or masculine gender the increase?

Guṇānām.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Of the qualities.

Keṣām?
(Sūtra-proponent:) Of which qualities?

Śabdasparśarūparasagandhānām. Sarvāś ca punar mūrtaya evam ātmikāḥ saṃstyānaprasavaguṇāḥ śabdasparśarūparasagandhavatyaḥ. Yatrālpīyāṃso guṇās tatrāvaratas trayaḥ śabdaḥ sparśo rūpam iti. Rasagandhau na sarvatra. Pravṛttiḥ khalvapi nityā. Na hīha kaścid api svasminnātmani muhūrtam apy avatiṣṭhate.

---

prāṇigarbhavimocane. Dhātupāṭha 2.21. Böhtlingk, vol. 2, p. 71. Kaiyaṭa gives the suffix ***masun*** following √*ṣūñ* and justifies the shortening of the *u*. Nāgeśa remarks that *"Pāter ḍumsun"* (Pañcapādyuṇādisūtra 4.178. SK #627 p. 559. See Amarakośa 2.6.1, p. 203) belongs to another grammatical school and has no authority. In his Rāmāśramī commentary on the Amarakośa, Bhānurjī Dīkṣita gives the alternate reading *"Pūño ḍumsun."* But see MPV, vol. 4, p. 116, note 9: *Puṃso 'suñ iti sūtrīyaśekhare tu msunpratyaya iti dṛśyate.*

[75]Kaiyaṭa: *Saṃghātarūpaṃ prāpnoti.* Obtains a combined state. MB, vol. 4, p. 22b. Carakasaṃhitā, Śārīrasthāna 3.3 (p. 308) speaks of the soul (*jīva*) entering the combination of the male's sperm and female's blood ("*...śukraśoṇitasaṃsargam... jīvo 'vakrāmati....*")

[76]Kaiyaṭa: *Sūte 'patyaṃ janayati.* Procreates, generates offspring. MB, vol. 4, p. 22b.

[77]Kaiyaṭa: ***Saṃstyānam*** *iti tirobhāvaḥ,* ***pravṛttir*** *āvirbhāvaḥ, sāmyāvasthā sthitiḥ, etāś cāvasthāḥ śabdagocarā evety avaseyam.* ***"Saṃstyānam"*** disappearance, ***pravṛttir*** manifestation, state of balance: maintenance. And one should conclude that these states are the meanings of the words (feminine, masculine and neuter respectively). MB, vol. 4, p. 22b.
Nāgeśa: ***Styānam*** *apacayaḥ.* ***Pravṛttir*** *vṛddhiḥ.* ***Styānam*** waning. ***Pravṛttir*** growth. MB, vol. 2, p. 98a.

Vardhate yāvad anena vardhitavyam apacayena vā yujyate. Tac cobhayaṃ sarvatra.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Of sound, touch, visual appearance, taste and smell. And what's more, all manifest entities (*mūrti*) are of this nature: the qualities, viz., decrease and increase, are in them and so are sound, touch, appearance, taste and smell. Where there are fewer qualities there are at least three: sound, touch and appearance.[78] Taste and smell aren't everywhere. Moreover, evolution is continuous. Nothing in the world remains in its own state even for an instant. It grows as much as it can grow or it begins to wane. This pair (growing and waning) is everywhere.[79]

Yady ubhayaṃ sarvatra kuto vyavasthā?
(Sūtra-proponent:) If it is everywhere, whence the arrangement?

---

[78]Kaiyaṭa: ***Avarata** iti. Antata ity arthaḥ.* MB, vol. 4, p. 23b.

[79]Growth and waning are two of the six changes which entities undergo according to Vārṣyāyaṇi. See Nirukta 1.2 (part 2, pp. 6-7; part 3, p. 29).
The list of the five basic elements (*tanmātra*) is representative of all manifest entities because all such entities consist of these basic elements according to Sāṅkhya. Original matter (*prakṛti*), comprised of three fundamental tendencies *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, after becoming intelligence (*citta*, or *buddhi* and then *ahaṃkāra*, ego) becomes the five basic elements (*tanmātra*) sequentially. These in turn manifest all that we ordinarily know. See Nāgeśa MB, vol. 4, p. 22a, and EIP, vol. 4, pp. 23-29.
Kaiyaṭa: *Guṇānāṃ sattvarajastamaḥpariṇāmarūpāṇāṃ śabdādīnāṃ vṛddhihrāsa-madhyasthāvasthāḥ śabdaikagocarāḥ liṅgatvena parigṛhyante. Ātmanas tv apariṇāmirūpatvād apravṛttidharmatve 'py anyapravṛttyanuyāyitvāl liṅgayogaḥ.* The growth, diminution and intermediate states of the qualities sound, etc. which are transformations of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and which can only be known by means of words, are taken to be gender. But, even though it does not have the property of increase because it is nonchanging, the self (*ātman*) is associated with gender because it takes on the (property of) increase belonging to other things. MB, p. vol. 2, p. 98a-b.
Patañjali explains the theory of gender as applying to all manifest entities (*mūrti*) whether such entities be considered to include only those objects consisting of all five basic entities, or those objects which have at least three of them (fire, water and earth). See Kumārila §3.3.4 note 36.
Nāgeśa: ***Traya** iti... Vastutas tejobannarūpāṇāṃ sarvamūrtīnāṃ trivṛtkaraṇa-mātrābhiprāyeṇedam uktam, vāyvākāśaśabdavācyayor liṅgavyvahāras tu īśvara iva svakāryatejobannagatopacayāropeṇa. ... Evaṃ ca prakṛtipariṇāmaviśeṣa-rūpajāteḥ svata eva liṅgayoga iti tātparyam.* Actually, Patañjali says *'traya'* intending merely the three-fold occurrence of all manifest entities consisting of fire, water and earth. But the usage of masculine and neuter terminations as if the objects denoted by the words 'air (*vāyu*, masculine)' and 'space (*ākāśa*, neuter)' had gender proceeds just as it does in the case of the Lord (*īśvara*, masculine) by superimposing on him the increase present in fire, water and earth which are his effects. ... The point is that in this way a generic property, which is a specific transformation of original matter (*prakṛti*), in and of itself is associated with a certain gender. MB, p. vol. 2, p. 98b.
Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.3 mentions three causes of entities. Śaṅkara refers to these (*trivṛtkaraṇa*) as fire, water and earth (*tejaḥprabhṛti*). *Ten Principal Upanishads*, pp. 511-12.

Vivakṣātaḥ. Saṃstyānavivakṣāyāṃ strī prasavavivakṣāyāṃ pumān ubhayor apy avivakṣāyāṃ napuṃsakam.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) From a speaker's intention. When a speaker intends decrease, the object is treated as feminine; when a speaker intends increase, masculine; when a speaker does not intend either of them, neuter.[80]

Tatra liṅgavacanasiddhir guṇavivakṣānityatvād iti liṅgaparihāra upapannaḥ. Vacanaparihāras tu nopapadyate.
(Sūtra-proponent:) In that case by saying, "Gender and number succeed because a speaker's intention of a quality is not innate," it may be possible to avoid the gender problem but it is not possible to avoid the number problem.

[53c.] *Vacanaparihāraś cāpy upapannaḥ. Idaṃ tāvad ayaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ. Atha yasya dravyaṃ padārthaḥ kathaṃ tasyaikavacanadvivacanabahuvacanāni bhavantīti. Evaṃ sa vakṣyati. Ekasminnekavacanaṃ dvayor dvivacanaṃ bahuṣu bahuvacanam iti. Yadi tasyāpi vācanikāni na svābhāvikāny aham apy evam vakṣyāmy ekasminnekavacanaṃ dvayor dvivacanaṃ bahuṣu bahuvacanam iti. Na hy ākṛtipadārthikasya dravyaṃ na padārtho dvavyapadārthikasya vākṛtir na padārthaḥ. Ubhayor ubhayaṃ padārthaḥ kasyacit tu kiṃcit pradhānabhūtam kiṃcid guṇabhūtam. Ākṛtipadārthikasyākṛtiḥ pradhānabhūtā dravyaṃ guṇabhūtam. Dravyapadārthikasya dravyaṃ pradhānabhūtam ākṛtir guṇabhūtā.*
(Sūtra-rejecter:) It is possible to avoid the number problem too. The proponent of the view that an individual substance is denoted has to be asked this: "How do singular, dual, and plural inflectional terminations occur for him for whom an individual substance is the object denoted by a word?" He will state, "The singular occurs for one object, the dual for two objects, and the plural for many objects."[81] If they have to be explicitly stated

---

[80]The passage, "Therefore, grammarians cannot accept the ordinary gender...when a speaker does not intend either of them, neuter, (*Tasmān na vaiyākaraṇaiḥ śakyaṃ laukikaṃ liṅgam āsthātum. ...ubhayor apy avivakṣāyāṃ napuṃsakam*)," cites Patañjali on 4.1.3, *Striyām*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 197, line 25 - p. 198, line10.

[81]Pāṇini 1.4.21. *Bahuṣu bahuvacanam*. The nominal terminations (*sup*) called plural (*bahuvacana* 1.4.102) occur if there are many objects denoted.
1.4.22. *Dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane*. The nominal terminations (*sup*) called dual (*dvivacana* 1.4.102) occur if there are two objects denoted, and those called singular (*ekavacana* 1.4.102), if there is one.
The first *vārttika* with Patañjali's commentary gives the reason for stating the *sūtras* as follows:
Pāṇini 4.1.2 and 3.4.78 provide that nominal and verbal affixes occur after nominal bases and verbal roots respectively without specifying which of the terminations of each set occur in which meanings. Yet Pāṇini does not sanction using the terminations in the wrong meanings. However, occasionally we do see

and don't occur naturally for him, then I too will state, "The singular occurs for one object, the dual for two objects, and the plural for many objects." Because it is not the case that an individual substance is not denoted for him for whom a class property is denoted, nor that a class property is not denoted for him for whom an individual substance is denoted. Both are denoted for both. But for each something is principal, something subordinate. For him for whom a class property is the object denoted the class property is principal and an individual substance is subordinate. For him for whom an individual substance is the object denoted an individual substance is principal and its class property is subordinate.[82]

---

the wrong terminations used. For example, in "My eyes (*akṣīṇi*) are beautiful (*darśanīyāni*); my feet (*pādāḥ*) are tender (*sukumārāḥ*)," the plural termination is used instead of the dual when there are only two eyes and two feet rather than many. Because we do see such usage and because the terminations are provided without specification, incorrect usage would result. To prevent that, Pāṇini states 1.4.21-22 as a restrictive rule. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 322, lines 1-8. See Cardona (1988: 41-45, 174, 183, especially 177-78).

[82]Kaiyaṭa: ***Vācanikānīti***. *Saṃkīrṇaprayogopalambhāt asaṃkarārtho yathā dravyapadārthikasya vācaniko vacananiyamaḥ tathākṛtivādino 'pi. Sa hy evaṃ vyācaṣṭe ekāśrayasaṃbandhavivakṣāyām ākṛter ekavacanaṃ yathā paśunā yajeteti. Anekāśrayasaṃbandhavivakṣāyāṃ dvivacanabahuvacane. Nanu dravyasyānabhidheyatvāt kathaṃ tatkṛta ākṛter vacanopakāra ity āha:* ***nahīti****. Tatra yathā pacati pacataḥ pacantīti kriyāprādhānye 'pi sādhanasaṃkhyākṛto vacanabhedaḥ evam ākṛtiprādhānye 'pi dravyasaṃkhyākṛta ity adoṣaḥ.* **They have to be explicitly stated.** Because we do find mixed usage (such as the dual termination on *'godau'* meaning a single village near two ponds and the plural termination on *'pañcālāḥ'* meaning a certain single district (4.2.81, 1.2.51)), the proponent of the view that an individual substance is the object denoted by a word has to state explicitly a restrictive rule concerning number in order to prevent mixing them up (i.e., the use of one set of endings where another should occur). Similarly, the proponent of the view that a class property is the object denoted by a word has to state it explicitly too. He explains (*sūtras* 1.4.21-22) as follows: A singular termination occurs if a speaker intends the class property as associated with a single substratum, for example, "One should sacrifice an animal (singular)." Dual and plural terminations occur if a speaker intends the class property as associated with more than one substratum. To answer the objection, "But if a substance is not denoted, how can it help (determine) number for the class property?" he says: **Because it is not the case.** In "(he) cooks, (they two) cook, (they) cook," although action is the principal meaning, the number of participants in the act causes different number-terminations. Similarly, although a class property is the principal meaning, the number of substances causes (different number-terminations). Hence the view that a class property is denoted is without fault.
Nāgeśa summarizes the section as follows: ***Ity adoṣa*** *iti. Evaṃ ca liṅgayogaḥ svata eva. Saṃkhyāyogas tv āropeṇa. Ekā ākṛtir iti pratijñā nāropitasaṃkhyābhiprāyā, nāpy ekaśeṣārambhaḥ. Anekaśabdaprayoge mānābhāvād iti tātparyam. Atra bhāṣye dravyapadārthavāde ākṛter viśeṣaṇatvoktyā tajjātyanugatīkṛtānekavyaktibodhasyaikasmād eva śabdāt sambhavena nānāśabdaprayogāprāptyā tatpakṣe 'py ekaśeṣo na kārya iti sūcitam. Jātivāde vyaktir dravyavāde jātiḥ śakyatāvacchediketi ca sūcitam.* **Hence it is without fault.** And in this way a class property has a connection with gender in and of

54. Guṇavacanavad vā.

Guṇavacanavad vā liṅgavacanāni bhaviṣyanti. Tad yathā guṇavacanānāṃ śabdānām āśrayato liṅgavacanāni bhavanti. Śuklaṃ vastram śuklā śāṭī śuklaḥ kambalaḥ śuklau kambalau śuklāḥ kambalā iti. Yad asau dravyaṃ śrito bhavati guṇas tasya yal liṅgaṃ vacanaṃ ca tad guṇasyāpi bhavati. Evam ihāpi yad asau dravyaṃ śritākṛtis tasya yal liṅgaṃ vacanaṃ ca tad ākṛter api bhaviṣyati.

55. Adhikaraṇagatiḥ sāhacaryāt.

Ākṛtāv ārambhaṇādīnāṃ saṃbhavo nāstīti kṛtvākṛtisahacarite dravya ārambhaṇādīni bhaviṣyanti.

Or as they do for words denoting qualities.

Or different genders and numbers will occur as they do for words denoting qualities, that is, as follows: Different genders and numbers occur for words denoting qualities according to the substrata in which the quality resides: *śuklaṃ vastram* (a white cloth), *śuklā śāṭī* (a white sari), *śuklaḥ kambalaḥ* (a white blanket), *śuklau kambalau* (two white blankets), *śuklāḥ kambalāḥ* (white blankets).[83] The gender and number of the substance in which the quality resides occur for the quality too. Similarly here too, the gender and number of the substance in which the class property resides will occur for the class property too.[84]

Cognition of a substratum arises because it accompanies the class property.

Considering that tying, etc., are impossible on a class property, tying, etc., will take place on a substance which accompanies the class property.[85]

---

itself but has a connection with number by superimposition. The thesis that a class property is one does not intend the superimposed number (which determines the use of number-terminations. Hence the thesis does not have to be abandoned) and (hence) one need not commence (the rule) that one remains because there is no evidence that many words would be used. That is the point. It is implied in (Patañjali's) present comment that (the rule) that one remains is not necessary on the view that an individual substance is the object denoted either. The use of many words does not obtain because, due to the fact that the class property is denoted as a qualifier, one can know the many individuals which include that generic property as a recurrent feature from just a single word. It is also implied that an individual delimits the generic property's being signified on the view that a generic property is denoted and a generic property (delimits an individual's being signified) on the view that an individual is denoted. MB, vol. 2, p. 99a.

[83]The examples show agreement of the word '*śukla* (white)' with words in the neuter and feminine singular, and with words in the masculine singular, dual, and plural, respectively.

[84]Kaiyaṭa: ***Yad asāv iti.*** *Jātitadvator abhedādhyavasāyād dravyātmā jātiḥ pratīyamānā tadgataliṅgasaṃkhyāgrāhiṇīty arthaḥ.* The meaning is: From determining the generic property as identical to that in which it resides, the generic property appears to have the nature of the substance and assumes the gender and number which belong to it. MB, vol. 2, p. 99b.

[85]*Vārttika* 55 answers *vārttika* 47 as well as completing *vārttika* 54's answer to

56. Na caikam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapad ity ādityavad viṣayaḥ.

Na khalvapy ekam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapad upalabhyata ity ādityavad viṣayo bhaviṣyati. Tad yathā. Eka ādityo 'nekādhikaraṇastho yugapad upalabhyate.

(If you object) **"And it is not the case that one thing is present in many substrata simultaneously,"** (I answer:) **The domain is like that of the sun.**

(If you object) "Moreover it is not the case that one thing is found present in many substrata simultaneously," (I answer:) The domain will be like that of the sun. For example, the one sun is found located in many places simultaneously.

Viṣama upanyāsaḥ. Naiko draṣṭānekādhikaraṇastham ādityam yugapad upalabhate.

(Sūtra-proponent:) The example given is not the same. It is not the case that one observer sees the sun present in many places simultaneously.

---

vārttika 46.

Kaiyaṭa: ***Codanāsu ca tasyārambhād*** *iti yad uktaṃ tatparihārārtham āha:* ***adhikaraṇagatir*** *iti. Yathāgnir āniyatām ity ukte kevalasyāgner ānayanāsaṃbhavān nāntarīyakatvād acoditam api pātram ānīyate etad evāgner ānayanaṃ yat pātrasthasya, tathākṛtāv ārambhaṇādini codyamānāni sāmarthyāt sāhacaryād dravyam abhiniviśante. Sarva evākṛteḥ kriyāyogo 'ntarbhāvitadravyāyā eveti dravyadvārakaḥ sampadyate.* He says (*vārttika* 55), **"Cognition of a substratum arises because of its accompaniment,"** to rebutt (*vārttika* 47) **"And because in injunctions** (one) **commences** (the action) **on** (a substance)." When someone says, "Bring fire," one brings its pot even though it is not enjoined because it is inseparably included due to the fact that it is impossible to bring fire by itself. The bringing of fire consists precisely in bringing it in a pot. Similarly, tying, etc., enjoined as if on a class property, apply to a substance because it is possible (on a substance) and because the substance accompanies the class property. All the action connected with a class property is connected with it as including a substance and so takes place by way of the substance. MB, vol. 2, p. 99b.

Nāgeśa: *Śābdabodhe tu na bādhajñānaṃ pratibandhakam....* But the controverting knowledge (that it is impossible to perform action on a class property) is not an obstacle to verbal cognition (of the class property).... MB, vol. 2, p. 100a.

Śivarāmendrasarasvatī: *Ākṛtau coditāyāṃ dravya ārambhaṇādikaraṇam aśāstrīya[m iti] dūṣaṇaṃ dattam, tat pariharati:* ***adhikaraṇagatir*** *iti.* ***Sāhacaryād*** *iti. Ākṛtivyaktyor atyantabhedābhāvād vyaktau kṛtam ākṛtāv eva kṛtam iti na tasyāśāstrīyateti bhāvaḥ.* (Under *vārttika* 47) the following fault was attributed (to the view that a class property is denoted): Performing the tying, etc., on a substance when a class property has been enjoined (as that on which to perform it) is not in accordance with the instruction. To avoid it he says: **Cognition of a substratum arises. Because it accompanies.** Because a class property and an individual are not entirely distinct, what is done on an individual is done on the class property. Hence it certainly is in accord with the instruction. That is what he has in mind. MPV, vol. 4, p. 119.

Evam tarhītīndravad viṣayaḥ. Tad yathā. Eka Indro 'nekasmin kratuśata āhūto yugapat sarvatra bhavati. Evam ākṛtir yugapat sarvatra bhaviṣyati.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) If that is so, then the domain is like that of *'Indra'*. Just as one Indra, invoked in many hundreds of Vedic performances, is simultaneously everywhere, thus a class property will be simultaneously everywhere.[86]
57. Avināśo 'nāśritatvāt.
Dravyavināśa ākṛter avināśaḥ.
A class property is not destroyed because it is not dependent.
A class property is not destroyed when a substance in which it resides is destroyed.

Kutaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) Why?

Anāśritatvāt. Anāśritākṛtir dravyam.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) Because it is not dependent. A class property does not depend on a substance.[87]

Kim ucyate 'nāśritatvād iti yad idānīm evoktam adhikaraṇagatiḥ sāhacaryād iti.
(Sūtra-proponent:) How can you say, "Because it is independent," when just now you said, "Cognition of a substratum arises because it accompanies the class property (*vārttika* 55)."

Evaṃ tarhy avināśo 'naikātmyāt. Dravyavināśa ākṛter avināśaḥ.
(Sūtra-rejecter:) If that is so, then it is not destroyed because it is not identical. A class property is not destroyed when a substance in which it resides is destroyed.

Kutaḥ?
(Sūtra-proponent:) Why?

Anaikātmyāt. Aneka ātmākṛter dravyasya ca. Tad yathā. Vṛkṣastho 'vatāno vṛkṣe chinne 'pi na vinaśyati.

---

[86]*vārttika* 56 answers *vārttika* 48 and reiterates *vārttika* 40.
Nāgeśa: ***Itīndravad*** *iti. Svabhāvād dheturahitadṛṣṭāntenāpy anekavṛttitvaṃ jāter abhyupagamyata ity arthaḥ.* **Like that of 'Indra'.** The meaning is: It is accepted that a generic property is present in many objects because of its nature, even though the inference given to establish that fact consists of an example devoid of an inferential mark (*hetu*). MB, vol. 2, p. 100a.
[87]*Vārttika* 57 answers *vārttika* 49.
Kaiyaṭa: *Anyatrāpi pratyayābhidhānayor ākṛtinimittayor bhāvān nityatvaṃ tasyā ity arthaḥ.* Because designation and cognition conditioned by a class property occur with respect to other individuals, a class property is eternal. MB, vol. 2, p. 100b.

(Sūtra-rejecter:) Because it is not identical. A class property and a substance have separate identities. For example, a vine hanging on a tree is not destroyed even when the tree is cut down.[88]

58. Vairūpyavigrahau dravyabhedāt.

Vairūpyavigrahāv api dravyabhedād bhaviṣyataḥ.

Difference and analytic strings are due to the difference of the individual substances in which a class property resides from each other.

The difference among individuals of a kind, and analytic strings illustrating the meaning of words in the dual and plural, will be due to the fact that the individual substances in which a class property inheres are different from each other.[89]

59. Vyartheṣu ca sāmānyāt siddham.

Vibhinnārtheṣu ca sāmānyāt siddhaṃ sarvam. Aśnoter akṣaḥ. Padyateḥ pādaḥ. Mimīter māṣaḥ. Tatra kriyā-sāmānyāt siddham. Aparas tv āha. Purākalpa etad āsīt ṣoḍaśa māṣāḥ kārṣāpaṇaṃ ṣoḍaśaphalāś ca māṣaśambaṭyaḥ. Tatra saṃkhyāsāmānyāt siddham.

And for words having different meanings, the occurrence of just one word is achieved because there is a general property.

And for words having different meanings, the occurrence of just one word for all of the meanings is achieved because there is a general property which they all have in common. In all meanings, *'akṣaḥ* (a die, an axle, a seed)' is derived from √*aś* (to pervade), *'pādaḥ* (a foot, a verse segment, a quarter)' from √*pad* (to step) and *'māṣaḥ* (a bean, a monetary unit, a fool)' from √*mā* (to measure).[90] Since that is so, the occurrence of just one word

---

[88]Kaiyaṭa: ***Anaikātmyād** iti. ... nityā ākṛtir ekā sarvatragā, tadviparītaṃ dravyam iti bhedād dravyavināśe 'pi na jāter vināśaḥ.* **Because it is not identical.** ... A generic property is not destroyed even when a substance (in which it resides) is destroyed because of this difference: a class property is eternal, one and all pervading; a substance is the opposite. MB, vol. 2, p. 101a.

[89]Because the class property is not identical to the substances in which it inheres, the fact that each substance has its individual differences does not prevent it from having the class property. *Vārttika* 58 answers *vārttikas* 50-51.

Kaiyaṭa: ***Vairūpyavigrahāv** iti. Dravyāṇāṃ svagatabhedapratibaddhau vairūpyavigrahāv ity arthaḥ. Tatra dravyagatabhedopacārād ekasyām apy ākṛtau samuccayopapattyā vigraho na virudhyate.* Difference and analytic strings. Difference and analytic strings are connected with differences present in the substances themselves. Since that is so, even though there is a single class property, conjunction makes sense by attending to the differences present in the substances. Hence an analytic string is not prevented.

Nāgeśa: *Dravyagataliṅgādigrāhitvavat tadgatabhedagrāhitvam api tasyā iti bodhyam.* One should understand that a class property assumes the differences present in the substances (in which it resides) as it assumes the gender and so on present in them. MB, vol. 2, p. 101a.

[90]*Aśū vyāptau saṃghāte ca.* Dhātupāṭha 1265. SK, p. 735. Böhtlingk, 5.18; vol. 2, p. 75.

Pada gatau. Dhātupāṭha 1169. SK, p. 734. Böhtlingk, 4.60; vol. 2, p. 73.

is achieved because the action constitutes a general property (*kriyā-sāmānya*).[91]

Māṅ māne śabde ca. Dhātupāṭha 1088. SK, p. 734. Böhtlingk, 3.6; vol. 2, p. 72. According to the Amarakośa, a *māṣa* is a measure (5.1.34), a bean (5.2.4) and an equal part (5.4.59).

[91]*Vārttika* 59 answers *vārttika* 52. It does not concern the view that a word denotes a substance at all. *Vārttika* 52 posed the objection that the rule that one remains would have to be stated even if a word denoted a generic property because some words refer to objects of more than one kind. Those words would denote more than one generic property. The rule that one remains would have to be stated in order to achieve the desired result that one occurrence of the word conveys the cognition of all of the generic properties concerned. *Vārttika* 59 answers that such words denote a more general property broad enough to include all the kinds of objects to which the word refers.

Kaiyaṭa explains this passage as meaning that there is one general property in all of the action instances of the action denoted by a certain verbal root. The general property inheres in each action instance, and each action instance inheres in an individual substance. This explanation justifies understanding *'kriyā-sāmānya'* as a *saptamītatpuruṣa* compound. Nāgeśa seems to favor certain others who take *'kriyā-sāmānya'* as a *karmadhāraya* compound meaning an action which is a general property. They consider that coextensive with that general action there is a generic property which inheres in the individual substances in which the action occurs. Finally, Sivarāmendrasarasvatī understands that the single general action inheres directly in each individual substance. The action itself constitutes a general property because it is a single entity residing in many substrata.

Kaiyaṭa: ***Kriyāsāmānyād*** *iti. Bhinnāsu kriyāsu abhinnapratyayābhidhāna-nimittaṃ yat sāmānyaṃ tad eva dravyeṣv api tannimittaṃ bhavati. Yathā pācaka ity āśrayāntaragatam api hi sāmānyaṃ samavetasamavāyād dravye upakaroti. Yathā gairikādigatam lauhityaṃ saṃyuktasamavāyāt paṭe lauhitya-pratyayam ādadhāti.* **Because there is a general property in the actions** (*kriyā-sāmānya*). The general property which causes identical cognition and denotation to arise with respect to distinct actions causes identical cognition and denotation to arise with respect to (the different) substances (in which those actions take place) too. It is like 'cook (*pācaka*)'. The general property (of cooking, *pākatva*), even though present in a different substratum (a cooking action instance which inheres in a cook rather than in the cook himself), serves in the substance (the cook) because it inheres in that which inheres in it. It is like this: The red color present in red chalk (used as dye) is the basis for the cognition of red in cloth because it inheres in that which is in contact with it (the color inheres in the chalk which is in contact with the cloth). MB, vol. 2, p. 101a.

Nāgeśa: *Evaṃ ca vyāptyādigatasāmānyasya paramparayā dravye sattvena tattaj-jātiviśiṣṭasya dravyasya vācyatvam iti bhāvaḥ. Na caivaṃ nānārthocchedaḥ, nānājātīnāṃ saṃbandhaghaṭakatvena nānārthatvopapatteh. Tattatkriyārūpa-sāmānyasamaniyatasyākṣatvāder jātirūpasyākṣapadārthatrayasādhāraṇasyāpi śakyatāvacchedakatvaśakyatvānyatarāṅgīkārāt siddham iti bhāṣyārtham anye. Sūtrārambhe 'pīdam āvaśyakam ekarūpeṇaiva sarvārthabodhād iti bhāva iti bodhyam.* And so for example, the word *'akṣaḥ'* denotes a substance qualified by a certain specific generic property (either being a die, being an axle or being a seed) by virtue of the fact that the general property of pervasion (*vyāptitva*) which inheres in the pervasion action instances is present indirectly in the substance (a die, an axle or a seed). That is what he has in mind. Nor is it the case that in this way the different meanings are undermined, because having different meanings attains by including the relation to the various specific

generic properties. Others say that the *bhāṣya* passage means the following: It succeeds by accepting, for example, the generic property *akṣatva*, which is coextensive with the general property in the form of a certain action, as the universal meaning of the word *'akṣaḥ'*, either as the signified (*śakya*) or as the delimiter of what is signified (*śakyatāvacchedaka*). (If *akṣatva* is signified, then either being a die, being an axle or being a seed is the delimiter of what is signified; alternatively, if *akṣatva* is the delimiter of what is signified, then either being a die, being an axle or being a seed is signified.) This (*vārttika* 59) is necessary even if *sūtra* (1.2.64) is undertaken, because, from the use of the word *'akṣa'*, one apprehends all the objects as being of the same type. It should be understood that this is what he has in mind. MB, vol. 2, p. 101b.
Even when the word *'akṣaḥ'* is used in the singular it gives rise to all three meanings. The rule that one remains (*ekaśeṣa*) assumes that one word *'akṣaḥ'* occurs in just one of the meanings, a second word *'akṣaḥ'* occurs in the second meaning, and a third word *'akṣaḥ'* in the third meaning. Applying the rule that one remains, one attains the word *'akṣāḥ'* in the plural denoting all three meanings. By a similar procedure, *'akṣau'* in the dual could denote no more than two meanings and *'akṣaḥ'* in the singular could denote no more than one of the meanings. Since the rule that one remains does not achieve the desired result, one must accept that there is a single general property common to all the individual substances to which the word refers in all of its meanings. That one arch general property is the object denoted by the word. Note that this is indeed Patañjali's intent as is shown by the fact that he uses the words *'akṣaḥ'*, *'pādaḥ'*, and *'māṣaḥ'* in the singular rather than the plural as he had when previously discussing these so-called polysemous examples before *vārttika* 1 and under *vārttika* 52.
Both Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa depart from Patañjali's statement in the following respect: They do not accept that the action itself constitutes the general property inherent in all the individual substances to which a polysemous term refers. Instead Kaiyaṭa accepts that the action general property has an indirect relation to the individual substances by way of action instances. Nāgeśa accepts a different general property coextensive with the action general property. According to him this other general property inheres in the individual substances. They do not accept that the action itself is a generic property inhering directly in the individual substances for the following reason: They wish to conform to certain notions concerning general properties which are accepted in order to avoid having generic properties of different categories in a single individual. With regard to the case at hand, this implies that an action general property can only occur in action instances and the action instances can inhere in substances, but an action general property cannot inhere in substances.
However, Patañjali accepts that a single action occurs again and again in many instances. The action itself has the character of a general property present in the substances which are its substrata. See *"ekā hi kriyā"* under *vārttika* 19 of the present *sūtra*. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 238, line 10. For another passage in which this conclusion is cited see MB-K, vol. 2, p. 418, lines 15-16. Patañjali specifically shows that one action inheres in many substances commenting on *sūtra* 3.1.67. He says, "all those who perform a certain action are its substrata (*yāvantas te tāṃ kriyāṃ kurvanti sarve te tasyā āśrayā bhavanti*)." MB-K, vol. 2, p. 56, lines 20-21. The agent (*kartṛ*) or direct object (*karman*) are considered to be the substratum (*āśraya*) of action. See the discussion beginning, *"Bhāvaḥ punar eka eva,"* under 3.1.67. MB-K, vol. 2, p. 56, line 18 - p. 57, line 12.
Śivarāmendrasarasvatī gives the correct interpretation of the *bhāṣya* passage: ***Kriyāsāmānyād*** *iti. Pācakādiśabdavad akṣādiśabdānāṃ kriyāśabdatvam āśritya vyāptyādikriyārūpaṃ sāmānyaṃ pravṛttinimittam....* **Because the action constitutes a general property (*kriyā-sāmānya*).** Accepting

But someone else says: In a previous age (*kalpa*) there were 16 *māṣa*s to a *kārṣāpaṇa* and beanpods having 16 *māṣa*s (beans).[92] Since that is so, the occurrence of just one word is achieved because the number (16) constitutes a general property (*saṃkhyā-sāmānya*).[93]

---

the word *'akṣa'*, for example, as a *kriyāśabda* (word denoting action) like the words *'pācaka* (a cook)', etc., the general property in the form of the action of pervading is the word *akṣa*'s condition for usage (*pravṛttinimitta*).... MPV, vol. 4, p. 120.

[92]A *kārṣāpaṇa* is a coin or weight. As a weight of gold it equals a *karṣa* which Monier-Williams defines as follows: A weight of gold or silver (= 16 *māṣas* = 80 *rettis* = 1/4 *pala* = 1/400 of a *tulā*). In common use 8 *rettis* are given to the *māṣa*. Monier-Williams, p. 259, 276. Nāgeśa, calling a *retti* a *guñjā*, confirms that while previously there were 5 *guñjās* to a *māṣa* and 16 *māṣas* to a *kārṣāpaṇa*, now there are 8 *guñjās* to a *māṣa* and 10 *māṣas* to a *kārṣāpaṇa*. See the next note.

[93]Kaiyaṭa: ***Purā kalpa*** *iti. Purā kalpe prasiddho 'rthaḥ samprati nimittābhāve 'pi tathaiva vyapadiśyate.* ***Māṣaśambaṭya*** *iti. Tatra ṣoḍaśabhāgatvena māṣaḥ prasiddhaḥ tathaiva kārṣāpaṇe māṣaḥ [ṣoḍaśabhāga iti] ṣoḍaśa[bhāga]tvaṃ nāma sāmānyam upādatte māṣaśabda iti siddham ekaśabdatvam.* ***Saṃkhyāsāmānyād*** *iti. Saṃkhyaiva sāmānyam abhinnapratyayahetutvāt. Nanu ṣoḍaśasaṃkhyā ṣoḍaśasu padārtheṣu vyāsajya sthitā na tv ekasmin ṣoḍaśe. Evaṃ tarhi ṣoḍaśasaṃkhyāpūraṇatvam nāma yat sāmānyaṃ tatsaṃkhyāmūlatvāt saṃkhyāsāmānyam ucyata ity adoṣaḥ. ... Tad evaṃ sarvatrākṛtisadbhāvāt siddham ekaśabdatvam.* **In the previous age.** In the previous age the meaning was well known; now it is signified in the same way even though the cause is absent. **Beanpods.** In (a beanpod) a *māṣa* (bean) is known as a sixteenth part. Similarly a *māṣa* is a sixteenth part of a *kārṣāpaṇa*. Hence the word *'māṣa'* receives the general property being a sixteenth part, so the occurrence of just one word is achieved. **Because the number constitutes a general property.** The number itself is the general property (*saṃkhyā-sāmānya* is a *karmadhāraya* compound). (Objection:) But the number 16 stands encompassing 16 entities not one sixteenth. (Answer:) In that case the general property, namely, being what completes the number 16 (i.e. being the ordinal number, a sixteenth), is called a number-general property (*saṃkhyā-sāmānya*) because it is based on that number. Hence it is without fault. ... In this way the occurrence of just one word is justified because of the existence of a class property (common) to all (the word's) meanings. MB, vol. 2, p. 101b.

Nāgeśa: ***Māṣaśambaṭyāṃ*** *māṣaḥ ṣoḍaśabhāgapalarūpaḥ. Kārṣāpaṇe māṣaḥ pañcaguñjāmitaḥ ṣoḍaśo bhāgas tayoḥ ṣoḍaśabhāgatvena sāmānyena sarveṣu māṣatvavyavahāraḥ. Idānīṃ tv aṣṭaguñjamitamāṣe ṣoḍaśatvam āropya tathā prayoga iti bhāvaḥ.* In a beanpod, a *māṣa*, in the form of a bean, was a sixteenth part. In a *kārṣāpaṇa* a *māṣa* measured by 5 *guñjās* (a berry or small weight) was a sixteenth part. Being a *māṣa* applied to both because both had the general property of being a sixteenth part. But now the usage is the same superimposing being a sixteenth on a *māṣa* measured by 8 *guñjās*. That is what he has in mind. MB, vol. 2, p. 102a.

It is clear from the fact that ancient weights were named for the berrys, beans, etc. which had those weights, and from the fact that coins were named for certain weights of precious metals, that a word such as *'māṣa'* had just one primary meaning on which the others are based.

In his critical apparatus Kielhorn notes that all MSS. except one have *'-palāś'*, which the other editions prefer, instead of *'-phalāś'*. One might infer from this that *'palāś'* indeed should be accepted, and that Patañjali is not referring to beans and beanpods here but to other measures of weight.

Śivarāmendrasarasvatī notes that even in the present age a *kārṣāpaṇa* is equal to 16 *māṣas* but there are not 16 *māṣas* in a *māṣaśambaṭī*. In Trailiṅga language (Telegu) a *śambaṭī* is called *giñjā*, and a *māṣaśambaṭī*, *minayagiñjā*. There are 16 gold *māṣas* in a *kārṣāpaṇa* and 16 gold *palas* in a *māṣa*. MPV, vol. 4, p. 120. But Guruprasādaśāstrī notes that a *śambaṭī* is known as *'chīmī* (a peapod)' or *'phalī* (a beanpod)'. MBPU, vol. 1, part 2, p. 140, note 1. Filliozat (1975-86: vol. 4, p. 370 note 4, p. 374 note 1) discusses the possibilities thoroughly and (1991: 24) more briefly. Kielhorn, in the preface to his first edition (vol. 3, p. 15, note 2 of p. 14), comments that the passage should read as given in the revised edition which is repeated and translated accordingly here.

Nyāya

2.1. Background

The Nyāya system of Indian philosophy analyzes the means of gaining knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the objects of knowledge (*prameya*) in order to arrive at correct knowledge (*tattvajñāna*). From correct knowledge one attains the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*).[1] The elimination of false knowledge leads to absolute liberation (*apavarga*) from suffering (*duḥkha*) and its causes.[2] Nyāya recognizes four means of gaining knowledge, the fourth of which is verbal evidence (*śabda*).[3] The instruction (*upadeśa*) of someone who directly knows something (*āpta*) and just wants to tell what he knows constitutes verbal evidence.[4] Depending upon whether he tells about ordinary things or about transcendental things, verbal evidence is ordinary or Vedic.[5]

Sound (*śabda*) is the one of the five basic qualities (*guṇa*) which belongs to space (*ākāśa*) and which one perceives by means of the ear (*śrotra*).[6] It is not eternal but is created and destroyed and if it appears to change into a similar sound, in fact, it is a new sound of similar quality which appears in its place.[7] Sound is of two types, plain noise (*dhvani*) and speech sound (*varṇa*).[8] Speech sounds singly and together constitute

---

[1] 1.1.1. *Pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetvābhāsacchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāṃ tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.*

[2] 1.1.2. *Duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād apavargaḥ.*

[3] 1.1.3. *Pratyakṣānumānopamāna-śabdāḥ pramāṇāni.* Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are the means of valid knowledge.

[4] 1.1.7. *Āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ.* Vātsyāyana comments: *Sākṣātkaraṇam arthasyāptiḥ, tayāpravartata ity āptaḥ.* ND, p. 174. Biardeau (1964: 209 note 1) mentions that the expressions '*āptavacana* (parole des *āpta*)' and '*āptāgama* (la tradition des *āpta*)' are used in Sāṅkhya.

[5] 1.1.8. *Sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt.* Vātsyāyana: *Yasyeha dṛśyate 'rthaḥ sa (śabdo) dṛṣṭārthaḥ. yasyāmutra pratīyate so 'dṛṣṭārthaḥ. Evam ṛṣilaukikavākyānāṃ vibhāga iti.* ND, p. 179.

[6] 1.1.14, 3.1.63. See trans. under 2.2.67 note 35.

[7] Vātsyāyana introduces the final view saying, "*Anityaḥ śabda ity uttaram.*" ND, p. 594. 2.2.13, *Ādimattvād aindriyakatvāt kṛtakavadupacārāc ca*, and 2.2.18, *Prāg uccāraṇād anupalabdher, āvaraṇād anupalabdheś ca*, give most of the reasons for this conclusion.

[8] Vātsyāyana introduces 2.2.40 saying, "*Dvividhaś cāyaṃ śabdo varṇātmako dhvanimātraś ca.*" ND, p. 638.

grammatical constituents such as verbal roots, nominal bases, and verbal and nominal terminations. Ending in a verbal or nominal termination, speech sounds constitute a word. Words have meaning.[9]

The relation of a word to its meaning is conventional (*sāmayika*), not innate (*svābhāvika*).[10] Speech is a valid means of knowledge only in so far as it is spoken by a trustworthy authority.[11] A person is a trustworthy authority because he has direct knowledge and out of compassion for other creatures wants to tell them.[12] One infers that speech is authoritative by confirming that what it says is correct. One infers that the speaker is knowledgeable and benevolent from the beneficial results of his instruction. One infers that speech regarding transcendental matters (such as Vedic texts) is authoritative if it is spoken by such a person.[13]

2.2. The Nature of a Generic Property, an Individual, and a Form

In Nyāya, the discussion of what the object denoted by a word is centers around three entities, a generic property (*jāti*), an

---

[9]See 2.2.58 trans.

[10]2.1.55. *Na sāmayikatvāc chabdārthasampratyayasya.* Vātsyāyana: *Yat tad avocāma asyedam iti ṣaṣṭhīviśiṣṭasya vākyasyārthaviśeṣo 'nujñātaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandha iti samayaṃ tam avocāma iti. Kaḥ punar ayam samayaḥ? Asya śabdasyedam arthajātam abhidheyam iti abhidhānābhidheya-niyamaniyogaḥ.* ND, p. 543. Biardeau (1964: 208). Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 7.2.24, *Sāmayikaḥ śabdād arthapratyayaḥ*, expresses the same. VS, p. 60. Gautama 2.1.56 and commentary argue against the view that a word and its object have a natural relation. Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 7.2.19, *Śabdārthāv asambaddhau*, explicitly rejects such a natural relation. VS, p. 59. See Dash (1991), Houben (1992a), and Matilal (1990: 26-30).

[11]2.1.52. *Āptopadeśasāmarthyād arthasaṃpratyayaḥ.* Vātsyāyana: *Svargaḥ, apsarasaḥ, uttarāḥ kuravaḥ, sapta dvīpāḥ, samudraḥ, lokasanniveśaḥ ityevam-āder apratyakṣasyārthasya na śabdamātrāt pratyayaḥ. Kiṃ tarhi? Āptair ayam uktaḥ śabda ity ataḥ saṃpratyayaḥ. Viparyayeṇa saṃpratyayābhāvāt.* ND, p. 536. 2.1.68. *Mantrāyurvedaprāmāṇyavac ca tatprāmāṇyam āptaprāmāṇyāt.* The *sūtra* states an inference for the authority of the Veda, but for all speech it is the case that the authority of the speech depends on the authority of the speaker. Vātsyāyana concludes his commentary saying, "*Āptaprāmāṇyāc ca prāmāṇyam, laukikeṣu śabdeṣu caitat samānam iti.*" ND, p. 570. Matilal (1990: 49-74) and the several articles in Matilal 1994 discussed in the literature review above deal with this topic.

[12]Under 2.1.68 Vātsyāyana describes the authority of an authoritative speaker in detail beginning with the following brief statement: *Kiṃ punar āptānāṃ prāmāṇyam? Sākṣātkṛtadharmatā bhūtadayā yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣeti.* ND, p. 565-66. See Matilal (1990: 6).

[13]See Vātsyāyana on 2.1.68. ND, p. 567.

individual (*vyakti*), and a form (*ākṛti*). Gautama defines them in the following three *sūtra*s:

> 2.2.67. An individual is the physical body which is the substratum of specific qualities.
> 2.2.68. A form is that which makes known the generic property and its indicatory marks.
> 2.2.69. A generic property is that whose nature is to produce the same (cognition).

Vātsyāyana explains that a physical body (*mūrti*) is a finite substance consisting of parts which is the substratum of certain qualities. Only a substance consisting of earth, water, fire, and air which is not an atomic constituent (*paramāṇu*) fits this description. Such a substance is termed a manifestation (*vyakti*) because one can perceive it with the sense organs (2.2.67).

Form (*ākṛti*) is that by which one knows the generic property of an individual (*vyakti*) or knows the parts of the individual which in turn serve as inferential marks of the generic property. It is the configuration of the parts (*avayavasaṃsthāna*) of an individual or the configuration of the parts of the parts of an individual. If one sees a cow at a distance, the figure itself, including such features as a dewlap, head, feet, tail, and hump, is the inferential mark that the generic property cowness inheres in that individual cow. If one sees the head of a cow peering around a corner, or its foot, one can infer from the configuration of the parts of that part that it is the head or foot of a cow. That head or foot, being a part of the whole cow is an inferential mark that the generic property cowness is in the individual whose head or foot it is (2.2.68 V1, U1).[14]

Although every form indicates a certain generic property, not all generic properties are indicated by a form (2.2.68 V2, U2). A form serves as an inferential mark of a generic property only if it is fixed (*niyata*) for the life of the individual substance. If the configuration changes but the individual substance remains what it is, then the configuration does not indicate the generic property. For example, clay, gold, and silver have no special shape. One can mold them into many different shapes. Whatever shape they assume they remain what they are: clay, gold, or

[14]Vācaspatimiśra comments as follows: *Śiraḥpāṇyādivyūha ākṛtir jātiṃ manuṣyatvādikam ācaṣṭe. Śironāsikālalāṭacibukādīnāṃ śiro'vayavānāṃ vyūho manuṣyatvajātiliṅgaṃ śira ācaṣṭe.* The form, which is the configuration of the head, hands, etc., makes known the generic property humanness, etc. The configuration of the parts of the head, the head's nose, forehead, chin, etc., makes known the head which is an inferential mark of the generic property humanness. ND, p. 692.

silver. The configuration does not indicate what the substance is; other qualities, such as color, taste, smell, etc., do.[15]

According to Uddyotakara, a configuration is a special conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and is classed as a quality (*guṇa*) (2.2.67 U). He considers qualities to be individual instances which inhere in an individual substance. A generic property inhering in all the quality instances of a kind is the basis of the same cognition with respect to each of them. Therefore, a form, being a special conjunction, inheres in a single individual. Although the form of one individual may be similar to the form of another, it is not common to both individuals (2.2.64 U4a). Furthermore, as a quality, it is immaterial and has no connection with action (2.2.60 U).

A generic property (*jāti*) is that which is the same in many individuals and differentiates those individuals from others. It generates the same cognition with respect to different individual objects. It is what Vaiśeṣika terms a general specific property (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*), considered and called general or specific depending on whether it serves to identify an individual as the same as others or to distinguish some from others.[16] Vaiśeṣika defines a general property as a single eternal entity which inheres in more than one substance, quality, or action.[17] In Vaiśeṣika, the

---

[15]Vācaspatimiśra makes it clear: ***Na punaḥ sarvā jātir ākṛtyā liṅgyata iti.*** *Mṛtsuvarṇarajatādikā hi rūpaviśeṣavyaṅgyā jātir nākṛtyā, brāhmaṇatvādi-jātis tu yonivyaṅgyā, ājyatailādīnāṃ jātis tu gandhena vā rasena vā vyajyate. Ata eva na sārṣapādīnāṃ tailatvam asti tadvyañjakayor gandharasayor abhāvāt, bhāktas tu tailaśabdaprayogaḥ.* **But not every generic property is indicated by a form:** A specific color manifests the generic property of clay, gold, silver, etc., the family descent manifests (the generic property) brāhmaṇa-ness (*brāhmaṇatva*), etc., the smell or taste manifests the generic property of clarified butter, sesame oil, etc. Hence being sesame oil does not belong to mustard oil, etc. because the smell and taste which manifest it are absent, but the use of the term 'sesame oil' (for it) is secondary. ND, p. 692. See Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, Vanavāda 26-29. ŚV, pp. 439-40.

[16]Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 1.2.3. *Sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam.* VS, p. 8. See Halbfass (1992: 239, 256-58). Though a general property may be called specific, it should not be confused with the unique properties of eternal entities which are also called specific properties. See Halbfass (1992: 71-72). Halbfass (1992: 113-37) discusses universals and (pp. 237-75) translates passages dealing with them.

[17]This is most succinctly stated in the Tarkasaṃgraha (p. 114): *Nityam ekam anekānugatam sāmānyam, dravyaguṇakarmavṛtti.* The Dīpikā notes: *anugatatvaṃ samavetatvam.* Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 8.6, *Sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu,* attributes knowledge of the ontological status of entities to general properties. VS, p. 63. 1.1.7, *Sad anityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti dravyaguṇakarmaṇām aviśeṣaḥ,* includes a general property as one of the entities which belong to all three classes of entities: substances, qualities and actions. VS, p. 3.

relation by which a general property is present in each object of a kind is known as inherence (*samavāya*).[18]

Because Vātsyāyana has defined the individual as a complex entity consisting of earth, water, fire, and air, his discussion concerning the object denoted by a word concerns only those generic properties which inhere in these substances. He considers only those generic properties which have the same substratum as some form or other. He does not mention generic properties in qualities or actions.

Although every generic property generates the same cognition in different individual objects, the occurrence of the same cognition in different individuals is not always due to a generic property (2.2.69 U, 2.2.64 U5-U6). Even without a generic property one may have the same cognition with respect to different objects. For example, one has the same cognition with respect to every cook that he is a cook, a cognition which the word 'cook' conveys. Yet, as Uddyotakara says, it is not a generic property which is responsible for the same cognition in this case.

A cook is the agent or principal participant in the act of cooking. The action of cooking and the relation of agency inhere together in every cook. The relation of agency involves being the primary participant in an action as opposed to the direct object (the food), the substratum (the pan), etc. This being primary in the action is part of what one knows in the cognition of a cook. Hence, in the case of cognition of a cook, two entities, the action of cooking and the property of being principal, present together, are responsible for the recurrent cognition with respect to many individuals. Because there are two entities, not one, which generate the recurrent cognition, the cause of the general cognition is not a generic property (2.2.64 U6).

The Buddhist objector in Uddyotakara's commentary on 2.2.64 finds fault with the conception of a generic property as defined by Nyāya. He raises the following objection: Nyāya does not require that every recurrent cognition have a generic property as its basis. Uddyotakara gives two examples: 1) The cognition that x is a generic property is common to all generic properties but is not caused by another generic property inherent in them all. Inherence in many substrata, which is common to them all, is the basis of the same cognition with respect to them (2.2.64 U5). 2) As has just been discussed, the cognition that x is a cook is common to all cooks but is not caused by a generic property (2.2.64 U6). Just as Nyāya accepts a cause for the same cognition with respect to many objects which is not a generic

---

[18]Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 7.2.29. *Iheti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*. Candrānanda comments, " A generic property inheres in an individual, specific properties in eternal substances (*jāter vyaktau viśeṣāṇāṃ ca nityadravyeṣu samavāyaḥ*)."

property in these cases, something other than a generic property may be the cause of the same cognition with respect to many objects in other cases as well.

Gautama 2.2.69 defines a generic property as the cause of a recurrent cognition. Vātsyāyana comments with respect to the ultimate general property that it is "that object which causes the same cognition to recur with respect to many objects (*yo 'rtho 'nekatra pratyayānuvṛttinimittaṃ*)." Gautama 2.2.68 defines a form as an inferential mark of a generic property. In whatever individual substance one sees a certain form, one infers the presence of a certain generic property, unless a contradictory cognition arises to block such an inference. In a substance such as clay, color or something else serves as an inferential mark by which to infer the generic property. The objector to the conception of the generic property argues that whatever serves as the inferential mark of the generic property may itself account for the recurrent cognition with respect to many objects. Hence one can always account for the recurrent cognition without accepting that there is a generic property besides the inferential mark.

In Uddyotakara's discussion, the objector to the notion of the generic property asserts that one can account for the recurrent cognition that x is a cow by the fact that the form is the same (2.2.64 U4). By this he means that the arrangement of the head, feet, etc. is the same in all cows (the head up front, four feet below, hump over the shoulders, dewlap below the neck). In response, the proponent of the notion of a generic property offers two possible conceptions of a form: either 1) it inheres in just one body (2.2.64 U4a) or 2) it inheres in many (2.2.64 U4b). 1) If it inheres in just one then something else which inheres in all of those bodies is required to be the basis of the same cognition with respect to them (2.2.64 U4c). That something else is the generic property. 2) If the form inheres in many bodies, then it differs from the generic property only in name. He says, "Argument over a name (*nāmni vivādo*) is pointless (2.2.64 U4b)." If it differs from a generic property only in name, then it does not differ in fact. For all practical purposes it is a generic property. Hence there are two possible meanings of the word 'form (*ākṛti*)' in this discussion: 1) a configuration of parts as belonging to a single individual substance, and 2) a configuration of parts as a common property belonging to all of the many individual substances of a kind, in which case the form itself is a generic property.

This dichotomy is complicated by another dichotomy. The form may be considered either as a rough figure or as an extremely detailed and precise arrangement of every particle of an individual substance. Although neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara dwell on this distinction, Kumārila brings it up in defending Śabara's example of the use of a generic term for a

brick falcon altar and the role this example plays in his argument for the view that a generic term denotes just a class property (Śabara IIIA note 12). A falcon altar has the shape of a falcon but is not a real individual falcon. Similarly, the model cow used as an example by Gautama has the shape of a cow, but it is not a real individual cow nor does it have the generic property cowness. In both Śabara's and Gautama's arguments, a model plays a decisive role; but it plays a different role in each. Hence it is important to clarify the conception of a shape, its relation to a generic property and the role it plays in each of their arguments. This is especially important given the different use of the term *'ākṛti'* by these authors and the difference of opinion concerning its translation in modern scholarship.

Whether the form is considered to be a rough figure or a detailed arrangement, it may be considered to belong just to a single individual or it may be considered common to many individuals. Hence there are four distinct possible conceptions of a form (*ākṛti*): 1) It has all the precision of the tendons, sinews, blood vessels, etc., and is common to many individual substances. 2) It is a rough figure with a hump, head, etc., and common to many individual substances. 3) It has all the precision of the sinews, etc., but is not common to many individual substances. 4) It is a rough figure with a hump, head, etc. as a specific conjunction, a quality inherent in a single individual substance.

I have already mentioned that in Nyāya the form is considered to be a specific conjunction which is a quality and inheres in just one substance. Hence, it does not mean form in the sense of 1 or 2. In addition, the form is not considered to be an extremely detailed and precise arrangement including all the precision of the sinews, etc. I have just mentioned Uddyotakara's discussion in which the objector to the notion of the generic property asserts that one can account for the recurrent cognition that x is a cow by the fact that the form is the same. The proponent of *sūtra* 2.2.64 elaborates what the objector means by this as follows: the arrangement of the head, feet, etc. is the same in all cows (the head up front, four feet below, hump over the shoulders, dewlap below the neck) (2.2.64 U4). Commenting on the definition of form, Uddyotakara explains that the arrangement of the head, hooves, etc. indicates the generic property of a cow (2.2.68 U1), and Vācaspatimiśra explains that the arrangement of the head, hands, etc. indicates the generic property of a human being, namely, humanness (see note 14 above).

Furthermore, Nyāya definitely considers the form to be present in the clay model. Because the model does not have sinews, etc. but has the dewlap, hump, head, tail, and hooves, Nyāya must mean the form to be the arrangement of these parts. In Uddyotakara's commentary, when asked why the word 'cow' is (sometimes) used for a clay model cow, the proponent of *sūtra*

2.2.64 answers, "Because the form is the same, just as (the form shown) in a picture is (the same as the form of the object it depicts) (2.2.64 U2b)." Here too the form is conceived as an arrangement of parts such as the hump, etc. (2.2.64 U2c). The form of the clay model cow is the same as the form of real cow. Finally, *sūtra* 2.2.64, as well Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara's explanations of it, asserts that the form of a cow is present in a clay model cow while the generic property cowness is not. The absence of the generic property accounts for not carrying out actions generally prescribed for cows on a clay model cow (2.2.64). If Gautama had considered that the form of a cow was not in the clay model, he could not have said in the *sūtra*, "even though it is an individual and has a form." By including this concessive clause Gautama himself shows that the form is present in the clay model. Therefore, in Nyāya a form (*ākṛti*) is considered to be a rough figure showing the arrangement of parts such as the head, hands, etc. It means this rough figure as a quality inherent in a single individual, the last of the four possible meanings offered above.[19]

In commenting on Gautama 2.2.64 Uddyotakara argues at length to defend the conception of a generic property as the single abstract entity which accounts for the same cognition recurring with respect to different individuals of a kind. The Buddhist objector contends that it is unnecessary to conceive that there is such an entity because one can account for the same cognition recurring with respect to different individuals without it. By this he means that the form, which Gautama accepts as the inferential mark of the generic property (2.2.68), would directly serve as the basis for a recurrent cognition (2.2.64 U4). Uddyotakara considers two alternatives as to how the objector conceives a form when he asserts this. The form is either present in a single individual or is common to many individuals: alternatives 4 and 2 of the above list, respectively. Rejecting alternative 4, Uddyotakara states that if the form occurs in just one individual it is not held in common (2.2.64 U4a). He implies that because it is not held in common it cannot be the basis for the same cognition recurring with respect to different individuals.

The second alternative Uddyotakara considers is that the objector conceives a form as common to many individuals (alternative 2). He charges the objector with arguing over a name if he accepts that a form, as common, is the basis of a recurrent cognition. His statement is briefly, "If you accept that a form does occur in other bodies, argument over a name is pointless (2.2.64 U4b)," but the implication is clear: If the form inheres in

[19]Halbfass (1992: 257-58) translates a passage in which the Vaiśeṣika commentator Śrīdhara discusses the issue of a number of recurrent characteristics implying the presence of a universal.

many bodies, then it differs from the generic property only in name.

The example of the clay model cow contradicts Uddyotakara's statement here. If the statement, "If the form inheres in many bodies, then it differs from the generic property only in name," were true, then whatever has the form of a cow, including a clay model cow, would have the generic property cowness. Now whatever has the generic property cowness, is a cow. Hence, whatever has the form of a cow would be a cow. If this were so, the following statement would be true: x is a cow if and only if x has the form of a cow. Symbolically, we may state this as follows: $(Ax)(Cx \equiv Fx)$, where x is any individual substance, Cx is the statement, "x is a cow," and Fx is the statement, "x has the form of a cow." This implies the following: It is not the case that there is an x such that x has the form of a cow and x is not a cow $\{\neg(Ex)(Fx \ \& \ \neg Cx)\}$. But the case of the clay model cow offers a falsifying example. The clay model cow (x_m) has the form of a cow and is not a cow $\{(Fx_m \ \& \ \neg Cx_m)\}$. In the clay model cow, although the form is present, it does not succeed in implying the presence of the generic property.

That a clay model cow does not have the generic property cowness, and is not a cow, is made clear by Gautama in *sūtra* 2.2.64 itself, as well as by both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. In answer to the objector's question, "Well, why isn't cowness the generic property in a clay model cow?" Uddyotakara says, "Because a clay model cow is not a cow, and cowness is not present in that which is not a cow, just as it is not present in a horse (2.2.64 U2a)."

The example of a clay model cow falsifies the statement, "If the form inheres in many bodies, then it differs from the generic property only in name." Therefore, it falsifies Uddyotakara's answer to the objector under the second alternative interpretation of the nature of a form. The charge that the objector is arguing over a name is false. The reason that a form cannot serve, in place of the generic property cowness, as the basis of the recurrent cognition "x is a cow" with regard to any individual substance x, is not that a form is not held in common. Something besides a form is required to make known cowness.

The example of the clay model cow, in serving as a counter example to the statement: x is a cow if and only if x has the form of a cow $(Ax)(Cx \equiv Fx)$, leads us to examine the status of the form of a cow as an inferential mark of the generic property cowness. The example also serves as a counterexample to the statement: x is a cow if x has the form of a cow $(Ax)(Fx \rightarrow Cx)$. Yet this is equivalent to the statement of pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the inference with cowness as the object to be inferred (*sādhya*) and the form of a cow as the inferential mark (*hetu*): In whatever individual substance the form of a cow is present, the generic

property cowness is present (*Yatra yatra gor ākṛtiḥ, tatra tatra gotvam*).

It is acceptable to call something an inferential mark even if there are exceptions to the statement of pervasion. It is still true that the form of a cow is the inferential mark of cowness. However, in an exception, another cognition controverts the cognition of cowness. In the case of the clay model cow, the knowledge that it is a clay model blocks the knowledge that it is a cow. When the objector asks, "Well, why is a clay model cow not a cow?," Uddyotakara answers, "It is not a cow just for the reason that it is a clay model cow (2.2.64 U2a)." One knows that it is a clay model because it is clay, that is, the generic property clayness is present in it. One knows clayness is present in it because one directly perceives the inferential marks of clayness.

A cow has other properties besides the form which taken together with the form are coextensive with the generic property cowness. These also serve to indicate that the generic property cowness is in an individual. The statement that a form is an inferential mark of a generic property does not deny that other things besides a form indicate generic properties. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara have both stated that there are substances for which the form does not indicate the generic property (2.2.68 V2, U2). Vācaspatimiśra gives examples in which other qualities indicate the generic property (see note 15 above). A specific color indicates that a certain substance is clay, gold, or silver; the smell or taste indicates the generic property of clarified butter, sesame oil, etc. His family descent is an inferential mark of the class of a *brāhmaṇa*, etc. Hence qualities such as the sound ('moo'), touch (soft and warm), color, smell, weight, size, etc. in addition to the form, and knowing that a bull and cow gave it birth, indicate that a substance has the generic property cowness. Similarly, the lightness, touch (cold and hard), etc. of a clay model cow indicate that it is a clay model. Knowledge of the generic property clayness there serves to block the inference of cowness based on the form. Hence one concludes that it is not a real cow.

Let us return to the argument of the Buddhist objector that one can account for the same cognition recurring with respect to different individuals without conceiving a single abstract entity, a generic property, as its basis. We have mentioned above that Nyāya accepts a cause for the same cognition with respect to many objects which is not a generic property in certain cases. Uddyotakara mentions two such cases in the argument under discussion. The first case concerns the cognition which recurs with respect to each generic property cowness, horseness, etc. that it is a generic property. Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 8.1.5 denies that there is a generic property generic-property-ness at the basis of this cognition. Uddyotakara defends this *sūtra* using the first person pronoun as if it belonged to his own school Nyāya in qualifying

the meaning of the *sūtra*. He says "I do not accept (*na mayā...)* that the same cognition with respect to (the general properties) cowness, potness, and horseness is without cause (2.2.64 U5)." The basis of the cognition is the inherence in more than one object. Every generic property is recognized as a generic property because it inheres in more than one object (2.2.64 U5).

The second case concerns the cognition which recurs with respect to each cook that he is a cook. Uddyotakara himself clearly states the example, "the words 'cook, etc.' and the (accompanying) recurrent cognitions occur, yet there is no general property cookness (2.2.64 U6)." Uddyotakara goes on to explain how accepting that a generic property is not the cause of a recurrent cognition in these two cases does not conflict with accepting that there are generic properties at the basis of other recurrent cognitions. The reason he accepts generic properties in other cases is, "Because distinct cognitions are not without basis." He explains that this "means that the cognition which is distinct from the cognition of a body arises from a different cause. It does not mean that all recurrent cognition occurs only because of a general property."

Uddyotakara's argument stops there. However, he has not got at the heart of the objection. The objector asserts that just as something other than a single abstract generic property is at the basis of recurrent cognition with respect to all generic properties and with respect to all cooks, something other than a single abstract cowness is at the basis of recurrent cognition with respect to all cows. Although it is not true that the form is coextensive with the generic property cowness, the form together with the qualities of a certain sound, touch, sight, smell, weight, etc. all taken together may be. If so, then that set of qualities may be the cause of the recurrent cognition "x is a cow" with respect to each and every cow. Then it would be unnecessary to presume the existence of an additional entity, a generic property. What we call cowness would in fact be the aggregate of all these qualities.

Naiyāyikas deny that a generic property can be reduced to an aggregate of concrete properties such as a form, color, or principal relation to an action like cooking. After Uddyotakara, they, as well as Kumārila, assert that perception of an object includes cognition of its generic property. They conceive two stages of perception: The first, unqualified (*nirvikalpaka*) perception, is a simple awareness of the object. The second, qualified (*savikalpaka*) perception, is cognition of the object qualified by its generic property and other properties. They consider that cognition of the generic property must occur even at the first stage, i.e. in the unqualified perception of the object, although at this stage it is not grasped as the qualifier of the object

nor can it serve to relate the object to other objects or distinguish it from them.[20]

According to the Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (550 C.E.), the first to describe these stages explicitly, unqualified cognition of the object produces unqualified cognition of its general properties which then serve to produce qualified cognition of the object.[21] He states that the intuition (*ālocanamātra*) of a substance is the means of knowledge (*pramāna*), perception, in the arising of cognition of the general properties of the object.[22] Although Praśastapāda does not use the term 'knowledge' (*pramā*) for the cognition of the general properties (*sāmānyaviśeṣaṇajñāna*) nor the term 'objects of knowledge' (*prameya*) for the general properties in such cognition, his commentator Śrīdhara does use the former term.[23] Furthermore, Praśastapāda explicitly asserts that yogis, with their settled awareness focused on the object, directly see general properties (and other objects beyond ordinary perceptual knowledge).[24] The claim that we have direct perception of them supports the Naiyāyikas claim that there are such entities as generic properties.

Buddhists deny that there are such entities as general properties as part of their denial of the duration of aggregate objects and of the substantiality of their constituents.[25] They deny that the identification of an object is due to a particular

---

[20]Vācaspatimiśra ND, p. 307-308. Kumārila, Ślokavārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra 118: *nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ grahaṇam.* 119 states the limitations. 111-13 introduce *nirvikalpaka* describing the lack of comparison to other objects. 120 describes *savikalpakapratyakṣa.*

[21]Vātsyāyana mentions intuition followed by representation by the mind but gives no description of the character of these stages under NS 1.1.4, ND p. 123 *sarvatra pratyakṣaviṣaye jñātur indriyeṇa vyavasāyaḥ, paścān manasā 'nuvyavasāyaḥ.* Clear (1990) discusses two-level perception in the Yuktidīpikā after an overview of the subject in early Indian epistemology.

[22]Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, p. 472-73: *sāmānyaviśeṣa-jñānotpattau avibhaktam ālocanamātraṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam.* Śrīdharabhaṭṭa, Nyāyakandalī: *ato viśeṣaṇajñāna[e] indriyārthasannikarṣamātram eva pramāṇam ity arthaḥ.* Hence the means of knowledge for the cognition of the qualifier is just the mere relation of the sense with the object. Halbfass (1992: 100) briefly discusses this passage.

[23]p. 472: *yadā nirvikalpakaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣajñānam api pramārūpam arthapratītirūpatvāt tadā tadutpattau avibhaktam ālocanamātraṃ pratyakṣam.* When unqualified cognition of general and specific properties arises in the form of knowledge (*pramā*) because they appear as objects of cognition, then, with respect to that arising, simple awareness unattached (to any other cognition) is (the means of knowledge) perception.

[24]Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, p. 465: *asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ tu yogināṃ yuktānāṃ yogajadharmānugṛhītena manasā ... sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu ... avitathaṃ svarūpadarśanam utpadyate.*

[25]Dhammapada v. 277: sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, and v. 279: sabbe dhammā anattā.

property of a special sort (a generic property) rather than to a temporary collocation of constituents. They consider it false belief to attribute identity through time to an aggregate of concrete properties which in fact is constantly changing. Belief in the permanence of objects results in suffering while realization of their impermanence brings about freedom from suffering.

As early as Nāgasena's dialogue with king Milinda regarding the identity of persons, Buddhists try to demonstrate that the only reality to the identity attributed to an aggregate through time is the term that designates it. Usage of the term in this case is not based on the existence of a single substance. On similar grounds Diṅnāga argues that the use of a generic term is not based upon a single general property belonging to the denoted objects. Instead, he argues that the basis of the use of the term is the negation of the complement class. Buddhists consider that knowledge arises from words through inference rather than through an independent means of knowledge. The negation of the complement class determines the set of objects subject to the inference from the word to its denoted object. Further discussion of Buddhist theories of meaning will lead us away from the texts under consideration here.[26]

Now that we have discussed the Naiyāyika's views concerning the nature of a generic property, a form and an individual, let us consider their view regarding which of them generic terms denote.

2.3. A Generic Term Denotes All Three Together.

Gautama, as elaborated by Vātsyāyana, concludes that a generic term like 'cow' denotes an individual, its form and its generic property together, one being principal and the others subordinate. A detailed outline of the argument for this conclusion precedes the translation.

The discussion comprises an argument for each of the three elements, the individual, form, and generic property, singly being the object denoted by a word, and an argument against each element being denoted by itself. The arguments concerning the individual and the generic property are comparable to those which Śabara and Patañjali explain. The conclusion is very close to one which Patañjali prefers and which Śabara rejects. That the object denoted includes a third element, the form, requires

[26]On the Buddhist view of meaning known as *apohavāda* see Siderits, 1985 and 1991: 87-110, Matilal 1986: articles by Matilal, Hayes, Herzberger, Kunjunni Raja, Tillemans and Bhattacharya.

detailed investigation because it will shed light on Śabara's example of the falcon altar. The numerous examples which Gautama, Vātsyāyana, and Uddyotakara give throughout the section supply us with examples of usages in which it is clear which element of the meaning is principal and which subordinate. Our discussion of how 2.2.66 applies to these examples not only will elucidate Vātsyāyana's explanation of this *sūtra* but will also shed light on Patañjali's view of how one element of the denoted object is principal and the other subordinate.

Gautama argues that the form should be accepted as the object denoted by the word because one depends on the form to determine what the individual substance is (2.2.63). We have shown that the form is not a reliable inferential mark of the generic property. A clay model cow has the form but is not a cow. However, the failure of an inference is not necessarily due to the fact that the inferential mark is inadequate. Even if the inferential mark is adequate the inference will fail if there is an obstacle (*bādhaka*). In the case of a clay model cow, the configuration is an inferential mark of the generic property cowness. However, the color (and numerous other qualities) indicate that it is clay. The generic property clayness is present there. The knowledge that it is clay blocks the inference that it is a cow. Therefore, the generic property cowness is absent even though the inferential mark, the form of a cow, is present.

In the case of clay, gold, silver, clarified butter, etc., one depends on qualities other than a form to determine what the object is. If form is included in the object denoted by a word for an individual substance whose generic property form identifies, then other qualities should be included in the object denoted by a word for a substance whose generic property they identify. Yet they are not. This consideration led the new school of Nyāya (*navyanyāya*) to exclude the form from the object denoted by the word, just as other properties which may indicate the presence of a certain generic property in an individual are excluded from the object denoted by the word. The form as well as other qualities may indicate the presence of a certain generic property in an individual, but just the individual and the generic property are denoted. One of the two is principal and the other subordinate in the manner which Vātsyāyana states under *sūtra* 2.2.66.[27]

Vātsyāyana states that the form by itself is not the object denoted by a word because the word denotes that which is qualified by the generic property (2.2.63 VB). The substance which has a certain form is that which is qualified by the generic property. In this statement, he repeats the statement by which he rejected that the individual alone is the object denoted by a word.

[27]See note 30 below.

Uddyotakara states explicitly that Gautama 2.2.61, "*Na tadanavasthānāt* (No because one would not determine it)," should be understood to be present here after 2.2.63 too. In its original occurrence, 2.2.61 gives the reason that the individual alone is not the object denoted by a word, namely, one does not determine the intended object of speech just by knowing that it is an unspecified individual. Recurring here it states that in fact one does not determine the intended object of speech just by knowing the form of an individual substance. The configuration alone does not succeed in identifying what the individual substance is. One relies on other properties too. The clay model cow has the form of a cow, yet one determines that it is not a cow. Its color, etc. indicate that it is clay. When the word 'cow' is used, one (usually) understands a real cow, not a model. Gautama's argument for accepting the generic property as the object denoted by a word shows that the form of the cow is not coextensive with the generic property cowness. The form does not by itself succeed in identifying what an individual substance is; it does not succeed in identifying the intended object of speech.

Gautama argues that the generic property is the object denoted by a word because due to its absence in a model the word does not refer to the model (2.2.64). Concomitant presence and absence determine what a word denotes. The form and individual are present in the model; the generic property is not. The word does not refer to the model. Therefore, there is a concomitant absence of the word and the generic property. Hence the generic property is the object denoted by a word. It is not the case that there is concomitant absence of the form and the word or of the individual and the word; hence, neither the form nor the individual is the object denoted by a word. The argument is entirely negative. It succeeds in establishing that the generic property is denoted but not that it alone is denoted. Gautama rejects the argument in the next *sūtra* because the generic property depends on the individual and form in order to be manifest. One never finds the generic property cowness without an individual substance and the form of a cow (2.2.65).

The argument that the generic property alone is denoted is just the converse of the argument which Śabara presents with respect to the altar in the shape of a falcon (IIIA). Śabara argues that there is concomitant presence between the class property and the generic term. As we will see in the next chapter, the deciding case in Śabara's argument is the example of the falcon altar. It is worth noting that Gautama's argument to show that the generic property is the object denoted implies that the form is not denoted alone, while Śabara's argument to show that just the class property is denoted is based on a word referring to a shape. As has been shown, Nyāya clearly distinguishes the form and generic property. As we shall see, Śabara does not.

After explaining the *sūtra*, Uddyotakara shows in his commentary that Nyāya also recognizes that the word 'cow' is sometimes used for the clay model. The proponent of the *sūtra* is asked why one does use the word 'cow' for a clay model cow. He answers, "Because the form is the same, just as (the form shown) in a picture is (the same as the form of the object it depicts) (2.2.64 U2b)." Complementing Gautama's use of the example of the clay model cow, the fact that the word is used for the model implies that the form is denoted even if the generic property is not. The presence of the generic property along with the form and individual in a real cow ordain the use of the word 'cow' for it. The clay model is sometimes called a cow, sometimes not. That is, when the word 'cow' is used, one sometimes understands the clay model, sometimes not. The usage of the word for the model is based on the form. The absence of usage is based on the absence of the generic property.

After stating arguments for and against accepting each of the individual, generic property, and form singly as the object denoted by a word, Gautama concludes in 2.2.66 that a word denotes the three of them together. Vātsyāyana explains that when possible, all three are the object denoted by a word together. One of the elements is principal; the others subordinate. He points out while defining form that the form is not included in the object denoted by words for substances such as clay, gold, and silver (2.2.68 V2). In these substances, the form does not indicate the generic property. The form is included in the object denoted by a word only when it indicates the generic property the word is used for. For example, the word 'cow' denotes cowness and an individual substance in which cowness inheres. Wherever the individual and cowness are present, so is the form of a cow. Hence, the form of a cow is also the object denoted by the word 'cow'. In contrast, a word referring to a substance such as clay, gold, or silver, which remains what it is even while taking various forms, does not denote the form. It denotes the generic property and the individual substance. In a sentence like, "This ornament is silver," the generic property is principal and the individual ornament is subordinate. The word 'silver' there intends to communicate the being silver of the ornaments. In a sentence like, "Put the silver on the table," the individual silver utensils are principal and the generic property is subordinate.

Uddyotakara explains and gives examples of what Vātsyāyana means when he says that one of the elements in the meaning is principal and the others subordinate (2.2.66 U1). The individual is principal when it is clear that the word refers to different objects. He gives the first example given in *sūtra* 2.2.60 as an example, "The cow which is standing, ... ; the cow which is sitting, ..." The injunctions, "Let the cow loose. Tie the cow," which are used indicating a specific individual, also serve as

examples.[28] The generic property is principal when it is clear that the word refers to any of the kind without distinction. For example, "One should not kick a cow. One should honor cows." The same word in the same sentence may sometimes mean the individual as principal, sometimes the generic property. It depends on the context. The configuration is principal when it is clear that that is what is meant. For example, in the sentence, "Make cows consisting of flour," the form is principal because one cannot make the generic property cowness. In fact the generic property cowness will be absent from the object produced; flourness will inhere in the flour model cows. The word 'flour' makes known the substance, flour. Making means forming. That which one can form is the form. Hence the principal element in the meaning is the form. The individual is subordinate, and the generic property is absent.[29] By analogy to Uddyotakara's example, the examples of the use of the word 'cow' for a clay model cow and Śabara's example of a brick falcon would also qualify as use of a word for a meaning in which the form is principal and the generic property and individual are subordinate.

Because the form is already one of the three elements in the object denoted by a word, it does not make sense to speak of secondary reference to a meaning in which the form is principal and the generic property and individual subordinate. In the example which Uddyotakara has given, however, there is no generic property at all in the meaning. The flour cow is not a cow. The generic property cowness does not inhere in it, just as the generic property cowness does not inhere in the clay model cow. As I have said above, the concessive clause of *sūtra* 2.2.64, "even though it is an individual and has a form," implies, and Vātsyāyana states, that the generic property is absent from the clay model cow (2.2.64 V1). On the occasions that the word 'cow' is used for the model, the case is strictly analogous to the example Uddyotakara gives of a flour cow. Hence the meaning of the word in this usage is different from the meaning in ordinary usage. Ordinarily the meaning has three elements; in this usage there are two. So it is possible that the word refers to this different meaning by secondary reference.

On the other hand, secondary reference is the use of a word for that which it does not denote (2.2.62). The form and individual are two of the three elements in the primary meaning of the word. Hence, use of the word for them does not constitute

---

[28]*Gām muñca, gām badhāneti niyatāṃ kāñcid vyaktim uddiśya prayujyate.* Nyāyamañjarī, vol 2, p. 42, lines 1-2.

[29]*Kvacid ākṛteḥ prādhānyaṃ vyakter aṅgabhāvo jātir nāsty eva, yathā piṣṭakamayyo gāvaḥ kriyantām iti tatsanniveśacikīrṣayā prayoga iti.* Nyāyamañjarī, vol. 2, p. 42, lines 2-3.

"use for that which it does not denote." It is use for that which it already denotes minus one element. In addition, the use of the word determines what it denotes (2.2.60 V). If the word is used for these two elements they are denoted. Lastly, the whole gist of Gautama's and Vātsyāyana's argument has been to show that each of a generic property, an individual, and a form must be denoted, yet none of the three elements alone can be. The three are together, each taking a turn as principal. If the flour cows, clay model cow, and similar objects do not exemplify what Vātsyāyana intended by the form being principal and the generic property and individual subordinate, what does? Therefore, it seems to me that the ancient Naiyāyikas intended such examples to show a less common but primary use of the word for the form and individual.

The new school of Nyāya considers the use of the word 'cow' for a real cow to denote the individual and generic property. The use of the word for a model denotes the form and individual. Hence the word has two word-meaning relations.[30]

We have discussed how qualities besides the form indicate generic properties. The color of the model indicates that it is clay, that the generic property clayness is present in it. The knowledge that it is a clay model cow blocks the inference based on the form that it is a real cow. The color, size, weight, sound, etc., of the real cow taken together with the form indicate that the generic property cowness is present in it. Hence, the quality which the model shares with real cows, the form, allows the use of the word for it. The absence of other qualities characteristic of cows prevents it.

[30]*Navyās tu saṃsthānānupasthitāv api gotvādinā gavādyanvayabodhāj jātiviśiṣṭavyaktāv eva śaktiḥ. Saṃsthāne ca pṛthag eva śaktiḥ.* Dinakarī comm. on Kārikāvalīmuktāvalī, p. 378.

Gautama 2.2.58-69 Outline

I. Preliminaries
  A. Definitions (2.2.58)
    1. Speech sounds ending in an inflectional termination constitute a word.
    2. A word is the basic unit of speech ordinarily used to express meaning.
  B. Whenever one uses a generic term like 'cow', three objects are present together: the individual, the configuration of parts of the individual, and the generic property (2.2.59).

II. An individual
  A. Usage shows that the word denotes an individual (2.2.60).
    1. The word 'cow' refers to different objects. Individuals are many and distinct from one another. The generic property is one and the same.
      a. It refers to the same object as a pronoun referring to a specific individual (1).
      b. It refers to objects of which a plurality is mentioned:
        i. An aggregate (2)
        ii. A number greater than one (5).[1]
      c. It refers to objects which belong to different owners (4).
      d. It refers to a succession of objects (10).
    2. The word refers to an object which participates in action. Only a finite mass can participate in action. The generic property is insubstantial (so is the form). The individual is a finite mass.
      a. It refers to an object given (3).
      b. It refers to an object which grows (6).
      c. It refers to an object which decays (7).[2]
    3. The word refers to an object which is the substratum of qualities. Qualities inhere only in substances. The individual is a substance. The generic property is not (nor is the form).

---

[1]This example also fits under 3 below because number (*saṃkhyā*) is a quality (*guṇa*).

[2]In these last two cases the action is possible only on an object which consists of parts. Growth is the addition of parts. Decay is the subtraction of parts. Only finite masses consist of parts.

a. It refers to an object given (IIA2a). The qualities disjunction and conjunction are essential in the act of giving (3).
b. It refers to colored objects (8).
c. In compounds it refers to an object which enjoys happiness, etc., which are qualities (9).

B. One does not use the word 'cow' for the pure individual devoid of all properties, but rather, for that which is qualified by the generic property (2.2.61).

C. Even if the individual were not denoted by the word, one could account for use referring to the individual by secondary reference (the use of a word for that which it does not denote when there is some cause). The following exemplify secondary reference (2.2.62):

1. The word 'staff' refers to a *brāhmaṇa* because he always carries a staff.
2. The word 'platform' refers to a man because he stands on it.
3. The word 'mat' refers to the reeds being woven because their purpose is the mat.
4. The names of deities refer to a king because he behaves like them.
5. The word for a measuring container refers to the item measured in that amount.
6. The word 'balance' refers to sandalwood powder because one usually buys an amount which doesn't weigh enough to tip the scales.
7. A river name refers to its bank due to its proximity.
8. The word for a color refers to that which has that color because it is connected with it.
9. The word 'life-breaths' refers to food because food is their cause.
10. The words 'family' and *'gotra'* refer to the head of the family or extended family because he rules it.

III. The configuration of parts

A. The word denotes the configuration of parts because one depends on it to determine what the substance is (2.2.63).

B. The word does not denote the configuration alone; rather, it denotes the object connected with the generic property, viz. the substance which has a certain configuration.

IV. The generic property

A. The word 'cow' denotes the generic property because one usually does not use it to refer to a model cow (2.2.64).

1. The generic property cowness is absent in a clay model cow.
2. A clay model cow is an individual and has the configuration of parts of a cow.
3. The meaning of the word is that object due to the absence of which the word 'cow' is not used for the clay model cow.

B. The word does not denote the generic property alone. The generic property depends on the configuration and individual in order to be manifest (2.2.65).

V. The individual, form and generic property together are the object denoted by the word (2.2.66).

A. When the speaker intends to distinguish an object from others of its kind and one understands a specific individual, then the individual is principal and the generic property and configuration are subordinate.

B. When the speaker does not intend to distinguish an object from others of its kind and one understands generality, then the generic property is principal and the individual and configuration are subordinate.

C. One should understand the use of a word intending the form as principal in a similar manner.

VI. Definitions

A. An individual is a finite substance consisting of parts which has certain qualities (2.2.67).

B. Form (2.2.68)

1. A form is the configuration of the parts of a substance which indicates the generic property and other inferential marks of the generic property.
2. A form is not the object denoted by the word for objects in which a form is not an inferential mark of its generic property, for example, clay, gold and silver.

C. A general property is that which is responsible for the fact that we know many things as the same (2.2.69).

1. The ultimate general property (existence) produces just the cognition of sameness.
2. Specific general properties (generic properties) produce the cognition that some things are the same as each other and yet different from other things.

Gautama 2.2.58-69 Translation

2.2.58. Te vibhaktyantāḥ padam.[1]
Those speech sounds which end in an inflectional termination constitute a word.
Yathādarśanaṃ vikṛtā varṇā vibhaktyantāḥ padasaṃjñā bhavanti. Vibhaktir dvayī: nāmikī ākhyātikī ca, brāhmaṇaḥ pacatīty udāharaṇam.
1) (Proponent:) Speech sounds, changed according to grammatical rules, ending in an inflectional termination, are termed a word (*pada*).[2] Inflectional terminations are of two types, nominal and verbal. *'Brāhmaṇaḥ'* and *'pacati'* are examples (of words ending in nominal and verbal terminations respectively).

Upasarganipātās tarhi na padasaṃjñāḥ. Lakṣaṇāntaraṃ vācyam iti.
(Objector:) Then prefixes and particles wouldn't be termed words. Another definition of a word should be stated.

Śiṣyate ca khalu: nāmikyā vibhakter avyayāl lopas, tayoḥ padasaṃjñārtham iti. Padenārthasaṃpratyaya iti prayojanam. Nāmapadaṃ cādhikṛtya parīkṣā. Gaur iti padaṃ khalv idam udāharaṇam. 58.
(Proponent:) As a matter of fact, Pāṇini teaches that zero substitutes for the nominal ending occurring after an indeclinable just so that the term 'word (*pada*)' may apply to prefixes and particles.[3] 2) The reason that Gautama states the present *sūtra* is

---

[1]The text is from ND, pp. 654-94. Occassionally I have preferred the reading of Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya in ND2, pp. 180-88.

[2]In the previous *sūtra* Vātsyāyana has explained that 'change (*vikāra*)' means substitution or the use of one sound where another would have been used. Modification of the sound is impossible because sounds cease to exist shortly after they arise. In Mīmāṃsā, Śabara similarly asserts that a word consists just of speech sounds. *"Tasmād akṣarāṇy eva padam."* MD, vol. 1, p. 58. However, he considers the sounds to be non-changing, eternal.

[3]Pāṇini 2.4.82. *Avyayād āpsupaḥ (luk 58). Luk* substitutes for (the feminine affix) *āp* and (nominal termination) *sup* after an indeclinable.
Patañjali concludes his commentary on 2.4.82 by quoting the following conclusion arrived at under 1.4.21 (see 1.2.64 trans. under *vārttika* 53c note 81): *Atha vācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati, utpadyante 'vyayebhyaḥ svādaya iti yad ayam: avyayād āpsupa ity avyayāl lukaṃ śāsti.* MB-K, vol. 1, p. 322, lines 24-25; p. 398, lines 11-12. Or the teacher's (Pāṇini's) procedure, namely, that he teaches zero (*luk*) in place of them after indeclinables, informs us that nominal endings arise after indeclinables.
Patañjali notes that the reason Pāṇini teaches the terminations and then zero in

that one knows an object by means of a word.[4] The following investigation concerning the object denoted by a word proceeds making a nominal word the topic. The word 'cow' is the example.[5]

Tadarthe

The following *sūtras* concern the object it denotes:

2.2.59. Vyaktyākṛtijātisaṃnidhāv upacārāt saṃśayaḥ.

The doubt arises because one uses (a word like 'cow') **for an individual, its form, and its generic property present together.**

Avinābhāvavṛttiḥ ***saṃnidhiḥ.*** *Avinābhāvena vartamānāsu vyaktyākṛtijātiṣu gaur iti prayujyate. Tatra na jñāyate: kim anyatamaḥ padārtha uta sarva iti.* 59.

Presence together means coextensive occurrence.[6] One uses the word 'cow' for an individual, its form, and its generic property occurring coextensively. Hence one does not know whether a certain one of the them is the object denoted by the word or all are.

Śabdasya prayogasāmarthyāt padārthāvadhāraṇam. Tasmāt,

(Objector:) One determines the object denoted by a word by force of the word's use. Therefore,

---

their place is to utilize the principle that rules apply as if an affix replaced by zero were still present: *Pratyayalakṣaṇam ācāryaḥ prārthayamānaḥ supo lukaṃ mṛṣyati.* The teacher permits zero in place of the nominal termination (following indeclinables) intending Pāṇini 1.1.62 (see 1.2.64 trans. *vārttika* 29 note 23) to apply. In the present consideration rules that should apply to indeclinables apply only to a speech form termed word (*pada*). The term 'word (*pada*)' applies to speech forms ending in a nominal or verbal termination.

Pāṇini 1.4.14. *Suptiṅantaṃ padam.* (A speech form) ending in a nominal (*sup*) or verbal termination (*tiṅ*) is termed a word (*pada*).

Gautama's *sūtra* is equivalent to Pāṇini's definition of a word, and Vātsyāyana accepts it.

[4]Kātyāyana in his first *vārttika* (§1.1) and Patañjali (1.2.64 trans. under *vārttika* 29 note 15) express that the pupose of using words is to convey meaning.

[5]Although the present discussion concerns the object denoted by a nominal word (*pada*), not a nominal base (*prātipadika*), the entities discussed are in fact considered to be denoted by the base in later Nyāya discussions which clearly distinguish the meaning of the base from that of the termination. In the present discussion, Vātsyāyana means only to distinguish nominals from verbs and to state that the discussion concerns the former rather than the latter. The example given is *'gauḥ'* which is a generic term.

[6]One occurs if and only if the others do. When one uses a generic term, one has cognition of all three at once, not of one of them without the others. Viśvanātha gives this interpretation saying that *sannidhi* is the *milana* of an individual, generic property and form. Others interpret *sannidhi* as the relation of the word to these three objects. Ruben (1928: 55) translates "Weil [das Wort] im Zusammenhang mit Individuum, form und genus gebraucht wird," and Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya (p. 147) translate, "because it [term] is found to be in use as 'invariably related' (*sannidhi*) to [i.e. as conveying] the individual (*vyakti*), the shape (*ākṛti*) and the class-essence (*jāti*)."

2.2.60. Yāśabda-samūha-tyāga-parigraha-saṃkhyā-vṛddhy-apacaya-varṇa-samāsa-anubandhānāṃ vyaktāv upacārād, vyaktiḥ.
Because the relative pronoun, a group, giving, acquisition, number, growth, decay, color, compounds, and succession pertain to the individual, an individual (is the object denoted by a word).
Vyaktiḥ padārthaḥ.
An individual is the object denoted by a word.

Kasmāt?
(Proponent:) Why?

Yāśabdaprabhṛtīnāṃ vyaktāv upacārāt. ***Upacāraḥ*** *prayogaḥ. 1)* ***Yā*** *gaus tiṣṭhati* ***yā*** *gaur niṣaṇṇeti nedaṃ vākyaṃ jāter abhidhāyakam, abhedāt. Bhedāt tu dravyābhidhāyakaṃ. 2) Gavāṃ* ***samūha*** *iti bhedād dravyābhidhānaṃ; na jāter, abhedāt. 3) Vaidyāya gāṃ dadātīti dravyasya* ***tyāgo****; na jāter, amūrtatvāt, pratikramānukramānupapatteś ca. 4)* ***Parigrahaḥ*** *svatvenābhisaṃbandhaḥ. Kauṇḍinyasya gaur brāhmaṇasya gaur iti dravyābhidhāne dravyabhedāt saṃbandhabheda ity upapannam. Abhinnā tu jātir iti. 5)* ***Saṃkhyā:*** *daśa gāvo viṃśatir gāva iti bhinnaṃ dravyaṃ saṃkhyāyate; na jātir, abhedād iti. 6)* ***Vṛddhiḥ:*** *kāraṇavato dravyasyāvayavopacayaḥ, Avardhata gaur iti. Niravayavā tu jātir iti. 7)* ***Etenāpacayo*** *vyākhyātaḥ. 8)* ***Varṇa:*** *śuklā gauḥ kapilā gaur iti dravyasya guṇayogo, na sāmānyasya. 9)* ***Samāsaḥ:*** *gohitaṃ gosukham iti dravyasya sukhādiyogo, na jāter iti. 10)* ***Anubandhaḥ*** *sarūpaprajananasaṃtānaḥ. Gaur gāṃ janayati iti, tadutpattidharmatvād dravye yuktaṃ na jātau viparyayād iti. Dravyaṃ vyaktir iti hi nārthāntaram.* 60.
(Objector:) Because the relative pronoun, etc. pertain to the individual. **To pertain to** is to apply to. 1) The sentence, "The cow which is standing, ... ; the cow which is sitting, ... ," does not refer to the generic property because a generic property is not differentiated. But it does refer to an individual substance because one individual substance differs from another of the same kind.[7] 2) The phrase, "a group of cows," refers to individual

---

[7]The sentence given is just a couple of relative clauses indicating agents of different activities. The full sentence would read something like the following: The cow which is standing gives milk, the cow which is sitting doesn't. The same generic property, cowness, is present in both cows. The relative pronoun 'which (*yā*)' points out a particular thing. The attribution of different activities, standing versus sitting, informs us that the two occurrences of the pronoun refer to two different objects. The word cow is in apposition with the pronoun in each of the two clauses so it refers to two different objects too. Hence cowness cannot be the object denoted by the word 'cow' because it is just one thing in both. The particular substance or individual standing is different from the one

substances because they differ; not to a generic property because it is the same.[8] 3) "He gives a cow to the *āyurvedic* physician." One gives a substance, not a generic property because it is immaterial and because (the cow's) disjunction (from the giver) and conjunction (with the physician) wouldn't make sense.[9] 4) **Acquisition** is the connection of something to oneself as property. The phrases, "Kauṇḍinya's cow, a *brāhmaṇa*'s cow," make sense if the word 'cow' refers to a substance because the relation differs according to the difference of the substance. But the generic property is undifferentiated.[10] 5) **Number:** "Ten cows, twenty cows." Individual substances, which are distinct from each other, are enumerated, not the generic property, because it is the same.[11] 6) **Growth:** A substance which has parts as its material causes accumulates parts. "The cow grew." But a generic property has no parts.[12] 7) This explains **decay** too. 8) **Color:** "White cow, brown cow." A quality has a connection with a substance, not a generic property.[13] 9) **Compounds:** "cow-benefit, cow-pleasure." Pleasure, etc. have a connection with a substance, not with a generic property.[14] 10)

---

sitting, hence the individual substance is the object denoted by the word.

[8]If the word 'cow' denoted the generic property, it would not make sense to speak of a group of cows because there is only one generic property, not many. A group requires more than one. Therefore, the word 'cow' must denote an individual because it makes sense to speak of a group of individuals.

[9]A generic property is present in an individual of its type by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). It has no direct relation with any other substance or action. According to Vaiśeṣika, only substances which are not all-pervasive are substrata of action, and only substances are substrata of qualities. Action brings about conjunction and disjunction which are qualities. See Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 1.1.5. *Rūparasagandhasparśāḥ saṅkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ*. VS, p. 2. 1.1.14. *Kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam*. VS, p. 5. Hence for two reasons the word 'cow' means the substance here and not the generic property: 1) The action of giving inheres in a substance, not a generic property. 2) The qualities of conjunction and disjunction inhere in substances, not generic properties.

[10]Different owners do not own the generic property cowness; they own individual cows. They have an ownership relation with the individual, not with the generic property.

[11]Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 1.1.5 lists number (*saṅkhyā*) among the qualities. See note 9.

[12]In Vaiśeṣika, parts are the material cause of all conglomerate substances.

[13]See Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 1.1.14 in note 9.

[14]Happiness (*sukha*), which is listed as a quality in Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 1.1.5, resides in a substance. The compounds mentioned are provided for by Pāṇini 2.1.36. *Cathurthī tadarthārthabalihita-sukharakṣitaiḥ*. A word ending in a fourth triplet nominal termination is compounded with a word for an original object which serves the purpose of that which the word ending in the fourth triplet termination denotes. It is also compounded with the words 'artha (purpose), *bali* (tribute, offering), *hita* (benefit), *sukha* (happiness) and *rakṣita* (protection)'. The compound so formed is a *tatpuruṣa*.

Succession is a series of generations of like things. The sentence, "A cow gives birth to a cow," makes sense with respect to substances because a succession of them can occur, not with respect to a generic property because a succession of a generic property can't. 'Substance' means nothing other than 'individual'.

> *...Ākṛter apy abhidhāyakam etan na bhavati, niṣkriyatvād ākṛteḥ. Na hi niṣkriyā gacchati tiṣṭhati bhavati ceti....*[15]
> 60.
> ....This (the word 'cow' in the phrase, "the cow which is standing, etc.,") does not denote the form either because the form is without activity. That which is without activity does not go, stand or become.

Asya pratiṣedhaḥ:
(Proponent:) The following *sūtra* refutes this.
2.2.61. Na tadanavasthānāt.
No because one would not determine what the object is.
Na vyaktiḥ padārthaḥ.
It is not the case that just the individual is denoted by a word.

Kasmāt?
(Objector:) Why?

Anavasthānāt. Yāśabdaprabhṛtibhir yo viśeṣyate, sa gośabdārtho, yā gaus tiṣṭhati yā gaur niṣaṇṇeti, na dravyamātram aviśiṣṭaṃ jātyā vinābhidhīyate.
(Proponent:) Because if it were, one would not determine what the object referred to is.[16] That which the relative pronoun, etc. specify in the examples, "The cow which is standing, ... ; the cow which is sitting, ... ," etc. is the object denoted by the word 'cow'. The word 'cow' does not denote a mere unqualified substance without any generic property.

Kiṃ tarhi?
(Objector:) Then what does it denote?

Jātiviśiṣṭam. Tasmān na vyaktiḥ padārthaḥ. Evaṃ samūhādiṣu draṣṭavyam. 61.
(Proponent:) That qualified by the generic property. Therefore, the individual alone is not the object denoted by a word. The case is the same with respect to a group and the rest of the examples in the last *sūtra*.

---

[15]ND, pp. 660-61.

[16]One would fail to put the object in the right ontological category.

> *....Nānena gośabdena vyaktimātraṃ śuddham ucyate. Yady ayaṃ vyaktimātrābhidhāyako 'bhaviṣyat, tena yasyāṃ kasyāṃcid vyaktau pratyayo 'bhaviṣyad iti sūtrārthaḥ.*[17] *61.*
> ....The *sūtra* means: The word 'cow' does not denote just the pure individual. If it did denote just the individual, then one would understand any individual whatsoever.

Yadi na vyaktiḥ padārthaḥ, kathaṃ tarhi vyakāv upacāra iti?
(Objector:) If the individual is not denoted by a word, then how is it that one uses a word for an individual?

Nimittād atadbāve 'pi tadupacāraḥ. Dṛśyate khalu
(Proponent:) A word is used for that which it does not denote when there is some cause. One sees the following:
2.2.62. Sahacaraṇa-sthāna-tādarthya-vṛtta-māna-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya-yoga-sādhana-ādhipatyebho brāhmaṇa-mañca-kaṭa-rāja-saktu-candana-gaṅgā-śāṭaka-anna-puruṣeṣv atadbhāve 'pi tad-upacāraḥ.
A word is used for that which it does not denote because of accompaniment, place, being for that purpose, behavior, measure, weight, proximity, connection, causation and seniority, in (the examples of) a *brāhmaṇa*, a platform, a mat, a king, barley meal, sandalwood powder, the Ganges, cloth, food, and a man respectively.
Atadbhāve 'pi tadupacāra ity atacchabdasya tena śabdenābhidhānam iti. 1) ***Sahacaraṇāt:*** *Yaṣṭikāṃ bhojaya iti yaṣṭikāsahacarito brāhmaṇo 'bhidhīyata iti. 2)* ***Sthānāt:*** *Mañcāḥ krośanti iti mañcasthāḥ puruṣā abhidhiyante. 3)* ***Tādarthyāt:*** *kaṭārtheṣu vīraṇeṣu vyūhyamāneṣu, Kaṭaṃ karoti iti. 4)* ***Vṛttāt:*** *Yamo rājā Kubero rājeti tadvad vartata iti. 5)* ***Mānāt:*** *āḍhakena mitāḥ saktava āḍhakasaktava iti. 6)* ***Dhāraṇāt:*** *tulayā dhṛtaṃ candanaṃ tulācandanam iti. 7)* ***Sāmīpyāt:*** *Gaṅgāyāṃ gāvaś carantīti deṣo 'bhidhīyate saṃnikṛṣṭaḥ. 8)* ***Yogāt:*** *kṛṣṇena rāgeṇa yuktaḥ śāṭakaḥ kṛṣṇa ity abhidhīyate. 9)* ***Sādhanāt:*** *Annaṃ prāṇā iti. 10)* ***Ādhipatyāt:*** *Ayaṃ puruṣaḥ kulaṃ ayaṃ gotram iti tatrāyaṃ sahacaraṇād yogād vā jātiśabdo vyaktau prayujyata iti.* 62.
"A word is used for that which it does not denote" means: A certain word refers to that which the word does not denote. **Because of** 1) **accompaniment:** The word 'staff (*yaṣṭikā*)' in the sentence, "Feed the staff," refers to a *brāhmaṇa* accompanied by a staff. 2) **Presence:** The word 'platforms (*mañcāḥ*)' in the sentence, "The platforms are shouting," refers to

[17] ND, p. 662.

the men located on the platforms.[18] 3) **Being for that purpose:** The word 'mat (*kaṭa*)' in the sentence, "He makes a mat," refers to the reeds which are being woven together for the purpose of a mat. 4) **Behavior:** The names 'Yama' and 'Kubera' in the descriptions, "The king is Yama, the king is Kubera," refer to the king because he behaves like Yama or Kubera.[19] 5) **Measure:** One refers to the barley meal measured by an *āḍhaka* as an *āḍhaka* of barley meal (*āḍhakasaktu*).[20] 6) **Weight:** One refers to the sandalwood powder (*candana*) weighed by a balance as balance-sandalwood (*tulācandana*).[21] 7) **Proximity:** The word 'Ganges' in the sentence, "The cows roam on the Ganges," refers to a place beside the river Ganges. 8) **Connection:** One refers to cloth connected with black dye as black. 9) **Causation:** The word 'life-breaths (*prāṇāḥ*)' in the sentence, "Food is the life-breaths," refers to the food which is a cause of them. 10) **Rulership:** The words 'family (*kula*)' and '*gotra*' in the sentence, "This man is the family, he is the *gotra*," refer to the man who is the head of the family or *gotra*.[22] Here one uses the generic term for the individual because of accompaniment (1) or connection (8).[23]

---

[18]The English equivalent is "The bleachers are roaring." Patañjali mentions this and three other reasons for the use of a word for what it does not denote with examples under Pāṇini 4.1.48: *Caturbhiḥ prakārair atasmin sa ity etad bhavati tātsthyāt tāddharmyāt tatsāmīpyāt tatsāhacaryād iti. tātsthyāt tāvat mañcā hasanti girir dahyate. Tāddharmyāt jaṭinaṃ yāntaṃ brahmadatta ity āha. Brahmadatte yāni kāryāṇi jaṭiny api tāni kriyanta ity ato jaṭī brahmadatta ity ucyate. Tatsāmīpyāt gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ kūpe gargakulam. Tatsāhacaryāt kuntān praveśaya yaṣṭīḥ praveśayeti.* MB-K, vol. 2, p. 218, lines 14-19. And a fifth under Pāṇini 6.1.37: *...Tādarthyāt tācchabdyaṃ bhaviṣyati. Tad yathā indrārthā sthūṇendra iti.* MB-K, vol. 3, p. 32, line 12.

[19]The lord of death and the lord of wealth. Calling the king Kubera is equivalent to the saying "The king is as rich or magnanimous as Kubera."

[20]An *āḍhaka* is a measure of volume equivalent to approximately 7 lbs., 11 ozs. of grain. In the example, the word properly denotes the measure but is used to refer to the item measured, just as the word 'cup' in "a cup of flour" refers to the flour the cup measures.

[21]The word *'tulā'* properly denotes a balance but in this usage refers to the standard weight of sandal-wood powder.

[22]Vātsyāyana takes the word *'gotra'* properly to denote the extended family but to refer secondarily to the head of the extended family. It is this second meaning which Pāṇini states in *sūtras* 4.1.162-65. 4.1.162. *Apatyaṃ pautraprabhṛti gotram.* A descendant beginning with a grandson is (termed) *gotra*. 4.1.163. *Jīvati tu vaṃśye yuvā.* But if a direct male ancestor of his lives, he is (termed) *yuvan*. 4.1.164. *Bhrātari ca jyāyasi.* Or if an elder brother of his lives (he is termed *yuvan*). 4.1.165. *Vānyasmin sapiṇḍe sthaviratare jīvati.* Optionally if another elder kinsman (descended from the same great grandfather) lives (he is termed *yuvan*).

[23]The *sūtra* states that secondary reference occurs when there is a cause for it and lists ten causes with corresponding examples. Note that the *sūtra* has a mixed mode of referring to an example of the secondary use of a word. In some cases the *sūtra* uses a word which has primary and secondary meanings, in other

Yaṣṭikāyāṃ tāvad ayaṃ yaṣṭikāśabdo jātinimittaḥ. Yaṣṭikātvaṃ jātiḥ. Sā yaṣṭikāyāṃ varttate. tayā yaṣṭikātvayuktayā yaṣṭikayā brāhmaṇasya yogaḥ. Sāhacaryāt saṃyuktasamavetāṃ jātiṃ brāhmaṇe 'dhyāropya brāhmaṇaṃ yaṣṭikety āha. Evaṃ śeṣāṇy upacārabījāni svayam utprekṣaṇīyānīti.[24]

The word 'staff' used for a staff has a generic property as its semantic condition. That generic property is staffhood. It is present in the staff. A *brāhmaṇa* is connected to a staff which is connected to the generic property staffhood. Due to accompaniment, one superimposes the generic property inherent in that to which he is connected, and hence one calls the *brāhmaṇa* a staff. The reader should understand the rest of the reasons for secondary usage in a similar manner himself.

Yadi gaur ity asya padasya na vyaktir arthaḥ, astu tarhi

(Objector:) If the object denoted by this word 'cow' is not an individual, then let it be

2.2.63. Ākṛtis tadapekṣatvāt sattvavyavasthāna-siddheḥ.

A form is the object denoted because one depends on that to succeed in determining what the substance is.

Ākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ.

A) A form is the object denoted by the word.

Kasmāt?

(Proponent:) Why?

Tadapekṣatvāt sattvavyavasthānasiddheḥ. Sattvāvayavānāṃ tad-avayavānāṃ ca niyato vyūha ākṛtiḥ. Tasyāṃ gṛhyamāṇāyāṃ sattvavyavasthānaṃ sidhyati: ayaṃ gaur ayam aśva iti, nāgṛhyamāṇāyām. Yasya grahaṇāt sattvavyavasthānaṃ sidhyati, taṃ śabdo 'bhidhātum arhati, so 'syārtha iti. 63.

(Objector:) Because one depends on that to succeed in determining what the substance is.[25] Form is the fixed

---

cases it refers directly to the secondary meaning by using a word which has that meaning as its primary sense. The first group includes examples 2, 3, and 7; the latter group includes examples 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1912-19: 1020 note 1) not recognizing this, erroneously asserts that all but the first are terms "that are figuratively applied to things other than those directly denoted by them." Although he interprets examples 5 and 6 so that the word for the measured item (*prameya*) applies to the the unit of measure (*pramāṇa*) (the reverse of what I have said); even doing so, only half of the examples have the characteristic he asserts all but the first have.

[24]ND, p. 664.

[25]Only seeing the form can one determine what type of substance it is (*dravyasvarūpanirṇaya*).

configuration of the parts of a substance and of their parts. If one grasps that, one succeeds in determining specifically what the substance is, "This is a cow, this is a horse," but one doesn't succeed if one doesn't grasp that. A word should denote that due to the comprehension of which one determines specifically what the substance is. That is the object denoted by the word.

Naitad upapadyate. Yasya jātyā yogas, tad atra jātiviśiṣṭam abhidhīyate gaur iti. Na cāvayavavyūhasya jātyā yogaḥ.
B) (Proponent:) This doesn't make sense. Whatever is connected with the generic property, that, qualified by the generic property, is denoted by the word 'cow' here. And the configuration of parts is not connected with the generic property.

Kasya tarhi?
(Objector:) What is (connected with the generic property)?

Niyatāvayavavyūhasya dravyasya. Tasmān nākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ.
(Proponent:) The substance whose parts are in a fixed configuration. Therefore, it is not the case that the form is the object denoted by the word.

> ....*Atrāpi tad evopasthitaṃ.* ***Na tadanavasthānād*** *iti. Yasya ca jātyā yogaḥ sa gośabdasya viṣayaḥ, nākṛtir jātyayogāt....*[26] 63.
> Here too the (above *sūtra* 2.2.61), **"No because one would not determine what the object is,"** is present. That which has a connection with the generic property is the object of the word 'cow', not the form because it does not have a connection with the generic property.

Astu tarhi jātiḥ padārthaḥ.
(Objector:) Then let the generic property be the object denoted by the word.
2.2.64. Vyaktyākṛtiyukte 'py aprasaṅgāt prokṣaṇādīnāṃ mṛdgavake, jātiḥ.
Because one does not erroneously wash, etc. a clay model cow, even though it is an individual and has a form, the generic property is the object denoted by a word.
Jātiḥ padārthaḥ.
The generic property is the object denoted by a word.

Kasmāt?
(Proponent:) Why?

---

[26]ND, pp. 665.

Vyaktyākṛtiyukte 'pi mṛdgavake prokṣaṇādīnām aprasaṅgād iti. Gāṃ prokṣaya gām ānaya gāṃ dehīti naitāni mṛdgavake prayujyante.
(Objector:) Because washing, etc. do not erroneously apply to a clay model cow, even though it is an individual and has a form.[27] The sentences, "Wash the cow, bring a cow, give a cow," are not used for a clay model cow.

Kasmāt?
(Proponent:) Why?

Jāter abhāvāt. Asti hi tatra vyaktiḥ. Asty ākṛtiḥ. Yadabhāvāt tatrāsaṃpratyayaḥ, sa padārtha iti. 64.
1) (Objector:) Because the generic property is absent. 2) There is an individual present; there is a form. 3) That due to the absence of which one does not comprehend the object is the object denoted by the word.

> *Yasmān mṛdgavake vyaktyākṛtī staḥ, na ca tatra prokṣaṅādīni prayujyante. Na hi gām ānaya, gāṃ dehīti mṛdgavake praiṣasampratipattī bhavataḥ. Yadabhāvāt tatrāsampratyayaḥ, sa gośabdasyārthaḥ.*
> U1) Because there is an individual substance and a form in a clay model cow, yet one does not perform washing, etc. on it. In the sentences, "Bring a cow, Give a cow," the speaker does not intend, nor does the hearer comprehend, that the action be performed on the clay model cow. That due to the absence of which (in the model) one does not understand the model as the object of action is the object denoted by the word 'cow'.
>
> *Kasyābhāvāt tatrāsampratyayaḥ?*
> (Buddhist:) Due to the absence of what does one not understand the model as the object of action?
>
> *Jāteḥ.*
> (Jātivādin:) The generic property.
>
> *Atha mṛdgavake kasmād gotvaṃ na jātiḥ?*
> U2a) (Buddhist:) Well, why isn't cowness the generic property in a clay model cow?
>
> *Yasmān mṛdgavako gaur na bhavati, yaś ca gaur na, na tatra gotvaṃ vartate, yathāśva iti.*

---

[27]The word *'gavaka'*, meaning an imitation of a cow, is formed by Pāṇini 5.3.96. See 1.2.64 trans. note 7.

(Jātivādin:) Because a clay model cow is not a cow, and cowness is not present in that which is not a cow, just as it is not present in a horse.

Atha mṛdgavakaḥ kasmād gaur na bhavatīti?
(Buddhist:) Well, why is a clay model cow not a cow?

Ata eva gaur na bhavati, yasmān mṛdgavaka iti. Na cāyaṃ yuktaḥ praśnaḥ: Mṛdgavakaḥ kasmād gaur na bhavatīti.
(Jātivādin:) It is not a cow just for the reason that it is a clay model cow. Nor does your question make sense, "Why is a clay model cow not a cow?"

Kiṃ kāraṇam?
(Buddhist:) Why?

Pratipattibādhitatvāt. Bhavān apy enam arthaṃ pratipadyate: Nāyaṃ gaur iti. Patipattyā ca praśno bādhyata iti.
(Jātivādin:) Because your understanding blocks it. You also understand this fact that it is not a cow. And understanding the answer blocks the question.

Atha mṛdgavake gośabdaḥ kutaḥ?
b) (Buddhist:) Then why does one use the word 'cow' for the clay model cow?

Ākṛtisāmānyāt citrādivad iti.
(Jātivādin:) Because the form is the same, just as the form shown in a picture is the same as the form of the object it depicts.

Sarvagateti cet.
(Buddhist:) It is all-pervading.

Atha manyase: Sarvagatā jātiḥ. Sotpadyamānena yathā gavā sambadhyate tathā mṛdgavakenāpīti asti mṛdgavake gotvaṃ. Na, anabhyupagamāt. Kena sarvagatatvaṃ jāter abhyupagamyate, api tu svaviṣaye sarvatra varttata iti sarvagatety ucyate.
(Jātivādin:) You think the following: The generic property is all-pervading. Just as it is connected to a cow upon coming into being, it is connected to a clay model cow; hence, there is cowness in a clay model cow. This is wrong because no one accepts it. No one accepts that the generic property is all pervading; however, they say it is

all-pervading because it is present everywhere in its own domain.

Kaḥ punar gotvasya svo viṣayaḥ?
(Buddhist:) But what is cowness's own domain?

Yatra gotvaṃ varttate.
(Jātivādin:) Where cowness is present.

Kva punar gotvam varttate?
(Buddhist:) But where is cowness present?

Yatra gotvanimitto 'nuvṛttapratyayo bhavati.
(Jātivādin:) Where there is the recurrent cognition caused by cowness.

Kva punar anuvṛttapratyayaṃ gotvaṃ karoti?
(Buddhist:) But with respect to what does cowness cause the recurrent cognition?

Yat tasya sādhanam.
(Jātivādin:) With respect to that which is the means of establishing it.

Kaḥ punar nitye gotve goḥ sādhanārthaḥ?
(Buddhist:) But if cowness is eternal, how does a cow serve as a means of establishing it?

Yat tena vyajyate. Na hi kakudādimadarthavyatirekeṇa gotvasya abhivyaktir asti.
c) (Jātivādin:) In that it is manifested by a cow. Cowness is not manifest in the absence of an object which has a hump, etc.

Na hi piṇḍebhyo 'rthāntaraṃ gotvam, piṇḍāntarāleṣv adarśanād iti Kecit.
U3) (Buddhist:) Some say that cowness is not a separate object from the bodies themselves because it is not found between the bodies.

Na vikalpānupapatteḥ. Piṅḍāntarāleṣv adarśanād iti bruvāṇaḥ piṇḍāntarālaṃ paryanuyojyaḥ: Kim idaṃ piṇḍāntarālaṃ, kim ākāśam āho abhāva uta dravyāntaram? Yady ākāśam, na tatra gotvam; na hy ākāśaṃ gaur iti. Etenābhāvo dravyāntaraṃ ca vyākhyātam. Viśeṣapratyayānām anākasmikatvāc ca. Ayaṃ ca piṇḍapratyayavyatirekabhāk pratyaya upajāyamāno nimittāntarād bhavati. Dṛṣṭā khalu piṇḍa-

pratyayavyatirekabhājāṃ pratyayānāṃ nimittāntarād utpattiḥ. Yathā vastracarmakambaleṣu nīlapratyaya iti.
(Jātivādin:) No a) because the alternatives don't make sense. He who says, "because it is not found between the bodies," must be challenged with regard to what is between the bodies: What is this stuff between the bodies? Is it space (*ākāśa*), absence or another substance? If it is space, cowness is not there because space is not a cow. This explains absence and another substance too. b) And because distinct cognitions are not without any basis. The cognition which arises as distinct from the cognition of a body occurs from a different cause. One does see cognitions separate from the cognitions of bodies arising from other causes, for example, the cognition of blue in a cloth, a skin and a blanket.[28]

Ākṛtisāmānyād iti cet,
U4) (Buddhist:) (The same cognition arises with respect to different individual bodies) because their form is the same.

Atha manyase: Satyam ayam astu: piṇḍavyatirekanimittād anuvṛttipratayo bhavati na punar asya jātir nimittam, api tu yac chirahpāṇipādākṛtisāmānyam tasmād anuvṛtti-pratyaya iti. Na, piṇḍavad asādhāraṇatvād ākṛteḥ. Yathaiva piṇḍāḥ piṇḍāntaravṛttayo na bhavanti, tathākṛtir api ekapiṇḍavarttitvāt piṇḍāntaravarttinī na bhavati. Ākṛteḥ piṇḍāntaravarttitvam abhyupagamyate, nāmni vivādo 'nārtha iti. Atha piṇḍavyatiriktaṃ sāmānyaṃ nābhyupagamyate, tathāpy ekasāmānyanirākaraṇāt samānapratyayabījam anyad vaktavyaṃ syāt. Na hy asati sāmānye samānapratyayaṃ paśyāma iti.
(Jātivādin:) Suppose you think the following: It may be true that something different from the body causes the cognition of recurrence, but a generic property doesn't; rather, the fact that the form (arrangement) of the head, hands, and feet is the same causes the cognition of recurrence. a) This is wrong, because each form is unique, just as a body is. Just as bodies do not occur in other bodies, a form does not occur in another body either, because it occurs in only one body. b) If you

---

[28]One sees the quality blue in different substances. The fact that one has the same cognition with respect to different substances shows that the cognition of the quality is different from the cognition of the substances. Different cognitions have different bases so the quality blue is not identical to the substance in which it inheres. Just as a quality is not simply identical to the substance in which it inheres so the generic property is not either.

accept that a form does occur in other bodies, argument over a name is pointless. (What you call a form; we call a generic property.) c) If you do not accept that there is any general property distinct from the body; nevertheless because you have denied that there is one general property, you have to state another cause of the same cognition. We just do not see the same cognition if there is no general property.

Asaty api sāmānye dṛṣṭaḥ sāmānyaprataya iti cet,
U5) (Buddhist:) One does see the same cognition even if there is no general property.

Atha manyase: Yathā sāmānyeṣv asati sāmānyāntare 'nuvṛttapratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ, gotvādiṣu idaṃ sāmānyam, idaṃ sāmānyam iti; tasmād anaikāntikatvād, anuvṛttipratyayo 'sādhanam arthāntarapratipādana iti. Na, anabhyupagamāt. Na mayā gotvaghaṭatvāśvatveṣu nirnimittaḥ sāmānyapratyayo 'bhyupagamyate. Tasmād anuttaram etat.
(Jātivādin:) If you think the following: Because one does see the recurrent cognition with respect to each of the general properties cowness, etc., that it is a general property, even when there is no other general property (in each which causes the same cognition with respect to each); therefore, because it is not consistent, the cognition of recurrence does not succeed in implying that there is another object. This is wrong because we do not accept that. I do not accept that the same cognition with respect to the general properties cowness, potness, and horseness is without cause.

Sūtravyāghāta iti cet,
(Buddhist:) You contradict your *sūtra*.

Yadi manyase: Sāmānyeṣv api sāmānyam astīti nanu sūtravyāghātaḥ, "Sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt, tata eva jñānam" iti? Na sūtrārthāparijñānāt. Ayaṃ sūtrārthaḥ: Yathā dravyam iti pratyayo dravyatvaviśeṣaṇo dravye bhavati na punaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣeṣv evam iti. Na punar ayaṃ sūtārthaḥ: Nirnimitto 'nuvṛttipratyaya iti.
(Jātivādin:) If you think the following: Accepting that there is a general property even in general properties, don't you contradict the *sūtra*, "Because there is no specific general property in specific general properties, one knows (that it is a general property) from those very

things"?[29] This is wrong, because you have not understood what the *sūtra* means. The *sūtra* means the following: The cognition "substance," qualified by the general property substanceness, occurs with respect to a substance, but it is not so that the cognition "general specific property" which occurs with respect to specific general properties is qualified by another general property, namely, general-property-ness. But the *sūtra* does not mean that the cognition of recurrence with respect to general properties is without any cause.

Kiṃnimittam iti cet,
(Buddhist:) What is its cause.

Atha manyase: Gotvādiṣv anuvṛttipratyayasya kiṃ nimittam? Yataḥ sāmānyam iti bhavati.
(Jātivādin:) If you wonder, "what is the cause of the cognition of recurrence with respect to the general properties cowness, etc.?" the cause is that because of which one knows that it is a general property.

Kutaḥ sāmānyam iti bhavati?
(Buddhist:) Because of what does one know that it is a general property?

Anekārthasamavāyāt. Yathā gotvam anekārthasamavāyi tathāśvatvādīty anekārthais tatsamavāyasya samānatvāt, gotvādiṣv anuvṛttipratyaya iti.
(Jātivādin:) Because it inheres in more than one object. Just as cowness inheres in many objects so do horseness, etc. Therefore, because each general property is the same in that it has the inherence relation with many objects, there is cognition of recurrence with respect to general properties cowness, etc.

Pācakādiśabdavad iti cet,
U6) (Buddhist:) It is just like the words 'cook', etc.

Atha manyase: Yathā pācakādiśabdā anuvṛttapratyayāś ca bhavanti, na ca pācakatvaṃ nāma sāmānyaviśeṣo 'sti tathā gavādiṣv anuvṛttapratyaya iti. Na hetvarthāparijñānāt. Viśeṣapratyayānām anākasmikatvād ity asya hetoḥ piṇḍapratyayavyatiriktasya pratyayasya nimittāntarād utpāda ity ayam arthaḥ, na punaḥ sarvo 'nuvṛttipratyayaḥ sāmānyād eva bhavatīti. Evaṃ sati pacanakriyāyāṃ yat

[29] Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 8.1.5. VS, p. 62.

pradhānaṃ sādhanaṃ tat pācakaśabdenocyate. Tac ca prādhānyaṃ pācakāntare 'py astīti na doṣaḥ.
(Jātivādin:) If you think the following: Just as the words 'cook', etc., and the accompanying recurrent cognitions, occur, yet there is no general property cookness, similarly there is recurrent cognition with respect to cows, etc. (even without a general property cowness). You are wrong, because you do not understand what the reason (for recurrent cognition which we stated above) means. The reason, "Because distinct cognitions are not without basis," means that the cognition which is distinct from the cognition of a body arises from a different cause. It does not mean that all recurrent cognition occurs only because of a general property. This being the case, the word 'cook' denotes the most important participant in the action of cooking. That importance occurs in other cooks too. Hence there is no problem.
....tasmād upapannā jātiḥ. Na cāsau mṛdgavaka iti. Yadabhāvāt tatrāsampratyayaḥ sa padārtha iti. 64.[30]
(Jātivādin:) Therefore, the concept of a generic property is sound. And the generic property cowness is not present in a clay model cow. That due to the absence of which, one does not understand the model as the object of action is the object denoted by the word 'cow'.

2.2.65. Na, ākṛtivyaktyapekṣatvāj jātyabhivyakteḥ.
(Proponent:) **No, because the manifestation of the generic property depends on the form and individual.**
Jāter abhivyaktir ākṛtivyaktī apekṣate. Nāgṛhyamāṇāyām ākṛtau vyaktau, jātimātraṃ śuddhaṃ gṛhyate. Tasmān na jātiḥ padārtha iti. 65.
The manifestation of the generic property depends on the form and individual. One does not grasp just the pure generic property, unless one grasps the form and individual. Therefore it is not the case that just a generic property is the object denoted by a word.

....Ākṛtiviśeṣaṇatvaṃ vyakteḥ. Yasmād vyaktyā viśeṣyamāṇā ākṛtir jāter liṅgaṃ bhavati, tasmāt pradhānam ākṛtiḥ....[31] *65.*
....The individual qualifies the form. Because the form qualified by the individual is an inferential mark of the generic property, therefore the form is principal....

---

[30]ND, pp. 666-68, 669.
[31]ND, pp. 670.

Na vai padārthena na bhavituṃ śakyam. Kaḥ khalv idānīṃ padārtha iti?
(Objector:) Well, it can't be the case that there is no object denoted by a word. So then what object is denoted by a word?

2.2.66. Vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ.
(Proponent:) **But the individual, form and generic property** (together) **are the object denoted by a word.**
Tuśabdo viśeṣaṇārthaḥ.
The word 'but' is for the purpose of a qualification.

Kiṃ viśiṣyate?
(Objector:) What is the qualification?

Pradhānāṅgabhāvasyāniyamena padārthatvam iti. A) Yadā hi bhedavivakṣā viśeṣagatiś ca, tadā vyaktiḥ pradhānam, aṅgaṃ tu jātyākṛtī. B) Yadā tu bhedo 'vivakṣita sāmānyagatis, tadā jātiḥ pradhānam, aṅgaṃ tu vyaktyākṛtī. Tad etad bahulaṃ prayogeṣu. C) Ākṛtes tu pradhānabhāva utprekṣitavyaḥ. 66.
(Proponent:) The object denoted by a word is the aggregate in which any one of the three is principal and the other two subordinate. A) When a speaker intends an object as distinguished from others of its kind (*bhedavivakṣā*) and the hearer understands a specific object (*viśeṣagati*), then the individual is principal, and the generic property and form are subordinate. B) When a speaker does not intend an object as distinguished from others of its kind (*bhedo 'vivakṣitaḥ*) and the hearer understands generality (*sāmānyagati*), then the generic property is principal and the individual and form are subordinate. Which is principal and which subordinate varies according to each usage. C) One should understand the form as principal in a similar manner.

> *Pradhānopasarjanabhāvasyāniyamena padārthatvam: Yadā bhedavivakṣā viśeṣagatiś ca, gaus tiṣṭhati gaur niṣaṇṇeti, tadā vyaktiḥ padārthaḥ, aṅgaṃ jātyākṛtī; jātāv ākṛtau ca sthānagamanādīnām abhāvād yatra sambhavaḥ sa padārtha iti. Yadā punar bhedo na vivakṣitaḥ sāmānyāvagatiś ca, tadā jātiḥ padārthaḥ, yathā gaur na padā spraṣṭavyeti. Ākṛteś ca* ***pradhānabhāva utprekṣitavya*** *iti svayam utprekṣya ity ayam arthaḥ.*
> U1) The object denoted by the word is the aggregate in which any one of the three is principal and the other two subordinate. a) When a speaker intends an object as distinguished from others of its kind (*bhedavivakṣā*) and the hearer understands a specific object (*viśeṣagati*), for example, "The cow is standing, the cow is sitting," then the individual is principal, and the generic property and form are subordinate. Because standing and going, etc.,

do not subsist in a generic property or a form, that in which they are possible is the principal object denoted by the word.[32] b) But when a speaker does not intend an object as distinguished from others of its kind (*bhedo 'vivakṣitaḥ*) and the hearer understands generality (*sāmānyagati*), then the generic property is the principal object denoted by the word, for example, "One should not kick a cow." c) (Vatsyāyana's statement) "One should understand the form as principal in a similar manner" means one should understand it as similar oneself.

Kva punar ākṛteḥ prādhānyaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ?
(Objector:) But where does one see the form being principal?

Yathā piṣṭakamayyo gāvaḥ kriyantām iti. Tad etad bahulaṃ prayogeṣu pradhānopasarjanabhāvaḥ svayam utprekṣya iti.[33]
(Proponent:) An example is "Make cows consisting of flour." Because it varies according to each usage, one should understand which one is principal and which subordinate in a similar manner oneself.
....Na hi kaścit tāntriko 'sti yo jātiśabdavācyān bhedān pratipadyate. Jāter apy avācakatve vyāghāto jātiśabda iti. Na hi yo yasyāvācakaḥ sa tacchabda iti śakyaṃ vaktum. Na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka iti....[34] 66.
U2) There is no logician who thinks that a generic term denotes individuals alone. If it did not denote the generic property too, it would fail to be a generic term. You simply cannot call that which does not denote x an x-word. A generic term does not denote individuals alone.

Kathaṃ punar jñāyate, nānā vyaktyākṛtijātaya iti?
(Objector:) But how does one know that the individual, form, and generic property are different from each other.

Lakṣaṇabhedāt. Tatra tāvad:
(Proponent:) Because they have different definitions. Concerning these,
2.2.67. Vyaktir guṇaviśeṣāśrayo mūrtiḥ.
An individual is the physical body which is the substratum of specific qualities.

---

[32]See example 1 under Gautama 2.2.60.
[33]ND, p. 671.
[34]ND, pp. 679.

Vyajyata iti vyaktir indriyagrāhyeti na sarvaṃ dravyaṃ vyaktiḥ. Yo guṇaviśeṣāṇāṃ sparśāntānāṃ gurutvaghanatvadravatva-saṃskārāṇām avyāpinaḥ parimāṇasyāśrayo yathāsaṃbhavaṃ, tad dravyaṃ mūrtir mūrchitāvayavatvād iti. 67.
An individual, literally that which is manifested, is perceptible by the senses; hence not every substance (*dravya*) is an individual (*vyakti*). That substance which is the substratum, as possible, of the specific qualities ending with touch, as well as weight, density, fluidity, resilience and finite measure, is a physical body because it is composed of parts.[35]

> *Guṇaviśeṣagrahaṇaṃ kimartham? Guṇapadārthena saṅgṛhītāyā ākṛter nirākaraṇārtham: Ākṛtiḥ saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ, sā ca guṇagrahaṇena saṅgṛhīteti tannirākaraṇārthaṃ guṇaviśeṣagrahaṇam....*[36] 67.
> Why mention the word *'guṇaviśeṣa'* in the definition of an individual (*vyakti*)? In order to exclude a form (*ākṛti*) which is included in the class of entities qualities. A form is a specific conjunction, and mentioning qualities includes it. Hence, mentioning qualities and specific properties in the definition of an individual serves to exclude a form from being an individual.

2.2.68. Ākṛtir jātiliṅgākhyā.
A form is that which makes known the generic property and its indicatory marks.[37]
Yayā jātir jātiliṅgāni ca prakhyāyante, tām ākṛtiṃ vidyāt. Sā ca nānyā sattvānāṃ tadavayavānāṃ ca niyatād vyūhād iti. Niyatāvayavavyūhāḥ khalu sattvāvayavā jātiliṅgam, śirasā pādena gām anuminvanti. Niyate ca sattvāvayavānāṃ vyūhe sati gotvaṃ

---

[35]Gautama 1.1.14 states that the qualities smell, taste, color, touch and sound, which are the qualities of the substances earth, water, fire, air and space, are the objects of the five senses. Gautama 3.1.62-63 state that all five qualities belong to earth, the last four belong to water, the last three belong to fire, etc. 1.1.14. *Gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇās tadarthāḥ.* ND, p. 202. 3.1.62. *Gandharasarūpasparśaśabdānāṃ sparśaparyantāḥ pṛthivyāḥ.* 3.1.63. *Aptejovāyūnāṃ pūrvaṃ pūrvam apohyākāśasyottaraḥ.* ND, p. 795. Because they are perishable and are characteristic of certain substances, they are called specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇa* or *vaiśeṣikaguṇa*). See Frauwallner (1956: vol. 2, 86-89). Nevertheless, it is possible that the word *'guṇaviśeṣa'* here means just certain qualities. Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya (p. 152) translate "some qualities" in the *sūtra*, and just "qualities" in the Bhāṣya.
Because Vātsyāyana mentions "finite measure" he excludes the all-pervading substances: *ākāśa, kāla, dik,* and *ātman.* The last clause, "composed of parts," excludes *manas* and the *paramāṇus* of the other four elements. That leaves substances which are aggregates consisting of earth, air, fire, and water, to be called *vyakti.*

[36]ND, p. 691.

[37]Ruben, disregarding Vātsyāyana's interpretation, takes the *sūtra* to say just that a form is known as the mark of the generic property. He translates (1928: 57), "Die Form nennt man: Merkmal des Genus."

prakhyāyata iti. Anākṛtivyaṅgyāyāṃ jātau, mṛt, suvarṇam, rajatam, ity evamādiṣv ākṛtir nivartate, jahāti padārthatvam. 68.
1) Know that, by means of which one knows the generic property and its indicatory marks, to be the form. And that is none other than the fixed configuration of the parts of a substance and of their parts. The parts of the substance, which (in turn) have a fixed configuration of their parts, are the indicatory mark of the generic property. People infer, by its head or by its foot, that an object is a cow. Cowness is also known if the fixed configuration of parts is present.[38] 2) If one does not know the generic property by means of a form, as in clay, gold, and silver, the form recedes, gives up being the object denoted by the word.

> *....Niyatavyūhāḥ khalv avayavā jātim anumāpayanti: śiraḥpāṇyādimadākārasāmānyena gotvaṃ vyajyate iti. Śiraḥpāṇyādīnāṃ vāvayavaviśeṣāṇāṃ darśanena.*
> U1) ....The parts in a fixed arrangement cause one to infer the generic property: the general form consisting of a head, hooves, etc. manifests cowness. Or seeing certain parts, the head, hooves, etc. manifests cowness.
> *Kadācid punar iyam ākṛtiḥ padārthatvaṃ jahāti.*
> U2) But sometimes the form gives up being the object denoted by the word.
>
> *Kva punar jahāti?*
> Where does it give it up?
>
> *Yatrākṛtivyaṅgyā jātir na bhavati yathā mṛtsuvarṇarajatam iti. Ākṛtau niyamo na jātau: sarvākṛtir jātiliṅgam iti na punaḥ sarvā jātir ākṛtyā liṅgyate.*[39] 68.
> Where the generic property is not manifested by a form, for example, clay, gold, and silver. The *sūtra* restricts the form, not the generic property: every form is an indicatory mark of a generic property, but not every generic property is indicated by a form.

2.2.69. Samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ.

A generic property is that whose nature is to produce the same cognition.

Yā samānāṃ buddhiṃ prasūte bhinneṣv adhikaraṇeṣu, yayā bahūnītaretarato na vyāvartante, yo 'rtho 'nekatra pratyayānuvṛtti-nimittaṃ, tat sāmānyam. Yac ca keṣāṃcid abhedaṃ kutaścid bhedaṃ karoti, tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātir iti. 69.
1) That which produces the same cognition in different substrata, that by which many things are not differentiated from each other,

---

[38]Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 2.1.8, *Viṣāṇī kakudmān prāntevāladhiḥ sāsnāvān iti gotve dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgam*, states that in the case of a cow, having certain features is the inferential mark of the generic property cowness. VS, p. 12.
[39]ND, p. 692.

that object which causes the same cognition to recur with respect to many objects, is the ultimate general property. 2) And that, which makes some things the same as each other, and yet differentiates them from other things, is a specific general property (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*), a generic property (*jāti*).

> *...Jātau niyamo na samānapratyayotpattau, jātim antareṇāpi dṛṣṭatvāt: jātim antareṇāpi samānapratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ, yathā pācakādiṣu....*[40] 69.
>
> ....The *sūtra* restricts the generic property, not the occurrence of the same cognition, because one sees the same cognition even without a generic property: One sees the same cognition even without a generic property, for example, in a cook, etc.

---

[40]ND, p. 693.

Mīmāṃsā

3.1. Background

3.1.1. Dharma, Injunctions, and Means of Knowledge

The Mīmāṃsā system of Indian philosophy investigates *dharma*.[1] *Dharma* is that object (*artha*) conducive to the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*) which is indicated by a Vedic injunction.[2] As an object indicated by an injunction, *dharma* is duty, an action to be performed.[3] Because it is yet to be brought about, it is not present and so cannot be perceived by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).[4] The other means of knowledge, inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*) depend on direct perception.[5] Speech (*śabda*) does not

---

[1]1.1.1. *Athāto dharmajijñāsā.*

[2]1.1.2. *Codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ.* Śabara introduces the *sūtra* saying, "(*Dharma*) unites a man with the highest good (*Sa hi niḥśreyasena puruṣaṃ saṃyunakti*)." MD, part 1, p. 13. Similarly he summarizes the meaning of the *sūtra* as follows: *Tayā (codanayā) yo lakṣyate so 'rthaḥ puruṣaṃ niḥśrayasena saṃyunakti.* The object indicated by an injunction unites a man with the highest good. MD, part 1, p. 15. Further on he states that the Vedic performances Jyotiṣṭoma etc. are such objects (*Ko 'rthaḥ? Yo niḥśrayasāya jyotiṣṭomādiḥ*). MD, part 1, p. 21. The exact nature of *dharma*, whether it is the action itself or an object beyond the range of the senses manifested by the action, how it is indicated by an injunction, how it brings about the highest good, what the nature of the highest good is, and other questions are all debated at length throughout the history of Mīmāṃsā. We just touch on the tip of such questions here as background to the perspective from which Mīmāṃsā approaches the question of what a generic term denotes. For a general introduction to various topics in Mīmāṃsā see Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1942) or Pashupatinath Sastri (1923).

[3]Śabara: *Codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam āhuḥ.* They say an injunction (*codanā*) is an utterance which urges one to action. MD, part 1, p. 14.

[4]*1.1.4. Satsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam; animittam, vidyamānopalambhanatvāt.* Direct perception is the cognition which arises for a person (*puruṣa*) when the senses come into contact with an existing object. It cannot cause knowledge of *dharma* because it is a perception of an existing thing.

[5]Concluding his commentary on 1.1.4, Śabara says, "Because they presuppose perception, inference, analogy and presumption do not cause knowledge of *dharma* (*Pratyakṣapūrvakatvāc cānumānopamānārthāpattīnām apy akāraṇatvam*)." But it is not the case that *dharma* does not exist because verbal instruction gives knowledge of it. Śabara introduces the next *sūtra* saying, "*Abhāvo 'pi nāsti, yataḥ...*" MD, part 1, p. 27. Kumārila takes non-perception

necessarily; it can be independent. Hence it is the only means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) of objects beyond the range of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), and in particular, of *dharma* (1.1.5).

Cognition is inherently positive and subject to doubt only as regards its cause. Although the validity of human speech may be doubted because of contradictory evidence from other sources or suspicion of the author of the speech; the Veda is not subject to doubt because, being authorless (*apauruṣeya*) and eternal, it is not caused, and, being the sole authority regarding *dharma*, it cannot be contradicted. Hence, the Veda has self-evident authority (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) regarding *dharma*.

3.1.2. Vedic and Ordinary Words and Meanings

The ability of the Veda to give knowledge of duty rests on the ability of an ordinary word to convey knowledge of an object. The Veda makes known duty by enjoining an action to be performed. If the words in the Veda were unintelligible, they would be unable to enjoin one to act. One can only act upon the statements made in the Veda, if one understands its sentences, and can only carry out its injunctions if the acts it enjoins and the objects used in those acts are familiar. One can only understand its injunctive sentences if one understands the words of which they are composed. Understanding the words depends on the fact that they are the same as ordinary words and on the fact that their meanings are the same which one knows ordinary words to have. Therefore, the words that occur in the Veda and their meanings are the same as the words that occur in ordinary usage and their meanings (1.3.30 Lokavedādhikaraṇa).

Once it has been determined that Vedic words and meanings are the same as ordinary words and meanings, Mīmāṃsā can raise the question whether Vedic words denote the generic property or the individual substance. If Vedic words and meanings were different from ordinary words and meanings the question would be pointless because there would be no way to determine the meaning of Vedic words. Because they are the same as ordinary words and meanings, the same methods used to determine what ordinary words denote can be applied to Vedic words. Furthermore, because their meanings are the same, if ordinary words denote the generic property so will Vedic words, or if ordinary words denote the individual substance so will Vedic words (I).

(*anupalabdhi*) to be a separate means of knowledge regarding something's absence.

3.1.3. Sentence Meaning

One comprehends the meaning of a sentence based upon one's comprehension of the meanings of the individual words. Sentences do not have an independent relation to a sentence-meaning as an independent entity.[6] One cannot presume such an independent relation because one can account for comprehension of the sentence-meaning otherwise.[7] Vedic sentences are eternal;

---

[6]*1.1.25. Tadbhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāyo 'rthasya tannimittatvāt.* **A sentence consists of words denoting their word-meanings together with a word denoting action because the sentence-meaning is caused by** (the word-meanings). Śabara: *Teṣv eva padārtheṣu bhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samuccāraṇam. Nānapekṣya padārthān pārthagarthyena vākyam arthāntaraprasiddham.* Words occurring in the same meanings they denote independently are spoken together with a word denoting action (to form a sentence). A sentence is not known in another meaning independent of and not based on the meanings of its words. MD, part 1, p. 115.

[7]*Nanv arthāpattir asti yat padārthavyatiriktam artham avagacchāmaḥ, na ca śaktim antareṇa tad avakalpyata iti.* (Objector:) Doesn't one presume (that the sentence has a capacity, independent of its constituent words, to denote an independent meaning) as follows: We do understand a meaning over and above the meanings of the words, and we can't imagine (how that meaning can occur) without (the sentence having) the capacity to denote meaning. *Tan na. Arthasya tannimittatvāt. Bhaved arthāpattir yady asatyām api śaktau nānyan nimittam avakalpyeta. Avagamyate tu nimittam.* (Proponent:) That is not so, because the sentence-meaning is caused by the word-meanings. One could presume that the sentence had a signifying capacity independent of its constituent words if without such a signifying capacity no other cause of the sentence-meaning would be possible. But a cause is understood. *Kim?* (Objector:) What? *Padārthāḥ. Padāni hi svaṃ svaṃ padārtham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi. Athedānīṃ padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārthaṃ gamayanti.* (Proponent:) The word-meanings. Each word denotes its own meaning and finishes its work with that. Then at that stage the word-meanings being understood convey the sentence-meaning. *Katham?* (Objector:) How? *Yathā hi śukla iti vā kṛṣṇa iti vā guṇaḥ pratīto bhavati. Bhavati khalv asāv alaṃ guṇavati pratyayam ādhātum. Tena guṇavati pratyayam icchantaḥ kevalaṃ guṇavacanam uccārayanti. Saṃpatsyata eṣāṃ yathāsaṃkalpito 'bhiprāyaḥ. Bhaviṣyati viśiṣṭārthasaṃpratyayaḥ. Viśiṣṭārthasaṃpratyayaś ca vākyārthaḥ. Evaṃ ced avagamyate 'nyata eva vākyārthaḥ, ko jātucid: adṛṣṭā padasamudāyasya śaktir arthād avagamyata iti vadiṣyati?* (Proponent:) In just the following manner: From the word 'white' or the word 'black' the quality is cognized. That (quality) is sufficient by itself to supply the cognition of the qualified (substance) having that quality. Because that is so, those desiring (to convey) the cognition of the qualified (substance) speak just the word denoting the quality. Their intended import will occur. There will be cognition of the object qualified (by the denoted object). This cognition of the qualified object (*viśiṣṭārthasaṃpratyaya*) is the sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*). If in this way the sentence-meaning is accounted for even without (the sentence having an independent capacity to denote), who will ever say that one presumes an invisible capacity of the word-group from the presence of the sentence-meaning? MD, part 1, p. 116.
Śabara's explanation given of how the sentence-meaning arises is called *abhihitānvaya*. Kumārila expands this view. Concerning Prabhākara's *anvitābhidhāna*, the view that words denote meanings already linked, see Siderits (1991: 32-50, 79-86). Concerning Bhartṛhari's view that the sentence is

they are not composed. Therefore, if words, their meanings and the relation of the two are eternal, and the sentences of the Veda are eternal, so are the Vedic-sentence-meanings. Hence, the Veda is the sole authority concerning duty owing to the fact that words, their meanings and the word-meaning relations are eternal.

3.2. The Eternal Nature of a Word, its Meaning, and their Relation

Mīmāṃsā considers words, their meanings, and the relation between a word and its meaning to be eternal (1.1.5). A word's capacity to convey knowledge of an object (*śakti*) consists in a permanent relation between the word and the known object. Unless both the speaker and the listener already know the word-meaning relation, speaking the word will fail to convey the speaker's intention. In order that the relation be eternal, the relata must be eternal too.

The view that speech sounds, and their meaningful combinations in the form of words and Vedic sentences, are eternal is central to Mīmāṃsā. It is on the basis of the eternal nature of sound and the authorless (*apauruṣeya*) character of Vedic sentences that the Vedic injunctions are eternal. It is this eternal character which allows them to express a meaning entirely independent of the input of an author. This in turn gives them a status independent of perception and the other means of knowledge by which they are the sole authorities concerning *dharma*. Because of the importance of the eternal nature of speech sound in Mīmāṃsā, the major arguments for this view in the Tarkapāda as elaborated by Śabara are included in the following section. Selections from Śabara's commentary appear in the notes.[8]

---

the primary denoter, see Biardeau (1964).

[8]Consult Frauwallner (1961b) and D'Sa (1980) for further exploration of this topic. Jacobi (1929:148-49), although supposing that the Mīmāṃsakas take the doctrine of the eternal nature of speech from the grammarians, considers it unresolved whether the discussion in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.6-23 concerning whether speech is eternal or not rests on Vyāḍi's Saṅgraha or is original. The view that speech units, their objects and the relation between them is established is upheld in the Mahābhāṣya. In the first *vārttika*, Kātyāyana states that the relation between a word and the object it denotes is established (§1.1). Patañjali in commenting on it states that the word and object are also established, and Kātyāyana clearly holds this view. The view that they are transient is also considered. See §1.2.3 and the references in note 20. Vātsyāyana considers that the relation between a word and the object it denotes is conventional, and that speech sounds are producible and transient. See §2.1 and note 7.

3.2.2. Word

Speech sound (*śabda*), which in the form of Vedic injunctions is the means to know duty, is distinct from sound (*nāda*) which is a producible and perishable substance.[9] A word must be single and eternal because one uses it to convey meaning to others. If it were new each time it was spoken, it could not convey meaning because a single utterance cannot form a relation with a meaning. However, if the same word occurs repeatedly it can form a relation which, if known by both the user and hearer, allows the word to convey its meaning.[10]

One argument for the view that a word is new and different each time it is spoken deserves mention: A word appears simultaneously in many places. It is impossible for a single thing to be in many places at once. Hence, a word is many. Unless there is a difference an eternal entity is not considered to be many, but a producible entity is naturally as many as are produced. Therefore, because it is many, a word is not eternal.[11]

---

[9]**1.1.17. *Nādavṛddhiparā.* When one speaks of increase of volume one refers to the increase of sound (not speech sound).** Compare this with Śabara's remark on Jaimini 1.1.5 that a word is merely the speech sounds, nothing more, and his rejection of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. See the discussion, "*Atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ....Tasmād akṣarāṇy eva padam.*" MD, part 1, pp. 54-58. Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1933: vol. 1, 19-20).

[10]**1.1.18. *Nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt.* Speech sound must be eternal because it appears in order to convey meaning to others.** Śabara: *Nityaḥ śabdo bhavitum arhati. Kutaḥ? Darśanasya parārthatvāt. Darśanam uccāraṇam. Tat parārtham param arthaṃ pratyāyayitum. Uccaritamātre hi vinaṣṭe śabde na cānyo 'nyān arthaṃ pratyāyayituṃ śaknuyāt; ato na parārtham uccāryeta. Atha na vinaṣṭas tato bahuśa upalabdhatvād arthāvagama iti yuktam....na caikenoccāraṇayatnena saṃvyavahāraś cārthasaṃbandhaś ca kartum.* Speech sound must be eternal. Why? Because it appears for the purpose of others. Its appearance means its utterance. That is for the purpose of others, i.e. in order to convey meaning to others. If it were the case that a speech sound is destroyed as soon as it has been spoken, one would not be able to convey meaning to others. Hence, one would not utter speech for the sake of others. Now if it is not destroyed, then because it is perceived repeatedly, the comprehension of a denoted object (is possible). Hence this is correct. ...and by the effort of a single utterance, verbal intercourse cannot be carried out nor can a signifying relation with an object be formed. MD, part 1, pp. 101-102.

[11]***1.1.9. Sattvāntare ca yaugapadyāt.* Because a speech unit is found in different substances simultaneously.** Śabara: *Nānādeśeṣu ca yugapac chabdam upalabhāmahe; tad ekasya nityasyānupapannam iti. Asati viśeṣe nityasya nānekatvam. Kāryāṇāṃ tu bahūnāṃ nānādeśeṣu kriyamāṇānām upapadyate 'nekadeśasaṃbandhas; tasmād apy anityaḥ.* We perceive a speech unit in various places simultaneously; that doesn't make sense for one eternal entity. An eternal entity is not more than one unless each one is different from the others. However, it does make sense that many products produced in various places be connected to more than one place (at once). For this reason too, a speech unit is not eternal. MD, part 1, p. 89. See the Mahābhāṣya on

Mīmāṃsā answers this objection as follows: People use and perceive the same single word in many places at once just as people see the sun in many places at once. In the morning the sun appears directly ahead of each of two people standing side by side facing east. Yet neither sees two suns, one directly in front of himself and a second directly in front of the man beside him. Hence the sun is one. It appears to be in more than one place because one does not realize how far away it is. Similarly, one seems to hear a word produced in various places because one overlooks the imperceptible air vibrations occurring in the ear and the fact that the ear does not go to the place of sound production but rather remains right where it is. Actually, the place of a word is space which is just one. Hence, a word is one.[12]

---

vārttika 48, §1.3.3, and Śivasūtra 1, *vārttika* 12, *Yugapacca deśapṛthaktva-darśanāt*. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 18, 9-21. For an English translation see Abhyankar and Shukla (1975: 62-69).

[12]*1.1.15.* ***Ādityavad yaugapadyam.*** (One word) **is simultaneously** (in many places) **just as the sun is.** Śabara: *Yat tv ekadeśasya sato nānādeśeṣu yugapad darśanam anupapannam ity ādityaṃ paśya devānāṃpriya. Ekaḥ sannanekadeśāvasthita iva lakṣyate.* (Proponent:) Concerning the objection that it doesn't make sense for one eternal entity to be perceived simultaneously in various places, consider the sun, blessed fool! Being one it appears as if present in more than one place. *Kathaṃ punar avagamyata eka āditya iti.* (Objector:) How do we know that there's one sun? *Ucyate: prāṅmukho Devadattaḥ pūrvāhṇe samprati purastād ādityaṃ paśyati. tasya dakṣiṇato 'vasthito na dvau paśyati, ātmānaś ca samprati sthitaṃ, tiraścīnaṃ devadattasyārjave. Tasmād eka āditya iti. Dūratvād asya deśo nāvadhāryate. Ato vyāmohaḥ. Evaṃ śabde 'pi vyāmohād anavadhāraṇaṃ deśasya. Yadi śrotraṃ saṃyogavibhāgadeśam āgatya śabdaṃ gṛhṇīyāt, tathāpi tāvad anekadeśatā kadācid avagamyeta. Na ca tat saṃyogavibhāgadeśam āgacchati. Pratyakṣā hi karṇaśaṣkulī taddeśā gṛhyate. Vāyavīyāḥ punaḥ saṃyogavibhāgā apratyakṣasya vāyoḥ karṇaśaṣkulīpradeśe prādurbhavanto nopalabhyanta iti nānupapannam. Ata eva vyāmoho yan nānādeśeṣu śabda iti. Ākāśadeśaś ca śabda iti. Ekaṃ ca ākāśam. Ato 'pi na nānādeśeṣu. Api caikarūpye sati deśabhedena kāmaṃ deśā eva bhinnā, na tu śabdaḥ. Tasmād ayam apy adoṣaḥ.* (The Proponent) answers: Devadatta facing east in the morning sees the sun directly in front of him. The person standing at his right doesn't see two, one directly in front of himself, another askance from himself straight in front of Devadatta. Therefore, there is one sun. Because it is far away we can't determine the exact position (of the sun). Therefore, we are deluded (that it is in more than one place). In the same way, we are deluded that a speech unit (is in more than one place) so can't determine in which place it is. If the ear, going to the place of contact and disjunction (of the tongue with a place of pronunciation), perceived a speech sound, then one might be able to understand that a speech sound was in many places. But it doesn't go to the place of contact. The ear-drum is obvious right where it is. But the contacts and disjunctions of the imperceptible air manifesting at the ear-drum are not perceived. Hence, it makes perfectly good sense (that a speech unit is one yet seems to be in many places). Also a speech unit is located in space and space is just one. For this reason too a speech unit is not in various places. Furthermore, (a speech unit) being of a single form, let the places be different, but the speech unit is not different. Therefore, this (view that a speech unit seems to be perceived in many places

Other reasons for concluding that a word is single and eternal are the following: 1) A word must be eternal because, in the case of a generic term, it conveys the cognition of all individual objects with respect to which it is used at once. Hence it refers to an element common to all those objects, the class property.[13] However, every object has many class properties. For example a cow is also a substance, and an entity; hence, besides the generic property cowness, it has substancehood and existence. If it were true that a word is new each time it is uttered, it could not form a relation with the generic property cowness, nor could one learn that relation. It would be present only once and then absent. Concomitance could not single out its relatum. One would be uncertain as to whether the speaker meant cowness, substancehood or existence. Only if the same word recurs can concomitance serve to establish the word's relation with a meaning. Therefore, a word is eternal and not new each time uttered.

2) We do not associate a word with a number greater than one. We count the number of occurrences of a word, while recognizing the word in each occurrence to be the very same identical word.[14] The fact that we do not perceive the word

---

simultaneously) is without fault too. MD, part 1, pp. 97-99. See §1.4.1; the Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.64 *vārttika* 40, §1.3.2; 56, §1.3.4, and especially on Śivasūtra 1 *vārttika* 12. MB-K, vol. 1, p. 18, lines 9-21.

[13]**1.1.19. *Sarvatra yaugapadyāt*. Because of simultaneity with respect to all.** Śabara: *Gośabda uccarite sarvagaviṣu yugapat pratyayo bhavati. Ata ākṛtivacano 'yam. Na cākṛtyā śabdasya saṃbandhaḥ śakyate kartum. Nirdiśya hy ākṛtiṃ kartā saṃbadhnīyāt. Gopiṇḍe ca bahūnām ākṛtīnāṃ sadbhāvāc chabdam antareṇa gośabdavācyāṃ vibhaktām ākṛtiṃ kena prakāreṇopadekṣyati? Nitye tu sati gośabde bahukṛtva uccaritaḥ śrutapūrvaś cānyāsu govyaktiṣv anvayavyatirekābhyām ākṛtivacanam avagamayiṣyati. Tasmād api nityaḥ.* When somenone says the word 'cow', one cognizes all cows simultaneously. When the word 'cow' is uttered, cognition arises simultaneously with respect to all cows. Hence, it denotes a class property (*ākṛti*). And (if the word 'cow' were new each time it was uttered) one could not create a (word-meaning) relation between the word and the general property. For the creator (of the word-meaning relation) would relate (the word to the general property) by pointing at the general property. But because there are many general properties in any particular cow, by what means other than the word itself would he indicate the general property (cowness) singled out (from all the other properties in the cow) as the one denoted by the word 'cow'? However, if the word 'cow' were eternal, uttered many times and heard before in connection with different individual cows, it could be cause to the understanding that it denotes the general property by means of its concommitant presence and absence (with cowness). Therefore too, speech sound is eternal. MD, part 1, p. 104-05.

[14]***1.1.20. Saṃkhyābhāvat*. Because there is no number.** Śabara: *Atha matam, anyatve sati sādṛśyena vyāmūḍhāḥ: sa iti vakṣyanti, tan na. na hi te: sadṛśa iti pratiyanti kiṃ tarhi: sa evāyam iti.* The view that each utterance constitutes a new and different word but that people say it is the same word because they are confused due to the similarity (of one utterance to another) is

between occurrences does not establish that the word itself is many. We leave the house in the morning and do not doubt while we do not perceive our family members that they do not exist. When we return we do not doubt that the mother, father, wife, etc. with whom we meet are different from and merely similar to those whom we left that morning. Rather, we greet them certain that they are the very same identical persons we left. Similarly, we identify the same word in each of its occurrences.[15] Therefore, a word is eternal and not new each time uttered.

3) Under 1.1.23, *Liṅgadarśanāc ca* (And because we see indicative text), Śabara refers to the following verse as scriptural evidence that speech is eternal:[16]

---

wrong. People do not understand that the word of one utterance is similar to the word of another utterance but that it is that very same word. MD, part 1, p. 106.

[15]*Hyastanasya śabdasya vināśād anyo 'dyatana iti cet, naiṣa vinaṣṭaḥ, yata enaṃ punar upalabhāmahe. Na hi pratyakṣadṛṣṭaṃ muhūrtam adṛṣṭvā punar upalabhyamānaṃ pratyabhijānanto vinaṣṭaṃ parikalpayanti. Parikalpayanto dvitīyasaṃdarśane mātari jāyāyāṃ pitari vā nāśvasyuḥ. Na hy anupalambhamātrena, nāstīty avagamya, naṣṭa ity eva kalpayanti. Apramāṇatāyāṃ viditāyāṃ nāstity avagacchāmaḥ. Na hi pramāṇe pratyakṣe saty apramāṇatā syāt. Astīti punar avyāmohenāvagamyamāne na kvacid apy abhāvaḥ. Na cāsiddhe 'bhāve vyāmohaḥ. Na ca siddho 'bhāvaḥ. Tasmād asati vyāmohe nābhāvaḥ. Tad etad ānupūrvyā siddham. Tasmāt purastād anuccāritam anupalabhamānā api—na vinaṣṭa ity avagantum arhanti. Tathā gṛhān nirgatāḥ sarvagṛhajanam apaśyantaḥ punaḥ praviśyopalabhamānā api na: prāk praveśād vinaṣṭa ity avagacchanti. Tadvad enam api: nānya iti vaktum arhanti.... Sa iti pratyakṣaḥ pratyayaḥ: sadṛśa ity ānumānikaḥ. na ca pratyakṣaviruddham anumānam udeti. Svakāryaṃ vā sādhayati. Tasmān nityaḥ.* If one objects that, because yesterday's word has been destroyed, today's is a different one, (I reply that) it has not been destroyed because we perceive it again. When people recognize a directly perceived object which is perceived after not being seen for a moment, they do not assume that it was destroyed. Those assuming so, when they saw their mother, wife or father a second time, wouldn't be sure that it was their mother, wife or father. It is not the case that just from not perceiving something they understand that it does not exist and assume that it has been destroyed. We understand that something does not exist when there is no means to know it. And it cannot be the case that there is no means to know it when direct perception is a means of knowledge of it. On the contrary, when we clearly understand that it exists, there's no chance that it doesn't exist. And when its lack of existence has not been established, we are not confused (as to whether it exists or not). And (a speech sound's) lack of existence has not been established. Therefore, because there is no confusion (as to whether it exists or not), it doesn't not exist (it definitely exists). That is proven by the consequence. Therefore, even while not perceiving the word not being uttered before them, they cannot properly understand that it is destroyed. Similarly, even leaving the house and not seeing anyone of the household, then reentering and seeing them, they do not understand that the members of the household had been destroyed in the meantime. In the same way, people are able to say that a word is the same and not other (than the one they perceived before).... The recognition that it is the same word as before is a direct perception: that it is similar (yet different) is an inference. Inference doesn't stand up against direct perception or accomplish anything contradictory to it. Therefore, speech is eternal. MD, part 1, p. 106-7.

[16]MD, part 1, p. 110.

Tásmai nūnám abhídyave, vācā́ virūpa nítyayā; vṛ́ṣṇe codasva suṣṭutím.
O Virūpa, send forth eulogy to the radiant showerer (bull, Agni) by eternal speech! (Ṛgveda 8.75.6)[17]

3.2.3. Meaning

3.2.3.1. Action

In addition to the word being eternal, the meaning must be eternal too in order that the relation between the two be eternal. One object which words in the Veda denote is *dharma*, in the form of the Vedic performances to be brought about (*sādhya*) (§3.1.1, note 2). In fact, it is the speciality of Vedic speech that it alone conveys knowledge of duty. Direct perception cannot provide knowledge of duty because perception is limited to what exists, whereas duty does not exist at the present time but is produced, brought into existence in the future (*sādhya*) (§3.1.1, note 4). In contrast, speech can provide knowledge of what is not in the range of direct perception, that is, an action to be brought about in the future (*sādhya*), duty (§3.1.1, 1.1.5). However, in order for speech to convey meaning, the object denoted cannot be something to be brought about (*sādhya*), but rather, must be something established (*siddha*). Just as speech must be eternal in order to be able to establish a relation with its object and so be able to denote it (§3.2.2, note 10), the object denoted must be eternal too in order to establish a relation with the word and so be able to be conveyed. Duty is action, namely the Vedic performances (*yajña*). If it were the case that action is new each time it is brought about, it could not form a lasting relation with a denoting word, speech would not be able to denote action, so the Veda would not be able to enjoin duty.

Jaimini considers that there is one action which does not differ according to different performances of it. The act is an established entity (*siddha*) and so can form an abiding connection with the word denoting it. Vedic injunctions enjoin its performance which is producible (*sādhya*). Duty is both an established entity (*siddha*) and producible (*sādhya*). It exists eternally in unmanifest form which is not subject to direct perception and has a relation with a word. Its performance manifests it. Although the Veda denotes the eternal action which cannot be brought about because it is already established, since it enjoins its performance, one determines that it means one to act

[17]RVS, vol. 3, p. 867. Concerning the word '*nitya*', see Hara (1959).

upon what one can act upon, i.e. the performance. Jaimini shows this to be his view stating his conclusion concerning the designation of names for Vedic performances in the following *sūtra:*

> Jaimini 6.3.12. *Api vāvyatirekād rūpaśabdāvibhāgāc ca gotvavad aikakarmyaṃ syān nāmadheyaṃ ca sattvavat.*
> On the other hand, because one performance of an action is no different from another, and because there is no difference in the word used for it, action is one, just as cowness is, and the name of the action refers to an individual occurrence of the action just as a generic term refers to a substance.[18]

A name of a Vedic rite denotes the single eternal action but refers to an individual performance of it just as a generic term denotes a generic property yet refers to an individual.

3.2.3.2. A Generic Term Must Denote an Eternal Object

In the case of generic terms too, the word-meaning relation will be eternal only if the object denoted is eternal. Hence one must consider the nature of a class property and of an individual in order to determine which of the two is eternal and hence able to be denoted by a generic term.

---

[18]MD, vol. 5, p. 250. The *sūtra* rejects an initial view expessed in the previous *sūtra.* Jaimini 6.3.11. *Kriyāṇām āśritatvād dravyāntare vibhāgaḥ syāt.* Because actions inhere in substances, they are different when different substances are used (in different instances). Kumārila discusses these *sūtras* in the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa. *Karmaṇām api yāgatvahomatvādivibhāgataḥ; aparyāyasmṛtair uktaṃ dhātubhiḥ pravibhajyate. Punarvidhānasaṃkhyākhyāguṇaprakaraṇā-'ntaraiḥ; anye tu bhedam ācāryāḥ karmaṇām eva manvate. Api vāvyatirekāt syād deśāder ekarūpatā; rūpaśabdāvibhāgāc ca vakṣyaty etad dhi Jaiminiḥ.* The action denoted by non-synonymous verbal roots is divisible according to the division of the properties inherent in it, being a Vedic performance, being an offering, etc. Other teachers considered the action itself to differ according to the chapter discussing the Vedic procedure, subordinate acts, the words for it, number and repeated provision (6.3.11). On the other hand Jaimini himself will say that it is the same act because no more or fewer (participants) such as place are involved in the act and because there is no difference in the word used for it (6.3.12). MD, part 2, p. 236-37.

3.3. The Nature of an Individual and of a Class Property

3.3.1. General remarks

At the beginning of the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa Śabara states what he means by a class property and an individual. He says:

> A class property is any general property of substances, qualities or actions. An individual is that in which there are exclusive distinguishing properties (IA).

Kumārila says that the term 'class property (*ākṛti*)' means the same thing as the terms 'generic property (*jāti*)' and 'general property (*sāmānya*)'. It is that which identifies or characterizes an individual as what it is and is the basis of the single general cognition which recurs with respect to distinct individual objects.[19] Two distinct natures, sameness (*sāmānya*) and difference (*viśeṣa*) are required to account for two types of cognition in all things, one which identifies an object with others (*anugama*) and one which differentiates an object from others (*vyāvṛtti*).[20] The same property which is the basis for discerning that some things are the same is the basis for discerning that other things are different. With the exception of universal existence (*sattā*) (and ultimate special properties according to Vaiśeṣika), all properties have both natures.

General properties (*sāmānya*) range in breadth from existence (*sattā*) or objecthood (*vastutva*) which belong to all entities, to more specific general properties of substances, qualities and actions.[21] Examples of specific general properties of substances include being a pot (*ghaṭatva*) and being a cow (*gotva*). Properties of qualities include being a quality (*guṇatā*), being a color (*rūpatā*), and whiteness (*śuklatā*), and of actions, being an action (*karmatva*) and occurrence (*janmatā*). The general property of a quality such as whiteness inheres in each

---

[19]*Ākṛtivāda 3. Jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā; sāmānyaṃ tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam.* It is the generic property (*jāti*) alone that one calls the class property (using the term *ākṛti* derived etymologically from *ā* + √*kṛ*, to mean that) by which an individual (*vyakti*) is drawn to (knowledge); and that (generic property) is the general property of things which is the basis of the same cognition with respect to (distinct) objects. ŚV, p. 385.

[20]*Ākṛtivāda 5. Sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca vyāvṛttyanugamātmikā; jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sā ca na siddhyati.* With respect to all objects, cognition has the nature of differentiating (an object from others) and identifying (it with others). Such cognition would not succeed unless objects had two natures. ŚV, p. 386.

[21]See Kumārila on 1.3.30. MD, part 2, p. 236. The broadest general property is *vastutva* according to Prabhākara; *sattā* according to Kumārila.

individual instance of the quality white.[22] The individual quality instance, in turn, inheres in the white substance. As Jaimini 6.3.12 implies, each verbal root, except synonymous ones, denotes a single action, instances of which occur at various times and places (§3.2.3.1 and note 18).

3.3.2. Individual

In his Tantravārttika on the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, Kumārila states that Śabara means an individual (*vyakti*) to be the substratum (*āśraya*) of exclusive specific properties (*viśeṣa*), not the exclusive specific properties themselves.[23] He rejects the view that an individual is identical to a specific property, because a specific property belongs to many individuals, even to individuals of different classes.[24] It is not true, he argues, that a unique specific property specifies each individual. A set of properties, each of which taken singly is common to a number of individuals, may isolate a unique individual. One different property in the set makes the set unique. Hence, it makes sense to call those properties exclusive. The word 'exclusive-specific-properties' is not a *karmadhāraya* compound meaning exclusive specific properties, but rather, a *bahuvrīhi* compound meaning that in which specific general properties (taken as a group) are unique. He cites Śabara stating that the individual is the substratum of general and specific properties.[25]

---

[22]Tantravārttika on 1.3.30. *Tataḥ śuklādi tadvyaktiguṇeṣu pratitiṣṭhati.* Next (the general qualities) white, etc. are present in their individual quality instances. MD, part 2, p. 236.

[23]*Tasmād: asādhāraṇā viśeṣā yasyāṃ sā vyaktir ity evaṃ vyākhyeyam.* (Proponent:) Therefore, (Śabara's definition of a *vyakti*) should be explained like this: The individual is that in which there are exclusive specific properties. MD, part 2, p. 238.

[24]***Asādhāraṇaviśeṣā vyaktir iti.*** *kecid āhur: asādhāraṇā viśeṣā eva vyaktir viśeṣavyatiriktavyaktyabhāvad iti.* Some say that the individual is the exclusive specific properties themselves because there is no individual separate from its specific properties. MD, part 2, pp. 237. *Te cānyatrāpi dṛśyante tathā jātyantareṣv api.* (Proponent:) The so called specific properties are seen in other individuals and even in (individuals of) different classes. MD, part 2, pp. 238. The question whether an individual object is identical to its properties or separate from them is raised by Patañjali in commenting on 5.1.119, "*anyacchabdādibhyo dravyam āhosvid ananyat?*" See the discussion of Patañjali's term '*guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam*' in §1.2.1, and the references in note 12. Vyāsa's term, "*Sāmānyaviśeṣasumudāyo 'tra dravyam,*" comes closest to the formulation of the objector here.

[25]*Ucyate: Naiva viśeṣāṇāṃ pratyekam asādhāraṇatvam āśritya vyaktiviśeṣaṇatvenopādānam: kathaṃ tarhi, sādhāraṇarūpāṇām apy ekadvitrādibhedena kvacid upalabdhāṇāṃ yad ekatra piṇḍikṛtānāṃ grahaṇaṃ, tadapekṣam asādhāraṇaviśeṣatvābhidhānam.* (Proponent:) We answer: Specific properties are not taken to qualify individuals relying on the fact that each specific property is

Vaiśeṣika holds the view that a substance is different in nature from a quality or action which inheres in it by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and of which it is the substratum. Similarly, substances, qualities, and actions are different in nature from general and specific properties which inhere in them and of which they are the substrata. A unique specific property inheres in each individual eternal entity (in each atom and in *ākāśa*, *ātman*, etc.), making it unique.[26] Kumārila rejects this view because it involves an overabundance of entities. Say there are 3 properties, a, b, and c, and 7 individuals. Kumārila intends that one need not posit the additional properties d, e, f, and g, in order to uniquely specify 7 individuals; seven sets of properties can uniquely specify the seven individuals: 1) a, 2) b, 3) c, 4) ab, 5) bc, 6) ac, 7) abc.[27]

Sāṅkhya holds the view that a substance is nothing other than the aggregate of its qualities. It does not assert that an individual substance is identical to each specific quality; rather it is identical to the set of them.[28] Hence, in the above example, the seven substances are identical to the seven sets of properties a, b,

---

unique. Rather, although taken singly or a few at a time specific properties, being found in several individuals, are common; when taken together as a group they are found in just one individual then specific properties are called unique. *Pravibhaktā hi ye dṛṣṭā dṛśyante saṃhatāḥ punaḥ; piṇḍāsādhāraṇatvena tair vyaktir upalakṣyate.* For the same (properties) seen separately are seen again grouped together. Because the group is unique, they identify an individual. *Na ca—ekasyāṃ vyaktau ye samuditā dṛṣṭās ta eva vyaktyantare 'py anyūnānatiriktā dṛśyante. Ya evādṛṣṭapūrvas tasmin samudāye samprati dṛśyate sa evāsādhāraṇatām āpādayati. Anantabhedāsv api vyaktiṣu nātyantāpūrva-viśeṣaṇopalakṣaṇopādānaṃ, kiṃcid utkarṣāpakarṣamātreṇa ca sarvatrāsādhāraṇopalakṣaṇalābhāt. Parasāmānyāpekṣayā ca sarvāṇy evāvāntara-sāmānyāni viśeṣavyapadeśaṃ prāpnuvanti. Saṃghātāvasthāyāṃ ca vyakti-viśeṣaṇatvāt teṣu viśeṣaśabdaḥ. Etac ca vyakter viśeṣaṇānam anyatvam upariṣṭād bhāṣyakāro 'pi vakṣyaty eva: yo 'rthaḥ sāmānyasya viśeṣāṇāṃ cāśrayaḥ sā vyaktir iti.* Nor does one see the very same properties which are seen grouped in one individual without any additions or subtractions in another individual. The property which one has not seen previously in the group, which one sees now, causes the uniqueness. We cannot accept that a completely new qualifier identifies (each individual) even if each individual is unique, because just by some increase or decrease we obtain a unique identification for each. Properties are called specific because in comparison to the ultimate universal (existence, *sattā*), all narrower general properties are specific, and because bunched together they specify an individual. Later the commentator himself will confirm outright that the individual is different from the specific properties, saying, "That object which is the substratum of the general property and specific properties is the individual (IIIC2b)." Kumārila, MD, part 2, pp. 238.

[26]See Praśastapāda (p. 78): *Sā ca (pṛthivī) dvividhā nityā cānityā ca. Paramāṇulakṣaṇā nityā, kāryyalakṣaṇā tv anityā.*

[27]If n is the number of individuals, n factorial (n!) is the minimum number of properties required to specify each of them uniquely.

[28]See Wezler (1985).

and c, and ultimately only the three properties a, b, and c exist. Kumārila is dissatisfied with this view because it does not recognize the difference between an individual and a property.

In the Ākṛtivāda section of his Ślokavārttika, Kumārila rejects both extremes. Properties are neither identical to the individuals in which they are present nor distinct from them. There is a natural relation between them whereby the property is part (*aṃśa*) of the individual which prevents them from being entirely distinguished. Yet different natures of the individual and property, namely, the fact that the individual is unique but that the property is common to other individuals, prevents them from being entirely identified.[29]

Given that Kumārila himself accepts a natural bond between an individual and its properties, his rejection of the identity of an individual and its properties in his Tantravārttika on the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa is overstated. In particular, his rejection of the interpretation of the compound 'exclusive-specific-properties' in Śabara's definition of an individual is unjustified. He says, "Later the commentator himself will confirm outright that the individual is different from the specific properties, saying, 'That object which is the substratum of the general property and specific properties is the individual. (IIIC2b)' (§3.3.2 note 25)." Śabara states the passage Kumārila quotes through the mouth of an objector.

Immediately preceding this statement of the objector, the proponent says, "If it (a word) denotes another individual devoid of all general and specific properties, then that which it denotes is precisely a general property (IIIC2)." The proponent intends to say that an individual devoid of all its properties is exactly the same as any other. In fact, without even the property of being a distinct entity, it is purely a thing in itself, which is nothing other than the ultimate general property, existence (*sattā*). Hence Śabara recognizes that the line of distinction between properties and substrata is not absolute.

---

[29]Kumārila states one aspect of the relationship as follows: *Tasmāt svābhāviko bhedo jātivyaktyoḥ pratīyate.* Therefore, there is understood to be a natural difference between the general property and the individual. Ākṛtivāda 50b. He qualifies this in verse 65a. *...aṃśatvaṃ tu na vāryate.* ...but (the properties) are not thereby prevented from still being parts (of the thing). Pārthasārathimiśra clearly states the qualification in his commentary on verse 50b-51: *Na tāvad Vaiśeṣikādivaj jātivyaktyor bhinnayoḥ samavāyasambhavaḥ, pratīty-ananuguṇatvāt. Na hi: iha gotvam iti kasyacit kadācid avagatiḥ: ayaṃ gaur ity aparyāyabuddhidvayasāmānādhikaraṇyadarśanāt.* But it is not possible to relate the general property and the individual which are different by the relation of inherence as Vaiśeṣika and others do. Because no one ever has the understanding, "There is cowness in this." Instead one sees the simultaneous presence of the pair of opposing cognitions (distinguishing the individual from the generic property, yet identifying the individual with it), "This is a cow." ŚV, p. 395.

While proving the existence of class properties, Śabara shows that he does not consider the class property to be entirely distinct from the individuals to which it belongs. As I will discuss shortly, the relation between a class property and an individual in which it inheres bears some resemblance to the relation between a whole and its parts. Śabara entertains the following objection: The class property does not exist because it is nothing other than the individuals just as the forest does not exist because it is nothing other than the trees. In his answer he says the following:

> Moreover, just because we don't perceive the forest to be distinct from the trees doesn't mean the forest doesn't exist. If for some other reason a cognition arises which contradicts the existence of the forest, then certainly the cognition of the forest is false. Then we understand that the forest does not exist.... On the other hand, if a cognition does not arise to contradict the existence of the forest and other (aggregates) then it is not true that they do not exist. (1.1.5 Ś4b).

Hence, a whole exists because we directly perceive it. The fact that it is not distinct from its parts does not imply that it does not exist. The conclusion that it does not exist follows only upon a cognition which contradicts its existence. Similarly, a property exists because we directly perceive it. The fact that it is not distinct from the individual to which it belongs does not imply that it does not exist. Therefore, Śabara recognizes that a property is not entirely distinct from the individuals to which it belongs.

However, he is not of the opinion that the individual is merely identical to its properties. In the dialogue in the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa just discussed, he shows that he considers the individual to be other than its properties. Just before his statement quoted above, the proponent says, "If it is used for another individual, then the individual is not the object denoted by the word because only that which is devoid of all general and specific properties is called an individual (IIIC1b)." This statement, very similar to the one just quoted, intends to say something quite different: If the same word refers to more than one object, it does so by denoting a property common to the objects, not by denoting the individual, because an individual is unique, not common to more than one thing. Hence the fact that they are common gives properties an existential status which is not reducible to the individuals to which they belong.

3.3.3. Class Property

In his commentary on Jaimini 1.1.5, Śabara cites a long passage from the Vṛttikāra including a discussion in which he

establishes that class properties exist.[30] The examination of that discussion in the next few pages makes frequent reference to the passage. The reader may find the text and translation under Jaimini 1.1.5 in the translation section of this chapter.

The fact that cognition is inherently positive (§3.1.1) means that our cognitions are based on real objects. If one sees cloth, cloth is there; it is not an illusion (1.1.5 Ś1). Similarly, a general cognition (the single cognition which recurs with respect to more than one individual object) is based on a general property. One can only establish that a cognition is illusory if another cognition shows it to be false (1.1.5 Ś3). Direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the strongest means of knowledge with regard to things which are directly perceivable. Hence if direct perception testifies to the existence of something, nothing can contradict it. The class property is directly perceptible (*pratyakṣa*).[31] It is not inferable (*sādhya*) from the presence of certain features or marks on an object (1.1.5 Ś2). Therefore, the class property exists.

At the beginning of this argument, the Vṛttikāra states that the word 'cow' denotes the class property qualified by the dewlap, etc. Then, asked whether the class property is something to be inferred (*sādhya*) or not, the proponent says, "Being directly perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) it cannot be something to be inferred (1.1.5 Ś2)." Kumārila confirms that the word *'pratyakṣa'* here has more than its ordinary sense of 'obvious'. He says that a general property is not known by inference. Being directly perceptible one knows it without inference (*lakṣaṇa*). An inferential mark (*hetu*) is not required to bond a generic property to an individual. The bond is natural.[32]

---

[30]Ākṛtivāda 2. *Tatsadbhāvaprasiddhyartham atra tāvat prayatyate; vācyatve vakṣyate yuktir vyaktyā saha balābale.* Here (under *sūtra* 1.1.5) we try to show that the general property exists. Later (in the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa) we will state the reason that it is the object denoted, a reason regarding its relative strength in comparison with an individual. ŚV, p. 385.

[31]*Pratyakṣa* does not require that the direct knowledge come through the senses. It may be a sensual or mental intuition. I translate with the word 'perception' in this broader sense.

[32]Ākṛtivāda 30b. *Dharmaś cāvyabhicāryasya na mṛgya upalakṣaṇe.* 31. *Nānumānāvagamyaṃ tat, pratyakṣe lakṣaṇena kim; svābhāvikaś ca sambandho jātivyaktyor na hetumān.* 32. *Tenaitasya prasiddhyarthaṃ nānyat sāmānyam iṣyate; śaktisiddhivad etasya svabhāvo 'tra na vāryate.* 30b. One should not seek a property to indicate the undeviating (general property). 31. A general property is not known by inference. Being directly perceptible, what is the need for an indicative mark? And the relation between a generic property and an individual is natural not caused. 32. Therefore, there is no need for a second general property (to determine the set of individuals) in order to achieve the relationship of the individuals to the first general property. Its own nature is not excluded (from achieving the relation between the individual and the general property) just as (the individual's) nature achieved (the relation between

Saying that the class property is directly perceptible, the Vṛttikāra gives the example of three golden ornaments. One directly perceives that a golden necklace is a necklace, a golden *svastika* a *svastika* and a golden cup a cup (1.1.5 Ś2). The fact that all three items are gold yet are different indicates that they are what they are because of something other than the gold which is their substance. That by virtue of which they are recognized as being the type of object they are is their class property. Being a necklace is the class property of necklaces, etc. The example shows the class property to be something other than the substance and yet directly perceptible. One has the same cognition with respect to one gold piece which one identifies as a necklace as one has to any other piece so identified. Kumārila explains in Ākṛtivāda 3 that the single cognition which one has with respect to different individuals has a basis, a cause. That cause is the class property (§3.3.1 note 19).

The perception of the class properties, being a necklace, etc. is not delusion. First of all, it is not delusion in the sense that it is completely without any basis in reality. The cognition has some basis. We do not perceive a forest when no trees are present, or a cloth when no threads are present. Similarly, we do not perceive the individual necklace's class property, being a necklace, if there is no golden ornament present (1.1.5 Ś4a).

Secondly, it is not delusion in the sense that we perceive more than is there. The objector implies that just as we falsely perceive the forest given only trees, we falsely perceive the class property given only individual substances. Just as the forest has no existence distinct from the trees, the class property has no existence distinct from individual substances. The Vṛttikāra answers that just because it is not distinct doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Just because the forest is not distinct from the trees, does not mean there is no such thing as a forest. The whole is not distinct from the part but still exists. Similar to an aggregate such as a forest, the class property which many substances have in common does not exist distinct from the substances but still exists (1.1.5 Ś4b).[33]

In his Ākṛtivāda, Kumārila says there is a natural relation (*svābhāvika sambandha*) between an object and its property. Just

---

itself and) its capacity (to reveal the generic property).

Pārthasārathimiśra comments on 31b-32: *Yathā hy abhivyaktiśaktiḥ svābhāvikī tathā sambandhasyāpi svabhāva eva hetuḥ. Kāścid vyaktayaḥ kiñcit sāmānyaṃ svabhāvād evātmanā sambadhnantīti.* Just as the capacity (of an individual object) to reveal (a generic property) is natural, the relation (of the individual directly to the general property) has nature as its cause. Certain individual entities simply out of their own nature bind a certain general property to themselves. ŚV, pp. 390-91.

[33]A class property is not to be distinguished from the class which is a special sort of aggregate.

as things have natural capacities, the nature of the individual thing binds to itself a certain property. The general property is directly perceptible and immediately evident in an individual object. Specific features of the object are not the mediate cause of our knowing it. On the contrary, in exactly the same way that one would identify an object as a cow because it is identical to those specific features, one can identify it because it is identical to the general property cowness. Therefore, he concludes that the individual has a natural connection to the general property.[34]

On the other hand, Kumārila does not regard the individual and the general property as entirely the same. The individual object is at once understood to be different from the general property cowness and identical to it. When one says, "This is a cow," the word 'this' denoting the individual gives the cognition of difference, the word 'cow' denoting the general property gives the cognition of sameness. Yet due to the identity expressed by the verb 'to be' in the sentence, both words refer to the same entity as the substratum of these two opposing cognitions. Because the two cognitions are in a single entity, the individual and the general property are not entirely different.

That the individual is at once different from and the same as the general property is not contradictory. One thing differs or is the same as others in different ways. One determines the unity and diversity of an object considering different natures (§3.3.2, note 29).

3.3.4. Class Property: Abstract Generic Property versus Shape

In his Tantravārttika on the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, Kumārila argues vigorously to show that the class property is not a shape. He comments that Śabara's purpose in defining the class property (*ākṛti*) as a general property (*sāmānya*) at the beginning of the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa (IA1) is to remove the doubt that it is a

---

[34]Ākṛtivāda 45. *Sāsnādyekārthasambandhi gotvam ity upalakṣaṇam; na ca svasamavāyy eva kevalaṃ cihnam iṣyate.* 46. *Sāsnādibhyas tu piṇḍasya bhedo nātyantato yadā; sāmānyasya ca piṇḍebhyas tadā syād etad uttaram.* 47. *Kasmāt sāsnādimatsv eva gotvaṃ? Yasmāt tadātmakam; tādātmyam asya kasmāc cet, svabhāvād iti gamyatām.* 45. The (marks of a cow) dewlap, etc. point out the (generic property) cowness which belongs to the same objects that the dewlap, etc. do; nor is it true that only that which inheres in something can be a mark of it. 46. When the object is not entirely different from the dewlap, etc., nor the general property from the objects, then the following will suffice to answer: 47. (Question:) Why is the general property cowness present only in individuals with the specific features, dewlap, etc? (Answer:) Because it is identical to them. If (one asks): Why is it identical to them? (I answer:) Understand that it is identical to them from its own nature. ŚV, p. 393-94. See also note 32.

configuration of parts (*avayavasaṃsthāna*) in Mīmāṃsā as it is in Nyāya.[35] He argues as follows: First, a configuration cannot be a class property because each individual is shaped slightly different. Hence, each individual has its own configuration not common to other individuals. For the purpose of this argument he accepts the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view that each quality is one of many quality instances of a kind. A general property of those qualities inheres in each quality instance of the kind. Each quality instance in turn inheres in a single substance. He considers configuration to be a quality instance which inheres in a single substance. Second, the general property of all configurations cannot define the class of cows, for example, because it belongs to any object which has shape, not only to cows.

Kumārila denies that there is any middle road. One cannot specify the configuration in such a way to include only the intended individuals and exclude all others. One cannot specify the shape of a cow with enough precision to distinguish it from a horse yet generally enough to include all cows. The only thing that identifies all and only cows is the generic property cowness.

Furthermore, he says, class properties belong to substances, qualities and actions. Only earthly substances independently have shape, and certainly the substances direction, time, and the self, as well as qualities and actions, do not have shape. Therefore, in order that a class property be the sort of thing which can belong to any of them in the same manner, it must be simply any general property (*sāmānya*) not a configuration (*avayavasaṃsthāna*).[36]

---

[35]*Satyam evākṛtiḥ pūrvaṃ pratyakṣeṇa nirūpitā; saṃsthānāśaṅkayā tv atra sāmānyātmā nirūpyate.* True, he (Śabara) described the class property as directly perceptible before (1.1.5 Ś2). But here (IA1), because of the doubt that it may be the configuration, he describes it as being a general property. MD, part 2, p. 236.

[36]*Evaṃ prapañcitaṃ sarvam arthasāmānyam ākṛtiḥ: na saṃsthānaṃ kuto hy etad ātmādiguṇakarmasu?* A class property is any general property of objects as I have just detailed above. It is not a configuration because where is the configuration in substances like the self, in qualities and in actions? *Sarveṣu hi pārthiveṣu gavādighaṭādiṣu saṃsthānaṃ bhavet. Agnitoyavāyvākāśādīnāṃ tu pārthivadravyaparigrahavaśād ākārānuvṛttiḥ kalpyeta na svātantryeṇa, dikkālātmamanasāṃ tu guṇakarmaṇāṃ ca na kathaṃcid api saṃsthānaṃ saṃbhavati. Sāmānyamātraṃ tu sarvasvaviśeṣānuvṛttirūpaṃ saṃbhāvyate. Tasmād etad evābhidheyākṛtilakṣaṇaṃ nāvayavaracanāsaṃsthānākṛtitvam avakalpate.* There may be configuration in all material objects such as cows, etc. and pots, etc. Although one may suppose that fire, water, air and space have the shape which they take on because of being included in a material substance, they do not have shape independently. However, shape is in no way possible for (the substances) direction, time, the self and mind, and qualities and actions. But an abstract general property in the form of that which recurs in each of the individual objects it qualifies is possible in them all. Therefore, just that is the character of a class property fit to be denoted. If a class property were a configuration constructed of parts it

Kumārila's arguments that shape cannot be a class property are not entirely sound. He notes that there is general agreement that a word denotes the common element which is the basis of the same cognition with respect to different things whatever that element may be. Pārthasārathimiśra comments that the disagreement lies in the nature of that element.[37] It seems plausible that Śabara intends shape itself to be a common property defining a class of individual substances.

---

wouldn't serve the purpose.
Saṃsthānasya ca nāśitvāt prativyakti ca bhedataḥ; sāmānyavyavahāritvaṃ nākṛtitve 'vakalpate. Atha saṃsthānasāmānyam ākṛtitvena gṛhyate; aśvādiṣv api tulyatvād bhaved ākṛtisaṃkaraḥ. Na cāvāntarasaṃsthānaṃ sarvagopiṇḍa-vṛtti yat; aśvādibhyo nivṛttaṃ ca gośabdālambanaṃ bhavet. Because configuration perishes and differs for each individual, (if being an *ākṛti* meant being a configuration) if something were an *ākṛti* it would be impossible for it to be the general property denoted by a word. If the configuration general property were taken as class property, there would be confusion of class properties because it is as much in horses, etc. (as it is in cows). Nor can a more specific configuration which is present in all the bodies of cows and absent from all horses be the object of the word 'cow'. [Note: *Saṃsthānasāmānya* is the general property in all configurations. Configuration is a conjunction quality instance which belongs to a single individual. The general property conjunctionhood is present in all conjunctions, that is, in any shape whatsoever. Hence, the class property could not distinguish between apples and oranges, or as Kumārila exemplifies objects which are obviously different, between cows and horses.]
Tasya hy upalakṣaṇam ālocyamānaṃ na jāter anyal labhyate tataś ca jātir eva sāmānyam iti nyāyenāpadyate. Tena prathamapāde rucakasvastika-vardhamānakodāharaṇāt saṃsthānākṛtyabhidhānāśaṅkākṣapādadarśanavad āsīd ity etābhyāṃ praśnottarābhyāṃ vyāvartyate. ataś ca dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ yāvatkiṃcit prāg vyaktibhyaḥ sāmānyaṃ tat sarvam ākṛtir evety abhipretya mātraśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ. Because, search as one may, one cannot find any identifying mark of it other than the generic property. Therefore, it follows logically that the general property (*sāmānya*) is just the generic property (*jāti*). Because of the example of (the three golden objects) the necklace, the auspicious symbol (*svastika*) and the cup in the first *pāda* (1.1.5. Ś2), the doubt arose that the word 'class property (*ākṛti*)' means configuration as it does in Gautama's view (Nyāya). This question ("What is a class property?") and its answer ("any general property of substances, qualities or actions" (IA1)) remove that doubt. Hence Śabara uses the word 'any (*-mātra*)' intending that a class property is any general property whatsoever of substances, qualities or actions up to but excluding individuals. MD, part 2, p. 237.

[37]Ākṛtivāda 4. *Tannimittaṃ ca yat kiñcit sāmānyaṃ śabdagocaram; sarva evecchatīty evam avirodho 'tra vādinām.* Everyone wants whatever the common element is which is the basis of (the same cognition of different objects) to be the range of a word so the theorists agree on this matter. Pārthasārathimiśra: *Ekabuddhinimittaṃ yat sāmānyaṃ jātirūpaṃ sārūpyarūpam apoharūpam, tasya śabdavācyatvaṃ sarvavādinām avivādam, tatsvarūpe tu vivāda iti.* All the theorists agree that the general property which is the basis of a single cognition (with respect to many objects), whether it has the form of a generic property, the similarity (of the objects to each other) or the removal (of other objects from knowledge), is the object denoted by a word, but disagree as to its nature. ŚV, p. 385.

Although Kumārila's remark that not all entities which one identifies as having general properties have shape is à propos, discussions concerning class properties, in the first instance, concern ordinary material substances which do have shape. The discussions concerning the meaning of a word in Nyāya and in the Mahābhāṣya certainly choose such objects as examples. The concept easily extends from that of general shape to that of any general property whatsoever. Hence the question is the following: In the case of ordinary material objects such as cows, falcons, ornaments, and pots, what does Śabara, and even Kumārila himself, consider a class property to be, a shape or an undefined abstraction?

It has been amply described how a general property is the basis of having the same recurrent cognition with respect to distinct objects.[38] I have also described how the shape of an object may be conceived of either as a quality belonging to that object alone or as one held in common.[39] If it is conceived of as common then it is a general property. Alternatively, if it is conceived of as the quality conjunction inhering in a single substance then a specific type of conjunction, more specific than the general property of all configurations, constitutes a property common to each of similar shapes and is the basis of the same cognition with respect to the objects. In either case, a shape general property is capable of defining a class.

While arguing that configuration cannot be a class property (*ākṛti*), Kumārila adopts the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view that each quality is one of many quality instances manifesting a quality general property and inheres in a single substance (§3.3.1 note 22). However, while arguing that speech (*śabda*) is eternal he rejects this view in favor of the view that the quality itself is general. He says that there is no need to accept any general property other than this. Individual differences in the appearance of the quality can be accounted for by the differences of the individual substance instances in which it inheres. There is no need to posit a different quality instance for each different appearance of the quality. For example, there is one general quality white present in any number of individual white substances and which is one of the several colors in which the general property color (*rūpatā*) inheres.[40] By analogy, there is a single general shape characterized by a dewlap, tail, hump, head, horns, and four legs present in each individual cow and which is

---

[38]See §1.3.1.5, §2.2, Gautama 2.2.69, and Uddyotakara's debate with the Buddhist (Gautama 2.2.64 U4-U6), §3.3.3.

[39]See §1.2.3, §2.2, Gautama 2.2.64 U4.

[40]Śabdanityatādhikaraṇa 411b. *Etayaiva diśā vācyā śuklāder api nityatā.* 412. *Saṃsargamātrabhedena syāt tatrāpi bhedadhīḥ; svarūpaṃ tu tadeveti ko jātiṃ kathayiṣyati.* ŚV, p. 591. See Halbfass (1980: 233).

one of the many configurations in which the general property of all configurations inheres.

Immediately following his argument that configuration cannot be a class property (*ākṛti*), Kumārila argues against the Vaiśeṣika notion that an exclusive specific property qualifies each individual eternal entity. He says that properties, each of which is general, can form an exclusive set capable of uniquely specifying each individual. Hence, it is unnecessary to presume that there is a unique specific property for each individual (§3.3.2, note 25). The basis for presuming that a property exists over and above an individual substance in which it is present is that it is present in more than one individual substance as the basis for recognizing it to be the same as another individual substance. If the property were present in only one substance there would be no basis for presuming that it is different from its substratum. This reasoning applies to all individuals, not just to eternal substances.

Analogous reasoning applies to qualities. If a quality were present in just one individual substance, there would be no basis for presuming it to exist over and above the substance itself. The fact that qualities are the basis for recognizing individual substances to be the same is the only testimony to their existence. Therefore, by fiat qualities are general in nature. Due to the fact that one perceives various individual material substances to be the same, one accepts as the basis of that cognition some general element, call it the class property. The question is whether Śabara and Kumārila consider the class property of a class of individual material objects, which is the basis for the same cognition one has with respect to each of those individual objects, to be just an abstraction, or a general shape.

In Nyāya, the configuration, among other features, of an object such as a cow is an inferential mark of the generic property (Gautama 2.2.68 V1, U1). In the case of other substances like clay, gold, and silver, Vācaspatimiśra suggests what Uddyotakara implies, that color is an inferential mark of the generic property (Gautama 2.2.68 U2, §2.2 note 15).[41] Śabara and Kumārila consider the class property to be directly perceptible; one need not infer it. Kumārila states in his Ākṛtivāda that one does not require a second general property in the form of an inferential mark in order to make the abstract general property known (§3.3.3 note 32). Hence one does not require the general shape including such features as a dewlap, hump, tail, etc. to indicate the cowness of a certain animal; one directly perceives it. Nor does one require the shape of a falcon with crooked wings and fanned tail to indicate falconhood. Hence there is no direct relation between the abstract general property, which is the basis of a

---

[41]Kumārila himself expresses this view in the Ślokavārttika, Vanavāda 26-29. ŚV, pp. 439-40.

general cognition, and a shape. The only relation between them is that they both belong to the same individuals (§3.3.3 note 34).

There is also no logical reason to have them both. The class property is directly perceptible in the sense that one immediately sees the object as what it is. But asserting that the generic property is an abstract entity other than the shape of a cow or falcon, and other than the color of clay, gold, or silver requires some evidence. Leaning on the assertion that the class property is directly perceptible and the fact that perception is inherently positive, Kumārila gives no evidence. We directly perceive shape, color, and other features. We do not directly perceive a generic property. Presumption could establish that the generic property exists as the basis of our general cognition. However, it cannot establish that it exists in addition to shape because shape serves to identify the object. One can only presume that without which the general cognition would not occur. If shape is coextensive with the general cognition, then it accounts for the general cognition and there is no ground for presuming another basis.

I have just mentioned Śabara's statement that the word 'cow' denotes the class property qualified by the dewlap, etc. If the general shape itself is not the class property; but rather, an abstract general property is, in what way do these features qualify it? In Ākṛtivāda 45 Kumārila says that these parts serve to point out the general property cowness from among the other general properties present in a cow (§3.3.3 note 34). If the general property does not require an inferential mark to make it known, why does Śabara use one in this instance? If the general property is directly perceptible, why doesn't Śabara just mention it directly? Why mention other features common to cows which are directly perceptible. Isn't it rather that Śabara mentions these features to describe the shape general property which is itself the class property?

Kumārila blames Śabara's example of the golden ornaments for giving rise to the doubt that a class property might be a configuration (§3.3.4 note 36). The cause of doubt is that the example does not necessarily show that a generic property as distinguished from an individual is the meaning of a word. It leaves open the possibility of concluding that shape as distinguished from the substance is the meaning of a word. The substance in all three is the same, gold. Yet one uses a different word for each of the three objects, a necklace, a svastika, and a cup. Concomitant presence and absence determine what the word means. Therefore, the word does not denote the substance; it denotes what differs from one object to the next. The shape differs. Hence, a word denotes shape. One identifies the object as what it is by its shape. One shape is a necklace, another is a *svastika*, a third is a cup.

Kumārila's objection implies that Śabara chose a bad example. However, it seems to me that he chose the example of ornaments deliberately. Choosing three gold ornaments intends their common material substance to be brought to the fore. The point is to show that there is no difference in material but only in shape; only shape can be the basis of the use of a different word not substance.[42] Because he requires the word-meaning to be eternal, however, he makes it clear that he does not mean shape as it inheres in a single individual. If Śabara had not meant shape itself to be the class property which a word denotes, he would not have used the example of golden ornaments. He would have stuck with the example of the cow with which he had introduced the section. By using the example of golden ornaments, he shows that he means shape as distinguished from the substance to be the meaning of a word.

Śabara cites the Vedic injunction to build a falcon altar as evidence that a word denotes the class property and not an individual. The injunction is carried out by piling up bricks in the figure of a falcon. Śabara argues that the injunction is possible if the word 'falcon' denotes the class property but impossible if it denotes an individual because it is impossible to create a falcon by piling up bricks. It is obvious to all that it is also impossible to create a class property by piling up bricks. A class property is eternal. Creating the class property means manifesting it, constructing an individual object to which the class property belongs and which is therefore a member of the class. If it is impossible to build an individual, it is equally impossible to manifest the class property.

Kumārila astutely observes this and concludes that whether the word 'falcon' denotes the class property or an individual the injunction means that one should construct something similar to the object denoted by the word 'falcon'. He says that it is possible to make an altar similar to the class property. Regarding the impossibility of making one similar to an individual, he continues as follows:

> And if one selected one individual (to which to make the altar similar) one would not be able to make it similar to any other individual. Therefore, the action of building a falcon altar is not possible if the object denoted by a word is an individual (IIIA note 12).

It is certainly true that a good copy of one individual differs from other individuals because one individual differs from another in some respects. However, each individual is similar to every other

---

[42]The example is very similar to Patañjali's example of gold shaped into different objects in the Paspaśāhnika. See §1.2.3.

in the class. It is precisely this similarity which the class property captures. Hence, it is not true that by being similar to one individual the falcon altar would fail to be similar to any other. Kumārila's point, however, is that the altar should not be more similar to one individual than to another. It should be similar just to that element which is common to all the individuals. If it is, then it is similar to the generic property not an individual.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, in the Nyāyamañjarī, states the following objection to Kumārila's argument:

> *Śyenavyaktyā cet sādṛśyam iṣṭakākūṭasya nāsti, vyaktyantareṇa vyabhicārāt; nitarām amūrttayā jātyā sādṛśyam ākāśeneva na tasyāvakalpate.*
> If the pile of bricks is not similar to an individual falcon because it would fail to be similar to another individual, then it is no more fit to be similar to the insubstantial generic property than it is (fit to be similar) to space.[43]

If the class property is merely an abstract generic property, there is simply no similarity between it and a shape which is not mediated by an individual. Kumārila himself recognizes that the dewlap and other marks are able to serve to point out the generic property cowness because they and the generic property belong to the same individual object (§3.3.3 note 34). Hence, the individual mediates the relation. The generic property belongs to a real individual of the class not to a model. The shape in which one lays the bricks is the figure of any individual which has that generic property, say for instance, the first one one sees or the first remembered.

One may argue that Kumārila's statement, "if one selected one individual (to which to make the altar similar) one would fail to make it similar to any other individual," intends to point out the following facts: An individual by its very nature is unique; it is not common to the class. The altar has to represent any falcon whatsoever not a particular falcon. Hence the altar must have a property common to all and only falcons. The fact of being a property common to all and only falcons makes the general shape coextensive with the generic property. This coextension is the basis of the shape's greater similarity to the generic property than to any one individual.

This argument has two difficulties: First, Kumārila has argued that configuration inheres in a single individual, or if it is considered to be general, the configuration of a cow is no different from that of a horse. If he sticks by these arguments, he cannot determine a general shape which belongs to all and only individuals with a certain generic property. If the shape is not

[43]Nyāyamañjarī, part. 2, p. 37, lines 13-14.

coextensive with the generic property, then there is no basis for the shape's greater similarity to the generic property. Alternatively, if the shape is coextensive with the generic property, there is no reason to presume that the two are distinct entities.

Second, the following position is obviously contradictory: The shape is coextensive with the generic property but the altar with that shape is not a real falcon so it can't have the generic property. Since it has the shape but not the generic property, the shape and generic property are distinct entities. Yet they are similar because they are coextensive. The contradiction is between the following two sets of statements: 1) The generic property does not belong to a model; the shape does. 2) The generic property is coextensive with the shape. By definition, coextension is just the very fact of belonging to the same entities. Now the first statement is the ground for distinguishing the generic property from shape. The second statement is the ground for similarity between the generic property and shape. Two things cannot be both the same and different in the same respect at once.

Therefore, if the class property is an abstract generic property and not a general shape, Śabara's example of the falcon altar fails to constitute evidence that a word denotes the class property and not an individual. On the other hand, however, if shape itself is the class property it succeeds in a most straightforward manner even without resorting to similarity. Whatever has the shape of a falcon is a falcon. Therefore, a pile of bricks in the shape of a falcon is a falcon too. The word 'falcon' in the injunction to build a falcon altar denotes shape which is the class property of the class of falcons.

There are two drawbacks to these arguments which indicate that Śabara recognizes a class property to be more than just shape. First of all, the dichotomy of shape and substance, where the latter is conceived of as the material from which an object is made, such as brick, or sinews, etc., does not hold up in Śabara's arguments concerning the meaning of a generic term. It has been discussed how Patañjali assumes that it is the *dravya* which is associated with dual and plural number rather than the *ākṛti*, in the arguments under Pāṇini 1.2.64 and 1.2.58. The implication of this, namely that he must conceive a *dravya* as an individual not as a material, has also been pointed out (§1.2.8). Similarly, Śabara's presentation of the argument for the view that a generic term denotes an individual includes a reason which applies to an individual but not to a material. Under Jaimini 1.3.31, Śabara says, "If the animal brought for a Vedic performance passes away, one should offer another one of the same color and age." The argument states that being other makes sense for a *dravya* but not for an *ākṛti*. "Even another individual

animal (*paśu-dravya*) has the same *ākṛti* (IIE)." The argument adduces this as a reason for considering that an individual (*vyakti*) is denoted. Hence Śabara uses both the words *'dravya'* and *'vyakti'* to mean an individual, not a material.

This has profound implications against the argument that Śabara considers shape to be the class property. If shape is the class property, then in the case of the falcon altar, the class property belongs to the pile of bricks assembled in the shape of a falcon. In this case, the pile of bricks is a member of the class of falcons and hence is a falcon. If the pile of bricks is a falcon, then it is an individual falcon too. Yet Śabara himself says that in building the altar one does not succeed in constructing an individual falcon. One is no more able to build a shape without constructing an individual than one is able to manifest a class property without creating an individual. Therefore, in either case, whether the class property be an abstract generic property or a general shape, the example of the falcon altar fails to show a word used for a class property without an individual. The difficulties of Śabara's argument concerning the falcon altar will be examined in more detail shortly.

Śabara's argument to prove that a word is eternal and that each enunciation does not constitute a new word (§3.2.2, note 13) shows that his concept of a class property is clearly broader than just the shape of a material object. If a word were new each time, it could not denote the class property because every object has many class properties. New each time, the word could not form a relation with the appropriate one among them. This argument is not valid on the view that what is meant by a class property (*ākṛti*) is the shape of material objects.

Śabara explains the reason that the word, if it were new each time uttered, could not denote the class property in the following manner:

> For the creator of the word-meaning relation would relate the word to the class property by pointing at the class property. But because there are many class properties in any particular cow, by what means other than the word itself would he indicate the general property cowness singled out from all the other properties in the cow as the one denoted by the word 'cow'? (§3.2.2 note 13)

If he considered a class property to be just a shape, there would be no reason that the creator of the word-meaning relation could not relate the word to shape by pointing at it, even if there are many shapes present in the cow. Because what could many shapes be but the shapes of various parts? Each part has its own location and so can be pointed to.

Śabara may consider other common elements which are not abstractions besides shape to be class properties.[44] For example, if the word 'cow' occurs once while someone points to an object of a certain shape, endowed with breath and motion and having a certain size, color, etc., one would be uncertain whether the word referred to the shape, breath, motion, size, color, or some other property of that object. However, if the same word 'cow' occurs again and again while someone indicates the animal of that shape even when the other properties, color, age, size, etc. vary, then one may understand that the word does not refer to those other properties; rather, it refers to the object with the recurrent property or properties. The point of the argument is that the procedure to determine meaning, concomitant presence and absence, requires repetition of the same word with an abiding object. This concomitant presence and absence could succeed if shape is the object it denotes.

On this interpretation, the term *'ākṛti'* then has two senses: 1) It is that which is the common element among a number of objects, no matter whether it be a shape, a quality, or an action. As such it is an abiding entity. 2) It is a producible individual shape as in a falcon altar which one creates.[45]

It seems more likely that Śabara uses the term *'ākṛti'* in the two senses mentioned at the start of the discussion: 1) a particular shape, and 2) an abstract generic property. These are the senses of the term familiar in both grammar and Nyāya. Hence in the argument for the eternity of speech sounds, it is the abstract generic property which is meant. The other generic properties, such as substancehood and existence, accompany the generic property cowness in the object. The shape clearly serves as an obvious example of a property which recurs and hence of an abstract generic property. In Śabara's arguments neither the conception of a class property as just shape, nor the conception of it as an abstract generic property are consistently adhered to. He may conceive of a class property abstractly but deliberately confound it with shape in order to prove that a class property is denoted by a generic term, or he may in fact not clearly distinguish the senses of the term *'ākṛti'* himself.

---

[44]Just as he conceives shape as general unlike Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, he may conceive qualities and parts as general just as he does actions. The use of the word 'general (*sāmānya*)' in Vaiśeṣika *sūtra* 1.1.18, *Dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyam*, suggests that it is also possible to consider substance as a common element. VS, p. 30. However, Śabara would never apply the concept of class property (*ākṛti*) to a single substance as the common cause of two or more objects. For example, gold in three golden ornaments is not a class property (*ākṛti*) but a single substance (*dravya*).

[45]D'Sa (1990: 91) seems to have these two senses in mind. He (p. 87) certainly interprets the generic *ākṛti* in the first sense.

Kumārila clearly conceives the debate over the meaning of generic terms as one concerned with the dichotomy of generic property versus individual. However, in spite of his vigorous arguments to free the concept of generic property from that of shape, the fact that he assumes that the shape of the altar bears some similarity to the generic property shows that even he conceives the generic property to be tinged with shape. Other than shape what similarity is there? Albeit contrary to his intentions, in trying to defend the validity of Śabara's argument concerning the falcon altar, shape colors his notion of a generic property.

3.3.5. The Bearing of the Nature of a Class Property and an Individual on the Denotation of a Generic Term

The class property is eternal; the individual substance which has that property is not. If the meaning is the class property, the word-meaning relation will be eternal and not otherwise. Hence Mīmāṃsā must argue that the meaning of the word is the class property and not the individual substance.[46] The Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa presents initial arguments for the view that a generic term denotes an individual alone, then rejecting them presents conclusive arguments for the view that a generic term denotes only the class property.

3.4. Analysis of Arguments in the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa

A detailed outline of the argument for the conclusion of the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, that a generic term denotes only a class property, appears at the beginning of the translation section of this chapter. Śabara discusses four views of what the meaning of a generic term is: 1) the individual alone, 2) the qualified individual or individual as being of such and such a type, 3) the qualified class property or class property as belonging to an individual and 4) the class property alone. First he presents the view that the individual alone is the meaning then gradually presses his objector to accept first that the class property must be

[46]Kumārila states this succinctly in Ākṛtivāda 1. *Ākṛtivyatirikte 'rthe sambandho nityatāsya ca; na sidhyetām iti jñātvā tad vācyatvam ihocyate.* Knowing that if the word-meaning relation were with respect to an object other than the class property, neither the relation itself nor its eternity would succeed, in Mīmāṃsā we say that the class property is denoted. ŚV, p. 385.

included in the meaning, second that the individual must be excluded.

He rejects the first view, that the individual alone is the meaning, because the following two facts make it untenable: 1) The general property must be an element in the resulting cognition in order to account for the knowledge of an individual as the same as others of the class (IIIC3aii, 3b). 2) The general property must identify the individuals the word denotes in order to account for the use of the word with respect to all and only individuals of the class, specifically members unknown previously (IIIC4).

Number one implies that the cognition of an individual following the use of a generic term does not have the individual alone as its object. Its object is the individual qualified by the class property. Śabara says that no one can apprehend a qualified object without knowing its qualifier. If the general property serves to mark the individuals the word denotes, then "one would apprehend an individual which is qualified. And if qualified, one would understand the qualifier first. No one can apprehend something qualified unless the qualifier is apprehended (IIIC4b)." Kumārila states the principle as follows:

> *Viśiṣṭagrahaṇaṃ neṣṭam agṛhītaviśeṣaṇam; ...*
> *Agṛhītaviśeṣaṇe tadanuraktā viśeṣyabuddhir nopajāyata iti tadgrahaṇam ārdatavyam.*
> It is not accepted that there is knowledge of the qualified without knowledge of the qualifier; ...
> (Because of the principle) "Without knowing the qualifier, the knowledge of the qualified, which is based on it, does not arise," one must respect the knowledge of the (qualifier).[47]

For the general property to identify an individual as an object the word may denote, one must know the general property to be present in the individual before applying the word to the individual. However, that does not necessarily imply that the role of giving knowledge of the general property must fall to the word. Explaining this limitation of the principle, Kumārila continues as follows:

---

[47]TV, vol. IV, p. 341. Kumārila refers to this principle twice in the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa. His first reference is by way of paraphrase. He says, "Because without denoting a qualifier it is impossible to denote a qualified object it qualifies.... (*Viśeṣaṇam anabhidhāya tadviśiṣṭaviśeṣyābhidhānāsaṃbhavād....*)" (MD, part 2, p. 241, line 12.) In his second reference, he says, "Because of the principle, 'Unless the qualifier is known,' etc. (*nāgṛhītaviśeṣaṇeti nyāyād...*)." (MD, part 2, p.248, line 4.) The principle appears in the Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa (p. 7, line 12.) as follows: *Nāgṛhītaviśeṣaṇā buddhir viśeṣya upajāyate.* Unless the qualifier is known, knowledge of the qualified object does not arise. The Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa quotes the verse line which I quote from Kumārila.

Na tv anabhihitaviśeṣaṇatvena kiṃcid duṣyati. Yadi nāmānabhihitam api viśeṣaṇaṃ kenacid anyena pratyāyyamānaṃ viśiṣṭapratyayotpādanāya paryāptaṃ bhavati, kiṃ tatrābhidhānānurodhena. But no fault arises if the word doesn't denote it. If even without being denoted something else conveys the cognition of the qualifier so that it is competent to bring about the cognition of the qualified object, then why does it have to be denoted?

In the case of a generic term, there is nothing else which consistently gives knowledge of the general property. If the word denoted only an individual and did not supply the knowledge of the general property, something else would have to. One can't rely on the individual object itself to give knowledge of the general property because knowledge of the individual results from the word which doesn't give knowledge of the individual until the general property indicates the individual as an object to denote. Knowledge of the general property would depend on knowledge of the individual and knowledge of the individual through the word would depend on knowledge of the general property. Hence, it would be circular to say that the general property indicates the individual for the word to denote and the individual gives knowledge of the general property. Therefore, the word does not denote the individual alone.

The proponent of the view that the word denotes only the individual agrees that the general property must identify the individuals the word denotes (IIIC4), and that the general property is an element in the resulting cognition (IIC). However, he denies that it must be denoted itself in order to do so, claiming that one knows the general property from the individuals of the class. He claims that the individual gives knowledge of the general property, knowledge of the general property brings about the word's relation to individuals, and the word gives knowledge of the individual; yet denies that this is circular.

He argues something like the following: Even without the use of the word one knows individual objects by direct perception and other means of knowledge. The individual objects known in this way give knowledge of the general property entirely independent of the use of the word. The general property so known brings about the word-meaning relation between the word and any individual which has that property. Thereafter whenever the word is used, the word generates cognition of that individual. Then the cognition of the individual generates cognition of the general property. In this way one arrives at the cognition of the individual as being of such and such a type. It is not necessary that the cognition of the qualifier precede the cognition of the qualified.

Śabara points out that such a view is not cogent. Knowing the relation between a word and its meaning depends

upon concomitant presence and absence; hence, it requires knowing each of the two independently yet concurrently more than once (§3.2.2, notes 10,13). Concomitant presence and absence can establish the relation between a word and an individual object provided that one knows the object and the word each independently first. In this case the relation between them would succeed directly, independent of the class property and there would be no reason to presume the mediation of the class property there.

However, a generic term is used for members of the class hitherto unknown, for example, a newly born calf (IIIC3ai). In order to achieve the use of the word for such an object one resorts to the mediation of the class property because one has seen the concomitant presence and absence of the word and the class property with regard to other individuals (IIIC4). Now one's neighbor rushes in and announces the birth of a calf. If one has not seen the calf yet and his use of the word does not bring the class property to mind how will cognition of either the class property or the new individual arise? The only answer possible is that it won't arise. By merely existing the class property cannot lead one to know that which has that property. It can do so only by being an object of cognition.[48] Therefore, the word directly gives knowledge of the class property.

The objector's explanation could account for the use of a word for individual objects of which direct perception or other means of knowledge have given cognition previously (although even there it is cumbersome because it involves the unnecessary mediation of the class property) but it cannot account for the use of a word for a member of the class not known previously. Even knowing the class property as belonging to known members of the class, one does not know that it belongs to the new object. Therefore, the class property can neither bring about the word's relation with the new object nor be a part of the resulting cognition. Hence Śabara correctly requires that the class property serve as a mark for all the individuals and correctly concludes that as such a mark it is both an element in the denoted meaning and the logically prior element (IIIC4).

The views that the word denotes either the qualified individual or the qualified class property with the other element taking a subordinate position in the meaning as the qualifier are moderate views. These are the views Patañjali considers in his commentary on 1.2.64 *vārttika* 53 (53c). Śabara rejects these

[48]As Kumārila says in Ākṛtivāda 14. *Bhaven nirviṣayā buddhir yadi śaktir na gṛhyate; na hi sadbhāvamātreṇa viṣayaḥ kaścid iṣyate.* Cognition would have no object if one did not know the capacity (of a general property to produce the same cognition). It is unacceptable that something be an object (of cognition) just because it exists. ŚV, p. 387.

moderate views for the following reasons: 1) If the individual were involved in the meaning at all, the meaning would be individual, not general (IIIF). One would require the unqualified class property as a truly general property to identify the qualified meaning, just as the view that the individual alone is the meaning required the general property to identify the objects which the word denotes. 2) Since the individual and the class property are inseparably connected, once one knows one of them that one will make the other known. Hence one cannot presume that the word denotes more than one (IIIE1). 3) Concomitant presence and absence show that the word denotes the class property and not the individual (E3).

The second argument, that only one of the two inseparable elements can be denoted because knowledge of that one is sufficient to supply knowledge of the other, is equally valid on the view that the individual alone is the meaning of the word and on the view that only the class property is the meaning of the word. The objector mentions that both views are equivalent in so far as action is impossible on either view yet both views can account for the action by having the denoted element indicate it (IIIB). The argument that the word denotes the individual points out that actions such as washing rice are impossible on the class property (IIIB1a). Śabara will respond that the word denotes the class property riceness, and the class property indicates the substance to wash (IIIB2a, IVB1). The argument that the word denotes the class property points out that actions, such as building a falcon with bricks, are impossible on an individual (IIIB1b). The objector could respond that the word denotes a real individual falcon and the individual falcon portrays its class property as the shape in which to lay the bricks (IIIB2b). Both arguments rely on the fact that the individual and the class property are inseparably connected in order to eliminate the other from being a part of the meaning (IIB, IIIE1).

The arguments seek to uphold an economy of word-meaning relations. The objector states the principle of economy as follows: It is unreasonable for a word to denote more than one meaning (*anyāyaś cānekārthatvam*) (IIB). The word *'ekārthatvam* (that there be one meaning)' glosses the word *'arthaikatvam'* in *sūtra* 1.3.30 interpreted as a statement of the proponent in the Lokavedādhikaraṇa:

> Jaimini 1.3.30. Because (Vedic texts) enjoin performance, each word has just one meaning because there is no division.

As stated, the *sūtra* applies specifically to Vedic context versus ordinary context. It asserts that we don't see any difference between a word used in the Veda and in ordinary use so the word is the same. In addition, if the meaning of the word used in the

Veda were different from the meaning of the word in ordinary usage, we would be unable to carry out the actions the Veda enjoins. However, the *sūtra* may be generalized to apply to any two contexts. As such it says that we don't see any difference between a word in one use and that word in another use. If the meaning in one use were different from the meaning in another use, we would not understand which one was intended.

Kumārila comments that if more than one meaning per word were accepted, the word-meaning relation would not be fixed, one would have to posit more than one signifying capacity, and the cognition of each meaning would be optional. In the case of connected meanings, by deriving one meaning from the other, one can avoid these faults; hence, just one should be accepted as the denoted meaning (IIB note 4).

The principle that each word have only one meaning complements the principle Jaimini states just four *sūtras* earlier in the Vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa that each meaning have only one word:

> Jaimini 1.3.26. *Anyāyaś cānekaśabdatvam.*
> It is unreasonable to have more than one word denoting one meaning.[49]

Śabara has the objector state the principle that it is unreasonable to have more than one meaning per word parallel to Jaimini 1.3.26.

Both principles uphold an economy of word-meaning relations. Jaimini 1.3.26 states that one can only presume that there be the minimum number of word-meaning relations which account for the usage. One cannot presume that a vernacular word similar to a Sanskrit word for the same meaning bears an independent relation to the meaning because one can account for the fact that it conveys the meaning by its similarity to and derivation from the Sanskrit word. Śabara points out a qualification: unless there is justification for assuming more than one. A second word is accepted in that meaning if the Veda actually states one.

Conversely, there is no reason for a word to denote more than one meaning, unless there is some justification for presuming an additional meaning. One cannot presume that one cognition bears an independent relation to a word if it can consistently be accounted for via a second cognition following the use of that word. If the first cognition cannot be accounted for by deriving it from the second then by all means it must be accepted as a second meaning. In addition, the second cognition must be one which cannot be accounted for by deriving it from the first. Hence, the cognition which does not depend on other meanings yet consistently arises upon the use of the word is the meaning of

---

[49]MD, vol. 2, p. 213.

the word. That is, one presumes that a word bears a signifying capacity with respect to a meaning if one cannot account for the cognition of that meaning other than by the word denoting it.

3.5. Criteria of Denotation

Although words and meanings are directly perceptible, a word-meaning relation is imperceptible. Therefore, neither direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) nor the other means of knowledge based on it (*anumāna*, *upamāna*) can give knowledge of it (§3.1.1 note 4). The Veda does not directly state which words match which meanings. Although speech in the form of dictionaries and statements of knowledgeable people do give such knowledge, they are not an ultimate source of knowledge. Their knowledge depends on other means of knowledge. Hence, based on observation and evaluation of usage by any of the other means of knowledge, presumption (*arthāpatti*) is the final means by which Mīmāṃsā determines a word-meaning relation. Presumption is based on not being able to account for the facts otherwise (*ananyathāsiddhi*).

Whenever a word is used, many meanings appear with it.[50] Two criteria, according to Mīmāṃsā, determine which among these is the denoted meaning: 1) concomitant presence and absence (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), and 2) inability to account for the cognition otherwise (*ananyalabhyatva*). 1) Concomitant presence and absence of a word w and a meaning x is the fact that whenever word w is present meaning x is present and whenever word w is absent meaning x is absent ($w \equiv x$). 2) Inability to account for the cognition otherwise is directly based on the character of presumption. One may presume the cognition of x to be caused by a word if there is no other way to account for the cognition. Therefore, only if a meaning is coextensive with a word, and in addition one cannot account for the presence of the meaning otherwise, should the meaning be considered the denoted meaning of the word.

The procedure of concomitant presence and absence has been discussed in relation to Patañjali's discussion of the denotation of generic terms (§1.3.1.1). Kumārila emphasizes the role that the means of knowledge known as presumption ought to play in determining the denoted meaning. He states outright that

---

[50]Kumārila enumerates seven meanings which occur with the use of a class term: *Gaur ity uccarite sapta vastūni pratibhānti naḥ: Jātir vyaktiś ca saṃbandhaḥ samūho liṅgakārake; Saṃkhyā ca saptamī.* When the word 'cow' is uttered seven objects appear to us: The generic property, an individual, their relation, the aggregate (of those three), gender and participant in the action, and number is the seventh. MD, part 2, p. 256, lines 18-20.

although two or more meanings appear with the use of a word, the word denotes only the one some other means of knowledge does not supply:

> *Sarvatraiva tāvac chabdād uccaritād aneko 'rtho gamyate. Na ca tāvatā sarva evābhidheyo bhavati, tadbhāvabhāvitvānyathānupapatty-adhīnatvād vācakaśaktikalpanāyāḥ. Sa nāmārtho 'bhidhīyate, yatra śabdasya vācakaśaktiḥ kalpyate. Kva cāsāv adṛṣṭā satī kalpyate? Yatra tatkalpanām antareṇa pratītiprayogau nāvakalpete. Yatra tv anyaviśayayaiva śaktyā kalpitayā tathānyatrāpi tau sidhyatas, tatrānupalabdhyā śaktyabhāvaḥ pratīyate.*
> One always understands many meanings from an uttered speech form. That doesn't imply that they are all its denoted meanings, because positing the signifying capacity depends on not being able otherwise to account for the occurrence of the meaning when the speech form is used. The denoted meaning is the (meaning) in which one posits the speech form's signifying capacity. In which (meaning) does one posit (the speech form's signifying capacity), since we can't see it? (In the meaning) in which cognition and usage would not succeed without positing it. But one knows that a word does not have the capacity to denote a certain meaning, by means of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), if cognition and usage succeed in that meaning, and in the other meanings as well, by positing that the word has the capacity to denote just another meaning.[51]

Three statements, shown symbolically in table 1, outline the procedure Kumārila describes to determine a word-meaning relation: In statement 1, "One always understands many meanings from an uttered speech form," he recognizes that the cognition of many objects arises regularly with the use of a certain word. By recognizing that the word does not necessarily denote all these objects saying, "That doesn't imply that they are all its denoted meanings," he introduces two statements concerning how to determine, by means of presumption and non-perception, which among these objects is denoted.

In statement 2, he states that one can presume that the word denotes an object if one cannot account for the cognition of that object otherwise, "The denoted meaning is the (meaning) in which ... cognition and usage would not succeed without positing (the speech form's signifying capacity there)." Note that Kumārila says, "without positing," not "positing that it is not." The phrase, "without positing," tells one not to do something; it does not outline any positive procedure to follow. Kumārila intends that there are a limited number of possible causes of the cognition. One of them must cause the cognition. If the one in question does not, one of the others must. Conversely, if none of the possible causes other than the one in question succeeds in

---

[51]MD, part 4, p. 338.

Table 1
Determining Denotation

1.	$(Ax)[Ksx \rightarrow (Em_1 \ldots m_n)(Km_1x \,\&\ldots\&\, Km_nx)]$
2.	$(Ai)[\neg Dsm_i \rightarrow \neg(Ax)Km_ix] \rightarrow Dsm_i$
3.	$(Ai, Aj: i \neq j)[Dsm_j \rightarrow (Ax)(Km_ix \,\&\, Km_jx)] \rightarrow \neg Dsm_i$

1. For all objects x, if one knows a speech form s for x then there are many meanings $m_1, \ldots, m_n$ such that one knows $m_1, \ldots$, and one knows m_n.
2. For all meanings m_i of an object x, if it is true that if it were not the case that the speech form denoted m_i then it would not be the case that for all x one knows m_i of x, then s denotes m_i.
3. For any m_i and m_j, if it is the case that if the speech form denotes m_j then for all x one knows m_i of x and one knows m_j of x, then it is not the case that the speech form denotes m_i.

bringing about cognition, the one in question must. Hence the procedure is the following: Assume that it is not the case that s denotes m_i. If it is not the case that for all x one knows m_i of x, then the assumption is false. One concludes that s denotes m_i.

Kumārila considers non-perception of an expected object (*anupalabdhi*) to be the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) whereby one determines the absence of that object. One can presume that a word bears a capacity to denote only those meanings of which cognition would not arise unless they were denoted. Non-perception testifies that any meanings whose cognition can be accounted for otherwise are not denoted. If one of the other possible causes succeeds in accounting for the cognition of a meaning then one cannot presume that the word does. In statement 3, he says, "But one knows that a word does not have the capacity to denote a certain meaning, by means of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), if cognition and usage succeed in that meaning, and in the other meanings as well, by positing that the word has the capacity to denote just another meaning." The procedure is to assume that s denotes m_j. If it follows that for all x one knows m_i and one knows m_j, then it is not the case that s denotes m_i.

Table two clarifies the relationships between hearing a generic term and knowing, by any means whatsoever, the class property and individuals to which the generic term refers. It shows the eight possible combinations of the three cognitions, knowledge of generic term, knowledge of the class property, and knowledge of an individual.

Rows 1 and 8 show the normal situations, row 1 where a word is used and we perceive both the class property and an individual, row 8 where a word is not used and we don't perceive either. If only the situations represented in these two rows in the table occurred, concomitant presence and absence would establish that the word denoted both the class property and the individual.

Table 2
Cognition Data

	Kwx	Kcx	Kix	Circumstance
1.	T	T	T	Normal use.
2.	F	T	T	See individual and recognize its class property.
3.	T	F	T	First hear word and see unknown object.
4.	F	F	T	One asks, "What is this?"
5.	T	T	F	The example of the falcon and other images.
6.	F	T	F	See image.
7.	T	F	F	Don't know or forget what the word means.
8.	F	F	F	No knowledge

'Kyx' represents the general statement: One knows y related to x. We deal with just three instances of y: the generic term w, the class property c, and an individual i. 'T' in a column represents the truth, and 'F' the falsity, of the statement at the head of the column: He knows the word w for x (Kwx), he knows the class property c of x (Kcx), or he knows an individual manifestation i of x (Kix). A separate variable x serves as an index variable to show the association of the three related objects, the word, the class property, and an individual. It stands for the class of objects associated with all three. Although Śabara does not mention any such thing as a class distinct from the class property, I speak of a class for convenience in the present discussion. For example, if we speak of the falcon class, f (falcon) instantiates x in the three statements Kwx, Kcx, and Kix to yield the following three statements:

1) One knows the word 'falcon' of the class of falcons (Kwf),
2) One knows the class property falconhood of the class of falcons (Kcf), and
3) One knows an individual falcon of the class of falcons (Kif).

The right hand column of the table describes a circumstance exemplifying the case the first three columns represent.

Row 2 shows the presence of cognition of the class property and individual in the absence of the word (IIIE3a). Row 7 shows the absence of cognition of the class property and the individual in the presence of the word (IIIE3b). The cases represented in these rows show the lack of concomitant presence and absence between the word and either the class property or the individual. However, the knowledge of the class property and individual in row 2 derives from perception, and row 7 shows the presence (not the knowledge) of the word.

Row 3 shows the presence of the word and the individual in the absence of cognition of the class property. This occurs only when one has not grasped the word-meaning relation and has not recognized the general type of the object. An elder may point to a cow and say, "This is a cow," to a child. The knowledge of the individual is directly perceived, and the child is not a full-fledged speaker of the language because he does not know the word-meaning relation. Row 6, showing the absence of hearing the word and the absence of the cognition of the individual on the cognition of the class property, occurs only

when one knows a class property through perception or some means of knowledge based on perception.

Row 4 shows the absence of the word and the class property in the presence of the cognition of the individual. Row 5 shows the presence of the word and the class property in the absence of the cognition of the individual. The situation in row 4 occurs only to one who directly perceives an individual and neither knows what type of thing it is nor what it is called. Row 5 represents cases like the example of the falcon. Śabara gives the example in order to establish the concomitant presence of knowing the word and knowledge of the class property and as a counterexample disproving the concomitant presence of knowing the word and the verbal cognition of the individual (IIIG4a).

The discussions concerning word and meaning with which we are dealing assume a number of limitations. Rather than complicate the relational statements by including these assumptions in them explicitly, we will state the assumptions in advance as background and restrict our discussions to the domain they frame. First of all, although knowledge is properly a relation between two objects, a knower and a known, we use the predicate K with a variable representing the known in relation to an index variable x. We do not include a variable for the knower because the knower is constant in our discussion. He is any competent speaker of the language in which w is a word so that he actively knows w and the word-meaning relation. The result is that knowing a word w does not mean just hearing it but rather knowing w and the word-meaning relation which is located in w and has w as one of its relata.[52] In some instances Śabara and Kumārila state that something is present or absent, particularly

---

[52]According to later refinements, the word-meaning relation participates in bringing about all verbal knowledge. First one learns the relation which is stored inactively in memory. Hearing the word arouses it or causes one to remember it. Then knowledge of the word together with the word-meaning relation brings about the cognition of the object. For example, Nāgeśa in his chapter describing the primary word-meaning relation (*Śaktinirūpaṇa*) says: *Taddharmāvacchinnaviṣayakaśābdabuddhitvāvacchinnaṃ (jñānam) prati taddharmāvacchinnanirūpitavṛttiviśiṣṭajñānaṃ hetuḥ. Ata eva nāgṛhītavṛttikasya śābdabodhaḥ.* (PLM, p. 17.) Knowledge of the word qualified by the word-meaning relation described with respect to the object qualified by a certain property x is the cause of verbal knowledge of an object qualified by x. Hence, one who has not comprehended the word-meaning relation does not have verbal cognition. He adds: *Jñāne vṛttivaiśiṣṭyaṃ ca svaviṣayakodbuddhasaṃskārasāmānādhikaraṇyasvāśrayapadaviṣayakatvobhayasambandhena bodhyam. Ato nāgṛhītavṛttikasya nāpi tatpadam ajānato... bodhaḥ.* (PLM, p. 22.) The knowledge (of the word) is qualified by the word-meaning relation in two ways: 1) it occurs in the same (human) substratum as the aroused memory of the word-meaning relation, 2) it has as its object the word which is the substratum of the word-meaning relation. Hence (verbal) cognition does not arise for one who has not comprehended the word-meaning relation or for one who does not perceive the word....

when discussing concomitant presence and absence, meaning that a competent speaker knows it as we have just described. In such cases, we restate their statements directly in terms of knowledge of the thing.[53]

Except for the cognition of a word, the knowledge under discussion rarely derives from direct perception. It derives either directly from words or indirectly from words via the word meanings. Śabara's discussion assumes that this is understood. Hence, we assume the statement, "For all y, if it is not the case that y is a word then it is not the case that one knows y by means of direct perception, or by means of inference or comparison based on direct perception $\{(Ay)(\neg Wy \rightarrow \neg Py)\}$." In the rare case that it is otherwise, this will be explicitly stated. Because denotation is a direct causal relation between knowledge of the word and knowledge of the denoted meaning, the statement that the word denotes the meaning implies that if one knows the word then one knows the meaning. In other words if w denotes a meaning m then, for all x, if one knows w of x then one knows m of x $\{(Am)[Dwm \rightarrow (Ax)(Kwx \rightarrow Kmx)]\}$. This is stated as an assumption in tables 4-7, 10 and 11, line 1. Finally, Śabara and Kumārila's discussions are not vacuous. They speak of ordinary words of a language known to competent speakers of the language. Hence we assume the statement, "For all x, one knows the word for x $\{(Ax)(Kwx)\}$." This is stated as an assumption in tables 4-7, 10 and 11, line 2.

Table 3
Verbal Cognition Data

	Kwx	Kcx	Kix	Circumstance
1.	T	T	T	Normal use.
2.	F	F	F	Kcx & Kix assume ¬Pc & ¬Pi.
3.	F	F	F	Kwx assumes knowing relation; Kix assumes ¬Pi.
4.	F	F	F	Kix assumes ¬Pi.
5.	T	T	F	The example of the falcon and other images.
6.	F	F	F	Kcx assumes ¬Pc.
7.	F	F	F	Kwx assumes knowing word-meaning relation.
8.	F	F	F	No knowledge

Table 3 shows the truth or falsity of the three statements shown in table 2 given the assumptions we have just stated. Rows 1, 5 and 8 remain the same. Our discussions assume that knowledge of a word includes active knowledge of the word meaning-relation located in it and having it as one of its relata. In the circumstances shown in rows 3 and 7 of table 2, while it is

[53]Indian philosophy recognizes two types of causes: that which causes simply by being (*satsatkāraṇa*) and that which causes by being known (*jñānasatkāraṇa*). We are dealing strictly with the latter.

true that one hears a word, one does not know it. Hence those rows under column 1 of table 3 bear an 'F' showing that the statement, "He knows a word," is false. In addition, we have assumed that knowledge of objects other than words does not derive from perception unless stated so. In the circumstances shown in rows 2-4 and 6 of table 2, although one may know the class property or individual by direct perception or some means based on it, one cannot know them independently of perception; it is not the case that all of the knowledge in the situation derives either directly or indirectly from speech. Hence the 'T's in rows 2 and 6 under column 2, and in rows 2-4 under column 3 showing that the statement, "He knows x," is true have been changed to 'F's in table 3 showing that the statement is false given the assumption.

Surveying the observed facts depicted in table 3, we see two types of situations arising upon a competent speaker's cognition of a generic term. There are the ordinary cases such as the example of rice where knowledge of the word 'rice' is followed by knowledge of the class property riceness and knowledge of individual grains of rice {Kwr & (Kcr & Kir)}. There are also cases such as the example of the falcon where knowledge of the word 'falcon' is followed by knowledge of the class property falconhood, but not by knowledge of an individual falcon {Kwf & (Kcf & ¬Kif)}. There are no cases which are not of either one of these types. In order to account for these facts, one wishes to explain the correspondence in terms of a cause and effect relation among these three elements: the word, the class property and an individual. Assuming that the other two, as meanings, are causally derivative from the knowledge of the word, given the assumption of knowledge of each word one must account for knowledge of each class property and in most cases knowledge of an individual.

Excepting the cases like the falcon example, the correspondences are uniform: knowledge of the word is followed by knowledge of the class property and knowledge of an individual {(Ax)[Kwx & (Kcx & Kix)]}. Given the assumption of knowledge of any word {(Ax)Kwx} one must account for knowledge of the class property and knowledge of an individual {(Ax)(Kcx & Kix)}. The simplest solution is to assume that the word denotes both the class property and the individual {(Dwc & Dwi)}. Given that one knows any word and that to denote implies that if one knows the word then one knows the denoted meaning, if the word denotes both the class property and the individual, it follows that one knows both the class property and the individual. Table 4 shows this argument as a symbolic logic derivation. The final conclusions in grammar and Nyāya concur with this solution.

In his argument to determine whether a word denotes a class property or an individual, Śabara acknowledges that

Table 4
A generic term denotes
both the class property and the individual.

1.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	
2.	(Ax)Kwx	
3.	Dwc & Dwi	
4.	Dwc & Dwi	(R, 3)
5.	Dwc	(&E, 4)
6.	Dwi	(&E, 4)
7.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	(R, 1)
8.	Dwc → (Ax)(Kwx → Kcx)	(AE, 7)
9.	Dwi → (Ax)(Kwx → Kix)	(AE, 7)
10.	(Ax)(Kwx → Kcx)	(→E, 5,8)
11.	(Ax)(Kwx → Kix)	(→E, 6,9)
12.	Kwa → Kca	(AE, 10)
13.	Kwa → Kia	(AE, 11)
14.	(Ax)Kwx	(R, 2)
15.	Kwa	(AE, 14)
16.	Kca	(→E, 12,15)
17.	Kia	(→E, 13,15)
18.	Kca & Kia	(&I, 16,17)
19.	(Ax)(Kcx & Kix)	(AI, 18)
20.	(Dwc & Dwi) → (Ax)(Kcx & Kix)	(→I, 3-19)

cognition of both follows the use of a word. At the beginning of the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, asked why the question arises, the proponent answers, "Because when the word 'cow' is spoken, one understands a general property (IB1)." While arguing against the view that a word denotes both the class property and an individual, the proponent says, "It is self-evident that one apprehends the individual when a word is uttered (IIIE2a)." Although Kumārila acknowledges that cognition of other meanings occurs as well, the current discussion does not consider them. The present argument considers only two meanings, the class property and an individual, and assumes that a generic term denotes at least one of the two. We state this as the following assumption in table 7, line 4 and table 11, line 5: w denotes c or w denotes i {Dwc V Dwi}.

Śabara argues that the word does not denote the individual because concomitant presence and absence proves that one can account for the cognition of the individual from the class property. Immediately following the last statement quoted he continues as follows:

> But the distinction, whether one apprehends it from the word or from the class property, is not evident. That is determined by means of concomitant presence and absence (IIIE2b-3).

Then he makes the following two statements intending to establish that knowledge of the class property rather than of the word is the direct cause of knowledge of an individual:

> a) Even without the use of the word, whoever apprehends a class property, certainly apprehends an individual (IIIE3a). b) But even upon hearing the word, whoever should fail to apprehend the class property at some time because his mind is dull, would certainly not understand that individual (IIIE3b).

These statements assert the following: a) Whether one has cognition of the word or not, if one knows the class property then one knows an individual. $\{(Ax)[(Kwx \vee \neg Kwx) \rightarrow (Kcx \rightarrow Kix)]\}$. b) Whether one has cognition of the word or not, if one does not know the class property then one does not know an individual. $\{(Ax)[(Kwx \vee \neg Kwx) \rightarrow (\neg Kcx \rightarrow \neg Kix)]\}$. By the law of the excluded middle $(p \vee \neg p)$, the statements imply the concomitant presence and absence of knowledge of the class property and knowledge of an individual $\{(Ax)[(Kcx \rightarrow Kix) \& (\neg Kcx \rightarrow \neg Kix)]\}$.

The phrases, "even without the use of the word" and "even upon hearing the word," show that in this case Śabara puts aside the assumption that the cognition of the object is not caused by perception or a means of knowledge dependent on perception. He states that there is concomitant presence and absence of knowledge of the class property and knowledge of an individual, regardless of the means of that knowledge (See table 2 rows 2 and 7; the present statement ignores rows 3-6 in which these two cognitions are not concurrent). The phrase, "because his mind is dull," in statement b sets aside the assumption that knowledge of the word includes active knowledge of the word-meaning relation. Therefore, although the statements assert the presence of the word with the absence of both meanings, and the absence of the word with the presence of both meanings, they do not contradict the concomitant presence (and absence) of knowledge of the word and knowledge of its meanings. Knowledge of a word and knowledge of its meanings are only (and need only be) coextensive insofar as the knowledge of the meanings arises from speech. Because they set aside the assumptions, Śabara's two statements (IIIE3a and IIIE3b) do not deny the coextension of knowledge of the word, as including active knowledge of its signifying capacity, and verbal knowledge of its meanings.

Śabara's introduction to his statement of the concomitant presence and absence of the class property and an individual show that he intends the known class property to be the direct cause of knowledge of an individual. He intends the statements to show that one knows the individual "from the class property (IIIE2b)." From his preceding statement it appears that he intends

the direct causation to be mutual due to the inseparable relation of the class property and an individual. He says, "...the class property is inseparably related to the individual, and once one knows that relatum one knows the other relatum (IIIE1)." Kumārila interprets the objector's argument that the word denotes only the individual to rely on this mutual causation, and interprets Jaimini's word 'because there is no division (*avibhāgāt*)' as implying this mutual causation. Kumārila comments as follows:

> To answer the objection, "Then how does one have the cognition of the general property?" (Jaimini) says, "Because there is no division." Because an individual and its class property are eternally inseparable, the individual being denoted can convey the understanding of the class property. (IIC note 5)

When the objector states that the view that a word denotes the individual and the view that a word denotes the class property are equivalent, he shows that he understands the inseparability of the class property and individual to imply that knowledge of either one causes knowledge of the other. He states that, on the view that the word denotes only the class property, the class property serves to make known the individual and, on the view that the word denotes only the individual, the individual serves to make known the class property (IIIB2). These statements interpret the concomitant presence and absence of knowledge of the class property and knowledge of an individual to be equivalent to their biconditional $\{(Ax)(Kix \equiv Kcx)\}$.[54] This statement appears as an assumption in tables 5 and 6, line 3.

The aim of Śabara's argument is to show that, because one can account for the knowledge of the individual from the knowledge of the class property, one cannot presume that the word denotes the individual. This is exactly a specific form of the general statement of presumption included in Kumārila's procedure discussed above (table 1, statement 3). This statement appears as an assumption on line 4 of table 5 which shows Śabara's argument as a derivation in symbolic logic.[55] The paragraph below the table summarizes the argument.

---

[54]Modern deductive logic holds the biconditional to be equivalent to the conjunction of the conditional and negative conditional $\{[(p \rightarrow q) \& (\neg p \rightarrow \neg q)] \equiv (p \equiv q)\}$. However, this equivalence relies on the intelim rules of negative introduction and elimination which are equivalent to the Mīmāṃsā means of knowledge by which the relation of cause and effect is established, presumption. Presumption is the weakest means of knowledge.

[55]Read: If it is true that, by assuming that the word denotes only the class property c (and not an individual i), for all classes x one knows c of x and i of x, then it is not the case that the word denotes i.

Table 5

One cannot presume that a word denotes an individual.

1.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	
2.	(Ax)Kwx	
3.	(Ax)(Kix ≡ Kcx)	
4.	[Dwc → (Ax)(Kcx & Kix)] → ¬Dwi	
5.	Dwc	
6.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	(R, 1)
7.	Dwc → (Ax)(Kwx → Kcx)	(AE, 6)
8.	Dwc	(R, 5)
9.	(Ax)(Kwx → Kcx)	(→E, 7,8)
10.	Kwa → Kca	(AE, 9)
11.	(Ax)Kwx	(R, 2)
12.	Kwa	(AE, 11)
13.	Kca	(→E, 10,12)
14.	(Ax)(Kix ≡ Kcx)	(R, 3)
15.	Kia ≡ Kca	(AE, 14)
16.	Kia	(≡E, 13,15)
17.	Kca & Kia	(&I, 13,16)
18.	(Ax)(Kcx & Kix)	(AI, 17)
19.	Dwc → (Ax)(Kcx & Kix)	(→I, 5-18)
20.	[Dwc → (Ax)(Kcx & Kix)] → ¬Dwi	(R, 4)
21.	¬Dwi	(→E, 19,20)

A word conveys cognition of both a class property and an individual, yet it need denote only one of the two. If it is the case that if the word denoted the class property the cognition of both the class property and individual would still arise, then we cannot presume that the individual is also denoted. Now, if one knows the class property, one knows an individual, independent of the use of the word. Therefore, if the word denotes only the class property, the word will cause cognition of the class property and the class property will cause cognition of an individual. Cognition of both class property and individual arises. Therefore, we cannot presume that the word denotes the individual. Since no other means of knowledge shows that it does denote the individual, we conclude the word does not denote an individual.

The proponent of the view that the word denotes only the individual uses the same general procedure to show that one cannot presume that the word denotes the class property (IIB, IIIE1). He makes the following assumption corresponding to the assumption on line 4 of table 5: If it is true that if the word denotes only an individual i (and not the class property c) then for all classes x one knows c of x and i of x, then it is not the case that the word denotes c. This statement appears as an assumption on line 4 of table 6 which shows his argument as a derivation in symbolic logic.

Given exactly the same assumptions (tables 5 and 6, lines 1-3, and line 4 which, in each of tables 5 and 6, is an instance of

Table 1, line 3), by assuming that a word denotes a class property (table 5, line 5) or by assuming that a word denotes an individual (table 6, line 5), one can account for the cognition of both the class property and the individual (tables 5 and 6 line 18). Given just the assumptions by which Śabara concludes that a word does not denote an individual (table 5 line 21), the objector concludes that a word does not denote a class property (table 6 line 21). Hence Śabara's second argument against the view that the word denotes both the class property and the individual could just as well establish that a word denotes an individual as it can establish that a word denotes only the class property.

In order to show that the view that a word denotes only a class property surpasses the view that a word denotes only an individual, Śabara explains the significance of the example of the falcon. The objector had argued that the class property can mark the individuals which the word denotes without being denoted itself just as a staff marks a staff-bearer without being denoted by the word 'staff' (IIC). Generic terms can denote only the individuals having the class property just as the term 'staff-bearer' denotes only the person bearing the staff. Śabara refutes this as follows:

> ...it is not the case that just as the word 'staff-bearer' is not used for the staff, the word 'cow' is not (used) for the class property. For that very reason we showed the example of the word 'falcon' which denotes only a class property. Because the word 'falcon' is uttered when there is no connection with an individual falcon, by concomitant presence and absence one knows that it denotes a class property (IIIG4a).

The argument approximately follows the second part of the general procedure Kumārila describes. Kumārila says that the denoted meaning is the meaning of which cognition would not occur without positing that the word denote it (table 1, line 2). Table 7, headed by an instance of table 1 line 2, shows the argument symbolically; the paragraph below summarizes it. The example of the falcon altar is central to this argument. It is an instance in which a generic term does not give knowledge of an individual (assumption on line 3). Hence it serves as a counterexample to the statement, "If one knows the word w for x then one knows an individual i of x," disproving the concomitant presence and absence of knowledge of w and knowledge of i. Since one knows the generic term while not knowing an individual, due to the lack of concomitant presence and absence, it cannot be the case that a generic term denotes an individual.

If the individual is not known from the word, the inseparable connection of the individual and its class property cannot serve as a way to knowledge of the class property. In fact,

Table 6

One cannot presume that a word denotes the class property

1.	$(Am)[Dwm \rightarrow (Ax)(Kwx \rightarrow Kmx)]$	
2.	$(Ax)Kwx$	
3.	$(Ax)(Kix \equiv Kcx)$	
4.	$[Dwi \rightarrow (Ax)(Kcx \& Kix)] \rightarrow \neg Dwc$	
5.	Dwi	
6.	$(Am)[Dwm \rightarrow (Ax)(Kwx \rightarrow Kmx)]$	(R, 1)
7.	$Dwi \rightarrow (Ax)(Kwx \rightarrow Kix)$	(AE, 6)
8.	Dwi	(R, 5)
9.	$(Ax)(Kwx \rightarrow Kix)$	(→E, 7,8)
10.	$Kwa \rightarrow Kia$	(AE, 9)
11.	$(Ax)Kwx$	(R, 2)
12.	Kwa	(AE, 11)
13.	Kia	(→E, 10,12)
14.	$(Ax)(Kix \equiv Kcx)$	(R, 3)
15.	$Kia \equiv Kca$	(AE, 14)
16.	Kca	(≡E, 13,15)
17.	$Kca \& Kia$	(&I, 13,16)
18.	$(Ax)(Kcx \& Kix)$	(AI, 17)
19.	$Dwi \rightarrow (Ax)(Kcx \& Kix)$	(→I, 5-18)
20.	$[Dwi \rightarrow (Ax)(Kcx \& Kix)] \rightarrow \neg Dwc$	(R, 4)
21.	$\neg Dwc$	(→E, 19,20)

the inability of the word to give knowledge of the individual contradicts the assumption that a word denotes an individual. It directly contradicts the assumption because the fact that a word denotes an object implies concomitant presence and absence of knowledge of the word and knowledge of the object. Therefore, the assumption must be rejected. It cannot be the case that a word denotes only an individual and not the class property; it must denote the class property.

Śabara's arguments attempt to establish logical precedence by means of the concomitant presence and absence of different elements. In order to show that knowledge of the word directly causes the cognition of the class property, and cognition of the class property directly causes knowledge of an individual; Śabara must show that knowledge of the word and class property are coextensive, knowledge of the class property and knowledge of the individual are coextensive independent of the use of a word, and knowledge of the word and knowledge of an individual are not coextensive. However, his counterexample to the coextension of knowledge of the word and knowledge of an individual is also a counterexample to the coextension of knowledge of the class property and knowledge of an individual.

The example of the falcon is absolutely crucial to showing that a generic term denotes only the class property. However, by

citing the example of the falcon, Śabara shows an instance in which one knows the class property without knowing any individual. This fact is inconsistent with the assumption he made to show that, if a word denotes only a class property, one can account for knowledge of both the class property and an individual. That assumption was the following: if one knows a class property then one knows an individual.

One proves that statements are mutually inconsistent by deriving a contradiction from them. Table 8 derives a contradiction from the following two assumptions: 1) If one knows the class property of a class x then one knows an individual of x. 2) One knows the falcon class property and it is not the case that one knows an individual falcon.

By setting forth the example of the falcon (IIIA) and stating that the reason the example was set forth was to show that the word denotes the class property even when there is no cognition of an individual (IIIG4a), Śabara implies that it is not true that knowledge of either an individual or the class property regularly gives knowledge of the other. It contradicts the statement that whoever apprehends the class property certainly apprehends an individual (IIIE3a). If the word 'falcon' refers only to the class property without any individual, the statement that if one knows the class property then one knows an individual is not true, the knowledge of one and the knowledge of the other are not inseparably connected, and one cannot count on knowing an individual merely from knowing the class property (or vice versa). Hence, if Śabara's statements concerning the concomitant presence and absence of knowledge of the class property and knowledge of an individual meant that the knowledge of one mutually causes knowledge of the other, his third argument would contradict his second. The example of the falcon establishing coextension of cognition of a word and of the class property and refuting coextension of cognition of the word and of the individual would contradict the coextension of knowledge of an individual and knowledge of its class property.

However, the inseparability of an individual and a class property does not imply that knowledge of a class property always provides knowledge of an individual and vice versa. It means only that it is the nature of a property to reside in an individual. And as a matter of fact the explanations which Śabara himself gives as to how one arrives at the understanding of the qualified individual in the examples of washing rice, number, and replacement under Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.35 do not require that knowledge of either a class property or an individual be a direct cause of knowledge of the other. They require only that the class property and the individual be connected.

Table 7

(¬Dwc → ¬(Ax)Kcx) → Dwc (AE, table 1, stmt. 2)

1.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	
2.	(Ax)Kwx	
3.	¬Kif	
4.	Dwc V Dwi	
5.	¬Dwc	
6.	Dwc V Dwi	(R, 4)
7.	Dwc	
8.	¬Dwi	
9.	¬Dwc	(R, 5)
10.	Dwc	(R, 7)
11.	¬¬Dwi	(¬I, 8-(9,10))
12.	Dwi	(¬E, 11)
13.	Dwi	
14.	Dwi	(R, 13)
15.	Dwi	(VE, 6,7-12,13-14)
16.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	(R, 1)
17.	Dwi → (Ax)(Kwx → Kix)	(AE, 16)
18.	(Ax)(Kwx → Kix)	(→E, 15,17)
19.	Kwf → Kif	(AE, 18)
20.	(Ax)Kwx	(R, 2)
21.	Kwf	(AE, 20)
22.	Kif	(→E, 19,21)
23.	¬Kif	(R, 3)
24.	¬¬Dwc	(¬I, 5-(22,23))
25.	Dwc	(¬E, 24)

Suppose that a word did not denote the class property. Then it would denote an individual. But it can't denote an individual because if it did it could not avoid giving knowledge of an individual whenever the word was used. For instance, whenever the word 'falcon' was used it would give knowledge of an individual falcon. Yet in the example of the falcon altar the word 'falcon' is used and knowledge of an individual falcon does not arise. Hence, a word does not denote an individual, and the supposition that it is not the case that a word denotes a class property is false. Therefore, a word denotes a class property.

Table 8

Inconsistency of inseparability and falcon example whether inseparability be (p ≡ q) or [(p → q) & (¬p → ¬q)]

1.	(Ax)(Kcx → Kix)	
2.	Kcf & ¬Kif	
3.	(Ax)(Kcx → Kix)	(R, 1)
4.	Kcf → Kif	(AE, 3)
5.	Kcf & ¬Kif	(R, 2)
6.	Kcf	(&E, 5)
7.	Kif	(→E, 4,6)
8.	¬Kif	(&E, 5)

In the example of washing rice, for example, Śabara says that the word 'rice' denotes the class property. The Vedic text mentions washing as an action to be performed on a substance; not on a class property because it is impossible to wash a class property. The second triplet termination on the word 'rice (*vrihīn*)' indicates that the meaning of the word 'rice' is that upon which the action of washing is to be performed. Hence the verb 'to wash' (*prokṣati*, literally 'sprinkle') makes known a substance in general. This general knowledge is the knowledge of the substance without knowing what type of substance. The substance in this case happens to be rice. The general knowledge of it is knowing it simply as the thing to be washed. The second triplet termination on the word 'rice (*vrihīn*)' brings that general knowledge of a substance into relation to the object denoted by the nominal base it follows. The rice class property which the word 'rice' makes known is understood to specify this general knowledge of a substance. The class property as qualifier together with the general knowledge of the substance give specific knowledge of the rice substance. This specific knowledge has the form of the knowledge of the substance to be washed as qualified by the class property riceness, or more simply, the knowledge of the rice as rice.

In general, the verb in a sentence together with the nominal termination on a generic term give general knowledge of an individual and bring that general knowledge into relation to the class property which the nominal base supplies. Other speech forms such as a compound or *taddhita* affix, instead of a nominal termination along with a verb, may supply the general knowledge of the individual and its relation to the object denoted by the base. General knowledge of an individual which happens to belong to class x {Gix} is knowledge of the individual merely as an individual substance without specification. If one has general knowledge of an individual which happens to belong to class x, and one has this knowledge in relation to the knowledge of the class property of x, then one has specific knowledge of an individual of class x {(Ax)[(Kcx & Gix) → Kix]}.

In some cases the action which the verb denotes may be impossible on an individual of class x. In such cases general knowledge of an individual in relation to x will not arise {¬Gix}. If one does not have general knowledge of an individual of x then one does not have specific knowledge of an individual of x {(Ax)(¬Gix → ¬Kix)}. For instance, in the example of the falcon altar, the verb 'to build (√*ci*)' implies that one use bricks as building blocks. The compound 'x-altar (*x-cit*)' indicates that x is that which is most desired to be brought about by the act of building. The verb and compound therefore give general knowledge of a brick individual of x. Now instantiate x with falcon. The compound 'falcon-altar (*śyena-cit*)' indicates that the

meaning of the word 'falcon' is that which is most desired to be brought about by the act of building. But it is not the case that a brick individual is the meaning of the word 'falcon'. The general knowledge of a brick individual does not make sense in relation to the meaning of the word 'falcon' so there is no general knowledge of an individual falcon {¬Gif}. Even knowing the falcon class property, without general knowledge of an individual falcon, specific knowledge of an individual falcon does not arise {¬Gif → ¬Kif} (IIIA).

In addition to contradicting the example of the falcon (table 8; tables 2 and 3, line 5), interpreting Śabara's statements concerning the concomitance of knowing a class property and knowing an individual as stating that knowledge of a class property and knowledge of an individual of that class each causes the other contradicts the examples in lines 3, 4 and 6 of table 2. Śabara certainly would not deny that the situations represented in rows 3-6 occur. The frequently encountered fact that people ask, "What is this?" proves that one does know an individual without knowing its class property (line 4). If one had no knowledge of it at all, one would not be able to ask about it. On the other hand, the question, "What is this?," asks for more information about an individual of which one has some knowledge; it asks what the individual is. Asking what the individual is asks its class property. Hence if one does not know the class property of an individual then one does not really know the individual fully.

Śabara has stated this concomitant absence of knowledge of a class property and specific knowledge of an individual in connection with the example of the new-born cow while arguing against the view that the individual alone is the denoted meaning of a word. He says, "No one can apprehend something qualified unless the qualifier is apprehended (IIIC4b)." Kumārila expresses this in the statement quoted above, namely, "Knowledge of the qualified is unacceptable without knowing the qualifier." In both statements, the qualifier is the class property. The qualified is the individual as qualified by the class property. In these statements, both Śabara and Kumārila express that one does not know the individual as qualified by its class property unless one knows the class property. Knowing an individual as qualified by its class property may be called specific knowledge of the individual. Hence Śabara and Kumārila's statements may be restated more formally in this way: For all classes x, if one does not know the class property of x then one does not have specific knowledge of an individual of class x {(Ax)(¬Kcx → ¬Kix)}.

Collecting our evaluations of Śabara's treatment of the example of washing rice under *sūtra* 1.3.35, his description of the falcon example and his statement concerning the example of the new-born cow that one must know the qualifier to know the qualified, we conclude that Śabara accepts that there are two

degrees of knowing an individual: 1) One may know that it is a thing, an individual of some type or other. 2) One may know specifically what it is, that is, know the individual as being of such and such a type. The former we call general knowledge of the individual; the latter, specific knowledge or knowledge of a qualified individual. Specific knowledge of an individual includes both general knowledge of the individual and knowledge of its class property. Hence when Śabara speaks of knowledge of an individual we must determine whether he intends general or specific knowledge. 'Gix' represents general knowledge of an individual which happens to belong to a class x, and 'Kix' represents specific knowledge of an individual of class x, that is, knowledge of an individual as qualified by the class property defining class x. The statements summarizing our evaluation of Śabara's discussion of the examples of washing rice, the falcon altar and the new-born cow are equivalent to the following statement: One has specific knowledge of an individual if and only if one knows the class property of an individual of a class x and has general knowledge of an individual of class x $\{((Ax)[(Kcx \ \& \ Gix) \rightarrow Kix] \ \& \ [(Ax)(\neg Gix \rightarrow \neg Kix) \ \& \ (Ax)(\neg Kcx \rightarrow \neg Kix)]) \equiv (Ax)[Kix \equiv (Kcx \ \& \ Gix)]\}$.

Now let us reexamine Śabara's statement of the concomitant presence and absence of knowledge of a class property and knowledge of an individual. In this statement when he speaks of knowledge of an individual he intends specific knowledge of an individual. The first part stating concomitant presence is clearly contradictory not only to the falcon example but also to the perception of, say, a model cow (table 2, lines 5-6). Knowledge of a class property by itself does not give specific knowledge of an individual of that class; knowledge of the class property together with general knowledge of an individual does. Therefore, although Śabara says, "whoever apprehends a class property, certainly apprehends an individual (IIIE3a)," in order not to contradict himself he must be understood to mean the following: if one knows the class property of class x, in addition to having general knowledge of an individual i which happens to belong to class x, then one has specific knowledge of an i of x $\{(Ax)[(Gix \ \& \ Kcx) \rightarrow Kix]\}$.

On our former interpretation, the second part of Śabara's statement which states concomitant absence was inconsistent with the cases exhibited in rows 3 and 4 of table 2. The knowledge of an individual which one has in these cases is general not specific. One does not know its class property which is one constituent element of specific knowledge of an individual; one knows an individual merely as a thing. If Śabara's statement, "whoever should fail to apprehend the class property...would certainly not understand that individual (IIIE3b)," concerns specific knowledge of an individual, it is perfectly consistent with lines 3 and 4 of

table 2. Śabara does not say, "If one does not know a class property then one does not know an individual <u>at all</u>;" rather, he says, "one does not know <u>that</u> individual." He uses the demonstrative pronoun 'that (*imām*)' to specify the individual. The specification intended is the class property of the individual. Hence this part of his statement repeats the statement that one does not know the qualified object without knowing the qualifier. Since knowing the qualified object consists in knowing both the qualifier and the object merely as a thing, the statement is a tautology: If it is not the case that one knows the class property then it is not the case that one knows the individual generally and one knows its class property {(Ax)[¬Kcx → ¬(Gix & Kcx)]}.

We have reinterpreted Śabara's statement of concomitant presence and absence, "whoever apprehends a class property, certainly apprehends an individual, ...but...whoever should fail to apprehend the class property...would certainly not understand that individual (IIIE3)," to mean the following: For all classes x, if one knows the class property of x and has general knowledge of an individual i which happens to belong to x, then one has specific knowledge of an i of x; and if it is not the case that one knows the class property c of a class x, then it is not the case that one has specific knowledge of an individual i of x {(Ax)([(Gix & Kcx) → Kix] & (¬Kcx → ¬Kix))}. Clarifying Śabara's argument concerning the falcon example in terms of general and specific knowledge, we formulated it as the statement that in the absence of general knowledge of an individual falcon specific knowledge of an individual would not arise {¬Gif → ¬Kif}. This is an instance of the general statement that in the absence of general knowledge of an individual of class x specific knowledge of an individual of class x does not arise {(Ax)(¬Gix → ¬Kix)}. If we add this to the previous statement, we get the following biconditional: For all x, one has specific knowledge of i of x if and only if one knows c of x and has general knowledge of i of x {(Ax)[Kix ≡ (Kcx & Gix)]}. This biconditional is consistent with the example of the falcon. One shows that a set of statements is consistent by showing one truth value assignment on which all the statements of the set are true. Table 9 shows such an assignment.

Table 9

<u>Consistency of revised inseparability and falcon example</u>

1. Kcf & ¬Kif
2. <u>Kif ≡ (Kcf & Gif)</u>, an instance of (Ax)[Kix ≡ (Kcx & Gix)]

				1		2
<u>Gif</u>	<u>Kcf</u>	<u>Kif</u>	<u>¬Kif</u>	<u>Kcf & ¬Kif</u>	<u>Kcf & Gif</u>	<u>Kif ≡ (Kcf & Gif)</u>
F	T	F	T	T	F	T

Our previous summary of the facts of usage notes two types of cognitions arising upon a competent speaker's cognition of a generic term: knowledge of both the class property and individual or knowledge only of the class property {(Ax)[(Kcx & Kix) V (Kcx & ¬Kix)]}. Without a factor other than knowledge of the class property to distinguish when knowledge of an individual arises following a word's use and when it doesn't, any set of assumptions which accounted for cognition of both the class property and the individual was unable to account for knowledge only of the class property and the absence of knowledge of an individual as in the example of the falcon altar. However, from our reexamination of Śabara's concept of the inseparability of class property and individual it is clear that general knowledge of an individual serves as such a factor. Assuming cognition of the word w for x, one knows the class property c of x, and one knows an individual i of x in addition if and only if one has general knowledge of an individual which happens to belong to x {(Ax)[(Kcx & (Kix ≡ Gix)]}.

Based on the initial impression of the inseparability of a class property and an individual, one could formulate an argument against the presumption that a word denotes the class property (table 6) corresponding to the argument against the presumption that it denotes an individual (table 5). With the revised understanding of inseparability, a corresponding argument does not succeed. Assuming the revised statement of inseparability (tables 10 and 11, line 3), we restate Śabara's arguments to prove that only a class property is denoted. The first establishes that one cannot presume that a word denotes an individual; the second, that one must presume that a word denotes a class property because one cannot account for the cognition that arises from a word otherwise. Tables 10 and 11 show these arguments as derivations in symbolic logic and the paragraphs beneath describe them.

Table 10 Caption

If it is the case that, if the word denoted only the class property, the cognition of the class property would arise, and, in addition, cognition of an individual would arise if and only if one has general knowledge of an individual, then we cannot presume that the individual is also denoted. Now, if the word denotes only the class property, the word will cause cognition of the class property. Look at the case in which one does arrive at specific knowledge of an individual. Specific knowledge of an individual arises if and only if one has knowledge of the class property and general knowledge of an individual. The necessary condition to give specific knowledge of an individual is that one have knowledge of both the class property and general knowledge of an individual. The word has given knowledge of the class property. Hence the

Table 10
One cannot presume that a word denotes an individual
(AE, table 1, stmt. 3)

1.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	
2.	(Ax)Kwx	
3.	(Ax)[Kix ≡ (Kcx & Gix)]	
4.	(Dwc → (Ax)[(Kcx & (Kix ≡ Gix)]) → ¬Dwi	
5.	Dwc	
6.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	(R, 1)
7.	Dwc → (Ax)(Kwx → Kcx)	(AE, 6)
8.	Dwc	(R, 5)
9.	(Ax)(Kwx → Kcx)	(→E, 7,8)
10.	Kwa → Kca	(AE, 9)
11.	(Ax)Kwx	(R, 2)
12.	Kwa	(AE, 11)
13.	Kca	(→E, 10,12)
14.	Kia	
15.	(Ax)[Kix ≡ (Kcx & Gix)]	(R, 3)
16.	Kia ≡ (Kca & Gia)	(AE, 15)
17.	Kia	(R, 14)
18.	Kca & Gia	(≡E 16,17)
19.	Gia	(&E, 18)
20.	Gia	
21.	(Ax)[Kix ≡ (Kcx & Gix)]	(R, 3)
22.	Kia ≡ (Kca & Gia)	(AE, 21)
23.	Gia	(R, 20)
24.	Kca & Gia	(&I, 13,23)
25.	Kia	(≡E, 22,24)
26.	Kia ≡ Gia	(≡I, 14-19,20-25)
27.	Kca & (Kia ≡ Gia)	(&I, 13,26)
28.	(Ax)[(Kcx & (Kix ≡ Gix)]	(AI, 27)
29.	Dwc → (Ax)[(Kcx & (Kix ≡ Gix)]	(→I, 5-28)
30.	(Dwc → (Ax)[(Kcx & (Kix ≡ Gix)]) → ¬Dwi	(R, 4)
31.	¬Dwi	(→E, 29,30)

necessary condition will be fulfilled only if one has general knowledge of an individual. Now suppose that one does have general knowledge of an individual. The word has given knowledge of the class property, so one has knowledge of the class property and general knowledge of an individual. This is a sufficient condition to generate specific knowledge of an individual. Hence, since the word has given knowledge of the class property, general knowledge of an individual is the necessary and sufficient condition to give knowledge of an individual. Therefore, if the word denotes only the class property one will arrive at knowledge of the class property, and, in addition, one will have specific knowledge of an individual if and only if one has general knowledge of an individual. Therefore, one cannot presume that the word denotes an individual.

Table 11
(¬Dwc → ¬(Ax)Kcx) → Dwc (AE, table 1, stmt. 2)

1.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	
2.	(Ax)Kwx	
3.	(Ax)[Kix ≡ (Kcx & Gix)]	
4.	¬Gif	
5.	Dwc V Dwi	
6.	¬Dwc	
7.	Dwc V Dwi	(R, 5)
8.	Dwc	
9.	¬Dwi	
10.	¬Dwc	(R, 6)
11.	Dwc	(R, 8)
12.	¬¬Dwi	(¬I, 9-(10,11))
13.	Dwi	(¬E, 12)
14.	Dwi	
15.	Dwi	(R, 14)
16.	Dwi	(VE, 7,8-13,14-15)
17.	(Am)[Dwm → (Ax)(Kwx → Kmx)]	(R, 1)
18.	Dwi → (Ax)(Kwx → Kix)	(AE, 17)
19.	(Ax)(Kwx → Kix)	(→E, 16,18)
20.	Kwf → Kif	(AE, 19)
21.	(Ax)Kwx	(R, 2)
22.	Kwf	(AE, 21)
23.	Kif	(→E, 20,22)
24.	(Ax)[Kix ≡ (Kcx & Gix)]	(R, 3)
25.	Kif ≡ (Kcf & Gif)	(AE, 24)
26.	Kcf & Gif	(≡E, 23,25)
27.	Gif	(&E, 26)
28.	¬Gif	(R, 4)
29.	¬¬Dwc	(¬I, 6-(27,28))
30.	Dwc	(¬E, 29)

Suppose that a word did not denote the class property. Then it would denote an individual. But it can't denote an individual because, if it did, it could not avoid giving specific knowledge of an individual whenever a word was used. For instance, whenever the word 'falcon' was used it would give specific knowledge of an individual falcon. Specific knowledge of an individual arises only if one has knowledge of the class property and general knowledge of an individual. This is true in the case of specific knowledge of an individual falcon too. Hence every cognition of the word 'falcon' would necessarily be accompanied by general knowledge of an individual falcon. Yet in the example of the falcon altar, cognition of the word 'falcon' is not accompanied by general knowledge of an individual falcon. Hence, a word does not denote an individual, and the supposition that it is not the case that a word denotes a class property is false. Therefore, a word denotes a class property.

The success of Śabara's argument against the view that a generic term denotes both the class property and an individual depends on instances such as the example of the falcon altar. Given such instances, a normal speaker who knows the word-meaning relation will have just the following two types of cognition following the use of a word: knowledge of both the class property and individual or knowledge only of the class property {(Ax)[(Kcx & Kix) V (Kcx & ¬Kix)]}. The example of the falcon, in which one knows the falcon class property but does not know a falcon individual {Kcf & ¬Kif}, does not have a balancing instance. Śabara states this fact clearly in concluding his reason for introducing the falcon example. He says, "But one never sees a word used for particular rice grains without a connection with the rice class property. Therefore, (the view) that a word denotes the class property is better (IIIG4b)." Denying that there is an instance, in which upon use of the word 'rice' one does not know the rice class property and yet one knows some individual rice grains {¬[Kwr & (¬Kcr & Kir)]}, intends the more general statement that one never knows an individual and not a class property upon the use of a generic term. Formally stated the statement is this: It is not the case that there is a class x such that one knows the word for x, and one knows an individual of x but does not know the class property of x {¬(Ex)[Kwx & (¬Kcx & Kix)]}. Hence data are weighted in favor of the class property; the cognition of the class property is coextensive with the use of the word but cognition of an individual is not.

The procedure to determine whether a generic term denotes the class property or an individual relies on presumption. Presumption is based on not being able to account for the cognition of the meaning otherwise. Śabara has shown that knowledge of the class property and general knowledge of an individual can account for the cognition of an individual, but one cannot account for the cognition of the class property other than from the word. Therefore he concludes that the word denotes only the class property.

3.6. Words Denoting Qualities

According to Mīmāṃsā, a sentence consists of words denoting their own meanings together with a word denoting action (§3.1.3, note 6). Śabara explains that once one understands the word-meanings, the word meanings convey the sentence-meaning. For example, the word 'white' denotes the quality white; the quality makes known a substance qualified by it, i.e. a white object (§3.1.3 note 7). The cognition of the qualified object, that is, the sentence-meaning, does not arise in all

usages. If the word-meaning (quality) by itself makes sense, then no additional meaning is added. On the other hand, if the word-meaning by itself serves no purpose and so is pointless there, then the sentence-meaning (qualified substance) is understood.[56] For example, when the qualifying word 'white' occurs near the word 'cow' or 'horse' which denote the general property, then one understands the sentence to mean a white cow or horse.[57]

One understands a substance from the use of a quality word in the same manner as from the use of a generic term. A quality word denotes a quality just as a generic term denotes a class property.[58] Because a class property is not separate from the substance in which it resides, the class property specifies the substance. Similarly, because a quality is not separate from the substance in which it resides, the quality qualifies the substance. In both cases the fact that a property (*dharma*) and its substratum (*āśraya*) are not separate makes the substance the most closely related thing to the property. When the denoted meaning of the word, i.e., the property, doesn't make sense in connection with the action because it is an immaterial object, but a substance qualified by it does, one understands the substratum of the property.

Although the Aruṇādhikaraṇa is not directly to this point, Śabara illustrates the manner in which one knows a substance from the use of a quality word there. The Aruṇādhikaraṇa consists of the following *sūtra:*

---

[56]*Yatra—kevalaḥ padārthaḥ prayujyamānaḥ prayojanābhāvād anarthakaḥ saṃjāyata ity avagataṃ bhavati, tatra vākyartho 'pi tāvad bhavatv iti viśiṣṭārthatāvagamyate na sarvatra.* When one understands that it would be useless to use the word-meaning alone because it has no purpose, then, letting the sentence-meaning supplement it, one understands that the qualified meaning occurs, not always. MD, part 1, p. 117.

[57]*Nanv evaṃ bhaviṣyati sāmānyavācinaḥ padasya gaur iti vāśva iti vā viśeṣakaṃ śukla iti vā kṛṣṇa iti vā padam antikād upanipatati yadā, tadā vākyārtho 'vagamyate.* (Proponent:) Will not the knowledge of the sentence-meaning arise (by way of the word-meanings) in the following manner? When a qualifying word such as 'white' or 'black' occurs near a word denoting a general property such as 'cow' or 'horse', then one understands the sentence-meaning. MD, part 1, p. 114.

[58]*Tad eva hi dravyam aruṇimnā paricchidyamānam aruṇāśabdābhidhānīyatāṃ labhate. Tad evānyaguṇakaṃ nāruṇāśabdaḥ śaknoty abhivaditum. Aruṇimānam eṣa śabdo na vyabhicarati. Vyabhicarati punar dravyam. Avyabhicāri ca kāraṇaṃ kāraṇavatām iṣṭam. Ato 'sya guṇaḥ svārtha iti gamyate.* A certain substance circumscribed with the quality tan attains to being called tan. The word 'tan' cannot refer to the same substance with a different quality. The word does not deviate from the quality tan, but it does deviate from the substance. That which does not deviate is accepted as the cause of a certain effect. Hence, one knows that the quality is its proper meaning. MD, part 4, p. 45.
At the end of his commentary on 1.1.25, Śabara describes how concomitant presence and absence determine that a quality word denotes a quality. MD, part 1, p. 117. The passage is parallel to the one in which he determines that a word denotes a generic term by concomitant presence and absence (IIIE3).

> 3.1.12. *Arthaikatve dravyaguṇayor, aikakarmyān niyamaḥ syāt.* Where the substance and the quality have one purpose, because they both participate in the same action, there should be a restriction.[59]

The point of the Aruṇādhikaraṇa is that mentioning a quality in the same participatory relation to the same action as a substance neither forms a separate statement nor states an alternative.[60] The direct statement of the participatory relation requires that the quality be a means in bringing about an action. It does so whether that action be the one named in this sentence or elsewhere. If the statement were divided so that the listener heard only the quality word, the expectation to know which action the quality brings about (and which substance it qualifies) would remain. If he heard just a word for the substance, the expectation to know which action the substance brings about would remain. Hence, the statement is not divided so there is just one statement.

The quality and substance do not constitute alternatives because they are not mutually exclusive. Even though the same nominal termination following the nominal bases denoting them assigns them the same relation to the action which is their purpose, they serve different roles in relation to it. The substance serves as direct participant in the action, the quality qualifies or further specifies the substance. The result is that the Vedic sentence enjoins an action on an object limited in two respects: it must be a certain substance and it must have a certain quality. Only one object with both characteristics can participate in achieving the action.

The following is a condensed description gleaned from Śabara's commentary on the Aruṇādhikaraṇa of how one knows a

---

[59]MD, part 4, p. 33.

[60]Śabara considers the statement, "One buys the *soma* with a tan hazel-eyed one-year-old (female calf) (*Aruṇayā piṅgākṣyaikahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti*)." In this statement, 'tan (*aruṇayā*)' denotes the quality tanness; 'hazel-eyed (*piṅgākṣyā*)' and 'one-year-old (*ekahāyanyā*)' refer to a substance, that is, a cow; 'buys (*krīṇāti*)' denotes the act of purchase, and the third triplet nominal termination (*ṭā*), on each of the words for tanness and the cow, directly states that the quality tan and the cow are instruments in the act of purchase. According to Jaimini 2.1.46, because a quality and a substance have one purpose, and if one uttered a quality word alone, a listener would expect more to be said, the statement of the quality, substance, and action constitutes a single meaningful unit:

Jaimini 2.1.46. Arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt. An utterance is one statement due to having one purpose (*artha*), if its parts would require something to complete their sense if the utterance were divided.

If a quality and a substance served precisely the same function in bringing about an action, the action would take place alternatively with either the quality or the substance but not both according to Jaimini 12.3.9:

Jaimini 12.3.9. Ekārthās tu vikalperan, samuccaye hy āvṛttiḥ syāt pradhānasya. Subordinates which serve the same purpose should alternate, for on their conjunction the principal action would repeat.

substance from the use of a quality word: The word for a quality denotes the quality. A verb denotes an action.[61] The nominal termination on the quality word denotes the participatory relation the quality has with the action (*sādhanatva*, i.e., *karmatva*, *karaṇatva*, etc.) It is impossible for a quality, being immaterial, to serve the function the termination names for it other than by qualifying a substance which does serve that function. Although a quality cannot directly serve as a means to bring about the action which its nominal termination assigns it, it can do so by qualifying a substance which is such a means. Therefore, due to the nature of the objects (*arthāt*, not due to the word's denotation (*śabdāt*)) the quality attains to specifying the substance.[62]

In both cases, that of a quality and that of a generic term, the point is that the word denotes just one meaning, the quality or the class property; it does not denote the individual. In the Aruṇādhikaraṇa, Śabara describes how one knows to perform the act of purchase using the substance qualified by the quality tan. Under *sūtra* 1.3.35, he describes how one knows to perform the action of washing on the substance qualified by the class property riceness from the sentence, "One washes rice (*Vrihīn prokṣati*)." The means by which one knows to perform the action on a substance, in the former case qualified by a quality and in the latter by a class property, is the same. In each case, although the sentence contains no word which directly gives specific knowledge of such a qualified substance, it contains words denoting a qualifying property and an action. The term in the sentence which denotes the qualifying property ends in a termination which denotes a means of bringing about action. Hence, the termination directly states that the property is for the

---

[61]More precisely, the verbal termination (*tiṅ*) denotes causal activity in general (*bhāvanā*); the verbal root (*dhātu*) denotes the specific process the activity results in (*phala*).

[62]See especially: Śabara: *Iha hi guṇam aruṇimānam amūrtaṃ santaṃ kriyāyāḥ karaṇam iti śabda upadiśati, yat karaṇābhidhāyinyā tṛtīyāvibhaktyā saṃyujya nirdiśati: aruṇayeti. Na cāmūrto 'rthaḥ kriyāyāḥ sādhanaṃ bhavitum arhati.* Here a verbal statement (*śabda*) teaches that the quality tanness, though it is immaterial, is the instrument of buying, in that it refers to it with the word *'aruṇayā'* joining the nominal base (*'aruṇa'*) with the third triplet ending which signifies an instrument. And yet an immaterial object is not fit to be a means of bringing about an action. MD, part 4, p. 40.
Further on he says: *Krīṇātinaiva saṃbadhyate. Evaṃ hi śrūyate: aruṇaguṇena krayam abhinirvartayed iti. Yathā ca tena nirvartyate, tathā yatitavyaṃ bhavati. Na cāviśiṃṣan sādhanaṃ guṇaḥ kriyām abhinirvartayatīty arthāt sādhana-viśeṣaṇatāṃ pratipadyate.* It is connected with the verb 'one buys'. It is directly stated that one should carry out the purchase by the instrumentality of the quality tan. One has to make an effort to see that it is carried out by that instrumentality. But without qualifying a means of bringing about the action, a quality does not carry it out. Hence, from the nature of the objects (*arthāt*), the quality attains to being a qualifier of the means of bringing about the action. MD, part 4, p. 62.

purpose of the action. The property, being immaterial, cannot bring about an action other than by qualifying a substance. By qualifying the substance, which can be a means to bring about the action, the property participates in bringing it about too. Therefore, due to the nature of the objects one knows that the action takes place on the substance qualified by the property.

3.7. Conclusions Drawn from Models in Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya

There are two types of usages of generic terms which one must explain. In most cases, such as the use of the word 'rice (*vrīhi*)' in Śabara's example, "One washes rice (*vrīhīn prokṣati*)," and the word 'cow (*go*)' in Vātsyāyana's examples, "Wash the cow (*gām prokṣaya*)," the speaker intends, and the listener understands, an individual qualified by a certain generic property and having a certain shape. In a few cases, such as the use of the word 'falcon (*śyena*)' in Śabara's example, "Build a falcon-altar (*śyena-citaṃ cinvīta*)," and the use of the word 'cow (*go*)' in Uddyotakara's example, "Make cows consisting of flour (*piṣṭakamayyo gāvaḥ kriyantām*)," the speaker intends, and the listener understands, an individual which is not directly qualified by the generic property, but rather, qualified by a shape indicative of the generic property.

Neither Śabara nor Vātsyāyana use the term *'vyakti* (individual)' strictly for individuals qualified by a certain generic property. Śabara makes the falcon class property coextensive with shape qualifying both real falcons and falcon altars. Gautama and Vātsyāyana limit the generic property cowness to real cows but call all substances which have the shape of a cow, both real and model, individuals. The difference in their use of the term does not necessarily imply that their concepts of generic property, individual, and shape are different. However, different conceptions of these entities bear on the complexity of the account of the use of generic terms.

In Mīmāṃsā, Śabara's argument that a generic term denotes a class property assumes that a shape is more closely associated with a class property than with an individual. If the dichotomy of class property versus individual is understood as shape versus substance, completely identifying the concept of a generic property with that of a certain general shape and the concept of an individual with that of a certain material, Śabara's argument that a generic term denotes a class property is very straightforward. In most cases in which a generic term is used, both the shape and a certain material are present. In the examples of models, the shape is present but the certain material is absent.

The use of the term is coextensive with the shape, not with the certain material; hence the term denotes the shape. Therefore, if one interprets Śabara as completely identifying a generic property with shape, and an individual with a material, Śabara may be understood to conclude from the occasional use of a word for a model that the meaning of the word is not limited to real individuals but extends to encompass the broader range of the general shape. The difficulty with this interpretation is that Śabara clearly uses the term *'dravya'* in the sense of an individual object in the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, at least in the argument concerning a replacement (§3.3.4, IIE).

In Nyāya, Gautama clearly distinguishes generic property from shape. A model individual has shape but lacks the generic property; a real individual has the generic property in addition to shape. Both, being manifest aggregate substances, are called individuals. Gautama 2.2.64 cites the fact that sometimes a listener does not understand a model individual from a generic term, but understands only a real individual. In these cases, the word does not deviate from the generic property; hence, he concludes that the meaning of a generic term must include the generic property.

Gautama accounts for usage for an individual qualified by a certain generic property and having a certain shape by stating the general rule that a generic term denotes all three elements, an individual, its generic property, and the shape indicative of the generic property. Vātsyāyana explains that the intention of the speaker determines which is principal and which subordinate in the meaning. However, he does not directly address the issue of how the word is used occasionally for a model which lacks the generic property. If the word denotes all three elements, whenever the word is used, even when it is used for a model, cognition of all three elements cannot be avoided. Because the word is used for a model, one would expect that cognition of the generic property would be included in the cognition of the model which the word conveys. Yet the generic property cowness is absent in a model cow. The fact that we know it is a model and not a real cow implies that cognition of the generic property is absent in cognition of the model too. Is cognition of the generic property present in the cognition conveyed by the generic term when used for a model, or not? We find two principal solutions to this dilemma in Nyāya.

Uddyotakara, citing the example of flour cows, gives the model as an instance in which the shape is principal in the meaning and the generic property and individual are subordinate. The subordinate position of the generic property in the cognition is a compromise. The generic property is present in cognition as the property ordinarily indicated by the shape which the model has but not as qualifier of the model. Although the word gives

knowledge of the generic property, the circumstances which force one to understand the model block knowledge of it.

The view which the Dinakarī attributes to Navyanyāya avoids the uncomfortable compromise of knowing and yet not knowing the generic property (§2.3 note 30). However, in exchange it accepts the encumbrance that a word does not consistently denote the same meaning. On this view a generic term denotes two different meanings. Generally, it denotes an individual qualified by the generic property. Although such an individual surely has the shape, shape is not part of this first denoted meaning of the word. Secondly, the generic term denotes an individual qualified by a shape and excludes the generic property. This double denotation is very close to the secondary usage described under Gautama 2.2.62.

Including use of a generic term for a model under usage of a word for that which it does not denote is inappropriate because the word is used for what it does denote. It denotes the shape, an individual, and a generic property. In the case of the model, it is used for the shape and an individual; it just so happens that the word denotes the generic property in addition to what it is used for. Use of a generic term for a model is not use of a word for an object which it does not denote; rather, it is use of the word for less than what it denotes. Besides, if the use of a generic term for a model is included as secondary usage under 2.2.62, it cannot serve as an example of shape as principal in the denoted meaning in primary usage; nor do there seem to be any other examples of shape as principal in the denoted meaning.

Mīmāṃsā accounts for the two types of usages of generic terms by stating the general rule that a generic term denotes only a class property. There is a second rule according to which, as far as possible, the class property qualifies an individual substance which is the means of bringing about an action. In the ordinary use of a generic term both rules apply to account for the cognition of an individual qualified by the class property.[63] In the exceptional cases in which the generic term is used for a model, the condition for the second rule, namely, that it makes sense for an individual qualified by the class property to be a means of bringing about the action, is absent. Hence the general rule alone applies to give cognition of the class property. Cognition of a real individual does not arise.

Kumārila insists that Śabara uses the term *'ākṛti* (class property)' strictly for an abstract generic property and that he sharply distinguishes it from shape. The dichotomy of class

---

[63]As explained in section 3.5, because a class property is an immaterial entity and as such cannot directly participate in the action in which the sentence states that it participates, but can participate by qualifying an individual, one understands an individual qualified by the class property.

property versus individual is not understood as shape versus substance; rather, it is understood as abstract generic property versus a manifest real individual (§3.3). Making a distinction between class property and shape leads to complications. If the word denotes the generic property and not the shape, an explanation is required of how one knows the shape in the example of the falcon altar and of how in that example Śabara's statement that one knows the class property but not the individual makes sense.

Kumārila claims that one knows the shape in which to build a falcon altar by the similarity the shape bears to the class property (§3.3.4, IIIA note 12). He must show not merely that shape is similar to the class property, but that it is more similar to the class property than it is to a real individual. Shape must have a direct relation to the class property not mediated by the individual because Śabara claims that cognition of an individual doesn't arise in the case of the falcon altar. In order that one be able to know a shape from knowing the class property without cognition of an individual arising, the shape must have a direct relation to the class property. His proof of this stands on uncertain ground. Nevertheless, let us attempt to see how Kumārila's interpretation would work.

According to Śabara, the means by which one arrives at the cognition of an individual qualified by the class property in the ordinary use of generic terms consists of two steps of knowledge which take place according to the two rules just stated. In the example of the falcon altar, this two step means of knowledge may serve to lead to cognition of an individual qualified by a shape but not to cognition of an individual qualified by a generic property. In every case, the class property, as an immaterial entity, cannot directly participate in the action in which the sentence states that it participates. In most cases it can participate by qualifying an individual so that one understands an individual qualified by the class property. In the exceptional cases such as the example of the falcon altar, it can't participate by qualifying an individual either. The ordinary condition for the second rule, namely, that it makes sense for an individual qualified by the class property to be a means of bringing about the action, is absent.

The instruction to build a falcon altar gives direct verbal knowledge of the class property falconhood qualifying, as far as is possible, an altar to be built of bricks. An individual qualified by the class property is a real individual of the class. It simply doesn't make sense to build a real individual falcon or to build an altar using individual falcons (IIIA). Hence a real individual qualified by the class property is not understood in this case. What does make sense is for a substance qualified by a shape associated with the class property to be a means of bringing about

the action. Hence, one understands such a substance, not a substance directly qualified by the class property.

It remains to make sense of Śabara's statement that in the falcon example one knows the class property but not an individual. In the process of arriving at the cognition of an individual qualified by the shape which is associated with the class property, it is not true that one knows a class property and not an individual. In fact, one does know an individual, an individual altar. One knows an individual altar just as, in the example of a model cow in Nyāya, Gautama says that one knows an individual model cow. It is not an individual cow, but it is a composite substance. Where Gautama calls a finite manifest substance an individual whether it is qualified by the denoted class property or not, Śabara only calls such a substance qualified by the denoted class property an individual. In the falcon example Śabara's statement that one does not know an individual means one knows an individual altar, not an individual falcon. But how does one not know an individual falcon yet know the falcon class property in relation to an individual altar?

The answer is similar to the compromise we arrived at in the case of Nyāya's explanation of the use of a generic term for a model. If the generic property falconhood were the qualifier of the individual falcon altar then that individual could not help but be an individual falcon. But falconhood is not the qualifier of the model. Yet it is present in cognition as the property ordinarily associated with the shape which the altar has. Although Kumārila does not accept the relation of shape to generic property to be that of being an inferential marker as Gautama states, he does maintain that there is some sort of qualifying or indicating relation.

The relation a shape has with a class property is that of ordinarily having the same substratum (*samānāśrayatva*). The substratum is an individual. Hence the relation between a shape and a class property is mediated by an individual. For Śabara's argument to succeed under Kumārila's interpretation, the relation between a generic property and shape must somehow be closer than the relation between an individual and its shape. If it is closer, it cannot be mediated by the individual. Hence one must find a relation between the shape and the class property which is not mediated by an individual. One may argue that once the relation of ordinarily having the same substratum is learned, it becomes independent of an individual. Thus, once learned, this becomes the relation by which the shape is closer to the class property than it is to an individual. That an object should have a closer relation to another object than it has to a third object which mediates the relation between the first two is certainly tenuous. Nevertheless, it is arguable that a direct relation between the shape and generic property not mediated by the qualified individual

does exist. If there is a direct relation, Śabara can assert that one knows the class property but not an individual.

Kumārila's interpretation of Śabara's argument that a generic term denotes only a class property introduces enough complexity that it becomes no more appealing than the view that a generic term denotes both a class property and an individual. Its appeal lies in the simplicity that only one meaning is denoted. However, it involves additional complexity in arriving at knowledge of the additional element. According to Śabara, one arrives at knowledge of an individual qualified by the class property due to the nature of the objects (*arthāt*). If class property is identical to general shape, then merely in the majority of cases, not in all cases, due to the nature of the objects (*arthāt*) one will know the object the speaker intends. However, if shape is about as different from the class property as an individual is then one does not know the shape immediately from the word; rather, one arrives at knowledge of it from the nature of the objects just as one arrives at knowledge of an individual. Hence, cognition of the intended object of speech always involves two steps of knowing, one from the word to the denoted class property, a second from the denoted class property to the intended object (either an individual qualified by the class property or one qualified by the shape).

According to Kumārila the means by which one arrives at knowledge of the intended object from the denoted class property, which Śabara speaks of as due to the nature of the objects (*arthāt*), is presumption (*ākṣepa*, *arthāpatti*).[64] Presumption depends on not being able to account for the facts otherwise (*ananyalabhyatva*). One determines that the speaker intends an individual qualified by a class property because one cannot make sense of the sentence otherwise. It does not make sense that one wash the rice class property itself because it is immaterial, hence one presumes that one washes the substance qualified by the class property. Similarly, on the interpretation that the class property is not identical to shape, because it does not make sense either to build the class property falconhood or to build a real individual falcon out of bricks, one presumes that one

[64]Prabhākara holds that the individual and the class property are necessarily elements of the same cognition (*tulyavittivedya*). One can never know one without knowing the other. According to him arriving at knowledge of the second is not a separate step of knowing; rather, one already knows the other too if one knows the first. The class property and individual are bound in one cognition. The class property is the handle which the word causes one to grab to give knowledge of both. This view is very close to the view that the word denotes both the class property and the individual.
Maṇḍanamiśra professes the view that the word has a primary signification relation with the class property alone. It has a secondary signification relation with the individual qualified by the class property.

builds the shape. In each use of a generic term, the speaker, intending an object other than the one the word denotes, uses a generic term to give knowledge of the generic property qualifying the intended object. Obtaining cognition of the generic property from the word, it is by presumption that the listener arrives at cognition of the intended object. Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is also the means by which one determines the denotation of a word (§3.5). One determines that a generic term denotes a generic property because one cannot account for the cognition of the generic property otherwise. One determines that the word does not denote an individual in addition to the class property because one can account for the cognition of an individual otherwise. How does one account for the cognition of an individual otherwise? By presumption. In each use the listener presumes the intended meaning from the impossibility to make sense of the denoted meaning in order to account for the usage of the sentence.

Hence, according to Kumārila, in each and every use of a generic term, the listener presumes the intended meaning from the denoted meaning because one cannot account for the facts otherwise. But one can account for the facts otherwise; one can presume that the word denotes those intended meanings. The only obstacle to presuming that the word denotes both the class property and an additional meaning is that one can presume the additional meaning without presuming that the word denotes it. But the consistent presumption of the additional meaning from the class property is no stronger than the presumption that the word denotes that meaning. The two presumptions are equivalent. Therefore, there is no stronger reason for the view that a generic term denotes only a class property than for the view that a generic term denotes both the class property and an additional meaning. Both in Nyāya and in grammar, the preferred view is that the additional meaning is also denoted.

The difficulty of the Nyāya view that a generic term denotes the generic property, an individual and a shape is that the word does not consistently give knowledge of all three. One must treat the usual case in which one knows an individual qualified by the generic property differently from the exceptional case in which one knows an individual qualified by a shape. The Mīmāṃsā view carries the advantage of a single word-meaning relation with a single denoted meaning but carries the disadvantage of two steps of knowing to arrive at the intended meaning.

Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa Outline

I. Preliminaries
   A. Definitions
      1. A class property is a general property of individual substances, qualities or actions.
      2. An individual is that which has specific properties which distinguish it as unique.
   B. Whenever one uses a generic term,
      1. One understands a class property.
      2. One acts upon an individual.

II. The word denotes an individual.
   A. Action:
      1. Vedic texts enjoin actions such as killing, washing and cutting.
      2. These actions are not possible on a class property.
      3. They are possible on an individual.
      4. Therefore, the texts make sense only if the word denotes an individual.
   B. Because a class property and an individual are inseparably connected, once one knows one of the two, one comes to know the other. Therefore, it is only necessary that the word give knowledge of one of the two. Hence, one cannot presume that the word denotes more than one of them.
   C. Cognition of the general property arises because it serves as a mark to identify the individuals for the word to denote; yet the general property itself is not denoted. For example, the staff is the mark of a staff-bearer, yet the word 'staff-bearer' does not denote the staff.
   D. Number:
      1. Vedic texts mention various numbers of the objects of a class.
      2. Number bears no relation to the class property because there is just one class property per class.
      3. Number relates to individuals.
      4. Therefore, the texts make sense only if the word denotes an individual.
   E. Difference
      1. Vedic texts mention other objects of the same kind.
      2. There is only one class property for the kind, no other.
      3. There are other individuals of the kind.
      4. Therefore, the texts make sense only if the word denotes an individual.

III. The word denotes the class property.
   A. Action:
      1. Vedic texts enjoin actions such as building a falcon altar.
      2. One carries out the action with respect to the class property; one makes the shape out of bricks.
      3. One cannot create a real individual falcon.
      4. Therefore, the texts make sense only if the word denotes the class property.
      5. Although one could construct something using individual falcons as building blocks, the text states the falcon as the direct object (*karman*) of the action in the sentence, not the instrument (*karaṇa*).
   B. (Objection:) The two views are equivalent with respect to action.
      1. Some action is impossible on either view .
         a. It is impossible to wash the class property of rice (IIA2).
         b. It is impossible to build an individual falcon by piling up bricks (IIIA3).
      2. Whichever is denoted can indicate the other as the participant in action.
         a. The word 'rice' denotes the class property, the class property indicates the individual on which to perform the action of washing (answers IIIB1a).
         b. The word 'falcon' denotes the individual, the individual indicates the class property (shape) to build (answers IIIB1b).
   C. The word does not denote an individual alone to the exclusion of its class property.
      1. If it did denote an individual alone,
         a. It wouldn't denote any other individuals, even those of the same kind.
         b. Because it does refer to other individuals of the class and an individual is by definition different from that which is common to more than one entity, it cannot denote an individual.
      2. If it denoted other individuals completely independent of any properties,
         a. Then the object the word denotes would be a general property.
         b. But an individual is different from properties; it is that in which properties reside.
      3. If each individual were completely devoid of all properties, one would be unable to set a criterion to delimit the class of individuals suitable to be denoted by a word.

   a. An exhaustive list of current usage could not be the criterion to delimit the class because:
      i. It wouldn't account for the fact that the word refers to new members of the class.
      ii. It wouldn't account for the cognition of the general property which is the basis of knowing each individual as the same.
   b. The signifying capacity of the word itself cannot determine that the word denotes certain individuals and not others because it does not denote a random set of individuals (IIIC3aii).
4. The criterion to determine the range of a generic term is the class property.
   a. If the word denoted all and only those individuals which their class property indicated, then the word would not produce cognition of the individual alone; rather, it would produce cognition of the individual as qualified by its class property.
   b. Knowledge of a qualified object presupposes knowledge of the qualifier. Therefore, a word cannot denote an individual alone and rely on the connection between the individual and its class property to supply cognition of the latter (IIB).

D. (Objection:) Both views accept both the individual and the class property as elements in the meaning of a word, they differ on which is principal and which secondary:
   1. On the view that a word denotes an individual, the individual is the principal meaning, and the class property is subordinate.
   2. On the view that a word denotes the class property, the class property is the principal meaning, and an individual is subordinate.

E. A word does not denote an individual as qualified by its class property. The class property alone is denoted.
   1. Because a class property and an individual are inseparably connected, once one knows the first, one comes to know the second. Therefore, it is only necessary that a word give knowledge of one of the two. Hence, one cannot presume that the word denote more than one of them (IIB).
   2. It is not necessarily the case that all the objects of the cognition which follows the use of a word are denoted.
      a. There is cognition of both an individual and the class property.

b. It is not obvious which the word denotes and which the denoted object gives knowledge of.

3. Concomitant presence and absence establish that it is the class property, not the word, which gives knowledge of the individual.
   a. Even without the use of a word, if one knows a class property then one knows an individual of the class.
   b. Even when a word is spoken, if cognition of the class property does not arise, one will not know an individual.

F. The word does not denote the class property as qualified by (resident in) an individual.
   1. Qualified by an individual, the class property loses its generality.
   2. If the individual were included in the meaning even as the qualifier, the word would be unable to denote the class property as qualified by (resident in) any other individual (IIIC1).

G. Accepting that the word denotes just the class property, one can account for the cognition of the individual as principal.
   1. Granted that one has the cognition of an individual as qualified by the class property.
   2. The word denotes the class property alone no matter whether it is principal or subordinate in the cognition.
      a. The way the meanings fit together decides what is principal and what is subordinate in the cognition.
         i. If the word is used to express its own meaning, the class property is principal.
         ii. If it is used to express another object, then the class property is subordinate and qualifies the principal object.
      b. The word is not engaged in whether its meaning is principal or subordinate in the cognition.
   3. The denotation of the word 'cow' is not parallel to that of 'staff-bearer' (IIC).
      a. In the example, because something supplies the knowledge of the qualifier first, the qualified cognition can arise in accordance with the principle that knowledge of a qualified object presupposes knowledge of the qualifier (IIIC4b).
         i. A separable part of the word 'staff-bearer', i.e. 'staff', supplies cognition of the staff.

ii. '-bearer' gives cognition of the person.
iii. These two cognitions together give the cognition of the person qualified by the staff.

b. There is no part of the word 'cow' to give knowledge of the qualifier cowness so that the qualified cognition could arise.
c. Because of the principle that one must know the qualifier first in order to have a qualified cognition, the word 'cow' denotes the class property.

4. Concomitant presence and absence determine that a generic term denotes the general property exclusively.
   a. One does find a generic term and class property, in the absence of an individual (e.g. 'falcon') (IIIA).
   b. One never finds a generic term and an individual, in the absence of the class property (e.g. 'rice').

IV. Response to the objections in II.
   A. 1.3.34 restates IIA, IID and IIE
   B. 1.3.35 answers them:
      1. Because the class property and individual are inseparably connected, although a word denotes the class property, it is used to convey the individual.
         a. Because an individual substance directly participates in the Vedic performance, it is connected to the transcendental result; the class property is not so connected because it cannot directly participate in the performance. Hence, just the mention of the action gives knowledge of an individual substance.
         b. A word denoting the class property alone is used to qualify the substance upon which the action is done. It specifies which substance. (e.g. 'rice')
      2. Because number relates to individuals, it gives knowledge of unspecified individuals. A word denoting the class property qualifies the individuals.
      3. Because a replacement relates to the substance it replaces by the relation of being other, the word denoting the class property will qualify the substance with the class property to provide the qualified cognition of the kind of substance.

Jaimini 1.1.5 Translation (Selections)

1.1.5. Autpatikas tu śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas; tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe; tat pramāṇaṃ Bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt. **The relation of a word with its object is innate; knowledge of it is verbal instruction, and** (verbal instruction) **does not fail with respect to an object beyond the range of perception; it is a valid means to know** (even such an object, and therefore to know *dharma*), **in the opinion of Bādarāyaṇa, because it is independent.**[1]

Nanu sarva eva nirālambanaḥ svapnavat pratyayaḥ....[2]
Ś1) (Buddhist:) All cognition has no basis in real objects just as dreams don't....

Api ca niyatanimittas tantuṣv evopādīyamāneṣu paṭapratyayaḥ. Itarathā tantvādāne 'pi kadācid ghaṭabuddhir avikalendriyasya syāt. Na caivam asti. Ato na nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ. Ato na vyabhicarati pratyakṣam.[3]
(Proponent:) Moreover, the cognition of cloth has a definite cause, it occurs when and only when threads are present (as material cause). Otherwise, even given threads, sometimes one whose senses are perfectly fine would have the the cognition of a pot. But it isn't so. Hence, cognition is not without a basis (in real objects). Therefore, direct perception does not err.

.... *Atha gaur ity asya śabdasya ko 'rthaḥ?*[4]
Ś2) (Objector:) .... Now what is the object denoted by the word cow?

Sāsnādiviśiṣṭākṛtir iti brūmaḥ.
(Proponent:) The class property characterized by the dewlap, etc.

---

[1]MD, part 1, p. 28. Śabara interprets *'tasya'* to refer to *dharma* so that the second phrase says, "the means to know (*dharma*) is verbal instruction. However, *'saṃbandha'* immediately precedes and makes a natural referent. Nāgeśa seems to make a direct reference to this *sūtra* interpreted in this way when he says, "verbal instruction is grasping the relation (between a word and the object it denotes) (*upadeśaḥ sambandhagrahaḥ*) (Under Pāṇini 1.2.64, MB, p. 70b)."

[2]MD, part 1, p. 34. For the full argument, see MD, pp. 34-42 or Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1933: vol. 1, pp. 12-15).

[3]MD, part 1, p. 42.

[4]MD, part 1, pp. 59-62.

Nanv ākṛtiḥ sādhyāsti vā, na vā?
(Objector:) Is the class property something to be inferred, or not?

Na pratyakṣā satī sādhyā bhavitum arhati. Rucakaḥ svastiko vardhamānaka iti hi pratyakṣaṃ dṛśyate.
(Proponent:) Being directly perceptible it cannot be something to be inferred. We directly perceive a necklace, an auspicious symbol and a cup.[5]

Vyāmoha iti cen,
Ś3) If (one objects that) it is delusion.

Na. Nāsati pratyayaviparyāse: vyāmoha iti śakyate vaktum.
(Proponent:) No. You can't say we are deluded unless another experience gives evidence that our cognition is false.

Asaty api arthāntara evaṃjātīyako bhavati pratyayaḥ, paṅktiḥ, yūthaṃ, vanam iti yatheti cet.
(Objector:) Even when there is no other additional object we have the cognition of such an object; for example, a row, a herd, a forest.

Na. Asaṃbaddham idaṃ vacanam upanyastam. Kim: asati vane vanapratyayo bhavatīti pratyakṣam evākṣipyate: vṛkṣā api na santīti? Yady evaṃ, pratyuktaḥ sa māhāyānikaḥ pakṣaḥ. Atha kim ākṛtisadbhāvavādy upālabhyate: siddhāntāntaraṃ te duṣyatīti: vane 'py asati vanapratyayaḥ prāpnotīti? Evam api prakṛtaṃ dūṣayitum aśaknuvatas tatsiddhāntāntaradūṣaṇe nigrahasthānam āpadyate, asādhakatvāt. Sa hi vakṣyati: Duṣyatu yadi duṣyati. Kiṃ tena duṣṭenāduṣṭena vā prakṛtaṃ tvayā sādhitaṃ bhavati, madīyo vā pakṣo dūṣito bhavatīti. Na ca vṛkṣavyatiriktaṃ vanaṃ yasmān nopalabhyate 'to: vanaṃ nāstīty avagamyate. Yadi vane 'nyena hetunā sadbhāvaviparītaḥ pratyaya utpadyate, mithyaiva

---

[5]A *vardhamānaka* is a certain type of pot for drinking. The Amarakoṣa, 2.9.32a (p. 313a) says, *"Ghaṭaḥ kuṭanipāv astrī śarāvo vardhamānakaḥ,"* on which the Rāmāśramī says, *"...dve pātrabhedasya."*
Vaidyanātha Śāstrī comments: *sauvarṇapadārthagatarucakatvādirūpāvāntara-sāmānyābhiprāyeṇa bodhyam. Trayānugatasuvarṇatvarūpasāmānyābhiprāyaṃ vedam.* He intends the specific properties of being a necklace, etc. in golden entities. He also intends the general property goldenness present in all three. MD, part 1, p. 61. That is, the different names denote the narrower class property as opposed to the one that the three objects have in common. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1977-86, vol. 1, p. 39) uses the Sanskrit words minus their terminations for the three examples in Hindi but adds, *"ābhūṣaṇaviśeṣa* (specific ornaments)."
Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1933: vol. 1, p. 21) translates the examples, "the necklace, the road-crossing, the dish, and so forth," as if they are totally unrelated things. Taking them as golden ornaments, as Vaidyanātha and Yuddhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka do, brings out the relevance of the objectors argument.

vanapratyaya iti. Tato: vanaṃ nāstīty avagacchāmaḥ. Na ca gavādiṣu pratyayo viparyeti. Ato vaiṣamyam. Atha vanādiṣu naiva viparyeti, na: te na santīti. Tasmād asaṃbaddhaḥ paṅkti-vanopanyāsaḥ. Ata upapannaṃ jaiminivacanam: ākṛtiḥ śabdārtha iti. Yathā cākṛtiḥ śabdārthas tathopariṣṭān nipuṇataram upapādayiṣyāma iti.

Ś4) (Proponent:) No. The statement you make (that we cognize a whole even when there is no object other than the parts) is irrelevant (it has nothing to do whether the perception of a class property is true). a) Saying, "When there is no forest, one has the cognition of the forest," do you mean thereby to object to the direct perception of trees? If so, this Māhāyāna Buddhist view (that no external objects exist) has been refuted (1.1.5. Ś1). b) Or by saying, "Even when a forest is not present one cognizes a forest," do you rebuke him who says that the class property exists, "another one of your conclusions is false?" In this way too, unable to refute the proposal at hand, by attacking his other conclusion, you are defeated, because refuting (the conclusion that cognition is based on real objects) does not prove (that a class property does not exist independent of substance). For he'll say, "If my conclusion (that cognition is based on real objects) is refuted, let it be refuted! By it being refuted or not do you prove your point in the current debate (that a class property does not exist) or refute my view (that it does)?" Moreover, just because we don't perceive the forest to be distinct from the trees doesn't mean the forest doesn't exist. If for some other reason a cognition arises which contradicts the existence of the forest, then certainly the cognition of the forest is false. Then we understand that the forest does not exist. But (just because a cognition arose to contradict the existence of the forest) it is not the case that the cognition with respect to cows (that they are cows, i.e. cowness) is contradicted. They are two different cases. On the other hand, if a cognition does not arise to contradict the existence of the forest and other aggregates (the row and the herd) then it is not true that they (the forest, the row and the herd) do not exist. Therefore, your statement about the row and forest is irrelevant. Hence, Jaimini's statement that the object denoted by a word is the class property makes sense. We will explain how the object denoted by a word is the class property more thoroughly later.[6]

[6] The references are to Jaimini 1.3.33, *Ākṛtis tu kriyārthatvāt*, and to the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa.

Jaimini 1.3.30-35 Translation

Lokavedādhikaraṇa (Selections)

1.3.30. ***Prayogacodanābhāvād, arthaikatvam, avibhāgāt.***[1]
(Proponent:) **Because** (Vedic texts) **enjoin performance,** (each word) **has just one meaning because there is no division.**

... ...

Ya eva laukikāḥ śabdās ta eva vaidikās, ta evaiṣām arthā iti.
(Proponent:) Words that occur in the Veda are none other than the words that occur in ordinary usage; their meanings are none other.

Kutaḥ?
(Objector:) Why?

Prayogacodanābhāvāt. *Evaṃ prayogacodanā saṃbhavati yadi ta eva śabdās ta evārthā; itarathā, śabdānyatve 'rtho na pratīyeta. Tasmād ekaśabdatvam iti.*
(Proponent:) **Because Vedic texts enjoin performance.** It is (only) possible to enjoin performance if the words are none other and their meanings are none other; otherwise, if the words were different, the meaning would not be understood.

Ucyate: Prayojanam idam. Hetur vyapadiśyatām.
(An objector) says: This is a purpose. State the cause.

Tato hetur ucyate: ***avibhāgād*** *iti. Na teṣām eṣāṃ ca vibhāgam upalabhāmahe, ata evaikaśabdatvaṃ. Tāṃś ca tāṃś cārthān avagacchāmaḥ ato nānyatvaṃ ca vadāmaḥ.*
Then (the proponent) states the cause, "because there is no division." We do not perceive any division between those (Vedic words) and these (ordinary words), so the words are the same. We understand the same meanings (from the Vedic words as we do from ordinary words), so we say that they too are none other.[2]

... ...

[1]MD, part 2, p. 229.
[2]MD, part 2, pp. 231-32.

Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa (Entire)

Yadi laukikās ta evārthās tadā saṃdehaḥ: kim ākṛtiḥ śabdārtho 'tha vyaktir? iti.[3]

(Proponent:) I) If the meanings (of words that occur in the Veda) are none other than the meanings of those words in ordinary usage, then the question arises, "Is the object denoted by a word the class property, or an individual?"

Kā punar ākṛtiḥ? Kā punar vyaktir? iti

(Objector:) A) But what is a class property? And what is an individual?

Dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ. Asādhāraṇaviśeṣā vyaktiḥ.

(Proponent:) 1) A class property is any general property of substances, qualities or actions. 2) An individual is that in which there are exclusive distinguishing properties.

Kutaḥ saṃśayaḥ?

(Objector:) B) Why does the doubt arise (as to whether the object denoted by a word is the class property or an individual)?

Gaur ity ukte sāmānyapratyayād, vyaktau ca kriyāsaṃbandhāt.

(Proponent:) 1) Because when the word 'cow' is spoken, one understands a general property, 2) but action has a relation with an individual.

Tad ucyate "vyaktiḥ śabdārtha" iti.

II) The (objector) says: An individual is the object denoted by a word.

Kutaḥ?

(Proponent:) Why?

Prayogacodanābhāvāt. *Ālambhanaprokṣaṇaviśasanādīnāṃ prayogacodanā ākṛtyarthe na saṃbhaveyuḥ.*

(Objector:) A) **Because** (Vedic texts) **enjoin performance.** Injunctions to perform killing, washing, cutting, etc. would be impossible if the object denoted by a word were the class property.

Yatroccāraṇānarthakyaṃ tatra vyaktyarthaḥ. Ato 'nyatrākṛtivacana iti cet,

---

[3]MD, part 2, p. 235-68.

(Proponent:) Where the utterance would have no purpose (if the word denoted a class property), it denotes an individual. Elsewhere it denotes a class property.

Uktam: anyāyaś cānekārthatvam iti.
(Objector:) B) It has been said that it is unreasonable for a word to denote more than one object.[4]

Katham sāmānyāvagatir iti cet,
C) If (the proponent) asks: (if the word denotes only the individual then) how does one understand the general property?[5]

Vyaktipadārthakasyākṛtiś cihnabhūtā bhaviṣyati ya evamākṛtikaḥ sa gaur iti. Yathā yasya daṇḍo 'sti sa daṇḍīti na ca daṇḍavacano daṇḍiśabdaḥ, evam ihāpi. 30.

---

[4]Kumārila: *Nyāyena hi sthitam ekasya śabdasyārthaikyam anavasthitasambandhānekādṛṣṭavācakaśaktikalpanavikalpadoṣaprasaṅgāt, sambaddhānām cārthānām anyatarābhidhānenaivetaratra pratipattisiddheḥ.* (Objector:) Reasoning has established that each word denotes only one object because otherwise the relation between the word and its object would not be fixed, one would have to posit more than one imperceptible capacity to denote (*śakti*) for each word, there would be an option (that sometimes the word denoted an individual and at other times the general property), and because just by denoting one of connected objects one achieves cognition of the others. MD, part 2, p. 243.

[5]Kumārila: *Katham tarhy ākṛtipratyaya iti ced ata āha:* ***avibhāgād*** *iti. Yatas tu nityam eva vyaktyākṛtyor avibhāgas, tasmād vyaktir abhihitā satī śaknoty evākṛtim gamayitum. Tad uktam tadbhūtādhikaraṇe. Yasya tu padasya yo 'rtho 'bhidheyatvenāśritas tasya tat-parihārāsambhavād avaśyam tatrasthasyaivārthāntaram lākṣaṇikatvenābhyupagantavyam iti. Api cākṛtipadārthakasya vyaktiṣu sādhāraṇānaikāntikatvān nirṇayo na syād. Vyaktipadārthakasya punar atyantāntarbhūtākṛtiniścayasiddher na śabdavyāpārakalpanopapattiḥ. Tasmād vyaktir eva śabdārtho nākṛtiḥ.* To answer the objection, "Then how does one have the cognition of the general property?" Jaimini says, **"because there is no division."** Because an individual and its class property are eternally inseparable, the individual being denoted can convey the understanding of the class property. This has been said in the *Tadbhūtādhikaraṇa* (§3.1.3 note 6). Because it is impossible for the object which a word denotes to avoid being denoted when the word is used, one must accept any additional meaning of the word which is fixed in its denoted object, as being indicated by the denoted object. Moreover, if one maintained that the object denoted by a word is the class property, one would not be able to determine which individual the class property indicated because there would be equal cause for it indicating each. But if one maintains that the object denoted by a word is an individual, one can determine (that any individual will indicate) the class property which is entirely included (in any individual which the word denotes). Hence, it does not make sense to posit that the word conveys the class property. Therefore, it is an individual which is the object denoted, not a class property. MD, part 2, p. 243-44. [Note: If the reading is *'kalpanānupapattiḥ'*, supply the individual instead of the class property and translate as follows: Hence it makes perfectly good sense to posit that the word conveys the individual.]

(Objector:) The class property will serve as a mark: whatever has such and such a class property is called a cow. Just as whoever has a staff (*daṇḍa*) is called a staff-bearer (*daṇḍin*), yet the word staff-bearer does not denote the staff, in the same way here (whatever has cowness is called a cow, yet the word 'cow' does not denote the class property cowness).[6]

1.3.31. Adravyaśabdatvāt.

D) **Because there would be no word for a substance.**

Dravyāśrayasya śabdo ***dravyaśabdaḥ****. Na tatra dravyāśrayavacanaśabdo bhavet, yady ākṛtiḥ śabdārtho bhavet. Ṣaḍ deyā dvādaśa deyāś caturviṃśatir deyā iti na hy ākṛtiḥ ṣaḍādibhiḥ saṃkhyābhir yujyate. Tasmān nākṛtivacanaḥ. 31.*

A **word for a substance** is a word for a substance as the substratum (of the general property and a number). There would be no word denoting a substance as the substratum, if the object denoted by a word were the class property. 1-2) The phrases "one should give six, one should give twelve, one should give twenty-four" would not make sense, because the class property has no connection with the numbers, six, etc.[7] 4) Therefore, the word does not denote the class property.[8]

---

[6]The word *'daṇḍin'* is formed by adding the suffix *ini* in the meaning of the suffix ***matup***. Pāṇini 5.2.115, *Ata iniṭhanau:* The affixes *ini* and ***ṭhan*** occur after a nominal base ending in the sound *a*. Pāṇini 5.2.94, *Tadasyāstyasminniti* ***matup***, provides the affix ***matup*** after a word meaning x to form a word meaning that of which, or in which, x is. The Kāśikā (vol. 2, p. 520) gives *'daṇḍin'* there as an example in the meaning contact (*saṃsarga*), i.e., one in whose contact there is a staff, or loosely, one who holds a staff. See Śabara on Jaimini 4.2.17-18. *"Daṇḍī praiṣān anvāha."* MD, part 5, p. 50-51.

[7]Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 2.2.2.3-5 (p. 39): *Tau vai ṣaḍ dadyāt.... Dvādaśa dadyāt.... Caturviṃśatiṃ dadyāt....* Taittirīyasaṃhitā 5.4.11.4 (p. 225): *Dvādaśopa dadhāti...* Śabara discusses number under Jaimini 4.1.15. MD, part 5, pp. 14-15.

[8]Śabara's compound *'dravya-āśraya'* is a *karmadhāraya*. His statement is straightforward and consistent with the objector's position. Kumārila has interpreted Śabara as taking the compound to be a *bahuvrīhi* meaning (a number, quality, or general property) whose substratum is a substance. Yet at the same time he rejects such an interpretation because it has several faults. See MD, part 2, pp. 2445. It seems to me that this was simply not what Śabara meant. Kumārila's own interpretation is quite reasonable.

Kumārila: *Api* ***cādravyaśabdatvād*** *vyakter evābhidheyatā; sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ hi nākṛtyarthaguṇārthayoḥ.* Moreover, the individual alone is the object denoted because otherwise **there would be no word for a substance**; a word denoting a class property and a word denoting a quality are not co-referential.

Gośabdādīnām ākṛtivacanatve gauḥ śuklaḥ, aruṇayā piṅgākṣyaikahāyanyā gavā krīṇātīti, ṣaḍ gāvo deyāḥ, ekāṃ gāṃ dakṣiṇāṃ dadyād ity evamādiṣu prayogeṣu sarveṣāṃ jātiguṇamātravacanatvāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na prāpnoti. If the words 'cow', etc. denoted the class property, in each of the usages, "white cow," "One buys (soma) with a tan brown-eyed one-year-old cow," "One should give six cows," "One should give one cow as fee," because all the words would denote only generic properties and qualities, they would not attain to being co-referential.

1.3.32. Anyadarśanāc ca.
E) **Because** (we) **see** (provision for) **another.**
Yadi paśur upākṛtaḥ palāyeta, anyaṃ tadvarṇaṃ tadvayasam ālabheteti yady ākṛtivacanaḥ śabdo bhaved, anyasyālambho nopapadyeta. Anyasyāpi paśudravyasya saivākṛtiḥ. Tasmād vyaktivacana iti. 32. (pūrvapakṣaḥ)
1) (A Vedic injunction states) "If the animal brought (for a Vedic performance) passes away, one should offer another one of the same color and age."[9] 2-4) If the word ('animal') denoted the class property, offering another one would not make sense. Even another individual animal has the same class property (so one would not succeed in offering something other. Therefore, the word denotes an individual.

1.3.33. Ākṛtis tu kriyārthatvāt.
(Proponent:) III) **But the class property is** (the object denoted by a word) **because it is for the purpose of the action.**
Tuśabdaḥ pakṣaṃ vyāvartayati. Ākṛtiḥ śabdārthaḥ.
The word 'but' rejects the previous view. The class property is the object denoted by a word.

Kutaḥ?
(Objector:) Why?

Gotvasya na hi saṃbandhaḥ śuklatvāruṇimādibhiḥ; yena ṣaṣṭhy api tāvat syāt kutas tv ekārthavṛttitā. Na hi gotvākṛtiḥ śuklā nāruṇā nāpi ṣaḍguṇā; vyaktis tv evaṃguṇā tasmād vyakter evābhidheyatā. Mama hi vyaktiśabdatvāt sidhyaty ekārthavṛttitā; tava tv ***adravyaśabdatvād*** *bhaved bhedo gavāśvavat.* Cowness simply has no connection with the color white, the color tan, etc., by which even a sixth triplet termination could occur (on the word cow, e.g., the cow's white color), so how can the words 'cow' and 'white' refer to the same object? For the class property cowness is neither white nor tan nor six-fold, but the individual has such qualities. Therefore, it is the individual which is denoted. Because on my view there is a word denoting an individual, the words succeed in referring to the same object, but because on your view **there would be no word for a substance**, their reference would be as different as cows and horses. MD, part 2, pp. 244-45. Taittirīyāsaṃhitā 6.1.6.7-8 (pp. 254-55, mantras 16, 19): *"Ekahāyanyā krīṇāti.* (One buys with a one-year-old)," *"Aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā krīṇāti.* (One buys with a tan hazel-eyed)." See Śabara on Jaimini 3.1.12. MD, part 4, p. 33.

[9] *"Paśuś ced upākṛtaḥ palāyate vāyave tam anudiśyānyaṃ tadvarṇaṃ tadvayasam ālabheta."* Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra 25.9.1 (part 2, p. 528).
The Karka commentary glosses the word *'palāyate'* with the word *'naśyet'*. Hence, it means dies as is also clear from Śabara's reference to the relation of the replacement to the 'deceased (*vinaṣṭasya*)' below (IVB3). The animal (*paśu*, literally, domestic animal) in the Vedic performance is a goat (*chāga*). See Jaimini 6.8.30. *Paśucodanāyām aniyamo 'viśeṣāt.* 31. *Chāgo vā mantravarṇāt.* (*"Agnaye chāgasya vapāyā medaso 'nubrūhi.* Invoke Agni with the fat of the marrow of a goat."). *'Upākṛta'* means brought near, tied to the post (*yūpa*) and prepared. To prepare it for offering, one rotates lit *darbha* grass around the goat in the manner of *ārātrikam* (Hindi, *āratī*).

Kriyārthatvāt. *Śyenacitaṃ cinvīteti vacanam ākṛtau saṃbhavati, yady ākṛtyarthaḥ śyenaśabdaḥ. Vyaktivacane tu: na cayanena śyenavyaktir utpādayituṃ śakyata ity aśakyārtha-vacanād anarthakaḥ. Tasmād ākṛtivacanaḥ.*
A) **Because it is for the sake of the action.** 1-2) (Proponent:) The injunction, "One should build a falcon altar," is possible with respect to the class property, that is, if the word 'falcon' denotes the class property.[10] 3-4) But if the word denoted the individual, the injunction would be pointless because, due to the fact that it is impossible to create an individual falcon by piling up (bricks), it would enjoin the impossible. Therefore, the word denotes the class property.

Nanu śyenavyaktibhiś cayanam anuṣṭhāsyate.
(Objector:) But piling up will be carried out using individual falcons (as building blocks).

Na sādhakatamaḥ śyenaśabdārthaḥ, īpsitatamo hy asau śyenaśabdena nirdiśyate. Ataś cayanena śyeno nirvartayitavyaḥ, sa ākṛtivacanatve 'vakalpyate.
(Proponent:) 5) The word 'falcon' does not mean that which most serves to bring about the act; rather, the word 'falcon' refers to that which one most wishes to obtain.[11] Hence, one must produce

---

[10]Taittirīyāsaṃhitā, 5.4.11.1 (p. 225): *Śyenacitaṃ cinvīta suvargakāmaś śyeno vai vayasāṃ patiṣṭhaś śyena eva bhūtvā suvargaṃ lokaṃ patati.... Śyenacitam iti śyena-citam, cinvīta, suvargakāma iti suvarga-kāmaḥ, śyenaḥ, vai, vayasām, patiṣṭhaḥ, śyenaḥ, eva, bhūtvā, suvargam iti suvaḥ-gam, lokam, patati....* One desirous of heaven (eternal happiness) should build a falcon (on which to put the fire). It is the falcon which is the best flyer among birds. Becoming a falcon he flies to heaven (the world of eternal happiness).
Bhaṭṭabhāskaramiśra comments: *Śyenacitam iti. Śyena iva cīyate vakrapakṣo vyastapuccha iti. Sa eva kvip. Nitya eva; nātra kāmasaṃyogaḥ. Uktaṃ ca: śyenacidagnīnām iti.* 'Falcon-built' means built like a falcon, with bent wings and fanned tail. The falcon itself is what is built. Building the falcon is a requirement; there is no connection with desire. In addition, it is said, "Among fires, the falcon-built...."

[11]The proponent states that the word 'falcon' refers to the falcon as the direct object of the action of piling up not as the instrument. To do so he indirectly refers to the following grammatical rules:
Pāṇini 1.4.42, *Sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam:* That participant in an act (*kāraka*) which most serves to bring about the act is the instrument (*karaṇa*).
Pāṇini 1.4.49, *Kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma:* That participant in an act (*kāraka*) which the agent (*kartṛ*) most wishes to obtain is the direct object (*karman*).
Pāṇini 3.2.92, *Karmaṇy agnyākhyāyām:* The Kāśikā (vol. 1, p. 232) says: *Ceḥ, karmaṇi iti vartate. Karmaṇy upapade cinoteḥ karmaṇy eva kārake kvip pratyayo bhavaty agnyākhyāyāṃ, dhātūpapadapratyayasamudāyena ced agnyākhyā gamyate. Śyena iva cīyate śyenacit. Kaṅkacit. Ākhyāgrahaṇam rūḍhisampratyayārtham. Agnyartho hi iṣṭakācaya ucyate: śyenacid iti.* When there is a co-occurring word denoting the direct object, the suffix ***kvip*** occurs after the verb root √*ci* (to build) to denote the direct object itself, if it is a name for a fire, that is, if one understands the aggregate of the root, subordinate word

a falcon by means of piling up. That is possible if the word denotes the class property.[12]

---

and suffix to be a name for a fire. 'Falcon-built' means built like a falcon. Heron-built. Pāṇini mentions the word 'name' to communicate that the words so formed are conventional terms. It is the brick structure for the purpose of the fire (not the fire itself) which is called 'falcon-built'.

The Padamañjarī commentary on the Kāśikā clarifies the final point: ***Ākhyāgrahaṇaṃ rūḍhisampratyayārtham*** *iti. Agniśabdo loke jvalane rūḍhaḥ, vede tv agnyartha iṣṭakācaye 'pi pracuraḥ prayogaḥ... iha tv asaty ākhyāgrahaṇe lokaprasiddhivaśena jvalana eva gṛhyeta: Mā grāhi, iṣṭakācaya eva gṛhyatām ity ākhyāgrahaṇam ity arthaḥ.* The statement that the word 'name' is to communicate that the words so formed are conventional terms means the following: The word 'fire' in normal usage conventionally means the flames but in the Veda it is also widely used to mean the brick structure whose purpose is the fire.... But here if the word 'name' were absent from the *sūtra*, because normal usage is so well known one would understand it only in the sense of flames. The mention of 'name' tells one not to understand it in the normal sense but to understand it only in the sense of a brick structure. KNP, part 2, p. 609.

The Nyāsa clarifies the meaning of the term as follows: *Agnyartho ya iṣṭakānāṃ racanāviśeṣaḥ sa śyenacid ity ucyate, tatraivāyaṃ pratyaya iṣyate....* A certain arrangement of bricks for the purpose of a fire is called 'falcon-built'. One wants the suffix ***kvip*** only in this meaning. KNP, part 2, p. 609.

[12]Kumārila: *Kiṃ ca naiveṣṭakābhir ākṛtisampādanam abhyupagataṃ yataḥ svabhāvāt snāyvādyārabdhadravyasamavāyitvenopālambhaḥ syāt. Piṣṭapiṇḍasiṃhavat sādṛśyasampattiḥ pakṣadvaye 'pi codanārthaḥ. Sā tv ākṛtyantaravilakṣaṇaśyenākṛtyā syān na tu vyaktyantaravilakṣaṇaśyenaviśeṣeṇā 'sādhāraṇena vā. Nirvikalpatvāt sāmānyaviśeṣānapekṣaṃ vyaktimātrasādṛśyam avidheyam, sarvadravyeṣu tulyatvāt. Ekavyaktiparigrahāc ca vyaktyantareṇa sādṛśyaṃ na kāryaṃ syāt. Tasmāc chyenacitkriyā vyaktau śabdārthe na sambhavati.* It is not accepted that one constructs the class property with bricks because then an objection would be possible because the class property naturally inheres in a substance that is made of tendons, etc. (not of bricks). The meaning of the injunction ("Build a falcon altar") on both views (the view that the word 'falcon' denotes the generic property falconness and the view that it denotes an individual falcon) is to construct something similar (to the denoted object, i.e., either the generic property or the individual) just as a flour lion (is made similar either to the generic property lion-ness or to an individual lion). Something could be constructed similar to the falcon class property which is different from other class properties, but could not be constructed similar to a specific or exclusive property of falcons which differentiates one or more falcons from other individual falcons. The injunction cannot command that one make something similar to the plain individual, irrespective of all general and specific properties, because the individual as such is predicateless and the same in all substances. And if one selected one individual to which to make the altar similar, one would not be able to make it similar to any other individual. Therefore, the action of building a falcon-altar is not possible if the object denoted by a word is an individual. MD, part 2, pp. 246.

Further on Kumārila says: *...ākṛtiḥ padārtha iti vijñāyate. Śyenacitaṃ cinvīta iti śravaṇāt. Atra hi śyenavyaktiṃ cayanena kuryād ākṛtiṃ veti vākyārthau syātām. Yāvad iṣṭakābhiḥ śyenavyakteḥ kartum aśakyatvāt snāyvādibhir apy anirvṛtter iṣṭakābādhāc chyenavyakteḥ prayojanakalpanāc cinoter amukhyārthatvāt* ***Karmaṇy agnyākhyāyām*** *iti smṛtiparityāgaprasaṅgāc ca cayanena śyenavyaktiṃ kuryād ity evaṃ tāvan nopapadyate. Tathākṛter apiṣṭakābhiḥ kartum aśakyatvād daivanirmitatvāt prayojanakalpanāc cinoter ayathārthatvaprasaṅgāt smṛtibādhāc cākṛtiṃ kuryād ity api nopapadyate. Pariśeṣāc chyenam iva citam*

Nanu ubhayatra kriyāyā asaṃbhava eva vyapadiśyate: Nākṛtiḥ śabdārthaḥ. Kutaḥ? Kriyā na saṃbhaved ākṛtau śabdārthe: vrīhīn prokṣatīti. Tathā na vyaktiḥ śabdārthaḥ, kriyaiva na saṃbhaved vyakteḥ śabdārthatve: śyenacitaṃ cinvīteti. Yad apy ucyeta: vrīhīn prokṣatīti vyaktilakṣaṇārthākṛtir iti. Śakyam anyatrāpi: śyenacitaṃ cinvīteti vaditum: ākṛtilakṣaṇārthā vyaktir iti. Kiṃ punar atra jyāyaḥ?

(Objector:) B1) It has been pointed out that action is impossible on both views: a) The class property is not the object denoted by a word because action would be impossible if the object denoted by a word were a class property; for instance (in the sentence) "One washes rice" (one cannot wash the class property of rice; one washes specific individual grains).[13] b) Likewise, an individual is not the object denoted by a word for the same reason, action would be impossible if the individual were the object denoted by a word; for instance (in the sentence), "One should build a falcon altar" (one cannot build a real individual falcon; one builds the shape). 2a) The proponent (of the view that the class property is the object denoted by a word) would answer that (in the example) "One washes rice," the class property (being denoted) serves the

---

agnisthalaṃ cayanena nirvartayed iti vākyārthaḥ, tataś ca yayā kayācic chyena-vyaktyā sadṛśasyāgneś cetum aśakyatvāt sarvavyaktisādṛśyāsaṃbhavād atītānāgatavyaktisādṛśyānupapatteś ca śyenākṛtisādṛśyasaṃpattisaṃbhavāc cākṛtiḥ śabdārtha iti niścīyate. We determine that a class property is the object denoted by a word because of the Vedic text, "One should build a falcon altar." Two sentence meanings are possible here: by piling up (bricks) one should make either a) an individual or b) a class property. a) It is impossible to make an individual falcon with bricks, and one doesn't create one using tendons, etc. because the fact that bricks must be used prevents it. Hence, because one would have to posit a purpose (of the injunction) for an individual falcon, one would (interpret the verb) 'to build' in a secondary meaning and so one would have to abandon the (grammatical) rule, Pāṇini 3.2.92 (which states that the verb 'to build ($\sqrt{ci}$)' compounds with a direct object to form a name of an altar). Therefore, the injunction (to build a falcon altar) does not make sense meaning that one should make an individual by piling up. b) Likewise, it is not possible to make a class property with bricks either because it is created by divine power. Hence, because one would have to posit a purpose (for the injunction), one would have to interpret (the verb) 'to build ($\sqrt{ci}$)' in an untrue sense which the (aforementioned) rule would prevent too. Therefore, the injunction (to build a falcon altar) doesn't make sense meaning that one should make a class property either. What remains is the following sentence meaning: One should create an altar, i.e a place for fire, like a falcon by piling up bricks. It is impossible to build an altar similar to any one particular individual falcon, similarity to all falcons is impossible, and similarity to past and future falcons does not make sense; but it is possible to bring about the similarity (of an altar) to the falcon class property. Therefore, we conclude that the class property is the object denoted by a word. MD, part 2, p. 259-60.

[13]Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra 1.9.1 (part 1, pp. 70, 96) identifies rice (*vrīhi*) as the oblation (*haviḥ*), 2.2.9. concerns washing it. This is what the 'washing (*prokṣaṇa*)' mentioned in IIA refers to. The statement, *"vrīhīn prokṣati,"* is also quoted by Śabara on 9.1.11 and 9.1.13, and discussed under 9.2.40. MD, part 6, pp. 81, 85 and 164.

purpose of making known the individual. b) On the other view too (in the example) "One should build a falcon," one can say that the individual (being denoted) serves the purpose of making known the class property (shape to build). Which is better here?

Ākṛtiḥ śabdārtha iti. Yadi vyaktiḥ śabdārtho bhaved, vyaktyantare na prayujyeta. Atha vyaktyantare prayujyate, na tarhi vyaktiḥ sabdārthaḥ, sarvasāmānyaviśeṣavinirmuktā hi vyaktir ity ucyate.
(Proponent:) C) That the class property is the object denoted by a word is better. 1a) If an individual were the object denoted by a word, the word would not be used for another individual. b) If it is used for another individual, then the individual is not the object denoted by the word because only that which is devoid of all general and specific properties is called an individual.

Naiṣa doṣaḥ. Vyaktyantare sarvasāmānyaviśeṣavinirmukta eva pravartiṣyate.
(Objector:) 2) This fault does not occur. The word will denote another individual which is in fact devoid of all general and specific properties.

Yadi vyaktyantare sarvasāmānyaviśeṣavinirmukte pravartiṣyate, sāmānyam eva tarhi tat.
(Proponent:) a) If it denotes another individual devoid of all general and specific properties, then that which it denotes is precisely a general property.[14]

Nety ucyate. Yo hy arthaḥ sāmānyasya viśeṣāṇāṃ cāśrayaḥ sā vyaktiḥ. Vyaktivacanaś ca śabdo na sāmānye na viśeṣe vartate, teṣāṃ tu āśrayam evābhidadhāti. Tena vyaktyantare vṛttir adoṣaḥ. Na hi tat sāmānyam.
b) (The objector) says: No. That object which is the substratum of the general property and specific properties is the individual. A word for an individual is used neither for the general property nor a specific property but denotes just their substratum. Therefore, it is not a fault (for the view that the word denotes an individual) that a word is used for another individual. An individual simply is not a general property.

---

[14]Biardeau (1964: 170) takes *'tat'* to refer to the word rather than the individual. Patañjali on 1.2.64 *vārttika* 41 explains how the word *'vṛkṣa'*, being common to all individual trees, would be a single entity occurring in many substrata at once. It is possible that Śabara has this in mind. However, the objector's answer contains no argument against a word being a general property. Whereas by distinguishing an individual from a general property it denies that an individual is a general property.

Yadi vyakyantareṣv api bhavati, sarvasāmānyaviśeṣa-vinirmuktāyām aśvavyaktau gośabdaḥ kimiti na vartate?
(Proponent:) 3a) If a word is used for other individuals too, why doesn't the word 'cow' denote an individual horse which is devoid of all general and specific properties?

Āha yeṣv eva prayogo dṛṣṭas, teṣu vartiṣyate, na sarvatra, na cāśvavyaktau gośabdasya prayogo dṛṣṭaḥ; tasmāt tatra na vartiṣyate.
(The objector) says: Because it denotes only those for which its usage has been seen, not all (individual objects), and one has not seen the word 'cow' used for an individual horse; therefore, it will not denote one.[15]

Yadi yatra prayogo dṛṣṭas tatra vṛttiḥ, adya jātāyāṃ gavi prathamaprayogo na prāpnoti, tatrādṛṣṭatvāt. Sāmānyapratyayaś ca na prāpnoti: iyam api gaur iti, iyam api gaur iti. Iyaṃ vā gaur iti, iyaṃ vā gaur iti syāt. Bhavati tu sāmānyapratyayo 'dṛṣṭapūrvāyām api govyaktau. Tasmān na: pratyayāpekṣo gośabdo vyaktivacana iti śakyata āśrayitum.
(Proponent:) i) If the word 'cow' denoted those individual objects for which it's usage has been seen, it's first usage for a cow born today would not obtain because it has not been seen.[16] ii) Also the cognition of the general property, "this is a cow and that is a cow too," would not obtain. Rather, the cognition "either this is a cow or that is a cow" would arise.[17] But the cognition of the general property does occur even with respect to an individual cow not previously seen. Therefore, one cannot resort to the explanation that the word cow denotes those individuals for which its usage has been seen.

---

[15]Śabara has the objector express the view that denotation is natural as expressed in the Mahābhāṣya on 1.2.64 *vārttikas* 29, 33 and 34. See §1.3.1.4.

[16]Kumārila: *Gośabdoccāraṇe hi pūrvam evāgṛhītāsu vyaktiṣu sāmānyaṃ pratīyate; tadākārajñānotpatteḥ paścād vyaktayaḥ pratīyante 'taś cākṛti-pratyayasya nimittāntarābhāvād vyaktipratyaye ca pūrvapratītasāmānya-nimittatvād ākṛtiḥ śabdārtha iti vijñāyate.* When the word 'cow' is uttered, one immediately apprehends the general property before one has grasped the individuals. One apprehends individuals after the knowledge of the general property has arisen. Hence, because the cognition of the class property does not have a cause other than the word and because the previously apprehended general property is the cause of the cognition of an individual, we conclude that the class property is the object denoted by a word. MD, part 2, p. 261.

[17]Kumārila: *Yadi ca vyaktayo 'bhidheyā bhaveyus tatas tāsāṃ citrakhaṇḍa-muṇḍādiviśeṣasvarūpagrahaṇād vicitrā śabdoccāraṇe buddhiḥ syāt. Ekākārā tūtpadyate. Tenāpy ākṛtiḥ śabdārtha iti niścīyate.* Furthermore, if individuals were denoted, then, because one would grasp their specific variously colored, broken, shaven natures, each use of a word would produce a different cognition. But each use produces the same cognition. For this reason too we conclude that the class property is the object denoted by a word. MD, part 2, p. 261.

Evaṃ tarhi śakteḥ svabhāva eṣaḥ, yat kasyāṃcit vyaktau vartate, kasyāṃcin na, yathā agnir uṣṇaḥ, udakaṃ śītam, evam etad bhaviṣyatīti.
(Objector:) b) Then it is the nature of the signifying capacity of a word that it denotes one individual and not another. Just as fire is hot and water cold (because such is its nature), so this will be (a word denotes the individuals it does because such is its nature).

Naivaṃ sidhyati. Na hy etad gamyate: kasyāṃcid vyaktau vartate, kasyāṃcin neti.
(Proponent:) It doesn't succeed that way. One does not just understand that the word 'cow' denotes one individual and not another arbitrarily.

Satyam etat. Gotvaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ bhaviṣyati: yatra gotvaṃ tasyāṃ vyaktāv iti.
(Objector:) 4) That's true. Cowness will be the identifying mark; the word 'cow' will denote each individual in which there is cowness.

Evaṃ tarhi viśiṣṭā vyaktiḥ pratīyeta. Yadi ca viśiṣṭā, pūrvataraṃ viśeṣaṇam avagamyeta. Na hy apratīte viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭaṃ kecana pratyetum arhantīti.
(Proponent:) a) In that case one would apprehend an individual which is qualified. b) And if qualified, one would understand the qualifier first. No one can apprehend something qualified unless the qualifier is apprehended.

Astu viśeṣaṇatvenākṛtiṃ vakṣyati, viśeṣyatvena vyaktim. Na hy ākṛtipadārthakasya vyaktir na padārtho, vyaktipadārthakasya vā nākṛtiḥ. Ubhayam ubhayasya padārthaḥ. Kasyacit kiṃcit prādhānyena vivakṣitaṃ bhavati. Tenātrākṛtir guṇabhāvena vyaktiḥ pradhānabhāvena vivakṣyata iti.
(Objector:) D1-2) Let it be that a word will denote the class property as qualifier, an individual as qualified. Because it is not the case that an individual is not denoted for him for whom a class property is denoted, nor that a class property is not for him for whom an individual is denoted. Both are denoted for both. For each something is intended as principal.[18] So here an individual is intended as principal and the class property as subordinate.

[18]The segment of text, "It is not the case that .... meant as principle (*Na hy ākṛti-padārthakasya .... prādhānyena vivakṣitaṃ bhavati*)," is a close paraphrase of Patañjali on Pāṇini 1.2.64, *vārttika* 53 (53c).

Naitad evam. Ubhayor ucyamānayor guṇapradhānabhāvaḥ syāt. Yadi cātrākṛtiḥ pratīyate śabdena tadā: vyaktir api padārtha iti na śakyate vaditum.
(Proponent:) E) It is not so. If both were denoted, one could be principal and the other subordinate. But if one apprehends the class property due to the word, then one cannot say that the individual is also the object denoted by the word.[19]

Kutaḥ?
(Objector:) Why?

Ākṛtir hi vyaktyā nityasaṃbaddhā, saṃbandhinyāṃ ca tasyām avagatāyāṃ saṃbandhyantaram avagamyate. Tad etad ātmapratyakṣaṃ yac: chabda uccarite vyaktiḥ pratīyata iti. Kiṃ śabdād utākṛter iti vibhāgo na pratyakṣaḥ. So 'nvaya-vyatirekābhyām avagamyate. Antareṇāpi śabdaṃ ya ākṛtim avabudhyeta, avabudhyetaivāsau vyaktim. Yas tūccarite 'pi śabde mānasād apacārāt kadācid ākṛtiṃ nopalabheta, na jātucid asāv imāṃ vyaktim avagaccheta.
(Proponent:) 1) Because the class property is inseparably related to the individual, and once one knows that relatum (the class property) one knows the other relatum. 2a) It is self-evident that one apprehends the individual when a word is uttered. b) But the distinction, whether (one apprehends it) from the word or from the class property, is not evident. 3) That is determined by means of concomitant presence and absence. a) Even without the use of the word, whoever apprehends a class property, certainly apprehends an individual. b) But even upon hearing the word, whoever should fail to apprehend the class property at some time because his mind is distracted, would certainly not understand that individual.

---

[19]Kumārila: *Jātiś cet pūrvam abhidheyatvenābhyupagatātraiva śabdasyopakṣīṇaśaktitvān na vyaktivacanatā labhyate. Na cākṛtisaṃvedanenā 'pi vyaktipratīter anyathāpy upapannatvāt satyāṃ gatāv anekārthatā yujyate 'bhyupagantum. Arthāpattyā ca śabdasya vācakaśaktiḥ kalpyate. Sā ca yadā vyaktipratīter anyathāpy upapannatvāt kṣīṇā tadā vācakaśaktikalpanāyāṃ pramāṇaṃ nāsti.* If the generic property is accepted as denoted first, then, because the word has used up its capacity to denote there, one cannot accept that it denotes an individual. Nor is it correct to accept that there is more than one object denoted (the individual in addition to the class property) while there is another (more economical) way, because the fact that there is cognition of an individual along with knowledge of the class property does make sense otherwise. And one posits a word's capacity to denote by means of presumption. When presumtion fails because the cognition of an individual makes sense otherwise, then there is no mode of evidence by which to posit the capacity to denote (the individual too). MD, part 2, p. 263.

Nanu vyaktiviśiṣṭāyām ākṛtau vartate?
(Objector:) F) Can't the word denote the class property as qualified by the individual?[20]

Vyaktiviśiṣṭāyāṃ ced varteta, vyaktyantaraviśiṣṭā na pratīyeta. Tasmāc chabda ākṛtipratyayasya nimittam, ākṛtipratyayo vyaktipratyayasyeti.
(Proponent:) 1-2) If the word denoted the class property as qualified by an individual, one would not apprehend it as qualified by another individual. Therefore, the word is the cause of the cognition of the class property, the cognition of the class property is the cause of the cognition of the individual.

Nanu guṇabhūtā pratīyata ity uktam.
(Objector:) G1) But we have said that one apprehends the class property as subordinate.[21]

Na guṇabhāvo 'smatpakṣasya bādhakaḥ. Sarvathā tāvat pratīyate. Arthād gunabhāvaḥ pradhānabhāvo vā. Svārthaṃ ced uccāryate, pradhānabhūtā. Atha na svārthaṃ, parārtham eva, tato guṇa-bhūtā. Na tatra śabdavyāpāro 'sti.
(Proponent:) The fact that one apprehends the class property as subordinate doesn't refute our view. 2) It doesn't matter how one apprehends it. a) The object determines what is principal and what subordinate in the cognition. i) If a word is uttered for the sake of its own denoted object, then the class property is principal; ii) if not for the sake of its own object but just for the sake of another object, then the class property is subordinate. b) The word is not engaged in this.

Nanu ca daṇḍīti na tāvad daṇḍiśabdena daṇḍo 'bhidhīyate atha ca daṇḍaviśiṣṭo 'vagamyate. Evam ihāpi na tāvad ākṛtir abhidhīyate atha cākṛtiviśiṣṭā vyaktir gamyeteti naitat sādhu.
(Objector:) 3) But it is not the case that the word 'staff-bearer' denotes a staff and yet we understand one who is qualified by a

---

[20]The objector retreats to a new position: the individual is subordinate and qualifies the class property which is the principal meaning.

[21]See *"Tenātrākṛtir guṇabhāvena...* (So here the class property is meant as subordinate and the individual as principal (IIID))." The objector cited Patañjali's statement that both the class property and the individual must be included in the meaning which the word denotes in order to establish the view that the word denotes the individual as qualified by the class property (D). The proponent accepted that one cognizes both the class property and the individual (E2a). However, he expressed at that point already that the cognition one has upon the use of the word is not necessarily the denoted meaning (E2b). The objector confuses the two again here and the proponent clarifies that which element is principal and which subordinate have nothing to do with what the word denotes.

staff. Similarly here too it is not the case that the word denotes the class property and yet one understands the individual qualified by the class property. Hence this is not correct (that the word denotes the class property alone, yet the cognition is of the individual qualified by the class property).

Ucyate: Satyaṃ daṇḍiśabdena daṇḍo nābhidhīyate. Na tv apratīte daṇḍe daṇḍipratyayo 'sti. Asti tu daṇḍiśabdaikadeśabhūto daṇḍaśabdo, yena daṇḍaḥ pratyāyitaḥ. Tasmāt sādhv etad yat pratīte viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭaḥ pratīyata iti. Na tu gośabdāvayavaḥ kaścid ākṛteḥ pratyāyakaḥ, anyo vyakteḥ; yata ucyate: tata ākṛtir avagatā, na gośabda ākṛtivacana iti. Na ca yathā daṇḍiśabdo na daṇḍe prayuktaḥ evaṃ gośabdo nākṛtau. Tadartham eva nirdarśitaṃ kevalākṛtyabhidhānaḥ śyenaśabda iti. Tad evam anvayavyatirekābhyām asati śyenavyaktisaṃbandhe śyenaśabdoccāraṇād: ākṛtivacana iti gamyate. Na tu vrīhyākṛtisaṃbandham antareṇa vrīhivyaktau śabdasya prayogo dṛṣṭaḥ. Tasmād ākṛtivacanaḥ śabda ity etaj jyāyaḥ. 33. (kṛtaḥ siddhāntaḥ)

The (proponent) answers: a) It is true that the word 'staff-bearer' does not denote a staff. However, one is not conscious of the staff-bearer without being conscious of the staff. i) In this case there is the word 'staff', present as part of the word 'staff-bearer', which conveys the cognition of the staff. c) So it is correct that one knows the qualified object only when the qualifier is known. b) In the other case, however, there is no part of the word 'cow' which conveys the cognition of the class property, other than (what conveys the cognition) of the individual; because you stated that the class property is understood from the individual, the word 'cow' does not denote the class property. 4a) Furthermore, it is not the case that just as the word 'staff-bearer' is not used for the staff, the word 'cow' is not used for the class property. For that very reason we showed the example of the word 'falcon' which denotes just a class property. Because the word 'falcon' is uttered when there is no connection with an individual falcon, by concomitant presence and absence one knows that it denotes a class property. b) But one never sees a word used for particular rice grains without a connection with the rice class property. Therefore, the view that a word denotes the class property is better.[22]

---

[22]Kumārila: *Śyenacid ity ādāv ākṛtau prayogadarśanād anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ ca jātir eva vācyety avadhāryate śyenacidvākye kevalāyām ākṛtau prayuktatvāt. Kvacid api cākṛtyā vinā vyaktimātre prayogādarśanād...tenākṛtir eva śabdārtha iti. 33.* Because we see a word used for a class property in 'falcon-altar' and so on, and concomitant presence and absence determine that a generic property alone is the denoted object because in the falcon altar sentence the word, 'falcon' is used for the class property alone. And because we never see a word used for

1.3.34. Na kriyā syād iti ced arthāntare vidhānaṃ na dravyam iti cet.

IVA) (The following objections were raised above: if the word denoted the class property) **action wouldn't take place, enjoining** (action) **on a replacement** (wouldn't make sense), **there wouldn't be** (any word denoting) **a substance.**

Atha yad uktaṃ, Na kriyā saṃbhaved: vrīhin prokṣatīti na dravyaśabdaḥ syāt: Ṣaḍ deyeti anyavacanaṃ ca na syāt: anyaṃ tadrūpam iti, tat parihartavyam. 34.

We must respond to the objections which were raised: (If the word denoted the class property) 1) no action would be possible (given the implied command to wash rice in the statement) "One washes rice" (IIA). 2) There would be no word denoting a substance (in injunctions such as) "One should give six (cows)" (IID). 3) There would be no mention of another (as there is in the phrase) "another of the same color" (IIE).

1.3.35. Tadarthatvāt prayogasyāvibhāgaḥ.

B) **Because** (a word) **has** (a class property) **as its meaning, its usage is not divorced** (from an individual qualified by the class property).

Ākṛtyarthatvāc chabdasya yasyā vyakter ākṛtyā saṃbandhas tatra prayogaḥ. Prokṣaṇaṃ hi dravyasya kartavyatayā śrūyate. Katamasya? Yad yajatisādhanam apūrvayuktatvāt tasya. Nākṛteḥ, aśakyatvāt. Tatra vrīhiśabda ākṛtivacanaḥ prayujyate prokṣaṇāsrayaviśeṣaṇāya. Sa hy ākṛtiṃ pratyāyayiṣyati, ākṛtiḥ pratītā satī prokṣaṇāśrayaṃ viśekṣyatīti. Tenākṛtivacanaṃ na virudhyata iti. Evaṃ: Ṣaḍ deyā gāvo dakṣiṇeti dakṣiṇādravye saṃkhyāyāḥ prayoktavye: gāva ity ākṛtivacano viśeṣakaḥ. Tathā: anyam iti vinaṣṭasya pratinidher anyatvasaṃbandhaḥ. Tatra paśuśabda ākṛtivacana ākṛtyā viśekṣyatīti. Tasmād: gaur, aśva ity evamādayaḥ śabdā ākṛter abhidhāyakā iti siddham. 35.

1) Because the word denotes the class property, it is used for an individual which has a relation with the class property. "One washes rice" directly states washing as something which must be done to a substance. Why to a substance? Because, due to the fact that it directly participates in the Vedic performance, it is connected to the transcendental result.[23] The statement does not

---

just an individual without a class property,...; therefore, just the class property is the object denoted by a word. MD, part 2, p. 266.

[23]Literally, "To which type of entity? To that type of entity which directly participates in the Vedic performance, because such an entity will be connected to the transcendental result. Not to a class property because it can't be (connected to the transcendental result because it doesn't participate directly in the performance)." The question "*Katamasya?*" asks what is so special about a substance that singles it out from the pool of entities as that to which washing is done rather than some other entity.

One could also interpret the question, "What kind (*Katamasya*)?" as showing that if the sentence were divided it would require something else to complete its

mention washing as something to be done to a class property because it can't be. This being the case, the word 'rice' which denotes the class property is used to qualify the recipient of washing.[24] For it will make known the class property and the class property being known will qualify the recipient of washing. Therefore it is not contradicted that the word denotes the class property. 2) In the same way, in the injunction "One should give six cows as fee," when the number must be connected with the substance which constitutes the fee, the word 'cows', denoting the class property, qualifies it. 3) Likewise, when the scripture enjoins getting an 'other' (goat), there is a connection of otherness between the deceased and its replacement.[25] The word 'animal', denoting the class property, will qualify the other substance with the class property. Therefore, it has been proven that words such as 'cow', 'horse', etc. denote class properties.

---

sense. The sentence, "The word 'rice', which denotes the class property, is used there to qualify the recipient of washing. (*Tatra vrīhi...*)," shows that the word denoting the class property fulfils the sense. The point is that if the sentence were divided the sense of the parts would be incomplete. This, together with the fact that the usage is for the sake of action, implies that it is one sentence. Śabara shows how the class property and substance are construed as the same object in the meaning of that single sentence.

[24]The substratum (*āśraya*) of an action is that in which the action directly takes place. It is either the agent or direct object of the action or both depending on the particular action. In the case of washing, both the agent and the direct object are substrata but from the use of the word 'rice' it is clear that Śabara is discussing the direct object, not the agent.

[25]Remember that the relation of difference requires that the related elements be substances because there is only one class property but many substances of the type (IIE).

General Conclusion

We have examined the discussions concerning the denotation of generic terms (common nouns) in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, Vātsyāyana's commentary on the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama, and Śabara's commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini. In the course of our discussion we have also considered what the terms *'ākṛti'*, *'jāti'*, and *'dravya'* refer to in each of the three texts. Each of the discussions includes consideration of the extreme views that a generic term denotes only an individual, and that it denotes only a generic property. In Nyāya, a third extreme position, that a generic term denotes only a shape, is considered too. Each of the discussions also considers a moderate view that a generic term denotes both a generic property and an individual. In the case of Nyāya, this moderate view includes the shape as a third element in the denoted meaning. On the moderate view, one of the elements in the meaning is principal and the rest subordinate in accordance with the intention of the speaker. Most important, we have examined the arguments for each of these views and the role that certain principles of procedure and epistemology play in them.

In his discussions under Pāṇini 1.2.64 and 1.2.58, Patañjali uses the terms *'ākṛti'* and *'jāti'* synonymously to mean a generic property, that is, a property wholly present in each of many individuals of a class. He also uses both terms to refer to the class, the aggregate of all the individual objects in which that generic property resides. He uses the term *'dravya'* to refer to an individual which is part of the class and substratum of the generic property. Śabara and Vātsyāyana occasionally use the term *'dravya'* in this sense but generally use the term *'vyakti'* instead. In Nyāya, the term *'jāti'* is used strictly for a generic property considered abstractly as the cause of the same cognition with respect to many objects of a kind. It is that by virtue of which an individual is recognized as being of a certain kind. A generic property is clearly distinguished from a shape, for which the term *'ākṛti'* is used. In the case of most material objects, the shape serves as an inferential mark of the generic property. Patañjali recognizes the use of the term *'ākṛti'* for a shape. He recognizes the role a shape plays in making known the generic property of an object too. However, shape does not enter into his serious discussions of the denotation of a generic term; nor does he use the term *'ākṛti'* in these discussions to mean shape. Because it is interchanged with the term *'jāti'* in different contexts, *'ākṛti'* cannot be understood to mean anything other than a generic property.

Śabara's use of the term *'ākṛti'* raises some doubts. He does not use the term *'jāti'* and uses the term *'ākṛti'* for the property which the individuals of a class have in common. In the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa it is not absolutely clear whether he means the term to refer to an abstract generic property or to a shape. In certain contexts he clearly uses the term *'ākṛti'* for common properties other than a shape, thus implying that he conceives of an *ākṛti* generally as an abstract generic property just as Patañjali does, and just as Vātsyāyana conceives a *jāti*. However, Śabara uses the term *'ākṛti'* for a shape in another context central to his argument to establish that a generic term denotes a generic property. The success of the argument depends on closely associating, or entirely identifying, the two senses of shape and generic property.

Patañjali considers two extreme views of what a word denotes: the view that it denotes only an individual and the view that it denotes only a generic property. The view that a generic term denotes only an individual has two variations, depending on whether one accepts the principle that a word denotes a single object or allows that it may denote more than one object. If a word can denote no more than one object, a problem arises in the case of duals, which refer to two objects, and plurals, which refer to many objects. According to the principle that one word denotes one object, to denote many objects many words would arise. But the accepted usage is that just one word is used with a plural inflectional termination. To account for this, one would have to state explicitly that just one of homophonous speech forms remains and the others are deleted. Such an explicit statement involves prolixity. A simpler explanation, according to which an additional rule does not have to be stated explicitly, would be preferred. Speech forms are used in order to give knowledge of the object they denote. It is preferable to account for their use by showing how they arise naturally, based on certain principles and the ordinary conception of the object. One method by which this can be done is to reject the principle that a word denotes just one object. The ultimate criterion in determining what a word denotes is ordinary usage. In ordinary usage a singular speech form is used to denote one object, a dual is used to denote two objects, and a plural is used to denote many object. Hence one can account for the use of the plural to denote many objects just by saying that it does so naturally.

This explanation is unsatisfactory because it does not allow the procedure of determining the meaning of a speech form by concomitant presence and absence to be carried out to its full extent. One determines that a speech form denotes a meaning when in the presence of that speech form that meaning is understood and in the absence of that speech form that meaning is not understood. When singular, dual, and plural forms of a word

are used, the nominal base recurs and so does a certain cognition. The basis of this cognition is said to be a generic property common to each of the individual objects for which the generic term is used. The simplest explanation for the use of the same nominal base in each usage of a generic term is that the term denotes a generic property. In this way the usage of a generic term to refer generally to any individual of a kind rather than just to a single particular individual is accounted for too.

There are drawbacks to the view that a generic term denotes only a generic property. It has difficulty accounting for the occurrence of different inflectional terminations in different genders and numbers, and difficulty accounting for the syntactic connection of a generic term with verbs and quality words. It is impossible for a generic property, which is a single abstract object, to have differences, to be associated with number greater than one, or to participate in action. The simplest explanation for the occurrence of gender and number suffixes is that they arise after a nominal base denoting the object to which the semantic conditions for those suffixes belong. The semantic conditions for gender and number suffixes are the properties of gender and number. These belong to individual substances, not to a generic property.

The view that a generic term denotes only a generic property accepts that the individual substances in which the generic property resides are the semantic conditions for different gender and number suffixes and for the use of a generic term in syntactic connection with verbs and quality words. Yet it maintains that the individual is not denoted. This is counter-intuitive. Hence Patañjali adopts the view that both the generic property and the individual are denoted. The generic property accounts for the recurrence of the same cognition with respect to all individuals of a class and is the semantic condition for the use of a single nominal base even in the plural. Including the individual as denoted too accounts for the use of a generic term in syntactic connection with verbs and different quality words, and for the use of different gender and number suffixes.

Similar arguments are put forth in Nyāya for the inclusion of an individual and a generic property in the meaning of a generic term. In addition, Gautama includes the shape which is the means by which one infers what an individual substance is. Of particular interest is his argument against accepting that the shape alone is denoted. He rejects such a view by saying that a word denotes the individual which has the shape, and which is directly connected with the generic property, rather than the shape itself. Suppose the general shape of a cow is the inferential mark of the generic property cowness. The generic term denotes an individual which is the substratum of the cow shape only if the

individual is also the substratum of the generic property cowness. The generic term 'cow' does not denote a model cow.

Śabara's discussion of the denotation of generic terms in the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa borrows considerably from the Mahābhāṣya. Śabara both argues against views presented in the Mahābhāṣya, and adopts principles and arguments from it. Occasionally he closely paraphrases it. Śabara rejects the view that a generic term denotes only an individual by developing the argument from the Mahābhāṣya that if a generic term denoted a particular individual it would not refer to another individual of the kind. On one view expressed in the Mahābhāṣya, accepting ordinary usage as the ultimate criterion with regard to what a word denotes justifies setting aside the principle that one word denotes just one meaning and the procedure of determining meaning by concomitant presence and absence. In criticism of this position, Śabara rejects the view that a word denotes what it does according to what is seen in ordinary usage, because this view does not account for the use of a generic term for a new object of the kind.

Śabara rules out the view that a generic property serves to indicate which individual objects are denoted without itself being denoted, because he accepts the principle that an object cannot be known as qualified by something without the qualifier being known first. Cognition of an individual as qualified by its generic property cannot arise unless cognition of the generic property arises first. Because usage of a generic term leads to knowledge of an individual as belonging to a certain class, cognition of the class property qualifying the individual must arise independent of the individual, directly from the generic term. Therefore, it must be denoted by the generic term.

Patañjali recognizes the principle that one generally does not use a word to denote an object which another word has already made known. In grammar the principle is limited in scope and emphasis. Śabara gives a similar principle central importance in his discussion on the denotation of a generic term. In Mīmāṃsā the procedure to determine what a word denotes includes, in addition to concomitant presence and absence, the mode of evidence known as presumption. One presumes that a word denotes an object, if one cannot account for cognition of that object otherwise whenever a word is used. Conversely, it cannot be accepted that the capacity of the word to denote is the direct cause of cognition of an object, if that cognition can be accounted for otherwise. As a result of this procedure, and in accordance with the principle that one word denotes just one meaning, Śabara argues against the view that the individual is denoted along with the class property. Thus he rejects the final views of grammar and Nyāya.

Śabara argues that concomitant presence and absence show that a generic term denotes a class property and not an

individual. Whenever an individual is known upon the use of a generic term, a class property is also known. But he denies the converse. He claims that there are cases in which a class property is known and an individual is not. He gives an example of the generic term 'falcon' referring to a brick altar in the shape of a falcon. This example is the cornerstone in his argument to establish that a generic term denotes only a generic property. I have mentioned that Śabara's use of the term *'ākṛti'* in this example raises some doubts concerning his use of the term and his concept of the entity which it denotes.

The soundness of his argument depends on identifying the generic property with shape, or at least associating it with shape more closely than a generic property is associated with its own substratum. Because it is difficult to see what relationship other than identity is closer than that between a generic property and its own substratum, one is forced to concede either that Śabara accepts shape itself as a generic property or that his argument succeeds only by the trick of using the single term *'ākṛti'* in two different meanings to achieve the appearance of an identity where there is none. If the latter is the case, his argument to establish that a generic term denotes only a generic property fails. On the other hand, if he accepts that shape itself is a class property, the clarity of his concepts must be called into question. A brick altar in the shape of a falcon is not a falcon. But if shape is a class property, namely, that by virtue of which an individual is recognized as being of a certain kind, then if the altar has the falcon shape it is a falcon. If it is a falcon, it is an individual falcon. If it is an individual falcon, then the example fails to serve the purpose it is intended to serve in his argument. In order to prove that a generic term denotes only a generic property and not an individual by concomitant presence and absence, he must show a case in which a generic term is used for a generic property and not for an individual. The falcon altar is adduced as such an example. But if the falcon altar is an individual falcon, then it is not true that upon the use of the generic term 'falcon', cognition of a generic property arises and cognition of an individual does not arise. Hence the example fails, and the argument from concomitant presence and absence fails with it.

In order to save Śabara's argument, Kumārila asserts that an *ākṛti* is an abstract generic property and not a shape but that shape is more similar to the generic property than it is to an individual. This is a tenuous assertion. The principal relation between a shape and a generic property discussed by Kumārila and in Nyāya is that of an inferential mark to the object to be inferred. Kumārila is equivocal about accepting such a relation at all. Even if he does accept this relation, or if he accepts some other relation of qualification, the relation is mediated by the individual. A shape is related to a generic property by inhering in

the same individuals in which the generic property inheres. If the individual mediates the relation between a generic property and a shape, it is impossible for knowledge of a generic property to give knowledge of a shape without giving knowledge of an individual. If a listener always arrives at knowledge of an individual in addition to knowledge of a class property, again concomitant presence and absence fail to show that only a class property is denoted.

The only evidence for not including an individual in the denoted meaning is the limitation imposed by virtue of adopting presumption as part of the means to determine what a word denotes. That limitation is that if one can account for cognition of the individual otherwise one cannot presume that the word denotes it. However, the manner in which Śabara accounts for knowledge of the individual otherwise, in each case of the use of a generic term, depends on the very same limitation, namely, that one not be able to make sense of the sentence otherwise.

Śabara explains how knowledge of a qualified individual arises from a generic term as follows: The generic term denoting a class property conveys the cognition of the class property. If the word is used in syntactic connection with action, because it is impossible to perform action on a class property whereas it is possible to perform it on an individual, one understands that the class property qualifies the individual. Hence one understands the qualified individual because the sentence doesn't make sense otherwise. Now according to Kumārila's interpretation, in the case of the falcon altar, if a generic term denotes a generic property, then when the generic term 'falcon' is used knowledge of the generic property falconhood will arise. It is impossible to perform building a brick altar on either the generic property falconhood or on a real individual falcon. One performs it on a shape because the sentence wouldn't make sense otherwise. As we see, cognition of the individual is no more absent in the example than cognition of the class property is. Either both are absent or both are present, depending upon what is meant by cognition being present. The example of the falcon was given by Śabara as one in which cognition of an individual does not arise but that of the class property does. Hence the example does not serve its intended purpose. Without an example showing the presence of cognition of the class property in the absence of cognition of an individual, the argument from concomitant presence and absence for the view that a generic term denotes only a generic property fails.

In every case of the use of a generic term, one arrives at knowledge of an individual or shape by reasoning that it is impossible otherwise. This is precisely the reasoning by which one establishes that a word has the capacity to denote a certain meaning. One presumes that an object is denoted if it is

impossible otherwise to account for the cognition of it when a word is used. Conversely, one cannot presume that a generic term denotes an individual because it is possible to account for cognition of an individual otherwise. The manner in which one accounts for cognition of an individual in every case is that it is impossible to account for the use of the sentence otherwise. Hence Śabara's argument against the view that an individual is denoted by a generic term in addition to a generic property depends on weighing one impossibility more than another. It depends on giving more importance to one presumption than to another.

Although his arguments to eliminate an individual from being denoted by a generic term are weak, the view that a generic term denotes only a generic property is not thereby invalidated. All that can be said of Śabara's conclusion is this: he considers it more reasonable, that in each use of a generic term one presumes that an individual is the intended object, than that one presume that the generic term denotes the individual in addition to the generic property. Patañjali and Vātsyāyana, on the other hand, consider it more reasonable that a generic term denote an individual as well as a generic property.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations found in the Notes

Kāś.	*Kāśikā*
KNP	*Kāśikāvṛtti... with Nyāsa and Padamañjarī*
MB	*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya...* Eds. Raghunātha Śarmā, ...
MB-K	*The Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali.* Ed. Kielhorn
MBPU	*Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali...* Ed. Guruprasāda Śāstrī.
MD	*Mīmāṃsādarśana*
MPV	*Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa-vyākhyānāni*
ND	*Nyāyadarśanam*
ND2	*Nyāyasūtras*
Nir.	*Nirukta.* See Sarup, Lakṣman. 1920-27. Part 3. Reprint ed.
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī*
PLM	See Kapil Deva Shastri. 1975.
RVS	*Ṛgveda-saṃhitā: with the Commentary of Sāyaṇācārya*
ŚV	*Ślokavārttika*
VS	*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*

Abbreviations found in the Bibliography

ĀSS	Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Pune
ABORI	*Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Pune
ALB	*Brahmavidyā, The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Adyar (Madras)
ALS	The Adyar Library Series, Adyar (Madras)
BORI	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London
BSPS	Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series
CSCRS	Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series
DCDS	Deccan College Dissertation Series, Pune
FL	*Foundations of Language*, Dordrecht
HOS	Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge
IA	*Indian Antiquary*, Bombay
IHQ	*Indian Historical Quarterly*, Calcutta

IIJ	*Indo-Iranian Journal*, The Hague
IL	*Indian Linguistics*, Pune: Linguistic Society of India.
JAOS	*American Oriental Society Journal*, New Haven
JBBRAS	*Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JGJRI	*Journal of the Gaṅgānātha Jhā Research Institute*, Allahabad
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Dordrecht and Boston and London: Klumer Academic Publishers
JOR	*Journal of Oriental Research*, Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Mylapore (Madras)
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, London
JUB	*Journal of the University of Bombay*
JUP	*Journal of the University of Poona, Humanities Section*
PCASS	Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona
PEW	*Philosophy East and West: A Quarterly of Asian and Comparative Thought*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press
PIFI	Publications de l'Institut français d'Indologie, Pondichéry
RSCG	Shri Rajasthan Sanskrit College Granthamala, Varanasi
SVUOJ	*Sri Venkateswara University Oriental Journal*, Tirupati
TPS	*Transactions of the Philological Society*, London
UPSPS	University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Pune
WZKS	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, Vienna
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Leipzig and Wiesbaden

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Amarakośa (Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana of Amarasiṃha): with the Rāmāśramī or Sudhā Commentary of Bhānujidīkṣita. Ed. Śivadattadādhimatha. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press. [Reprint: Delhi: Caukhambā Saṃskṛta Pratiṣṭhāna, 1985.]

Atharvavedasaṃhitā. Ed. Śrīpād Dāmodar Sātavalekar. Aundh: Svādhyāya Maṇḍala, 1939. 4th ed.: Pārḍī: Svādhyāya Maṇḍala.

Carakasaṃhitā by Agniveśa: Revised by Caraka and Dṛḍhabala: with the Āyurveda-Dīpikā Commentary of Cakrapāṇidatta. Ed. Yādavaśarman. Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, 1941. Reprint: Kashi Sanskrit Series, no. 288. Varanasi: Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, 1984.

Kārikāvalī and Nyāyamuktāvalī of Viśvanāthanyāyapañcānana-bhāṭṭācārya: with the Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī Commentaries. Ed. Ātmarāmaśarman. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, n.d. Reprint: Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series Office.

Kāśikā: A Commentary on Pāṇini's Grammar by Vāmana and Jayāditya. Part 1 (*adhyāyas* 1-4) and part 2 (*adhyāyas* 5-8), eds. Aryendra Sharma, Khanderao Deshpande, and D. G. Padhye. Part 3, Indices, ed. B. R. Śāstrī and V. Sundara Śarmā. Sanskrit Academy Series nos. 17, 20, 23. Hyderabad: Sanskrit Academy, Osmania University, 1969, 1970, 1976.

Kāśikāvṛtti of Jayāditya and Vāmana: Along with Commentaries Vivaraṇapañcikā-Nyāsa of Jinendrabuddhi and Padamañjarī of Haradatta Miśra. Ed. Śrīnārāyaṇa Miśra. 6 Parts. Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1985.

Kāṭhakasaṃhitā. Ed. Śrīpād Dāmodar Sātavalekar. Aundh: Svādhyāya Maṇḍala, 1943. 4th ed.: Pārḍī: Svādhyāya Maṇḍala.

Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra with the Karkabhāṣya. Ed. Paṭṭābhirāmaśāstrī. Lāl Bahādur Śāstrī Kendriya Saṃskṛta Vidyāpīṭha Series, no. 42. 2 parts. New Delhi, 1982-83.

Laghumañjūṣā. See Sabhāpati Śarmā Upādhyāya. 1973.

Maitrāyaṇīsaṃhitā. Ed. Śrīpād Dāmodar Sātavalekar. Aundh: Svādhyāya Maṇḍala, 1942. 4th ed.: Pārḍī: Svādhyāya Maṇḍala.

Manusmṛti: with the Hindi translation by Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭācārya. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, n.d. Reprint: Delhi: Caukhambā Saṃskṛt Pratiṣṭhān, 1985.

Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali: with the Commentaries Mahābhāṣya-Pradīpa by Kaiyaṭa and Pradīpoddyota of Śrī Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa. Ed. Guruprasāda Śāstrī. 9 volumes. RSCG 30. Benares: Bhargava Pustakalaya, 1938. Reprint: 9 parts in 8 volumes. Varanasi: Vanivilas Prakashan, 1987.

Mahābhāṣyapradīpaprakāśa by Pravartakopādhyāya: Commentaires sur le Mahābhāṣya de Patañjali et le Pradīpa de Kaiyaṭa. Ed. M. S. Narasiṃhacharya. PIFI 73. Pondichéry: Institut français d'Indologie, 1986.

Mīmāṃsādarśana of Jaimini with Śabara's Bhāṣya. Vol. 1, *Tarkapāda with Vaidyanāthaśāstrī's Prabhā Commentary (adhyāya 1, pāda 1)*, ed. Tīrthahallīgrāmābhijana Subbāśāstrī, reedited by Kāśīnātha Vāsudev Abhyankar and Gaṇeśaśāstrī Aṃbādāsa Jośī, 1976. Vol. 2, *with Kumārila's Tantravārtika (1.2 - 2.1)*. Vol. 3, *with Kumārila's Tantravārttika (2.2 - 2.4)*, 3d ed., edited by Gaṇeśaśāstrī Jośī, 1980. Vol. 4, *with Kumārila's Tantravārtika (adhyāya 3)*, new ed., edited by Kāśīnātha Vāsudeva Abhyaṃkar and Gaṇeśaśāstrī Aṃbādāsa Jośī, 1984. Vol. 5, *with Kumārila's Ṭupṭīkā (adhyāyas 4-7)*, new ed., 1984. Vol. 6, *with Kumārila's Ṭupṭīkā* (*adhyāyas* 8-10), new ed., edited by Kāśīnātha Vāsudeva Abhyaṃkar and Gaṇeśaśāstrī Jośī, 1984. Vol. 7, *with Kumārila's Ṭupṭīkā (adhyāyas 11-12)*, new ed., 1985. ĀSS, no. 17. Pune.

Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa by Āpadeva: Edited with an Original Commentary by Mahamahopadhyaya Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar. 2d ed. Pune: BORI, 1972.

Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa-vyākhyānāni: Commentaires sur le Mahābhāṣya de Patañjali et le Pradīpa de Kaiyaṭa. Ed. M. S.

Narasiṃhacharya. PIFI 51, 1-10. 10 volumes. Pondichéry: Institut français d'Indologie, 1973-83.

Nyāyadarśanam: with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā, and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti. Eds. Taranatha, Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series, nos. 18-19. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing, 1936-44. 2d edition in 1 vol.: Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985.

Nyāyasūtras of Gautama: with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya and Viśvanātha-bhaṭṭācārya's Vṛtti. 1985. ĀSS, no. 91. Pune.

Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa: with the commentary Granthibhaṅga by Cakradhara. Ed. Gaurinātha Śāstrī. 3 parts. Vārānasī: Sampūrṇānandasaṃskṛtaviśvavidyālaya, 1982-84.

Pātañjalayogasūtra: with the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa and Ṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra. ĀSS, no. 47. Pune.

Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya: with Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa and Nāgeśa's Uddyota. Vol. 1 (*navāhnika*), eds. Raghunātha Śarmā and Śivadatta Kudāla. Sudhi Series 12. Varanasi: Sudhi Prakashan, 1987. Vol. 2 (*adhyāyas* 1.2 - 2), ed. Śivadatta D. Kudāla. Bombay: Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1912. Vol. 3 (*adhyāya* 3), eds. Raghunātha Śarmā and Śivadatta Kudāla. Bombay: Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1937. Vol. 4 (*adhyāyas* 4-5), ed. Bhārgavaśāstrī Joshi. Bombay: Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1942. Vol. 5 (*adhyāya* 6), ed. Bhārgavaśāstrī Joshi. Bombay: Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1945.

Pramāṇavārttika of Ācārya Dharmakīrti: with the Commentary 'Vritti' of Ācārya Manorathanandin. Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. Varanasi: Bhauddha Bharati, 1984.

Praśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmasaṅgraha): with Commentary Nyāyakandalī by Śrīdharabhaṭṭa along with Hindi Translation. Ed. Durgādhara Jhā. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya Research Institute, 1977.

Ṛgveda-saṃhitā: with the Commentary of Sāyaṇācārya. 2d ed. Eds. N. S. Sontakke, C. G. Kashikar, et al. 5 Volumes. Pune: Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala, 1972.

Śatapathabrāhmaṇa: According to the Mādhyandina Recension: with the Vedārthaprakāśa commentary of Sāyaṇācārya. Part 1. Bombay: Laxmi Venkateshwar Steam Press, 1940.

Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra. Ed. Dvārikādāsaśāstrī. Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1978.

Taittirīyasaṃhitā. Ed. A. Y. Dhupkar. 1945. 4th ed.: Ed. Śrīpād Dāmodar Sātavalekar. Pārḍī: Svādhyāya Maṇḍala.

Tarkasaṃgraha. See Kedāranātha Tripāṭhī. 1977.

Ten Principal Upanishads with Śāṅkarabhāṣya. Works of Śaṅkarācārya, vol. 1. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda: with the commentary of Candrānanda. Ed. Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji. Gaikwad's Oriental Series, no. 136. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. Eds. Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev, and V. P. Limaye. UPSPS 2. Pune, 1965.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Commentaries Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva: Kāṇḍa 1. Ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer. DCMS 32. Pune: Deccan College, 1966.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Commentary of Helārāja: Kāṇḍa 3, part 1 (samuddeśas 1-7). Ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer. DCMS 21. Pune: Deccan College, 1963.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Prakīrṇaprakāśa of Helārāja: Kāṇḍa 3, part 2 (samuddeśas 8-14). Ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer. Pune: Deccan College, 1973.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari (An Ancient Treatise on the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar): Containing the Ṭīkā of Puṇyarāja and the Ancient Vṛtti: With a Forward by Ashok Aklujkar: Kāṇḍa 2. Ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

The Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. Ed. Lorenz Franz Kielhorn. 3 vols. BSPS 18-22, 28-30. Bombay: Government Central Press: Vol. I, 1880; Vol. 2, 1883; Vol. 3, 1885. Second edition: 1892, 1906, 1909. Third edition revised and furnished with additional readings references and select critical notes by K. V. Abhyankar. Pune: BORI, 1962, 1965, 1972. Reprint: 1985.

Secondary Sources

The titles of works written in modern foreign languages are not translated. For all works with titles in more than one language, the title in the language in which the work is written appears first with the second title in brackets. If the work is in a foreign language, the English title appears in brackets; if the work is written in English but published in a foreign language journal, etc., the foreign title appears in brackets.

Abegg, Emil. 1923. "Die Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes bei Kumārila." In *Antidoron für Jacob Wackernagel*, 255-64. Göttingen.

Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev, ed. 1962. *The paribhāṣendu-śekhara of Nāgojībhaṭṭa: with the commentary Tattvādarśa of MM. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar*. Pune: BORI.

_____. 1967. *Paribhāṣāsaṃgraha: A Collection of Original Works on Vyākaraṇa Paribhāṣās*. BORI Post-graduate and Research Department Series, no. 7. Pune.

Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev and Jayadev Mohanlal Shukla, eds., trans. 1975. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya, Ahnikas 1-3 with English Translation and Notes*. BORI Research Unit Publications 1. Pune.

Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev, and V. P. Limaye, eds. 1963-69. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari*. Supplements to ABORI 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50. Reprint: BORI Post Graduate and Research Series 8. Pune, 1967, 1970.

Agrawal, Dhannalal Javaharlal, ed. 1985. *Mīmāṃsā-uddharaṇa-kośa (The citations from Śābara-bhāṣya traced to their original sources)*. Pune: Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala.

Aklujkar, Ashok Narhar 1970. "Ancient Indian Semantics." *ABORI* 51:11-29.

Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1982. "The Concept of Similarity in Indian Philosophy." *JIP* 10: 239-75.

Bedekar, D. K. 1958. "Some concepts based on revelatory Epistemology." *ABORI*.

Bergdahl, Roland. 1987. "The Sādhanasamuddeśa (*kārikas* 1-11) of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya with the commentary Prakāśa of Helārāja: A Translation with an Introductory Essay and Explanatory Notes." Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania.

Bhaduri, Sadananda. 1947. *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*. Bhandarkar Oriental Series, no. 5. Pune: BORI. Reprint: 1975.

Bhagavat, Vaman Balakrishna and Saroja V. Bhate, eds., trans. 1986, 1990. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari: Fascicules 3, 7: Āhnika 6, parts 1, 2*. BORI Post Graduate and Research Department Series 26, 34. Pune.

Bhandarkar, Ramkrishna Gopal. 1927-33. *Collected Works*, ed. N. B. Utgikar. 4 vols. Pune: BORI.

Bhattacharya, Bishnupada. 1956. "Philosophical data in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya." *Our Heritage* 4:51-65. Calcutta.

____. 1962. *A Study in Language and Meaning: A Critical Examination of Some aspects of Indian Semantics*. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers.

Biardeau, Madeleine. 1960. Compte-rendu de *Contribution à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne*, by D. S. Ruegg. *IIJ* 4, nos. 2-3:170-72.

____. 1964. *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique*. Le monde d'outre-mer passé et présent, Première série, études 23. Paris; Le Haye: Mouton.

Böhtlingk, Otto. 1876. "Kātyāyana oder Patañjali im Mahābhāṣya." *ZDMG* 29:183-90.

____. 1887. *Pāṇini's Grammatik*. Leipzig. Reprint: 2 vols. Olms: Hildesheim, 1964.

Boudon, Pierre. 1938. "Une application du raisonnement par l'absurde dans l'interpretation de Pāṇini: les *jñāpakasiddhaparibhāṣā*." *Journal Asiatique* 230:65-121. Paris.

Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1983. "On the History of Pāṇinian Grammar in the Early Centuries Following Patañjali." *JIP* 11, no. 4 (December): 357-412.

____. 1987. *Three Problems Pertaining to the Mahābhāṣya*. Post-graduate and Research Department Series, no. 30. Pune: BORI.

____, ed., trans. 1987. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari: Fascicule 4: Āhnika 1*. BORI Post Graduate and Research Department Series 28. Pune.

Brough, John 1951. "Theories of general linguistics in the Sanskrit grammarians." *TPS* 1951:27-46. Reprint: Staal 1972:402-14.

____. 1953. "Some Indian Theories of Meaning." *TPS* 1953:161-76. Reprint: Staal 1972:414-23.

____. 1973. "I-ching on the Sanskrit Grammarians." *BSOAS* 36:248-60.

Bühler, George, trans. 1886. *The Laws of Manu*. Oxford. First AMS edition: New York: AMS Press, 1971.

Cardona, George. 1967-68. "*Anvaya* and *vyatireka* in Indian grammar." *ALB* 31-32, *V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume*, 313-52.

____. 1975. "A note on the formulation of Pāṇini 6.1.67." *Annals of Oriental Research, Silver Jubilee Volume:* 11-20. University of Madras, Sanskrit section.

____. 1976. *Pāṇini: A Survey of Research*. The Hague; Paris: Mouton. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 2d In Press.

____. 1977-78. "Still Again on the History of the Mahābhāṣya." *ABORI* 58-59, *Diamond Jubilee Volume*, 79-99.

____. 1981. "On reasoning from *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in early Advaita." In *Studies in Indian philosophy: A memorial volume in honour of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi*, ed. Dalsukh Malvania and Nagin J. Shah, 79-104. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology.

____. 1983. *Linguistic analysis and some Indian traditions*. The Pandit Shripad Sastri Devdhar Memorial Lectures, 1st ser., no. 20. Pune: BORI.

____. 1988. *Pāṇini: His Work and its Traditions*. Vol. 1, *Background and Introduction*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 2d In Press.

Chakravarti, Prabhat Chandra. 1930. *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*. University of Calcutta.

____. 1933. *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*. University of Calcutta.

Chakravarti, Pulinbihari. 1951. *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House. Second Edition: Delhi, 1975.

Charudeva Shastri, trans. 1968. *Bhagavatpatañjali viracita vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya (prathama navāhnika) kā hindī anuvāda tathā vivaraṇa [The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (first nine āhnikas) translated into Hindi with comments]*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Chatterji, Kshitish Chandra, trans. 1957. *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya: Paspaśāhnika (introductory chapter)*. Usha Memorial Series 7. Second edition: Calcutta: A. Mukherjee, 1957. Reprint: 1964, 1972.

Chatterji, S. C. 1939. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*. University of Calcutta. Fourth edition: 1972.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad and Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya. 1967-73. *Nyāya Philosophy: Literal Translation of Gautama's Nyāyasūtra & Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya along with a free and abridged translation of the Elucidation by Mahāmahopādhyaya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa*. 5 parts [part 1 (first adhyāya), 1967; part 2 (second adhyāya), 1968; part 3, 1972; part 4, 1973; part 5, 1976]. Indian Studies Past & Present. Calcutta: R. K. Maitra, R. D. Press.

Chaṭṭopādhyāya Kshetreśachandra. 1937. "References to Buddhist Philosophy in the *Vṛttikāragrantha* of *Śabarabhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* of Jaimini," In *Jha Commemoration Volume: essays on oriental subjects*, 115-27. Poona Oriental Series 39. Poona: Oriental Book Agency.

Clear, Edeltraud Harzer. 1990. "Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Two-level Perception: Propositional and Non-propositional," *JIP* 18: 305-40.

Clooney, Francis X. 1988. "Devatādhikaraṇa: A Theological Debate in the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta Tradition," *JIP* 16, no. 3 (September): 277-98.

____. 1990. *Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini.* Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, no. 17. Vienna.

Coward, Harold G. and K. Kunjunni Raja, eds. 1990. *The Philosophy of the Grammarians.* Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, gen. ed. Karl H. Potter, Vol. 5. Princeton: Princeton University Press and Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Danielsson, O. A. 1883. "Die Einleitung des Mahābhāṣya." *ZDMG* 37:20-53. Leipzig.

Dasgupta, S. N. 1920. *The Study of Patañjali.* Calcutta.

Dash, Subas Chandra. 1991. "Samaya: The Word Meaning Relationship in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System." *JOI* (Baroda) 41, no. 1-2:57-66.

Devasthali, Govind Vinayak. 1942. "On the probable date of Śabarasvāmin." *ABORI* 23, *Silver Jubilee Volume:* 84-97. Pune.

____. 1948. "Śabara and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Darśanas." *JOR* 18:16-24. Madras.

____. 1949. "Positive Data for the Date of Śabarasvāmin." *JGJRI* 6:231-40.

____. 1951. "Śabara and Patañjali." *JUB* 20 (part 2): 101-6.

____. 1959. *Mīmāṃsā: The Vākya-Śāstra of Ancient India.* Bombay: Booksellers' Publishing Co.

Devasthali, Govind Vinayak and Gajanan Balakrishna Palsule, eds., trans. 1989. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari: Fascicule 6: Āhnika 4.* BORI Post Graduate and Research Department Series 32. Pune.

Deshpande, Madhav 1972. "Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa on the philosophy of nominal meanings: The text of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's Nāmārthanirṇaya, with an English translation, explanation and an introductory essay." Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania.

____. 1992. The Meaning of Nouns, Semantic Theory in Classical and Medieval India: Nāmārthanirṇaya of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa Translated and Annotated. Studies of Classical India 13. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Dravid, Raja Ram. 1972. *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

D'Sa, Francis X. 1980. *Śabdaprāmāṇyam in Śabara and Kumārila: Towards a Study of the Mīmāṃsā Experience of Language*. Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, no. 7. Vienna.

Edgerton, Franklin. 1928. "Some linguistic notes on the Mīmāṃsā system." *Language* 4:171-77.

Elayath, K. N. Neelakantan. 1989. "Sentence and its Meaning in Advaita Vedānta." *JOI* (Baroda) 39, no. 1-2:51-56.

Filliozat, Pierre-Sylvain. 1973. Introduction to *Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa-vyākhyānāni*, ed. by Narasiṃhacharya, vol. 1, iii-xiii.

____. 1975-86. *Le Mahābhāṣya de Patañjali avec le Pradīpa de Kaiyaṭa et l'Uddyota de Nāgeśa*. PIFI 54, 1-5. Vol. 1, *Adhyāya 1 Pāda 1 Āhnikas 1-4*, 1975. Vol. 2, *Adhyāya 1 Pāda 1 Āhnikas 5-7*, 1976. Vol. 3, *Adhyāya 1 Pāda 1 Āhnikas 8-9*, 1978. Vol. 4, *Adhyāya 1 Pāda 2*, 1980. Vol. 5, *Adhyāya 1 Pāda 3*, 1986. Pondichéry: Institut Français d'Indology.

____. 1991. An Introduction to Commentaries on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya. Post-graduate and Research Department Series, no. 35. Pune: BORI.

Frauwallner, Erich. 1956. *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*. Band 2, *Die Naturphilosophischen Schulen und das Vaiśeṣika-system, das System der Jaina, der Materialismus*. Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag.

____. 1960a. "Das Eindringen der Sprachtheorie in die indischen philosophischen Systeme." In *Indologen-Tagung 1959: Verhandlungen der Indologischen Arbeitstagung in Essen-Bredeney, Villa Hügel, 13.-15. Juli 1959*, 239-43. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Reprint: *Kleine Schriften*, 279-83.

____. 1960b. "Sprachtheorie und Philosophie im Mahābhāṣya des Patañjali." *WZKS* 4:92-118. Reprint: *Kleine Schriften*, 284-310.

____. 1961a. "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." *WZKS* 5:125-48.

____. 1961b. "Mīmāṃsāsūtram I, 1, 6-23." *WZKS* 5:113-24.

____. 1974. *History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. 2, *The Nature-Philosophical Schools and the Vaiśeṣika System, the System of the Jaina, the Materialism*. Trans. V. M. Bedekar. New York: Humanities Press.

____. 1982. *Kleine Schriften*. Ed. Gerhard Oberhammer und Ernst Steinkellner. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

____. 1984. *Nachgelassene Werke*. Band 1, *Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen*, ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. [*Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*. Band 4, Nachgelassene Skizzen: 3, Sprachtheorie, 93-119. 4, Mīmāṃsā, 120-22. 5, Sprachtheorie des Vṛttikāra, 123-24. 6, Kumārila, 125-26.]

Gächter, Othmar. 1983. *Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā: A Study in Śābara Bhāṣya*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Gaṅgānātha Jhā. 1942. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in its sources*. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University.

____, trans. 1900-8. *Ślokavārtika: ...with extracts from the commentaries "Kāśikā" of Sucarita Miśra and "Nyāyaratnākara" of Pārtha Sārathi Miśra*, by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Calcutta. 2d ed. 1 vol. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1983.

____, trans. 1903-24. *Tantravārttika: A Commentary on Śabara's Bhāṣya on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini*, by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. 2 vols. Calcutta. 2d ed. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1983.

____, trans. 1912-19. *The Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama: with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara*. Indian Thought 4-11. Reprint in 4 vols.: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.

____. 1916. *The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini: Chapters I-III: Translated with an Original Commentary*. The Sacred Books of the Hindus, vol. 10. Allahabad: The Pāṇini Office, Bhuvaneśwarī Āśrama.

____. 1933. *Śābara-bhāṣya*. 3 vols. GOS, nos. 66, 70, 73. Baroda: Oriental Institute. Reprint: 1973.

Garge, Damodar Vishnu. 1952. *Citations in Śabara-bhāṣya*. DCDS 8. Pune.

Gaurinath Sastri 1959. *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning: Some Indian approaches with special reference to the philosophy of Bhartṛhari*. CSCRS 5. Reprint: Calcutta: Century Press, 1983.

Gerow, Edwin. 1984. "Language and symbol in Indian semiotics." *PEW* 34, no. 3 (July): 245-60.

Goldstücker, Theodor 1860. *Pāṇini: His Place in Sanskrit Literature: An investigation of some literary and chronological questions which may be settled by a study of his work*. London: Trübner. First Indian Edition: Ed. Surendra Nath Shastri. Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1965.

Halbfass, Wilhelm 1976. "Zum Begriff der Substanz (*dravya*) im Vaiśeṣika." *WZKS* 20:141-66.

____. 1976. *Zur Theorie der Kastenordnung in der indischen Philosophie*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.

____. 1980. "The Vaiśeṣika concept of *guṇa* and the Problem of Universals." *WZKS* 24:225-38.

____. 1983. *Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara*. Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik, ed. Inge Wezler, no. 9. Reinbek: Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen.

____. 1992. *On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Hara, Minoru. 1959. "Note on the Sanskrit word *ní-tya*." *JAOS* 79:90-96.

Haradatta Sharma. 1936. "The Meaning of the word *upacāra* According to Gotama and the Rhetoricians." *Poona Orientalist* 1, no. 1:26-33.

Herzberger, Radhika. 1986. *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists: An essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel.

Hiriyanna, M. 1938. "Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana." *IHQ* 14:261-66.

Houben, Jan E. M. 1992a. "Bhartṛhari's Samaya / Helārāja's Saṃketa." *JIP* 20:219-42.

____. 1992b. "The Saṃbandha-sumuddeśa (Chapter on Relation) and Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language: A Study of Bhartṛhari's Saṃbandha-samuddeśa in the context of the Vākyapadīya with a translation of Helārāja's Commentary Prakīrṇa-Prakāśa on the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa." Ph.D. diss., University of Utrecht.

Ingalls Daniel H. H. 1951. *Materials for the Study of Navyanyāya Logic*. HOS 40.

____. 1957. "Dharma and Mokṣa." *PEW* 7, nos. 1-2 (April-July):41-48.

Jacob, George Adolphus, Colonel. 1984. *Index to Śābara-bhāṣya*. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri. The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, no. 4. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya.

Jacobi, Hermann 1911. "The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmans." *JAOS* 31:1-29.

____. 1929. "Mīmāṃsā und Vaiśeṣika." In *Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman*, 145-65. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

____. *Kleine Schriften*. 1970. Ed. Bernhard Kölver. Glasenapp-Stiftung 4, nos. 1-2. 2 Parts. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Joshi, Shivaram Dattatray. 1966. "Adjectives and Substantives as a Single Class in the 'Parts of Speech'." *JUP* 25:19-30. (PCASS, class A, no. 9.) Pune.

____. 1968. "Word-integrity and syntactic analysis." *JUP* 27:165-73. (PCASS, class A, no. 20.) Pune.

____, ed., trans. 1968. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya samarthāhnika (P. 2.1.1)*. PCASS, Class C, No. 3. Pune.

Joshi, Shivaram Dattatray and J. A. F. Roodbergen, eds., trans. 1969. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Avyayībhāva-tatpuruṣāhnika (P. 2.1.2 - 2.1.49)*. PCASS, class C, no. 5. Pune.

____, eds., trans. 1971. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Karmadhārayāhnika (P. 2.1.51 - 2.1.72)*. PCASS, class C, no. 6. Pune.

———, eds., trans. 1973. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Tatpuruṣāhnika (P. 2.2.2 - 2.2.23)*. PCASS, class C, no. 7. Pune.

———, eds., trans. 1974. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Bahuvrīhi-dvandvāhnika (P. 2.2.23 - 2.2.38)*. PCASS, class C, no. 9. Pune.

———, eds., trans. 1975. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya: kārakāhnika (P. 1.4.23 - 1.4.55)*. PCASS, class C, no. 10. Pune.

———, eds., trans. 1976. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Anabhihitāhnika (P. 2.3.1 - 2.3.17)*. PCASS, class C, no. 11. Pune.

———, eds., trans. 1980. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Vibhaktyāhnika (P. 2.3.18 - 2.3.45)*. PCASS, class C, no. 12. Pune.

———, eds., trans. 1981. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Prātipadikārthaśeṣāhnika (P. 2.3.46 - 2.3.71)*. PCASS, class C, no. 14. Pune.

———, eds., trans. 1986. *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Paspaśāhnika*. PCASS, class C, no. 15. Pune.

Kane, Pandurang Vaman 1922. "Gleanings from the Bhāṣya of Śabara and the Tantravārttika." *JBBRAS* 26:83-98.

———. 1945. "The Mahābhāṣya and the Bhāṣya of Śabara." *Bhāratīyā Vidyā* 6:43-45.

Kapil Deva Shastri, ed., trans., 1975. *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-paramalaghumañjūṣā of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa: Text, Translation, and Study*. Kurukshetra University Publications.

Kedāranātha Tripāṭhī, ed. 1977. *Tarkasaṃgraha with the Dīpikā* (of Annambhaṭṭa) *and Hindīkalā* (of Kedāranātha Tripāṭhi) *Commentaries*. Varanasi: Kāśī Hindū Viśvavidyālaya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Kielhorn, Lorenz Franz, ed. 1868. *The Paribhāṣenduśakhara of Nāgojībhaṭṭa*. Part 1, *Sanskrit text*. BSPS, 2, 7. Bombay: The Indu Prakash Press. Second edition: K. V. Abhyankar. Pune: BORI, 1962.

____, trans. 1871-74. *The Paribhāṣenduśakhara of Nāgojībhaṭṭa.* Part 2, *Translation and notes.* BSPS 9, 12. Bombay: Government Central Book Depot. Revised edition: K. V. Abhyankar. Pune: BORI, 1960.

____. 1875. "Note on Rājataranginī I 176." *IA* 4:107-8. Reprint: *Kleine Schriften*, Teil 1, 156-57.

____. 1876a. *Kātyāyana and Patañjali: Their relation to each other and to Pāṇini.* Bombay: The Educational Society, 1876. Reprint: Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1963; Osnabrück: Zeller, 1965; *Kleine Schriften*, 1-64.

____. 1876b. "On the Mahābhāṣya." *IA* 5:241-51. Reprint: *Kleine Schriften*, Teil 1, 169-79.

____. 1886. "Notes on the Mahābhāṣya." IA 1886 (July): 203. [*Kleine Schriften*, 206-14.]

____. 1969. *Kleine Schriften: mit einer Auswahl der epigraphischen Aufsätze*, ed. Wilhelm Rau. 2 vols. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Kiparsky, Paul, and J. F. Staal. 1969. "Syntactic and semantic relations in Pāṇini." *FL* 5:83-117.

Kuiper, F. B. J. 1957. "Vācārambhaṇam." *IIJ* 1, no. 2:154-59.

____. 1958. Vācārambhaṇam (II)". *IIJ* 2, no. 4:306-10.

Kunjunni Raja, K. 1955. "Indian Theories of Homophones and homonyms." *ALB* 19:193-222.

____. 1963. *Indian Theories of Meaning.* ALS 91. Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Center. Second edition: 1969.

____. 1965. "Pāṇini's attitude towards lakṣaṇā." *ALB* 29:177-87.

Lahiri, Prabhodh Chandra. 1935. *Concordance Pāṇini-Patañjali (Mahābhāṣya).* Indische Forschungen 10. Breslau: M. and H. Marcus.

Larson, Gerald James and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, eds. 1987. *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy.* Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, gen. ed. Karl H. Potter, Vol. 4. Princeton: Princeton University Press and Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Leblanc, Hugues, and William A. Wisdom. 1972. *Deductive Logic*. 2d ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Limaye, Vishnu Prabhakar. 1974. *Critical Studies on the Mahābhāṣya*. Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute.

Limaye, Vishnu Prabhakar, G. B. Palsule and V. B. Bhagavat, eds., trans. 1985. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari: Fascicule 2: Āhnika 5*. BORI Post Graduate and Research Department Series 23. Pune.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1966. "Indian theorists on the nature of the sentence (*vākya*)." *FL* 2:377-93.

____. 1968a. *The navya-nyāya doctrine of negation: The semantics and ontology of negative statements in Navya-nyāya philosophy*. HOS 46. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

____. 1968b. "Gaṅgeśa on the concept of Universal Property (*Kevalānvayin*)." *PEW* 18, no. 3 (July): 151-61.

____. 1971. *Epistemology, logic, and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis*. The Hague and Paris: Mouton.

____. 1973. "The Notion of Substance and Quality in Ancient Indian Grammar." Acta et Communicationes Universitatis, II, 2:384-407. Tartu.

____. 1977. *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*. A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, vol. 6, fasc. 2. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz.

____. 1983. "Some comments of Patañjali under 1.2.64." In PCASS E 9, *Proceedings of the International Seminar on Studies in the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini* (July 1981), 119-26. Pune.

____. 1985. *Logic, Language and Reality: An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

____. 1986. Perception: *An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

____. 1988. "Śābdabodha and the Problem of Knowledge-Representation in Sanskrit." *JIP* 16, no. 2 (June): 107-22.

____. 1990. *The Word and the World: India's Contribution to the Study of Language*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Arindam Chakrabarti, eds. 1994. *Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony*. Synthese Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, vol. 230. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Robert D. Evans, eds. 1986. *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and language*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Jaysankar Lal Shaw, eds. 1985. *Analytic Philosophy in Comparative Perspective: Exploratory Essays in Current Theories and classical Indian Theories of Meaning and Reference*. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel.

Mishra, Umesha. 1926. "Physical theory of sound and its origin in Indian thought." *Allahabad University Studies* 2:239-90.

Mishra, Vedapati. 1970. *Vyākaraṇa vārttika: Eka samīkṣātmaka adhyayana [A critical study on Vyākaraṇa-vārttika]*. Varanasi: Prithivi Prakashan.

Mukherji, Gurusankar. 1992. "Some Linguistic Problems: Sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau." In *Corpus of Indological Studies: Professor Ramaranjan Mukherji Felicitation Volume*, vol. 2, ed. Anantalal Thakur, 360-68. Delhi: Sharada Publishing House.

Narayana Murti, M. S. 1971a. "A Note on the iva-samāsa." *SVUOJ* 14:47-52.

____. 1971b. "A Note on Ekaśeṣa." *SVUOJ* 14:83-98.

____. 1973. "Philosophy of Grammar." In *SVUOJ* 16, *Proceedings of the Seminar on Andhra's contribution to Indian culture*, 37-54.

Nilakantha Sastri, K. A. 1921. "Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa". *IA* 50:167-74.

Oberhammer, Gerhard. 1964. "Gedanken zur historischen Darstellung indischer Logik." *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* 59:5-19. Leipzig.

Ojihara, Yutaka. 1965. "À la recherche de la motivation ultime du Pāṇini-sūtra 1.1.62." *Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia* 6-7:69-85. Kyoto.

____. 1967. "Causerie vyākaraṇique IV: *Jāti* 'genus' et deux définitions prépatañjaliennes." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 16:459-51. Tokyo.

____. 1967-68. "Sur l'énoncé pāṇinéen *astrīviṣaya* (IV.1.63): deux interprétations et leur rapport avec le Gaṇapāṭha." *ALB* 31-32 (V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume): 125-43.

Palsule, Gajanan Balakrishna. 1967. "'Saṃjñāyām' in Pāṇini." *JUP* 25:31-75. (PCASS, class A, no. 10.)

____, ed., trans. 1985, 1988. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari: Fascicules 1, 5: Āhnikas 3, 2.* BORI Post Graduate and Research Department Series 22, 31. Pune.

Palsule, Gajanan Balakrishna and Vaman Balakrishna Bhagavat, eds., trans. 1991. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari: Fascicule 8: Āhnika 7.* BORI Post Graduate and Research Department Series 37. Pune.

Pandeya, R. C. 1963. *The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Paranjpe, Vasudeva Gopala. 1922. *Le vārttika de Kātyāyana: une étude du style, du vocabulaire et des postulats philosophiques.* Heidelberg: Weiss'sche Universitäts-buchhandlung.

Pashupatinath Sastri. 1923. *Introduction to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.* Calcutta. (Ph.D. diss., University of Calcutta, 1924.) Second Edition: Gaurinath Shastri, ed. Chaukhambha Orientalia, 1980.

Pathak, Shridhar, and Siddheshvar Chitrao. 1927. *Word-index to Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya.* Pune: BORI.

____. 1935. *Word-index to Pāṇini-sūtra-pāṭha and Pariśiṣṭas.* Pune: BORI.

Perry, Bruce M. 1995. "An Introduction to the Nyāyacatur-granthikā: with English Translations." Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania.

Potter, Karl H., gen. ed. 1970-. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. Vol. 1, *Bibliography*, 2d ed., 1983 [1st ed. 1970]. Vol. 2, *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, 1977. Vol. 3, *Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and His Pupils*, 1981. Vol. 4, *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*, ed. Gerald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, 1987. Vol. 5, *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, ed. Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, 1990. Princeton: Princeton University Press and Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Raju, Poola Tirupatti. 1942. "Arthāpatti: Its Logical Significance." Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference. Varanasi.

____. 1951. "The Universal in the Western and the Indian Philosophy." In *Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of his Sixtieth Birthday*, 379-408. New York: Harper and Brothers.

____. 1971. *The Philosophical Traditions of India*. London: Allen and Unwin.

____. 1985. *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*. SUNY Series in Philosophy, ed. Robert C. Neville. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Ramasvami Shastri, V. A. 1952. "Bhāvanā: the leading concept of Verbal Cognition." *Bhāratīya Vidyā* 13:169-76.

Rau, Wilhelm. 1985. *Die Vedischen Zitate im Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*. Mainz: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur; Stuttgart and Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Renou, Louis. 1942. *Terminologie grammaticale du sanskrit*. Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes, nos. 280, 281, 282. 3 vols. Paris: Champion, 1942. Reprint in 1 vol., 1957.

____. 1953a. "Les spéculations sur le langage." *L'Inde Classique* 2:79-84.

____. 1953b. "Philosophie grammaticale." *L'Inde Classique* 2:93-94.

Rocher, Rosane. 1966. "*Bhāva* 'état' et *kriyā* 'action' chez Pāṇini." In *Recherches linguistiques en Belgique*, ed. Yvan Lebrun, 113-20. Wetteren: Universa.

_____. 1975. "India." Current Trends in Linguistics, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok, vol. 13, *Historiography of Linguistics*, 3-67. The Hague: Mouton.

Ruben, Walter. 1928. *Die Nyāyasūtra's: Text, übersetzung, Erläuterung und Glossar.* Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 18, no. 2. Leipzig: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1958. "On the term *buddhivipariṇāma* and the problem of illusory change." *IIJ* 2, no. 4:271-83.

_____. 1959. *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne.* Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation indienne, série in-8, no. 7. Paris: De Boccard.

_____. 1960. Compte-rendu de *The philosophy of word and meaning*, by Gaurinath Sastri. *IIJ* 4, nos. 2-3:173-79.

Sabhāpati Śarmā Upādhyāya, ed. 1973. *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā* (of Nāgeśa): *with the 'Ratnaprabhā' Commentary* (of Sabhāpati Śarmā Upādhyāya). Kashi Sanskrit Series 163. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office.

Sarma, K. Madhava Krishna. 1968. *Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali.* Delhi: Lal Bahadur Shastri Samskrita Vidyapeetha.

_____.1943. "Vāk before Bhartṛhari." *The Poona Orientalist* 8, nos. 1-2:21-36.

Sarup, Lakṣman, ed., trans. 1920-27. *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta: The Oldest Indian Treatise on Etymology, Philology and Semantics.* Reprinted with three parts in one volume: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.

Scharf, Peter. 1990. "The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Grammar, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā." Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania.

_____. 1993. "The term *'ākṛti'* and the Concept of a Class Property in the Mahābhāṣya." *WZKS* 36 (1992), supplement (1993): 31-48. (Paper presented at the VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference, 27 August - 2 September 1990, Vienna.)

_____. 1993b. "Assessing Śabara's Arguments for the Conclusion that a Generic Term Denotes Just a Class Property." *JIP* 21

(March): 1-10. (Paper presented at the XIIIth South Asian Languages Analysis Roundtable, 25-27 May 1991, Urbana-Champaign.)

____. 1995. "Early Indian Grammarians on a speaker's intention," *JAOS* 115.1: 66-76.

Scharfe, Hartmut. 1961. *Die Logik im Mahābhāṣya*. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin Institut für Orientforschung 50. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

____. 1965. *"Vacana* 'numerus' bei Pāṇini?" *(Kuhns) Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen* 79:239-46. Göttingen.

____. 1971. *Pāṇini's metalanguage*. Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 89. Philadelphia.

____. 1977. *Grammatical Literature*. A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, vol. 5, fasc. 2, 77-216. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Sen, Sukumar. 1952-53. "The story of Devadatta in the Mahābhāṣya." *IL* 12:9-16.

Sharma, Rama Nath. 1987. *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*. Vol. 1, *Introduction to the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a Grammatical Device*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Siderits, Mark. 1982. "More things in Heaven and Earth," Review of Dravid (1972). *JIP* 10:187-208.

____. 1985. "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Apoha." *JIP* 13:133-51.

____. 1991. *Indian Philosophy of Language: Studies in Selected Issues*. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 46. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Smet, Robert de. 1960. "Language and Philosophy in India." *Proceedings of the XII International Congress of Philosophy* 10: 47-54. Florence.

Soni, Jayandra. 1991. "Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya in Jaina Thought." *JIP* 19:75-88.

Spitzer, Morris. 1927. *Begriffsuntersuchungen zum Nyāyabhāṣya*. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz. (Ph.D. diss., University of Kiel, 1926.)

Sreekrishna Sarma. 1954. "The theories of the ancient Indian philosophers about word, meaning, their mutual relationship and syntactical connection. [Die Theorien der alten indischen Philosophen über Wort und Bedeutung, ihre Wechselbeziehung, sowie über syntaktische Verbindung.]" Ph.D. diss., Philipps-Universität Marburg/Lahn.

____. 1957. "The words *ākṛti* and *jāti* in the Mahābhāṣya." *ALB* 21, nos. 1-2 (May): 54-65.

____. 1959. "Syntactical Meaning — Two Theories." *ALB* 23:41-62.

Staal, J.F. 1962. "Philosophy and language." In *T.M.P. Mahadevan Volume*, 10-25. Madras

____. 1966. "Indian Semantics, I." *JAOS* 86:304-11.

____. 1972. *A reader on the Sanskrit grammarians*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

____. 1976. "Sanskrit philosophy of language." In *History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics*, ed. by H. Parret. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

____. 1988. *Universals: Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, Otto. 1927a. "Altindische Spekulationen über die Sprache und ihre Probleme." *ZDMG* 81:99-151. Reprint: *Kleine Schriften*, 220-72.

____. 1927b. "Mahābhāṣya ad Pāṇini 4.1.3 und seine Bedeutung für die Geschichte der indischen Logik." *Aus Indiens Kultur: Festgabe für Richard von Garbe*, ed. J. Negelein, 84-94. Erlangen: Palm und Enke. Reprint: *Kleine Schriften*, 273-83.

____. 1932. *Die älteste Philosophie der Karma-Mīmāṃsā*. Berlin: Lüders.

____. 1983. *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Subha Rao, Veluri. 1969. *The Philosophy of a Sentence and its Parts*. New Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar Lal.

Subrahmanya Sastri, P. S. 1944-62. *Lectures on the Mahābhāṣya*. Vols. 1 and 2, Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, nos. 9 and 11, 1944 and 1951. Vols. 3-5, Tiruchirapalli, 1955, 1956, 1957. Vol. 6, Thiruvaiyaru, 1962. Annamalainagar: Annamalai University and the author. Vol. 1, 2d ed., 1960.

Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1942. "The Conception of Guṇa among the Vaiyākaraṇas." *New Indian Antiquary* 5:121-30. Bombay.

____. 1945. "The Vaiyākaraṇa Conception of 'Gender'." In *Bhāratakaumudī: Studies in Indology in honour of Dr. Radha Kumud Mukherjee*, vol. 1, 291-307. Allahabad: The Indian Press.

____. 1951. "The Point of View of the Vaiyākaraṇas." *JOR* 18:84-96. Madras. Reprint: Staal (1972): 393-400.

____. 1950-51. "The Conception of Action among the Vaiyākaraṇas." *JGJRI* 8:165-88.

____. 1969. Bhartṛhari: A study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries. Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series, no. 68. Pune.

Suryanarayana Sastri, S. S. 1942. "Word and sense" *ABORI* 23, *Silver Jubilee Volume*, 424-30.

Taber, John A. 1989. "The Theory of the Sentence in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Western Philosophy," *JIP* 17, no. 4 (December): 407-30.

Tarkatīrtha, Viśvabandhu. 1992. "The Nyāya on the Meaning of Some Words," translated with explanatory notes by J. L. Shaw. *JIP* 20:41-88.

Thieme, Paul. 1937. "On the identity of the Vārttikakāra." *Indian Culture* 4:189-209. Calcutta: Indian Historical Institute.

____. 1956. "Pāṇini and the Pāṇinīyas." *JAOS* 76:1-23. Reprint: Kleine Schriften. Teil 2, pp. 573-95.

____. 1971. *Kleine Schriften*. Ed. G. Buddruss. 2 vols. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Tiwari, Heeraman. 1994. "One and Many: The Early Naiyāyikas and the Problem of Universals." *JIP* 22:137-70.

Tola, Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti. 1990. "Some Remarks on Bhartṛhari's Concept of Pratibhā." *JIP* 18:95-112.

Trapp, Valentin, trans. 1933. *Die ersten fünf Āhnikas des Mahābhāṣyam ins Deutsche übersetzt und erklärt.* Leipzig: Harrassowitz. (Ph.D. diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität zu München.)

Van Buitenen, J. A. B. 1956. "Vācārambhaṇam" *IL* 16:157-62.

____. 1958. "Vācāraṃbhaṇam Reconsidered." *IIJ* 2:295-305.

____. 1957. "Dharma and mokṣa" *PEW* 7, nos 1-2:33-40.

Van Nooten, Barend A. 1969. "Pāṇini's theory of verbal meaning." *FL* 5:242-55.

____. 1983. *"Vivakṣā,* or intention to speak, as a linguistic principle." In PCASS E 9, *Proceedings of the International Seminar on Studies in the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini* (July 1981), ed. S. D. Joshi and S. D. Laddu, 43-52. Pune.

Varma, Siddhesvara. 1925. "Analysis of Meaning in the Indian Philosophy of language." *JRAS* 1925:21-35.

____. 1926. "Analysis of Meaning in Indian Semantics." *Journal of the Department of Letters* 13:1-38. University of Calcutta.

Vattanky, John. 1993. "The Referent of Words: Universal or Individual, the Controversies Between Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas." *JIP* 21:51-78.

Vedavrata, ed. 1962-63. Patañjali's Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya with Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa and Nāgojībhaṭṭa's Uddyota. 5 vols. Gurukula Jhajjar (Rohatak): Haryāṇā Sāhitya Saṃsthāna.

Verpoorten, Jean-Marie. 1987. *Mīmāṃsā Literature.* A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, vol. 6, fasc. 5. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Wezler, Albrecht. 1982. "Paralipomena zum Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda (I). Mahābhāṣya zu Pāṇini 4.3.155 und seine einheimischen Erklärer." *WZKS* 26:149-66.

____. 1985. "A Note on Mahābhāṣya II 366.26: *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam*: Studies on Mallavādin's Dvādaśāranayacakra II." In *Bukkyī to ishūkyī: Kumoi Shīzen hakushi koki kinen [Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions: Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthday]*. Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten.


____. 1994. "Once Again on Patañjali's Definition of a Word (Studies in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya V)." *WZKS* 38:173-89.

Yuddhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka. 1973. *Saṃskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā itihāsa [History of Sanskrit grammar]*. Sonipat: Ram Lal Kapur Trust.

____, trans. 1977-86. *Śabara's Jaiminīyamīmāṃsābhāṣya with Hindi explanation called ārṣamata-vimarśinī*. 5 vols. Bahālagaḍha (Sonīpat-Harayāṇā): Ram Lal Kapur Trust, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1986.

Index






ISBN 0-87169-863-3
9 780871 698636